State of Iowa v. D'iona Asia Marie Wilson-Bass

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1674
Filed April 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

D'IONA ASIA MARIE WILSON-BASS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J. Dryer,

Judge.

D’iona Wilson-Bass appeals the revocation of her probation and the

sentence imposed. AFFIRMED.

Stuart G. Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers and Kyle Hanson (until

withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

D’iona Wilson-Bass appeals the revocation of her deferred judgment and

the sentence imposed. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Wilson-Bass pled guilty to intimidation with a dangerous weapon after

admitting that she “having the intent to injure or provoke fear or anger in another,

discharge[d] a handgun, within an assembly of people, thereby placing others in

reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” The court then granted Wilson-Bass

a deferred judgment and placed her on probation. The order for deferred judgment

explained, “Upon violation of the terms of probation, the court will enter a judgment

of guilt and sentence” her.

Wilson-Bass violated the terms of her probation two months later when she

tested positive for methamphetamine. The court did not revoke probation but did

place her in the Swift, Certain, and Fair Program. Wilson-Bass did not complete

drug testing ordered by the Swift program—again violating her probation. In

response, the court kept Wilson-Bass on probation but imposed a contempt

sanction. A couple of weeks later, Wilson-Bass again violated her probation by

again failing to complete drug testing and failing to meet with her probation officer.

In response, the court modified Wilson-Bass’s probation and placed her at

Pathways Residential Treatment center. Wilson-Bass walked out of Pathways the

day after she arrived. The court again modified Wilson-Bass’s probation and

ordered her placement at the Waterloo Women’s Center for Change. Within days,

Wilson-Bass left the center, refusing to comply with the center’s rules, and did not
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return—resulting in an April 4, 2022 report of violation. In response, the State

charged Wilson-Bass with voluntary absence, and Wilson-Bass pled guilty.

The court held a joint hearing to address Wilson-Bass’s April 4 probation

violations and sentencing for the voluntary absence conviction. At the hearing, the

State provided testimony from Wilson-Bass’s probation officer, who detailed

Wilson-Bass’s historical inability to comply with the terms of her probation. The

court then explained to Wilson-Bass, “we’re not here just for one probation

violation. You had probation violations,” and detailed her past failures to comply

with various programs and services. The court then revoked the deferred

judgment, adjudicated Wilson-Bass guilty of intimidation with a dangerous

weapon, and imposed a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years with no

mandatory minimum. The court imposed a 180-day sentence on the voluntary

absence conviction to run consecutively.

Wilson-Bass appeals. She claims the court improperly believed “it was

convened for the purposes of not only the April 4th report of violation but also for

prior probation violations.”

II. Standard of Review

“We will overturn a revocation of probation only if there has been an abuse

of discretion.” State v. Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted).

When an imposed sentence is within the statutory limits, we likewise review for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020).

“Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption

in their favor.” Id. at 385–86 (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs

when the court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that are clearly
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untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019).

“However, it is the defendant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the

sentencing court relied on an improper factor.” State v. Canady, ___ N.W.3d ___,

___, 2024 WL 1221420, at *10 (Iowa 2024).

III. Discussion

Wilson-Bass’s claim is two-fold: that the district court improperly considered

her past probation violations (1) when adjudicating the probation revocation and

(2) when imposing sentence following revocation of the deferred judgment of

probation.

A. Adjudication of the probation revocation

We begin by addressing the adjudication of the probation revocation. At the

outset and contrary to Wilson-Bass’s assertions, nothing in the record establishes

that the district court believed it was tasked with adjudicating anything more than

the April 4 report of violation. Its references to prior violations were made only to

consider what services or programs Wilson-Bass already tried unsuccessfully.

“The district court has broad discretion in determining whether probation

should be continued or revoked.” Covel, 925 N.W.2d at 188. Revocation

proceedings are a two-step process. Id. at 187. First, the court determines

“whether the person has acted in violation of one or more conditions of his or her

probation.” Id. If so, then the court determines “whether the person should be

committed to prison or whether the court should take other steps to protect society

and improve changes of rehabilitation.” Id.

Wilson-Bass admitted to committing two probation violations identified in

the April 4 report of violations “by being voluntarily absent from the facility and by
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failing to follow the rules and regulations at the facility,” satisfying the first step.

That left the court with the task of determining whether Wilson-Bass should

continue with probation with or without an alteration of the conditions of probation;

hold Wilson-Bass in contempt of court; order Wilson-Bass to a violator facility while

continuing probation; extend her probation; or because she was granted a deferred

judgment, impose any sentence that may have been originally imposed. See Iowa

Code § 908.11(4) (2022).

When making that determination, the court properly considered Wilson-

Bass’s past experiences and performance with different probation programing to

decide what would best serve her and the community. See State v. Sims,

No. 19-0316, 2020 WL 1879706, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (concluding

the court properly considered a defendant’s conduct following a prior revocation

hearing); cf. Iowa Code § 907.5 (identifying factors for the district court to consider

when determining whether to defer judgment). This helped inform the court what

conditions and services Wilson-Bass would likely respond to and comply with by

identifying what has not worked. Given the fact that Wilson-Bass had already

failed to comply with multiple alternatives to revocation, the record does not reflect

that the court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without adequate information. See

State v. Hughes, 200 N.W.2d 559,562 (Iowa 1972) (recognizing that our decisions

clearly indicate “that probation cannot be revoked arbitrarily, capriciously, or

without any information”). We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

when it decided to revoke probation and impose judgment.
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B. Sentencing

We move on to the second component of Wilson-Bass’s claim, that the

district court abused its discretion during sentencing because it erroneously

considered her prior probation violations and failed to consider mitigating factors.

“[I]t is the defendant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the sentencing court

relied on an improper factor.” Canady, ___ N.W.3d at ___, 2024 WL 1221420,

at *10. Wilson-Bass cannot satisfy this burden. No factor relied on by the district

court amounted to an improper factor. The court considered Wilson-Bass’s young

age and her substance-abuse and mental-health needs—permissible sentencing

factors and indicia that the district court exercised individualized sentencing

discretion. And the court properly considered her past failures at community

supervision in a variety of settings. Doing so aided the court in selecting a

sentence that would “provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of [Wilson-

Bass], and for the protection of the community from further offenses by [Wilson-

Bass] and others.” See Iowa Code § 901.5. We understand that Wilson-Bass

implies that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider all pertinent

sentencing factors, specifically her role as a mother and the death of her own

mother. We acknowledge the significance of her child and the loss of a parent;

however, the court was not required to discuss or reference the mitigating factors

it considered. Instead it “need only explain its reasons for selecting the sentence

imposed.” State v. Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1989). Because we find

nothing improper in the court’s sentencing rationale, we do not disturb it.

AFFIRMED.