State v. Glover

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50509

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 4, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
TERRENCE ENGLE GLOVER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for felony driving under the influence, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Terrence Engle Glover appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony driving under
the influence. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During a traffic stop, Glover provided a breath alcohol sample which indicated he was
driving under the influence. Glover was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol (DUI). The State then amended the complaint and charged Glover with felony
DUI based upon his prior convictions within fifteen years. Glover moved to remand the case back
to the magistrate court, arguing that there were no prior DUIs that would permit the enhancement
of his current charge to a felony. Glover argued that the Oklahoma DUI statute he had previously

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been convicted under did not substantially conform with Idaho’s DUI statute. The district court
denied Glover’s motion, finding that Oklahoma’s DUI statute was substantially conforming to
Idaho’s DUI statute. Glover subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, I.C.
§ 18-8004(1)(a), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to remand. Glover appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a question of law to be
determined by the court. I.C. § 18-8005(10). The construction and application of a statute is also
a question of law. State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 451, 313 P.3d 777, 779 (Ct. App. 2013). Over
questions of law, we exercise free review. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122
(1990).
III.
ANALYSIS
Glover contends the district court erred in denying his motion to remand his felony DUI to
magistrate court to be prosecuted as a misdemeanor because his previous DUI convictions under
the Oklahoma statute do not substantially conform to Idaho’s DUI statutes. Specifically, Glover
argues there are five differences between Oklahoma’s DUI statute and Idaho’s DUI statute that
make them substantively different. First, Glover argues that the Oklahoma DUI statute
criminalizes driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while being
under the influence, whereas Idaho’s DUI statute does not include “operating” and only
criminalizes driving and being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while being under the
influence. Second, the Oklahoma statute allows analysis of the motorist’s blood, breath, saliva or
urine, whereas the Idaho statute only authorizes analysis of blood, breath, or urine. Third, the
Oklahoma statute requires that an evidentiary test be collected within two hours of the arrest for
that test to be admissible, whereas Idaho has no similar requirement. Fourth, the Oklahoma statute
criminalizes driving when a driver’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is above 0.05 if there is
also evidence that the person’s ability to operate the vehicle was affected by alcohol to the extent
that the person threatened public health and safety. However, the blood alcohol concentration
threshold for prosecution in Idaho is above 0.08. Fifth, the Oklahoma statute criminalizes driving
while having any amount of a Schedule 1 chemical or controlled substance in the driver’s system,

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whereas Idaho criminalizes driving while being under the influence of drugs or any other
intoxicating substance. The State argues that the district court did not err in denying Glover’s
motion to remand after concluding that Oklahoma’s DUI statute substantially conforms to Idaho’s
DUI statute for the purpose of the felony DUI enhancement. We hold that Oklahoma’s DUI statute
substantially conforms with Idaho’s DUI statute and that Glover has failed to show the district
court erred in denying his motion to remand.
A DUI charge may be enhanced from a misdemeanor offense to a felony offense if, within
the past fifteen years, the defendant has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony violation
from another state that is substantially conforming to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8004. I.C.
§ 18-8005(9); Juarez, 155 Idaho at 450, 313 P.3d at 778. In determining whether a foreign DUI
statute substantially conforms to Idaho’s DUI statute, the focus of the comparison is on the
elements of the respective statutes and not the specific conduct giving rise to the prior violation.
Juarez, 155 Idaho at 451, 313 P.3d at 779. Substantial conformity does not require exact
correspondence between the two statutes. Id. A foreign statute may be substantially conforming
even though it encompasses conduct that would not be illegal in Idaho. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho
887, 898, 231 P.3d 532, 543 (Ct. App. 2010). Despite Idaho’s statute requiring different BAC
requirements than Oklahoma and other states, the statutes prohibit the same conduct--driving under
the influence of alcohol. See State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 804, 172 P.3d 555, 559 (Ct. App.
2007). Substantial conformity ultimately occurs when comparing whether both statutes prohibit
the same essential conduct and frame their prohibitions using similar language. Juarez, 155 Idaho
at 452, 313 P.3d at 780.
As noted, Glover has identified five differences between Idaho’s statute and the Oklahoma
statute pursuant to which he was previously convicted. Although the phrasing in the two statutes
includes some differences, exact correspondence in language is not required. Thus, Glover’s
reliance on nonsubstantive language differences between the two statutes does not establish that
the statutes are not substantially conforming.
Glover’s reliance on the two-hour evidentiary testing period required for admissibility in
Oklahoma, which does not exist in Idaho, is also not a substantive difference. See Juarez, 155
Idaho at 452, 313 P.3d at 780. The same is true for the differing BAC requirements between the

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two statutes. Regardless of the number, the BAC element prohibits the same conduct--driving
under the influence of alcohol as reflected by a certain alcohol concentration level.
Glover’s final argument relying on the Oklahoma DUI statute’s per se requirement for
Schedule 1 drugs compared to Idaho’s less specific drug-based DUI also fails because both statutes
prohibit the same essential conduct. See Juarez, 155 Idaho at 453, 313 P.3d at 781. Additionally,
both statutes frame their prohibition using similar language, making it clear that driving while
under the influence is illegal. Glover has failed to show that the Oklahoma DUI statute is not
substantially conforming to Idaho’s DUI statute.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Glover has failed to show that Oklahoma’s DUI statute is not substantially conforming
with respect to Idaho’s DUI statute for purposes of using a conviction pursuant to the Oklahoma
DUI statute to enhance his DUI in Idaho. Accordingly, Glover’s judgment of conviction for felony
DUI is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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