State of Iowa v. Martavius Lamon Green

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0440
Filed May 13, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Martavius Lamon Green,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Joseph Seidlin, Judge.
_______________

APPEAL DISMISSED
_______________

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., West Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

1
TABOR, Chief Judge.

On the fourth day of his murder trial, Martavius Green accepted a deal.
He pleaded guilty to burglary in the first degree and voluntary manslaughter.
The court imposed a prison sentence and suspended the fine associated with
that second count. Green now seeks resentencing, arguing it was illegal for
the court to suspend the fine. Because he fails to show good cause to
challenge the sentence, we dismiss his appeal.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In September 2024, Green visited family in Iowa and stayed in their
home. After an argument, he left their house and reentered with a handgun.
Green then shot and killed his cousin.

The State charged him with murder in the first degree. His case went
before a jury. But mid-trial, Green pleaded guilty to lesser offenses. In court,
Green’s counsel detailed the terms of the deal. In exchange for the State’s
amended trial information, Green agreed to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and burglary in the first degree. Iowa Code §§ 707.4, 713.1,
713.3(1) (2024). The agreed-to prison terms were twenty-five years for
burglary and ten years for voluntary manslaughter, to run consecutively.
Green also agreed to the five-year dangerous weapon enhancement under
Iowa Code section 902.7 for both counts, so his sentence included a ten-year
mandatory minimum.

The parties also addressed the fine associated with his voluntary
manslaughter conviction. Green’s counsel stated, “We haven’t made an
agreement regarding fines, but we would assume that under the
circumstances that the fines would be suspended.” The State responded,
“[W]e would not object to it being suspended due to his incarceration.” After

2
that back and forth, the court asked Green if the attorneys stated the
agreement correctly. Green responded, “Yes.”

At Green’s sentencing hearing, the parties again agreed to suspend the
fine, and the court sentenced Green in accordance with the plea agreement.
The court assessed a fine of $1,370 with a fifteen percent surcharge, which
the court suspended due to his incarceration.

Green appeals his sentence.

II. Analysis

Green anchors his appeal on the partial dissent in State v. Laue, No. 23-
0208, 2023 WL 8448475, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Ahlers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argues his sentence is illegal
because Iowa Code sections 901.5(3) and 907.3(3) do not permit courts to
suspend fines based on incarceration. The State pushes back, emphasizing
that our supreme court has not accepted the partial dissent as correct.

Before we reach the merits, we must determine whether Green has
good cause to appeal. Under Iowa Code section 814.6, we lack jurisdiction to
review a sentence arising from a plea agreement on anything above a simple
misdemeanor unless the defendant establishes good cause or the crime is for
a class “A” felony. The statute does not define good cause, but our supreme
court described it as “a legally sufficient reason to appeal.” State v. Damme,
944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). “A legally sufficient reason is a ground that
potentially would afford the appellant relief.” State v. Hidlebaugh, 32 N.W.3d
783, 790 (Iowa 2026). Caselaw continues to refine that definition.

Good cause exists to challenge a sentence when the sentence “was
neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d
at 100. Even if the sentence imposed matches the recommendation in the

3
plea agreement, a defendant can still show good cause if there is a sentencing
error outside the scope of the plea agreement. Hidlebaugh, 32 N.W.3d at 791.
But the supreme court has not decided if the same is true when the plea
agreement binds the district court to a sentence under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.10(3) Id.

Here, Green contends he has good cause to appeal because he did not
agree to the fine and surcharge in the plea agreement. The State disagrees,
pointing out that Green’s counsel brought up the suspension of fines, the
State did not object, and Green affirmed that he understood the plea
agreement.

From our reading, Green agreed to the suspended fine. Green and the
State entered the plea agreement under rule 2.10(3).1 Because he agreed to
the sentence, which was binding on the court, he cannot show good cause.
See State v. Jones, No. 25-1258, 2026 WL 892816, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. April
1, 2026).

Green fails to show good cause, so we lack jurisdiction and dismiss his
appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

1
In court, Green and the State requested the plea agreement be binding on the
court. The district court then asked Green, “So you understand, Mr. Green, that part of
the plea agreement here is, is that I would have to agree to be bound by the agreement
that’s just been announced?” Green answered, “Yes.”

4