In the Interest of T.A., T.A., T.A., and T.A., Minor Children

CourtListener 10843384Iowactapp15 de abr. de 2026

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0195
Filed April 15, 2026
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In the Interest of T.A., T.A., T.A., and T.A., Minor Children,
P.L., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
The Honorable Matthew A. Schuling, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Mandy L. Whiddon of Whiddon Law, Omaha, Nebraska, attorney for
appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Abby Davison of Office of the State Public Defender, Council Bluffs,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

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BULLER, Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four
children who all share the initials T.A., with birthdates in 2013, 2015, 2017,
and 2019. The father’s rights were also terminated, but he does not appeal.
We affirm, agreeing with the juvenile court that the mother made virtually no
progress toward reunification over the life of these cases.

Given our resolution of the issues raised on appeal, we do not dwell
too long on the underlying facts. The Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) became involved with this family in part because the mother
used or possessed methamphetamine while caring for the children and
provided one of the children with prescription drugs that were not prescribed
to the child. The department offered services, but the mother’s engagement
was minimal at first and then stopped altogether about six months before the
termination trial. There were at most a small handful of visits with the
children after their removal, some of which were detrimental to the children.
And the mother never completed required substance-abuse and mental-
health evaluations or treatment. Nor did she show up for court-ordered drug
testing.

In the juvenile court’s words, the mother’s trial testimony “was
frenzied, off topic, and disjointed.” The court found the mother “continue[d]
to blame everyone but herself for the current juvenile court cases, including
placing blame on the children.” And the court expressed concern about the
mother’s sobriety and mental health, given “her testimony, speech patterns,
and the history of this case.”

The mother testified that she had been evicted from her home and was
living in a hotel. She said she was unable to work or stand or sit for significant
periods of time. And she admitted she continued to use unprescribed

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controlled substances. She said she didn’t complete the required substance-
abuse or mental-health evaluations or treatments because she felt “like [her]
rights have been violated,” though she didn’t really explain how. She said she
believed the children were bonded to her. And when asked if the children
could be returned to her care as of trial, she answered “[n]ot at this moment”
and estimated she would be ready to parent within six months.

As of trial, one of the children was placed at a psychiatric medical
institution for children (PMIC), and the other three were in foster care. An
HHS worker observed the children were sad to not have their mother in their
lives, but the worker questioned whether any parent–child bond remained
intact. The children were all doing reasonably well in their placements, given
the circumstances.

The county attorney and HHS supported termination of the mother’s
rights to all four children. The guardian ad litem recommended termination
of the mother’s parental rights to the younger three children and declined to
recommend termination for the older child because he was in PMIC without
a concrete plan for permanency. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s
rights to all four children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (f )
(2025), emphasizing her failure to assume any of the duties of parenting, her
lack of progress toward any case goal, failure to comply with court-ordered
services, failure to prioritize the children, and inability to safely care for them.
The mother appeals, and we review de novo. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312
(Iowa 2021).

The mother first challenges the statutory grounds for termination.
But, when a juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights on multiple grounds,
we need only find one statutory ground supported by clear and convincing
evidence to affirm. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus on

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section 232.116(1)(f ), and the only element the mother challenges on appeal
is whether the child could be safely returned to her custody as of the hearing.
See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 2018). But the mother admitted at
trial she could not then safely resume custody of the children. This waives
her claim on appeal. See In re T.M.-L., No. 24-1818, 2025 WL 548851, at *3
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025); In re D.C., No. 24-1792, 2025 WL 401965,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025); In re J.S., No. 25-1012, 2025
WL 2658437, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 17, 2025). And even if it didn’t, the
record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion given the mother’s failure to
progress with visits, her unresolved substance-abuse and mental-health
issues, and her failure to engage with services.

The mother also appears to contest whether termination was in the
children’s best interests. The State asserts the mother’s argument is so
conclusory and underdeveloped we should not consider it, and we tend to
agree. But, even if the issue was adequately raised, we agree with the juvenile
court’s ruling. In deciding best interests, we give primary weight “to the
child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).
For the three younger children, the record overwhelmingly demonstrates
their safety, health, and stability is best served by termination. The older
child faces more uncertainty given his PMIC placement and lack of
permanency plan upon release. But we cannot say that it would be better for
him to return to his mother’s care than face that uncertainty. So we affirm the
juvenile court’s best-interests finding.

The mother last contests whether HHS made reasonable efforts to
support reunification. But she did not request any specific additional services

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below—to say nothing of the fact that she did not engage with any of the
services that were offered. This claim was not preserved for our review. See
In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (“[HHS] has an
obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, but a parent has
an equal obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to
a permanency or termination hearing.”). And even if the claim was
preserved, it is meritless.

AFFIRMED.

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