Jason Asa Grulkey v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0394
Filed April 15, 2026
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Jason Asa Grulkey,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Patrick R. Grady, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Siobhan Briley of Ellis & Winters LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

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AHLERS, Judge.

Jason Grulkey pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for third-degree
burglary after he was found with materials taken from a building on a
construction site. He filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR)
claiming his attorneys in the underlying criminal proceedings were
ineffective. The district court denied the application. Grulkey appeals.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

Cedar Rapids police officers were alerted to be on the lookout for a
suspect in a recent burglary. A few days later, two officers saw Grulkey riding
a bike loaded with boxes and wearing clothing similar to that of the alleged
perpetrator of the prior burglary. They lost sight of Grulkey, so they
communicated with other officers to try to locate him.

Other officers spotted Grulkey with his bike heading toward Grulkey’s
friend’s house. When Grulkey spotted the officers, he changed direction to
head toward the back entrance to the property. Grulkey testified at his PCR
trial that he took this evasive action because he had an outstanding warrant
for his arrest. Although the record is not clear when, at some point Grulkey
left the bike and its contents in his friend’s driveway. More officers arrived
and detained Grulkey before he could enter the home. When officers asked
Grulkey for his name, he gave the name of the homeowner.

Officers noticed the boxes in plain view on the bike had shipping labels
and contained construction materials. After communicating with the
manager of the construction company to which the boxes were addressed,
officers determined that—between the time the construction crew stopped
working on the project the night before and the next morning when Grulkey
was detained—someone had removed the screws to a board used as a

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makeshift door to the garage on the construction site and stolen construction
materials from inside the garage. The stolen materials were the ones found
on Grulkey’s bike. Officers also searched a green bag hanging from the
handlebars of Grulkey’s bike and found a drill, drill bits, and Grulkey’s wallet.

Grulkey was charged with burglary in the third degree as a habitual
offender, theft in the second degree as a habitual offender, possession of
burglary tools, and providing false identification. His trial counsel filed a
motion to suppress the evidence found with the bike. But after examining a
video and photos from the scene that showed the construction materials in
plain view on the bike, she concluded the motion was meritless, so she
withdrew it. When she would not refile the motion, Grulkey sought and
obtained new counsel.

Grulkey’s new counsel was aware that Grulkey’s previous counsel did
not believe a motion to suppress had merit. And because the prosecutor
indicated that the State would keep the habitual offender enhancement in
place if a motion to suppress was pursued—creating what defense counsel
described as an “all or nothing” situation—counsel determined that refiling
a motion to suppress was too risky. Instead, he negotiated a favorable plea
deal whereby Grulkey would plead guilty to burglary in the third degree as a
class “D” felony. In return, the State dropped the habitual-offender
enhancement and dismissed the remaining charges. This reduced Grulkey’s
potential term of incarceration from thirty-two years and one month (with a
minimum of six years) to a maximum of five years. Grulkey agreed to the
deal, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly.

Grulkey then filed a PCR application claiming his attorneys were
ineffective. The district court denied the application, and Grulkey appeals.

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II. Standard of Review

Our review of applications for PCR is for errors at law. Doss v. State,
961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 2021). But when a PCR application is based on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it raises constitutional issues that
we review de novo. Id. As part of our de novo review “we give weight to the
lower court’s findings concerning witness credibility.” Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

III. Analysis

On appeal, Grulkey argues his attorneys were ineffective by (1) failing
to file a motion to suppress the evidence found in the green bag; (2) failing to
adequately advise him regarding the terms of his guilty plea; and (3) allowing
him to plead guilty to a crime without a factual basis.

Both our state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal
defendant effective assistance of counsel. Trane v. State, 16 N.W.3d 683, 692
(Iowa 2025). A PCR applicant establishes ineffective assistance of counsel
by proving (1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and
(2) prejudice resulted. Id. Grulkey is required to prove both elements, so
failure to prove either element is fatal to his claim. See Sothman v. State, 967
N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). And because Grulkey pleaded guilty, to
establish the prejudice element, he must prove that, but for counsel’s errors,
he “would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
See id. at 523 (quoting Doss, 961 N.W.2d at 709).

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A. Motion to Suppress

Grulkey’s claim that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to pursue
a motion to suppress the evidence in the green bag fails on both the breach-
of-duty and prejudice elements.

As to the breach element, counsel is presumed effective, and it is
Grulkey’s burden to prove otherwise. See id. at 522. Because miscalculated
tactics do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance, we do not second-
guess reasonable tactical decisions made by counsel. Lamasters v. State, 821
N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa 2012).

Counsel’s decision not to pursue efforts to suppress the evidence
found in the green bag was a tactical decision, and it was a reasonable one.
Assuming counsel could have successfully suppressed that evidence, it
probably would have helped Grulkey defend against the burglary and
possession-of-burglary-tools charges. But it would have provided little to no
help defending the theft charge. Grulkey still faced the problem that he had
enough stolen construction equipment strapped on the back of his bike to
constitute felony theft. And, since he was a habitual offender, he faced up to
fifteen years of incarceration with a minimum of three years on that charge
alone. See Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(c) (2022) (setting maximum term of
incarceration of fifteen years for a habitual offender); see also id. § 902.8
(setting minimum term of three years for a habitual offender). Couple that
with the fact that the prosecutor indicated the State would not back off the
habitual-offender enhancement if Grulkey pursued a suppression motion,
and it became a very reasonable tactical decision (and thus no breach of duty)
for counsel to forgo pursuing suppression of the evidence in the green bag
and instead focus on pursuing a favorable plea offer, which he was able to
achieve.

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For many of the same reasons Grulkey failed to prove a breach of duty,
Grulkey also failed to prove prejudice. As noted, even if counsel had
successfully achieved suppression of the evidence in the green bag, Grulkey
still faced strong evidence of felony theft as a habitual offender, which carried
up to fifteen years in prison with a minimum of three years. By forgoing
suppression efforts to keep the door open to plea negotiations, counsel
successfully achieved a favorable plea deal that resulted in dismissal of all but
one charge and a maximum sentence of five years. Only Grulkey’s self-
serving testimony supports his claim that, but for counsel’s failure to file a
motion to suppress the evidence in the green bag, he would not have pleaded
guilty and insisted on going to trial. This testimony is unconvincing in the
face of the disparity in possible sentence lengths and the strength of the
State’s case even without the evidence found in the green bag. See Doss, 961
N.W.2d at 714 (“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his
attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous
evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.” (citation
omitted)). In short, Grulkey failed to establish any prejudice to him resulting
from counsel’s failure to pursue efforts to suppress the evidence found in his
green bag.

B. Failure to Adequately Advise Regarding the Guilty Plea

Grulkey’s guilty plea was done in writing. He argues plea counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately advise him of the terms of the plea. He
claims counsel sent his investigator to get Grulkey’s signature on the plea
document without explaining the contents of it. As a result, Grulkey
contends he was not aware that he was pleading to a felony, and had he known
the charge was a felony, he would not have pleaded guilty to it.

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Plea counsel’s testimony and the written guilty plea itself rebut
Grulkey’s claim that he did not know he was pleading guilty to a felony.
Grulkey’s plea counsel testified that he always goes through guilty pleas with
clients when he sends an investigator to get the required signature. See Adams
v. State, 269 N.W.2d 442, 444–45 (Iowa 1978) (relying in part on plea
counsel’s testimony at PCR proceedings to determine whether the
defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary). Counsel also testified that he
instructs his investigator to advise clients not to sign the plea if they have
questions or are otherwise unsure about signing. This testimony went
unrebutted. Additionally, as plea counsel noted, the original felony charge of
third-degree burglary was not changed by the plea agreement. Instead, the
enhancements to the charge were dropped along with the other charges. So
Grulkey had no reason to think the charge had somehow become a
misdemeanor. And the written guilty plea contained a checklist of potential
crimes, and only the box marked “Burglary—Third Degree” was marked.
That box was under a subsection labeled “Class D Felonies.”

Based on our de novo review revealing the above facts, we find plea
counsel adequately advised Grulkey of the terms of the plea agreement and
the terms of the written guilty plea. We also find Grulkey knowingly and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the felony charge of burglary in the third
degree. Therefore, plea counsel did not breach an essential duty and was not
ineffective.

C. Factual Basis

Finally, Grulkey contends his plea counsel was ineffective because he
allowed Grulkey to plead guilty to a crime for which there was no factual
basis. We bypass the State’s argument that Grulkey failed to preserve error
on this claim, assume without deciding that he did, and proceed to the merits.

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Plea counsel breaches an essential duty if counsel permits a defendant
to plead guilty to a charge for which there is no factual basis. Rhoades v. State,
848 N.W.2d 22, 29 (Iowa 2014). In such circumstances, prejudice is
presumed. Id. To determine whether there is a factual basis at the time of a
guilty plea, we look at multiple sources within the record, including the
defendant’s statements and the minutes of testimony. Id. “When analyzing
the record, we do not require the record ʻto show the totality of evidence
necessary to support a guilty conviction,’ but only that the record
demonstrates the facts to support the elements of the offense.” Id. (quoting
State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010)).

Here, Grulkey pleaded guilty to burglary in the third degree as an aider
and abettor. Burglary in the third degree occurs when a person enters an
occupied structure that is not open to the public without permission and with
the intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft therein. See Iowa Code
§§ 713.1 (defining burglary), .6A(1) (defining burglary in the third degree as
a class “D” felony). And all person who aid and abet the commission of
crime “shall be charged, tried[,] and punished as principals.” Id. § 703.1.

There is ample support in the record for Grulkey’s guilty plea to
burglary in the third degree as an aider and abettor. We start and end our
discussion with Grulkey’s written guilty plea. In that document signed by
Grulkey, he admitted he “aid[ed] and abet[ted] another to enter a garage
without permission with the intent to take construction materials contained
inside.” This admission alone provides a sufficient factual basis for Grulkey’s
guilty plea, so we need not address his arguments about claimed weaknesses
in the minutes of testimony. See State v. Philo, 697 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Iowa
2005) (noting it is only necessary to look to other parts of the record to
establish a factual basis if the defendant’s statements are not enough).

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Because there was a factual basis for Grulkey’s guilty plea, his counsel
did not allow him to plead guilty to a crime for which there was no factual
basis, and counsel was not ineffective.

IV. Conclusion

Having rejected all Grulkey’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,
we affirm the district court’s denial of his PCR application.

AFFIRMED.

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