United Properties Investment Company, L.C. v. Moore

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0497
Filed June 10, 2026
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United Properties Investment Company, L.C. and Echo Valley
Investment Company, L.C.,
Plaintiffs–Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
Bryan Kratzer and Becki Moore,
Defendants–Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
and
Maxwell Midwest Holding Company, LLC,
Defendant/Cross-Appellee.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County,
The Honorable Terry Rickers, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON APPEAL IN PART AND REMANDED TO
CONSIDER TRIAL ATTORNEY FEES; AFFIRMED ON CROSS
APPEAL
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Alan R. Ostergren (argued) of Alan R. Ostergren, PC, Des Moines, attorney
for appellants/cross-appellees.

William M. Reasoner (argued) of Dickinson, Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen,
P.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellees/cross-appellants.

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Diana Kenney (argued) and Kate M. Simon of Dentons Davis Brown PC,
Ames, attorneys for cross-appellee Maxwell Midwest Holding
Company, LLC.
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Heard at oral argument
by Buller, P.J., Sandy, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Presiding Judge.

Two homeowners appeal from a ruling finding they violated restrictive
covenants in the construction of an outbuilding1 in their yard abutting a golf
course. They also appeal a $100-per-day payment and trial-attorney-fee
award flowing from the covenants. The developers cross-appeal dismissal of
the legal title holder from the suit and request appellate attorney fees.
Because we are a court of correction of errors at law and limited to deciding
preserved errors, we affirm the ruling. We reverse the trial-attorney-fees
award in part and remand with directions, and we separately award appellate
attorney fees.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Bryan Kratzer and Becki Moore are homeowners in The Ridge at Echo
Valley development in Norwalk, where their home abuts the Echo Valley golf
course. The development and the golf course are interrelated, with the
former owned by United Properties Investment Company, L.C. and the latter
by Echo Valley Investment Company, L.C. (collectively “UPI”). Kratzer and
Moore contracted to purchase their home from Maxwell Midwest
Properties, LLC (Maxwell) in April 2020, which continues to hold legal title.
The development properties are bound by a Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (the covenants) aimed at
maintaining the development and golf course’s property value and
desirability.

Many of the covenants require homeowners to receive express
approval for “any and all improvements” from the development’s

1
There is debate in the record about what exactly to call this structure; attorneys
and litigants used terms including “shed,” “bar structure,” and “saloon.”

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architectural review committee (ARC) created under the covenants’
Article 6.02. The ARC has a quorum requirement of three members. The
ARC is also authorized to consult architects, engineers, urban designers, and
attorneys as necessary to fulfill its duties. Scott McMurray is the manager of
development construction and special projects for UPI. McMurray, in
practice, runs the ARC along with fellow committee member (and United
Properties owner) Michael Coppola. Depending on the proposal, the ARC
will sometimes involve outside engineering or landscape firms to review
projects.

Among other things, homeowners in the development are restricted
from:

 Constructing temporary structures lacking permanent
foundation except for specified social functions;

 Constructing any improvements unless plans and specifications
are submitted and approved by the ARC;

 Violating applicable set-back limits when constructing any
improvement;

 Displaying signs or advertisements without express permission
of the ARC; and

 Distracting or diminishing the playing quality at the golf course.

The plat map has a fifty-foot building set-back requirement for any property
abutting the golf course. Otherwise, the rear building setback is thirty-five
feet. The covenants also empower UPI to charge “reasonable monetary fines
which shall constitute an equitable charge and a continuing lien upon the

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Lot” or “move for any injunction which the Board deems appropriate and
reasonable” to enforce any property owner to comply under Article 7.02.

In July 2021, Kratzer displayed political signage at his property.
McMurray informed him that his signs were prohibited under the covenants,
and Kratzer took the signage down within a week or two. McMurray testified
that, between 2021 and trial, Kratzer periodically displayed political flags and
signage with profanity and at least arguably threatening overtones, such as a
Confederate battle flag with a Colt AR-15 reading “Come and Take It.” In
August 2022, McMurray discovered that Kratzer was building a structure
behind his property facing the golf cart path. Shortly after learning about the
construction, McMurray informed Kratzer that the outbuilding did not
comply with the covenants because it was too close to the golf course and the
planned structure needed to be submitted to the ARC for approval. Kratzer,
despite being repeatedly informed of the violations and receiving a cease-and-
desist letter from UPI’s attorney, continued to construct the outbuilding and
declined to contact McMurray or otherwise submit his construction to the
ARC for approval.

In April 2023, UPI filed suit against Kratzer and Moore over the
violations and their continued work on the outbuilding. UPI also sued
Maxwell as the legal title holder, having previously copied Maxwell on the
cease-and-desist letter to Kratzer. UPI also encouraged Maxwell to influence
Kratzer to comply with the covenants, warning that its interest as “fee
holder” may be implicated. While the court case was pending, Kratzer
completed the outbuilding. At some point, Kratzer and Moore erected a
separate pre-cut shed on their property—another alleged violation of the
covenants.

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In late April 2024, after apparently receiving documents from UPI,
Kratzer put up more political signage and flags, some of which was vulgar or
profane—a “Fuck Biden” flag, a “Piss on Biden” sign, and a spray-painted
sign reading “FU E.V.[2 ] NOT TEARING THIS DOWN” behind his
property and facing the golf course. The golf course received complaints
from its members, and UPI avoided scheduling tournament play or touring
prospective members around the golf holes near Kratzer and Moore’s
property because of the signage. On May 10, 2024, UPI’s attorney sent
Kratzer a letter informing him that it would be levying $1,000 per day for the
ongoing violations relating to the outbuilding and the signage. Afterward,
Kratzer removed some but not all the signage.

A bench trial was held in June 2024. UPI offered photo evidence of
Kratzer and Moore’s fifty-foot setback violation but did not present a
traditional land survey. In his testimony, Kratzer admitted that he measured
the set-back distance and found that it was twenty feet on one side and
twenty-seven feet on the other. He claimed that McMurray gave him verbal
permission to build so long as the outbuilding was set back at least eighteen
to twenty feet. McMurray testified that his comments were misconstrued,
and the district court found McMurray more credible than Kratzer.

The court found that Kratzer and Moore violated multiple covenants.
The court also ordered Kratzer and Moore to pay UPI $100 per day effective
May 10, 2024, with all fees aggregated as an equitable charge and continuing
lien until the property was in full compliance; ordered both the outbuilding
and other infringing shed to be deconstructed; and ordered Kratzer and
Moore to pay UPI’s reasonable attorney fees. The district court also granted

2
The court below understood this to mean “FUCK YOU ECHO VALLEY,” and
we also find that to be the natural reading.

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Maxwell’s motion to be dismissed from the case, finding that Maxwell lacked
any possessory interest in the property as a contract vendee.

Kratzer and Moore appeal, and UPI cross-appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case was tried in equity. Our review is de novo, though we give
weight to the district court’s fact findings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Brede v.
Koop, 706 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Iowa 2005). And, “because the district court
had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, we do give
deference to those findings.” State v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 440
(Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
Kratzer and Moore make several challenges. They argue the ARC
lacked a quorum, making it impossible for them to comply with the covenants
and thus excusing their obligation to get approval before construction. Next,
they argue that UPI failed to prove Kratzer and Moore committed a set-back
violation. Then, they argue the district court exceeded its equitable authority
by ordering them to pay UPI $100 per day until Kratzer and Moore complied
with the covenants. Finally, Kratzer and Moore dispute the court’s award of
attorney fees. Separately, UPI cross-appeals the district court’s dismissal of
Maxwell from the case and requests appellate attorney fees under the
covenants.

We take each party’s arguments in turn, considering error
preservation along the way.

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I. Doctrines of Impossibility and Impracticality

On appeal, Kratzer and Moore argue they weren’t obligated to seek
approval of the ARC before constructing the outbuilding because the
committee lacked a quorum of members. They argue that it was impossible
or impractical to comply, even if they had tried.

But that argument was not developed below. Our error-preservation
rules require that, to preserve error on an issue, a party must raise the issue
and obtain a ruling on it from the district court. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). And that did not happen here, as the court
below noted when it observed: “Although Article 6.03 of the Covenants
requires a minimum of three persons serving on the Committee, no party
raised that issue during trial.” We agree. We find the issue was not raised and
decided, implicitly or explicitly, and we do not consider this issue further.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Kratzer and Moore argued that UPI failed to prove the outbuilding
construction violated the set-back provision. Specifically, they argue that the
applicable set-back distance was twenty feet—not fifty, as argued and
accepted by the district court below.

To support their contention about the set-back distance, Kratzer and
Moore point to allegedly irregular set-back lines on the plat map and suggest
that this irregularity indicates not all lot set-back lines abutting the golf course
require fifty feet, only those near a golf hole—meaning the outbuilding
should be subject to a thirty-five-foot rear setback. Kratzer and Moore also
argue that a use-restriction exception requires set-back requirements for
accessory buildings to be set back only twenty feet. But they failed to make

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this contention below, and it is another unpreserved issue we cannot reach.
See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537.

The district court accepted the uncontradicted testimony of
McMurray that the setback abutting the golf course is fifty feet. And, even if
we considered the argument, the exception Kratzer and Moore rely on is
limited:
“In-ground” pools shall be permitted provided that they have proper
Municipal Code fencing and are set back not less than 20 feet from the
Golf Course property. . . . Detached garages (in addition to the required
three car attached garage) shall be permitted provided they are in harmony
with the main dwelling and are set back not less than 20 feet from the Golf
Course property.

This provision doesn’t include a general exception to the set-back
requirements for all accessory buildings, only detached garages and
in-ground swimming pools. Even if we credited Kratzer and Moore’s
argument the thirty-five-foot set-back applied, Kratzer admitted—and the
court credited—that the outbuilding was exactly twenty feet from the lot line.
On our de novo review, we find UPI proved Kratzer and Moore violated the
set-back covenant.

III. $100-per-day payment

Kratzer and Moore next argue that the district court exceeded its
authority by ordering a $100-per-day payment from Kratzer and Moore to
UPI under the covenants until Kratzer and Moore are fully compliant.
Kratzer and Moore argue that a district court sitting in equity cannot order a
penalty untethered to a loss suffered by the breach, and that the covenants’
“reasonable monetary fine” language is an unenforceable penalty.

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Kratzer and Moore correctly admit error was not preserved on this
issue at trial or through a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.904(2). They instead claim that error preservation is
inapplicable because “the illegality of the fine” constitutes “a void
sentence.” In support, Kratzer and Moore cite contempt case law: Wilson v.
Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524, 528–29, overruled on other grounds by Ervin v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 495 N.W.3d 742, 745 (Iowa 1993). We find that precedent
inapplicable because this is neither a criminal nor contempt case. Kratzer and
Moore have not supplied any authority applying illegal-sentence principles
from those arenas to this kind of breach-of-contract dispute, and we are aware
of none. Cf. id. We apply our general principles of error preservation and find
no reviewable issue. See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537.

IV. Trial-Attorney Fees

Kratzer and Moore’s final issue is that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding UPI $24,000 in attorney fees under a lien and
obligation provision in the covenants. They level six grounds as to why: the
billing contained redactions, some entries related to Maxwell, the time billed
included work on a never-filed motion for preliminary injunction, the entries
included discussions with Norwalk public officials, the bill included
preparing a no-trespassing notice to Kratzer for UPI properties, and they
billed for responding to a media inquiry. Kratzer and Moore assert we should
reduce the award by more than $8,200.

An award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Robinson v. Cent. Iowa Power Coop., 21 N.W.3d 842, 854 (Iowa 2025). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s ruling is based on grounds that are
unreasonable or untenable or when the record lacks substantial evidence to
support the court’s conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up). “An applicant for attorney

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fees has the burden to prove that the services were reasonably necessary and
that the charges were reasonable in amount.” Schaffer v. Frank Moyer Constr.,
Inc., 628 N.W.2d 11, 23 (Iowa 2001). When assessing attorney fee awards, it
is appropriate for the district court to consider:
[T]he time necessarily spent, the nature and extent of the service, the
amount involved, the difficulty of handling and importance of the issues,
the responsibility assumed and results obtained, the standing and
experience of the attorney in the profession, and the customary charges for
similar service.

Additionally, the district court must look at the whole picture and,
using independent judgment with the benefit of hindsight, decide on a total
fee appropriate for handling the complete case.

Id. at 24 (cleaned up). The district court is “in an ideal position to judge the
necessity of time and effort spent by counsel and the rationality of the
relationship between services rendered and the causes of action and other
matters involved in this case.” Id. (cleaned up).

After Kratzer and Moore moved to enlarge findings under Iowa Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), the district court explained that it presumed
redactions in UPI’s billings were necessary to preserve attorney-client
privileged information and not in bad faith, that the billing for actions relating
to third-party Maxwell was justified because Maxwell’s inclusion in the case
was a consequence of Kratzer and Moore’s conduct, and that the not-filed
preliminary injunction was a potential means of relief considered by UPI as
a “direct result of actions of Kratzer and Moore.” The court concluded that
its “de minimus reduction of the fee claim in the amount of $413.25 was
motivated by the court’s desire to impose a supersedeas bond amount that
adequately and reasonably compensated the Plaintiffs while keeping the bond
at a round number.” On our review, we do not disagree with any of these
findings.

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However, we also find that the district court failed to address all of
Kratzer and Moore’s arguments on this issue, despite the motion to enlarge.
Specifically, we discern no ruling on the issues relating to the billing entries
for trespass, the discussion with Norwalk public officials, or the media
inquiry. We find the record inadequate for us to decide those issues in the
first instance. As a result, we remand with directions for the district court to
address those issues. Based upon its findings on those legal questions, the
district shall modify its fee award (or not) accordingly.

V. Motion to Dismiss Maxwell

UPI cross-appeals, arguing that, since Maxwell was legal title holder,
the district court should not have dismissed Maxwell from the suit. UPI
argues that its requested relief—monetary charges and removal of the
outbuilding—may become a continuing lien under the covenants. And if UPI
foreclosed its lien, that would necessarily impact Maxwell’s interest in the
property despite not having a possessory interest.

But longstanding precedent holds that Maxwell’s interest is not
implicated by Kratzer and Moore’s violations of the covenants:
It has been held repeatedly by this court that when a landowner
enters into a contract of sale whereby the purchaser agrees to buy, and the
owner to sell, and whereby the vendor retains the legal title until the
purchase money or some part thereof be paid, the ownership of the real
estate, as such, passes to the purchaser, and that from such time forth the
vendor holds the legal title as security for a debt and as trustee for the
purchaser. The interest acquired by the vendee is “land,” and the right and
interest conferred by the contract upon the vendor is “personal property.”
. . . . A judgment against the vendee would become a lien on the land,
inferior, of course, to the rights of the vendor.

Junkin v. McClain, 265 N.W. 362, 365 (Iowa 1936) (citation omitted). And a
“vendor’s security interest under an installment land sale contract, like the

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interest created by a purchase-money mortgage, protects the vendor’s . . .
property rights from being appropriated by creditors of the vendee . . . .”
92A C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 515 (2026) (footnote omitted). On our de
novo review, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Maxwell from the
lawsuit.

VI. Appellate-Attorney Fees and Costs

UPI seeks appellate attorney fees under the covenants, as well as
appellate costs. We dispose of the second first. Given UPI’s victory on most
substantive issues, our narrow remand on the trial-attorney-fee question, and
our rejection of UPI’s cross-appeal, we assess costs on appeal 80% to Kratzer
and Moore, 20% to UPI, and 0% to Maxwell.

As for appellate attorney fees, we observe UPI requested them in its
appellee’s brief under the covenants’ lien and obligation provision.
See Bankers Tr. Co. v. Woltz, 326 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Iowa 1982) (concluding
the fee-shifting provisions that are not expressly limited to trial-attorney fees
also apply to appellate-attorney fees). We appreciate that UPI promptly filed
an affidavit detailing its appellate attorney fees after oral argument. See In re
Marriage of Samuels da Fonseca Silva, 15 N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2024) (expressing our preference “that parties requesting appellate fees
do so in their briefs and submit an attorney-fee affidavit immediately after
oral argument”). Kratzer and Moore did not file a written resistance to the
request for appellate attorney fees.

UPI requests a total of $14,195 in appellate attorney fees and costs. We
have carefully reviewed its fee affidavit, which includes appellate costs and
fees related to enforcing the judgment below. The former are addressed by
our ruling on costs in the first paragraph of this division. See In re Romig’s
Marriage, 207 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Iowa 1973). We do not find the latter

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recoverable as appellate attorney fees, so we deny them without prejudice to
UPI requesting those fees from the district court in the first instance. Where
UPI’s billing entries include a mix of appellate and judgment-enforcement
fees, we have proportionally reduced the line items. After exercising our
discretion, we order Kratzer and Moore to pay UPI $12,717.25 in appellate
attorney fees.

DISPOSITION
We affirm the district court ruling in all aspects but one: we remand to
the district court for the limited purpose of addressing the trial-attorney fees
issues as explained in this above. We separately order Kratzer and Moore to
pay UPI $12,717.25 in appellate attorney fees. We assess costs on appeal 80%
to Kratzer and Moore, 20% to UPI, and 0% to Maxwell.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL IN PART AND REMANDED TO
CONSIDER TRIAL ATTORNEY FEES; AFFIRMED ON CROSS
APPEAL.

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