State of Iowa v. Megan Renee Sunderman

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1610
Filed June 10, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Megan Renee Sunderman,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County,
The Honorable Jennifer Benson Bahr, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Krisanne C. Weimer of Weimer Law, PC, Council Bluffs,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

In February 2025, Megan Sunderman received a deferred judgment
following her guilty plea to one count of possessing methamphetamine with
the intent to deliver—a class “C” felony. Less than one month into her term
of probation, Sunderman stopped communicating with her probation officer,
did not report to the probation office, and refused to sign her probation
agreement. After absconding for approximately three months, Sunderman
was arrested and a probation revocation hearing was held. Finding
Sunderman was not amenable to probation and had materially violated the
terms of her deferred judgment, the district court revoked the deferred
judgment and imposed the underlying ten-year sentence of incarceration.
Sunderman appeals.1 We affirm.

Sunderman first argues the district court erred when it revoked her
deferred judgment. We review the revocation of a deferred judgment for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019). In
Covel, our supreme court articulated the analysis for probation revocations:
The district court is to apply a straightforward two-step analysis for
revocation decisions. The first step is determining whether the person has
acted in violation of one or more conditions of his or her probation. If the
court determines the person violated his or her probation, the second step
is determining whether the person should be committed to prison or
whether the court should take other steps to protect society and improve
chances of rehabilitation.

Id. at 187–88 (citations omitted). Here, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that a probation revocation was
1
As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached
pursuant to a plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025). We find there is good
cause for appeal because Sunderman is challenging her discretionary sentence rather than
the guilty plea. See State v. Boldon, 954 N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021).

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warranted in this case. Sunderman did not cooperate with the terms of
probation agreement. In fact, Sunderman never signed the agreement at all
and immediately absconded from probation. We agree with the district court
when it noted Sunderman “made no real effort to comply.” Therefore, we
find no abuse of discretion in the district court finding Sunderman violated
the terms of her probation agreement.

Next Sunderman argues the district court should have suspended her
sentence in favor of probation. A sentencing “court shall state on the record
the basis for the sentence imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The
sentencing court weighs “the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the
chances of reform” against the defendant’s criminal history, family
circumstances, and the societal goals of sentencing. State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). The district court’s reasons
for a particular sentence may be “terse and succinct” if “the reasons for the
exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record
before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015). The
district court “has broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines is
best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.” State v. West
Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the district court stated:
Ms. Sunderman, as I stated, the charge to which you pled guilty is serious.
Probation is a final opportunity to prove that you can comply instead of
incarceration. You failed to take advantage of that opportunity, and

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accordingly I am going to impose the original sentence of ten years’
incarceration.

I don’t take any pleasure in sending anyone to prison, especially a
person such as yourself with young children who wants to get their life back
on the straight and narrow; however, I do believe that a sentence of
incarceration will provide you with the maximum opportunity to do so. It
will provide you further distance from the people that are bad influences
on you and, as I said, I believe that you’re simply not amenable to
probation, especially given the prior cases in Nebraska for failure to appear.
You failed to cooperate with your probation officer in this case.

So for purposes of your rehabilitation and the safety of the
community, I am going to sentence you to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed ten years.

Here, among the district court’s considerations were the “maximum
opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of
the community from further offenses by the defendant.” See Iowa Code
§ 901.5. The district court further weighed Sunderman’s age, environmental
characteristics, prior performance on probation, and her likelihood of success
on further probation. Because the district court appropriately weighed these
factors and concluded a carceral sentence was most appropriate for
Sunderman’s situation, we will not substitute our judgment on appeal. See
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724–25. Accordingly, we affirm Sunderman’s
sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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