State of Iowa v. Monte Dean Neubauer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0586
Filed April 29, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Monte Dean Neubauer,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,
The Honorable Karen Kaufman Salic, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Nathan A. Olson of Branstad & Olson Law Office, Des Moines, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal turns less on what the district court denied than on what
the defendant declined. Despite receiving a continuance, advance notice of
the rescheduled hearing, and additional opportunities to confer with counsel
and present mitigating evidence, Monte Neubauer proceeded to sentencing
and now challenges both the process and the result. Finding no abuse of
discretion in either the denial of a further continuance or the imposition of
consecutive sentences, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Neubauer was charged in two separate Cerro Gordo County matters
arising from events occurring in November 2024. The State charged
Neubauer with eluding and driving while barred following an incident on
November 15. Law enforcement attempted to stop Neubauer while he was
operating a motor vehicle with a barred license. Neubauer did not
immediately stop but continued driving to his residence while generally
complying with traffic laws.

Less than two weeks later, on November 26, officers encountered
Neubauer in connection with outstanding probation-violation warrants.
During that encounter, a search of his person yielded a small quantity of
methamphetamine, leading to a charge of possession of a controlled
substance, third offense.

On February 4, 2025, Neubauer entered guilty pleas to possession of a
controlled substance, third offense, and eluding. As part of the resolution,
the State dismissed the driving-while-barred count in the earlier case. The
district court accepted his pleas and scheduled sentencing for March 4.

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Before sentencing, Neubauer moved to withdraw his guilty pleas and
stipulations related to probation violations. The district court set the matter
for hearing and, upon request, granted a continuance to allow additional
preparation following the filing of the presentence investigation report. The
hearing was scheduled for March 10.

At the hearing, Neubauer withdrew his motion to withdraw his pleas
but requested an additional continuance, citing limited preparation time,
recent schedule changes, and the unavailability of witnesses he intended to
present at sentencing. The State resisted further delay, noting the matter had
been pending and that the defense had prior opportunity to prepare.

The district court initially considered a brief continuance but also
addressed concerns raised by Neubauer regarding counsel and preparation.
After a colloquy with the parties and opportunities to confer further with
counsel, the court proceeded with sentencing. At sentencing, the State
requested consecutive sentences and revocation of probation, including
terms of incarceration for the underlying offenses. Neubauer requested more
lenient dispositions, including time served on probation matters, a jail
sentence on the eluding conviction, and a suspended prison sentence on the
drug offense.

After considering the presentence investigation report, the parties’
recommendations, and the relevant sentencing factors, the district court
imposed consecutive sentences. The court sentenced Neubauer to an
indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years for possession of
a controlled substance, third offense. It imposed a ninety-day jail sentence for
eluding. The court ordered these sentences, along with additional probation-
revocation dispositions, to run consecutively.

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Neubauer appealed his sentence as to his convictions in both cases. He
subsequently moved to consolidate the appeals, and the supreme court
granted that motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s specific sentencing decision for abuse of
discretion. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). We will not disturb
a sentence unless the defendant proves an abuse of discretion or a defect in
the sentencing procedure occurred. State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678
(Iowa 1998). “An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on
grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v.
Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). Review of the
district court’s denial of a motion to continue is for abuse of discretion. See
State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Iowa 2000) (“The decision to grant or
deny a motion for continuance rests in the sound discretion of the [district
court] judge.”).

DISCUSSION
Neubauer raises two primary claims on appeal, both challenging the
district court’s exercise of discretion at sentencing.

First, he argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his
request to continue the sentencing hearing. He contends the last-minute
rescheduling of the hearing, coupled with counsel’s illness, heavy caseload,
and limited opportunity to confer, left him inadequately prepared. He further
asserts the denial prevented him from presenting mitigation evidence,
including testimony from family members and others, and that tensions
between himself and counsel impaired effective representation. We disagree.

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Because the trial court is in the best position to “sense whether a given
continuance motion stems from a legitimate need, or from a wish to delay,”
we are reticent to reverse its ruling on such motions, and absent an abuse of
discretion, will not do so. State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1992).
The court had already granted a continuance to allow additional preparation
following the presentence investigation report and provided several days’
notice of the rescheduled hearing. It reasonably concluded Neubauer had
sufficient opportunity to prepare and secure witnesses. When concerns were
raised at the hearing, the court offered additional accommodations—
including time to confer with counsel and the opportunity to present the
substance of anticipated witness testimony—but Neubauer declined to
utilize them. The denial of a further continuance was neither untenable nor
unreasonable. No abuse of discretion occurred.

Second, Neubauer argues the district court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive terms of incarceration rather than a more lenient,
treatment-oriented sentence. He maintains the record supports probation
with substance-use treatment, emphasizing his longstanding addiction,
family support, housing stability, and efforts toward rehabilitation. He
contends the court overstated his status as a danger to the public and failed
to give adequate weight to mitigating circumstances and less restrictive
sentencing alternatives.

A sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence
imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The sentencing court weighs “the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and
propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform” along with the
defendant’s criminal history, family circumstances, and the societal goals of
sentencing. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation

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omitted). The district court’s statement may be “terse and succinct” if “the
reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and
the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408
(Iowa 2015). The district court “has broad discretion to impose the sentence
it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”
State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the district court gave an explanation of its decision to
not suspend Neubauer’s sentence:
Mr. Neubauer, you have demonstrated an inability to comply with
the rules of the State of Iowa despite probation supervisions, the existence
of family and employer support, and a resistance to all efforts to rehabilitate
you. You just—we continue to have you violate the law, and it’s occurring
in an escalating manner, which is concerning. You’ve also been given the
opportunity many times through just court orders at least eight prior
attempts at substance-abuse treatment. You have not availed yourself of
that or sought any on your own, apparently, and it would be foolish to
believe that that’s going to change if you’re granted probation again. I do
note that you have been granted probation many times previously. That’s
been revoked a number of times. It does not appear that that’s going to be
any more successful at this time.

Upon our review, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing a carceral sentence. Each of the factors the district court
discussed is a proper sentencing factor. See Iowa Code § 901.5 (2025). Given
the sentence is based on proper factors and is sufficiently explained, we
discern no abuse of discretion. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 724. To the extent
that Neubauer asks us to reweigh the factors and grant him probation, we will

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not override the district court’s proper exercise of its discretion. See State v.
Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 2023).

AFFIRMED.

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