Hartig v. Property Assessment Appeal Board

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0618
Filed April 15, 2026
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Robert Hartig,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v.
Property Assessment Appeal Board,
Respondent–Appellee,
and
City of Dubuque Board of Review,
Intervenor-Appellee.
_______________

Appeal from Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Davin C. Curtiss of O’Connor & Thomas, P.C., Dubuque,
attorney for appellant.
Jessica Braunschweig-Norris and Bradley O. Hopkins,
attorneys for appellee.
Barry A. Lindahl, Dubuque, attorney for intervenor appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

1
BADDING, Judge.

Following limited success before three other tribunals, Robert Hartig
asks this court to take a fourth look at his challenge to a 2021 residential
property tax assessment. Hartig’s protest alleged his assessment was
inequitable compared to his neighbors, who he says saw slower increases and
more generous adjustments for their similar homes. The Property
Assessment Appeal Board (PAAB) rejected Hartig’s claims, finding his
assessment was equitable. The district court affirmed the board’s decision
on judicial review. The primary question before us on Hartig’s appeal from
that ruling is whether substantial evidence supported the board’s decision.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Robert Hartig owns a roughly 4,000-square-foot home on a one-acre
lot in a high-end Dubuque neighborhood. In 2021, the local assessor valued
Hartig’s property at $673,152—up from the previous year’s assessment of
$612,390 due to a roughly 11% increase in dwelling value. 1 Hartig filed a
pro se tax protest with the City of Dubuque Board of Review, challenging the
2021 assessment on inequity grounds. See Iowa Code § 441.37(1)(a)(1)(a)
(2021). Among other things, Hartig argued that the assessment ignored the
depreciating effect of the high-voltage transmission lines that cross his front
yard. The board of review reduced Hartig’s assessed dwelling value by
$18,722 on that basis.

Hartig wasn’t satisfied. He filed an appeal with the PAAB, asserting a
claim of inequity under section 441.37. Hartig advanced two theories.
Pointing to tax roll data, he first alleged that the increase in his 2021
assessment was disproportionate to more modest hikes seen by seven other

1
There was no change to the value of Hartig’s land.

2
properties in his assessment district. Hartig also argued that his property was
entitled to a greater reduction for the power lines and pylons because—
according to Hartig—a nearby property (the “Ryan property”) had received
“an effective 28% decrease” for its proximity to such lines.2

The PAAB rejected both arguments. With respect to Hartig’s
comparators, it first explained that “comparing the percentage increase of
assessments is not a recognized method of supporting inequity.” It also
noted flaws in Hartig’s “annualized” calculations, finding his property was
assessed proportionately with the others in the neighborhood. As for the
transmission lines, the board credited the testimony of the Dubuque city
assessor, who testified that the assessment adjustment at the Ryan property
was largely because of its proximity to a noisy substation. Due to the
substation, as well as the Ryan property’s “larger size, larger lot, higher
quality, and higher value,” the board found that Hartig’s property was not
“directly comparable” to the Ryan property. It also explained that a claim of
inequity cannot be established from a single comparator.

Following an unsuccessful request for reconsideration, Hartig—now
represented by counsel—petitioned for judicial review under Iowa Code
section 17A.19 (2022). 3 The district court denied relief, concluding the

2
Contrary to Hartig’s allegations, the assessor report for the Ryan property shows
that a 20% decrease was applied to the property through a settlement between the board
of review and the property owner. Five percent was for the electrical “towers/lines,”
while 15% was attributed to a nearby substation.
3
Hartig named the PAAB as the respondent in the chapter 17A action. The City
of Dubuque Board of Review intervened in support of the PAAB’s decision in the district
court and on appeal.

3
PAAB’s decision was “both supported by substantial evidence and a correct
application of the law.” Hartig appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Judicial review of a PAAB decision is governed by Iowa Code section
17A.19. Iowa Code § 441.37B(1). On appeal, this court applies the standards
in section 17A.19(10) to determine whether the district court reached the
correct result in granting or denying relief. StateLine Coop. v. Iowa Prop.
Assessment Appeal Bd., 958 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Iowa 2021).

The district court construed Hartig’s petition as a request for relief
under paragraph f of section 17A.19(10), 4 which applies when an agency
action that is “[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a
provision of law in the discretion of the agency . . . is not supported by
substantial evidence.” The burden is on Hartig to show both error and
prejudice under this standard. Wendling Quarries, Inc. v. Prop. Assessment
Appeal Bd., 865 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015); see also Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10).

4
Hartig contends on appeal that he also presented claims under paragraphs d and
h of section 17A.19(10). In his petition for judicial review, Hartig broadly alleged that the
PAAB’s decision “violate[d] the provisions” of section 17A.19(10), including by departing
from “the agency’s prior practice or precedents” and by refusing to consider evidence
that he offered in support of a request for rehearing. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(d)
(permitting judicial relief from an agency action that “was taken without following the
prescribed procedure or decision-making process”), 17A.19(10)(h) (allowing relief from
actions “inconsistent with the agency’s prior practice or precedents”). Trouble is, the
district court’s ruling did not address these claims, and Hartig did not file a motion asking
the court to do so. As a result, we will not consider any other section 17A.19(10) grounds
on appeal. See Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 670–71 (Iowa 2005) (“Without a
ruling by the trial court for us to review, and with Hill not requesting a ruling, we will not
consider this issue on appeal.”).

4
III. Analysis

In Iowa, property is taxed according to its “actual value,” which—for
the residential property at issue here—means the “fair and reasonable
market value.” Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(a), (b)(1) (2021). In general, local
assessors must determine that value “using evidence of the sales price of the
property being assessed or using evidence of comparable sales.” Boekeloo v.
Bd. of Rev., 529 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Iowa 1995); see also Iowa Code
§ 441.21(1)(b)(1). The department of revenue has promulgated a Real
Property Appraisal Manual, which assessors are required to follow when
determining market value. Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(h).

The goal of the assessment framework is uniformity. See Chi. & N.W.
Ry. v. Iowa State Tax Comm’n, 137 N.W.2d 246, 253 (Iowa 1965) (“Equality of
taxation, of course, requires not only a uniform rate of tax but uniformity in
valuation.”). That said, “[t]he valuation of property has never been an exact
science.” Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 875 N.W.2d 667, 672
(Iowa 2016). Recognizing this fact, the code permits aggrieved owners to
protest their property assessment on the ground that it “is not equitable as
compared with assessments of other like property in the taxing district.”
Iowa Code § 441.37(1)(a)(1)(a).

To prevail on a claim of inequity under section 441.37, 5 a taxpayer
typically must show “that there are several other properties within the

5
Neither the parties nor the district court addressed the burden-shifting
framework in section 441.21 for a tax protest. See, e.g., Compiano v. Bd. of Rev., 771
N.W.2d 392, 397–98 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the “two-step process” of review within the
statute’s burden-shifting framework). Under the statute, the initial burden is on the
property owner to put forward “competent evidence” of the ground for protest, after
which the burden shifts to tax officials to defend the assessment. Iowa Code
§ 441.21(3)(b)(2). The supreme court has said that evidence is competent only if

5
assessment district” similar to the one at issue and that, by comparison, “the
property at issue is assessed at a higher proportion of its actual value than the
ratio existing between the assessed and actual valuations” of the similar
properties. Riso v. Pottawattamie Bd. of Rev., 362 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 1985)
(citing Maxwell v. Shivers, 133 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Iowa 1965)). Alternatively, a
taxpayer may establish inequity by showing the assessment methodology was
“not uniformly applied to comparable properties.” Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc. v.
Bd. of Rev., 497 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Iowa 1993) (finding inequitable assessment
where the local assessor’s income-based valuation used inconsistent factors
to value similar Davenport shopping centers).

With this framework in mind, we turn to Hartig’s claim that the
PAAB’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f )(1) (requiring proof of a quantity and quality “that would be
deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish
the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of
that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.”). Hartig
argues that he “presented a substantial body of evidence to support that his
property was assessed inequitably when compared to his neighbors,”
including a rate-of-change comparison and an adjusted square-foot valuation.
He also contends the city assessor’s testimony about the Ryan property
cannot be reconciled with other evidence showing the assessor applied
inconsistent obsolescence adjustments in Hartig’s neighborhood.

“consistent with the statutory scheme” for determining market value. Boekeloo, 529
N.W.2d at 279. The PAAB does not expressly challenge the competency of the
comparator evidence offered by Hartig, although it does contend that his “calculations are
not consistent with the [Iowa Real Property Appraisal Manual] or generally accepted
appraisal methods.” Because this issue is non-dispositive, we assume without deciding
that Hartig’s evidence was competent and shifted the burden of proof.

6
A. Hartig’s Rate-of-Change Analysis

At the hearing before the PAAB, the assessor detailed the valuation
process used to assess Hartig’s property, which—“along with the rest of the
city”—followed the methodology of the Iowa Property Appraisal Manual.
The assessor explained that a market-condition adjustment based on 2020
home sales resulted in “an average increase of about 11%” for properties
throughout Hartig’s neighborhood. See Iowa Code § 441.47 (requiring the
“equalization of the levels of assessment of each class of property” in the
assessing jurisdictions every two years); Off. of the Assessor v. Iowa Dep’t of
Rev., 417 N.W.2d 214, 216 (Iowa 1987) (explaining the use of sales studies in
the equalization process). Challenging this testimony, Hartig contends his
assessment hike is higher than the increases for comparable properties. He
points to the gentler appreciation rate his neighbors saw on an “annualized”
basis between 2019 and 2021.

The PAAB contends that Hartig’s rate-of-change analysis fails on its
facts. 6 We agree. A careful review of the assessment data introduced by
Hartig in his administrative appeal reveals that the change in his property
value is proportionate to his neighbor’s increases. The following table shows

6
The PAAB also suggests that Hartig’s theory fails “as a legal matter” because
comparing appreciation rates for neighboring properties “is not a recognized method for
proving inequity under Iowa law,” see Riso, 362 N.W.2d at 517 (setting out the traditional
inequity elements), although the board acknowledges that Hartig can also show inequity
under the uniformity test from Eagle Food Centers, 497 N.W.2d at 865. Because we agree
with the PAAB’s factual argument, we do not resolve this issue.

7
the assessments for Hartig and his comparators during the years at issue,7
with the increased rates calculated on a one-year and “annualized” basis.
2019 2020 2021 2021 Two-Year
Property
Assessment Assessment Assessment Increase Average
Land $ 70,420 $ 60,000 $ 60,000
Hartig Dwelling $ 519,580 $ 552,390 $ 613,152 11.0% 9.0%
(1804 Creek *Adjusted $ 594,430 7.6% 7.2%
Wood Dr.)
Net $ 590,000 $ 612,390 $ 673,152 9.9% 7.0%
*Adjusted $ 654,430 6.9% 5.5%
Land $ 161,160 $ 161,160 $ 161,160
1834 Creek Dwelling $ 1,919,510 $ 1,919,510 $ 2,142,460 11.6% 5.8%
Wood Dr. Net $ 2,080,670 $ 2,080,670 $ 2,303,620 10.7% 5.4%
Land $ 65,410 $ 65,410 $ 65,410
1827 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 363,480 $ 363,480 $ 405,420 11.5% 5.8%
Net $ 428,890 $ 428,890 $ 470,830 9.8% 4.9%
Land $ 81,890 $ 81,890 $ 81,890
1809 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 722,410 $ 722,410 $ 807,410 11.8% 5.9%
Net $ 804,300 $ 804,300 $ 889,300 10.6% 5.3%
Land $ 63,550 $ 63,550 $ 63,550
1803 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 473,210 $ 473,210 $ 531,130 12.2% 6.1%
Net $ 536,760 $ 536,760 $ 594,680 10.8% 5.4%
Land $ 69,750 $ 69,750 $ 69,750
1797 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 493,790 $ 493,790 $ 544,400 10.2% 5.1%
Net $ 563,540 $ 563,540 $ 614,150 9.0% 4.5%
Land $ 75,700 $ 75,700 $ 75,700
1791 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 690,150 $ 690,150 $ 734,300 6.4% 3.2%
Net $ 765,850 $ 765,850 $ 810,000 5.8% 2.9%
Land $ 83,050 $ 83,050 $ 83,050
1780 Creek
Wood Dr. Dwelling $ 290,970 $ 487,220 $ 529,290 8.6% 41.0%
Net $ 374,020 $ 570,270 $ 612,340 7.4% 31.9%

Contrary to Hartig’s claims, and consistent with the local assessor’s
testimony, Hartig’s 11% dwelling value increase for 2021 was on par with the

7
The adjusted numbers for Hartig’s dwelling and net valuation reflect his initial
success in getting the board of review to reduce his assessed dwelling value by $18,722
because of the high-voltage transmission lines.

8
median dwelling value increase in his neighborhood that year. Accounting
for the board of review’s adjustment, the change in Hartig’s dwelling value
was the second-lowest among his comparators. These numbers simply do
not show the inequity Hartig claims.

Many of the numbers Hartig cites in support of his inequity argument
fail to draw accurate comparisons between his assessment and others. For
instance, Hartig points to the difference between his 2021 dwelling-value
increase and the annualized appreciation rates of his seven neighbors. But
that is an apples-to-oranges comparison. Because assessments in Hartig’s
neighborhood saw steeper increases in 2021 than in 2020—which was an
interim year in the two-year assessment cycle8—it is unsurprising that his
one-year rate-of-change exceeds the neighborhood’s two-year trend.

To be sure, the comparison is more favorable for Hartig when
appreciation rates are viewed on an “annualized” basis. His 9% average
dwelling increase between 2019 and 2021 outpaced most of his neighbors.
But the irrelevance of this multi-year comparison is immediately clear from
the data. Only two properties saw dwelling value adjustments between 2019
and 2020. One was the property at 1780 Creek Wood Dr., which was only
partially constructed at the time of its 2019 assessment. The other was
Hartig’s, which received an assessment bump for basement space that was

8
Our property assessment system operates on a two-year cycle under which
reassessments are performed in odd-numbered years based on market values on January
1st. See Iowa Code § 428.4. “In an interim year, assessments of real estate are made only
to the extent that the property was incorrectly valued in the assessment year, not listed in
the assessment year, or experiences a change in value as of the assessment year.” Eagle
Food Centers, 497 N.W.2d at 862.

9
finished the year before.9 In other words, both properties’ 2020 dwelling-
assessment increases were due to improvements. By averaging these changes
with the next year’s market-condition adjustments, Hartig’s “annualized”
comparison disguises the fact that his comparators are not, in fact, similarly
situated.

All told, we find no support for Hartig’s argument that his property
assessment increased at a rate of change meaningfully steeper than his
neighbors’.

B. Hartig’s “Value per Square Foot” Analysis

Along with his rate-of-change comparison, Hartig also cites the
comparator properties’ “assessed value per square foot of finished area”—a
metric he developed in part based on his own “experience as an architect.”
According to Hartig, these calculations show unexplained disparities
between the home size and dwelling value in assessments across his
neighborhood. At the PAAB hearing, Hartig conceded that these valuations
were based in part on his personal judgment:
[F]or example, our home . . . , there’s a two-story interior space which the
other homes do not have, so I threw something in there for that. I put a
number in for second story finished space. Now these might seem like
they’re arbitrary, but I’m an architect. I’ve been in this profession for over
forty years and estimating homes. So, I took an estimate based on my
experience as a professional architect.

The PAAB contends that Hartig’s appraisals are not based on “any
recognized methodology” and that his “results are self-serving and flawed.”

9
At the PAAB hearing, Hartig conceded that his basement improvements were
“probably why [his] rate went up” in 2020.

10
Hartig offers only a cursory explanation of his square-footage analysis
on appeal. A summary introduced at the PAAB hearing suggests that he
recalculated dwelling values for his home and others by assigning fixed
square-footage prices to various architectural features. Among other issues,
the PAAB contends this fixed-price approach was improper, citing the local
assessor’s testimony that values “on most of the pricing mechanisms used in
the Property Appraisal Manual usually goes down as the size increases.” We
agree that to the extent Hartig’s calculations depart from the assessment
requirements of chapter 441 and the Iowa Real Property Manual, they are not
evidence of inequity. See Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(h); Soifer v. Floyd Cnty. Bd.
of Rev., 759 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Iowa 2009).

But an even more fundamental problem with Hartig’s square-footage
analysis is that it fails to illuminate a flaw in the local assessor’s valuation
method. Instead, it merely presents a competing view of neighborhood
dwelling values based in part on Hartig’s competing professional judgment.
That misses the point of a substantial-evidence review. The relevant
question under section 17A.19(10)(f ) is whether substantial evidence
supports the agency’s conclusion, not Hartig’s. Arndt v. City of Le Claire,
728 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa 2007) (explaining that whether one party’s
“evidence ʻtrumps’ other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is
ʻqualitatively weaker’ than another piece of evidence” is not for the
reviewing court to decide). Here, the local assessor testified that each of the
homes cited by Hartig was assessed using the Iowa Real Property Manual.
He explained that the 11% increase in Hartig’s 2021 dwelling assessment was
based on a market-conditions adjustment, and Hartig’s own comparator
evidence confirms that adjustment was applied throughout his
neighborhood. Substantial evidence supports the board’s equity finding.

11
C. The Seattle Study

Hartig also alleges his assessment is inequitable because it did not
receive an appropriate obsolescence discount for the high-voltage
transmission lines that cross his property. He contends the Ryan property
received a 28% discount for its proximity to the same lines based on the
findings of the “Seattle Study”—a 2013 analysis of Pacific-Northwest homes
that found a negative impact in sale values for properties abutting high-
voltage electrical infrastructure.10 The local assessor denied this allegation,
testifying that the Seattle Study was referenced only “informally” during
negotiations in the Ryans’ tax protest and that their property’s adjustment
was primarily owed to noise caused by a nearby substation. On appeal to this
court, Hartig contends the assessor’s testimony conflicts with other evidence
in the record, including an agenda letter from the City of Dubuque’s attorney
describing the basis for the Ryan adjustment.

There are multiple problems with Hartig’s argument. The first is that
it amounts to a credibility challenge beyond the reach of substantial-evidence
review. See id. at 394. However, even if we treat it as a challenge to the
uniformity of the assessor’s valuations—rather than the credibility of the
assessor’s testimony—it still fails as a matter of law. The rule is well
established that “the showing of only one other comparable property in the
area or district is not sufficient to afford relief” on an inequity claim.
Maxwell, 133 N.W.2d at 712 (explaining “an assessment is not discriminatory
unless it stands out above the general level”); accord Metro. Jacobson Dev.
Venture v. Bd. of Rev., 476 N.W.2d 726, 730 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (“[M]ore

10
The Seattle Study itself is not a part of the administrative record. But at the
PAAB hearing, Hartig introduced a 2017 research review discussing the Seattle Study’s
results, which found an average “negative impact of 11.23%.”

12
than one comparable property is required.”). If one comparator was enough,
then “an isolated instance of underassessment might result in a general
reduction for all similar properties.” Miller v. Prop. Assessment Appeal Bd.,
No. 18-0929, 2019 WL 3714977, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2019) (quoting
Crary v. Bd. of Rev., 286 N.W. 428, 430 (Iowa 1939)). Hartig points to no
evidence that other homes in his neighborhood have received obsolescence
discounts based on their proximity to high-voltage lines. He cannot show
inequity by comparison to the Ryan property alone.

Finally, Hartig’s Seattle Study argument also fails on its facts. The
PAAB found that Hartig’s property was not comparable to the “larger size,
larger lot, higher quality, and higher value” of the Ryan home. It also noted
the express geographical limitations in the Seattle Study, which—according
to the secondary source Hartig introduced at the hearing—is “not applicable
outside the Northwest.” From these facts, a reasonable person could
conclude that the downward adjustment at the Ryan property was not based
on the Seattle Study and that Hartig was not entitled to the same assessment
reduction. That is all that is needed to affirm on a review for substantial
evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f )(1).

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying Hartig’s
petition for judicial review. The PAAB’s decision rejecting Hartig’s
inequitable assessment claim is supported by substantial evidence, and we
find no merit to his counter arguments.

AFFIRMED.

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