State of Iowa v. Jordan Farshid Allen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0720
Filed April 15, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Jordan Farshid Allen,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Jesse Ramirez, Judge.
_______________

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING
_______________

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

1
SANDY, Judge.

Not every unfavorable comment by the prosecutor at sentencing
following a guilty plea is a breach of the plea agreement. Jordan Allen
challenges both the prosecutor’s fidelity to the plea agreement and the
district court’s exercise of sentencing discretion. But the record reveals no
broken promise. And although we find no abuse of sentencing discretion in
Allen’s carceral sentence, the district court erred in failing to determine
whether his sentence should run consecutively to or concurrently with his
prior parole sentences. We thus vacate Allen’s sentence and remand to the
district court for resentencing. We affirm in all other respects.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from a fatal vehicle-pedestrian collision that occurred
on October 21, 2024, in Polk County. In his written plea of guilty, Allen
admitted that, on that date, he committed a reckless act by turning the wrong
way down a lane and failing to yield and striking S.A., a pedestrian, thereby
unintentionally causing her death. He further admitted the reckless act was
likely to cause death or serious injury. The underlying minutes reflected that
Allen struck S.A. with his pickup truck as she was walking from a designated
disabled parking space in a Hy-Vee parking lot in Des Moines. S.A., who was
sixty-seven years old, later died from the injuries she sustained.

The record reflects some variation in how witnesses and law
enforcement described Allen’s driving immediately before the collision.
According to the minutes, two witnesses reported Allen was moving slowly,
and one witness reported seeing him stop at a stop sign before impact. An
officer’s review of the surveillance footage showed Allen traveling at a normal
speed or slightly faster than other vehicles in the lot. At sentencing, the
prosecutor characterized the video differently, asserting Allen was traveling

2
faster than he should have been in a busy parking lot, failed to stop at a stop
sign, turned the wrong way into a marked travel lane, and then struck S.A.
The sentencing record reflects that Allen remained at the scene after the
collision.

On February 6, 2025, Allen entered a guilty plea to one count of
involuntary manslaughter under Iowa Code section 707.5(1)(b) (2024), the
reckless-act alternative. The sentencing order reflects that the district court
reviewed the signed plea petition, considered Allen’s statements, and found
he understood the charge, the penal consequences, and the constitutional
rights he was waiving. The court further found a factual basis for the plea
from Allen’s admissions, the prosecutor’s statements, and the minutes of
testimony accepted as true by Allen, and it accepted the plea as knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent.

The plea agreement contemplated a recommendation for probation if
Allen complied with recommended substance-use treatment at Bridges of
Iowa. Prior to sentencing, Allen entered the Bridges of Iowa program. At
sentencing, both parties jointly urged a suspended sentence with probation,
continued treatment, random urinalysis testing, and mental-health
counseling. The prosecutor’s sentencing remarks acknowledged that Allen
had accepted responsibility, complied with treatment expectations, and in the
State’s view, earned the opportunity to continue treatment in the community
if he remained compliant.

Before sentence was imposed, a presentence investigation (PSI) report
was prepared and reviewed by the court and the parties. The PSI report
reflected that Allen had a documented substance-use history, which included
a positive fentanyl test from December 24, 2024. At sentencing, defense
counsel objected to consideration of the positive test, while the State argued

3
it was relevant to Allen’s substance-use history and rehabilitative needs. The
district court stated it would consider the positive test, particularly as it
related to Allen’s substance-use history outlined in the PSI report.

The sentencing hearing also included statements from the victim’s
family. S.A.’s surviving sister was an active advocate on her sister’s behalf
and was dissatisfied with the charge resolution. Both written and oral victim-
impact statements were submitted at sentencing and were emotional and
forceful.

Allen was afforded his right of allocution before the court imposed his
sentence. The court considered the factors set out in Iowa Code
section 907.5. The court identified as particularly significant the nature and
circumstances of the crime, statutory sentencing requirements, the victim
impact statement, protection of the public, the plea agreement, Allen’s
statement, his age and character, criminal history, employment, substance-
use history, family circumstances, propensity for further criminal acts, and
the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation.

The district court adjudged Allen guilty and imposed an incarceration
term not to exceed two years, with credit for time served. The court denied
probation, suspended the fine because of incarceration, and ordered victim
pecuniary damages in an amount to be determined, along with other
restitution obligations. The sentencing order further set appeal bond at
$5,000 cash only. Although the sentence was imposed while Allen was on
parole, the sentencing materials do not reflect that the court specified on the
record whether the sentence would run concurrently with or consecutively
to the parole-revocation sentence.

4
Allen appeals from the judgment and sentence challenging the
sentencing on several grounds, including an asserted breach of the plea
agreement and alleged sentencing error. In response, the State defends the
prosecutor’s compliance with the plea agreement but concedes resentencing
is required because the district court did not indicate whether the sentence
was to be served concurrently with or consecutively to Allen’s prior parole-
related sentences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of an allegation that the State breached a plea agreement
during sentencing is for errors at law. State v. King, 576 N.W.2d 369, 370
(Iowa 1998). We review a district court’s specific sentencing decision for
abuse of discretion. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). We will
not disturb a sentence unless the defendant proves an abuse of discretion or
a defect in the sentencing procedure occurred. State v. Witham, 583
N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998). “An abuse of discretion will only be found
when a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) (citation
omitted).

DISCUSSION
Allen contends the State breached the plea agreement by “failing to
advocate for a suspended sentence with probation.” In addition, he argues
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing incarceration.
Specifically, he asserts that the court failed to provide adequate reasons for
the prison sentence.

5
I. Breach of Plea Agreement

When a plea agreement requires the State to recommend a particular
sentence, the prosecutor must do more than merely recite the agreement; the
State must present the recommendation with its approval and indicate it is
worthy of the court’s acceptance. State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299
(Iowa 1999). The cases Allen relies on illustrate the type of conduct that
constitutes a breach and highlight why no breach occurred here.

In Horness, the prosecutor nominally recited the agreed
recommendation but undercut it by referencing an “alternative
recommendation” from the PSI report and describing the defendant’s
conduct in a manner supporting a harsher sentence. Id. at 299–300. The Iowa
Supreme Court concluded the prosecutor’s comments created ambiguity as
to whether the State actually endorsed the agreed-upon recommendation and
deprived the defendant of the benefit of the bargain. Id. at 300.

Similarly, in State v. Bearse, the prosecutor initially recommended
incarceration—contrary to the plea agreement—and, even after being
corrected, failed to affirmatively advocate for the agreed-upon
recommendation, merely suggesting the State would “abide by the
agreement.” 748 N.W.2d 211, 216 (Iowa 2008). Instead, the prosecutor
emphasized the PSI report and reminded the court it was not bound by the
agreement, effectively suggesting a more severe sentence than the one
promised. Id. at 216–17. The supreme court held this conduct breached both
the letter and the spirit of the plea agreement. Id. at 216.

Allen contends the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by failing
to “live up to the spirit of the agreement” by disputing information and
arguing factors that undermined the agreement. But the record here stands
in sharp contrast to that contention.

6
First, the prosecutor expressly and unequivocally recommended the
agreed-upon sentence (probation), with continued substance-use treatment.
Unlike in Horness and Bearse, the prosecutor did not present competing
recommendations, did not reference an alternative harsher sentence, and did
not suggest incarceration was more appropriate. The State’s
recommendation was clear and consistent with the plea agreement.

Second, the challenged remarks (involving the positive fentanyl test,
driving conduct, and victim’s sister) were made in response to issues raised
by the defense or the court and did not undermine the State’s
recommendation. For example, the prosecutor’s comments regarding the
positive fentanyl test were made after defense counsel objected to its
inclusion in the PSI report. In responding, the prosecutor emphasized the
relevance of the information to Allen’s substance-use history and need for
treatment—considerations directly aligned with the parties’ joint
recommendation for probation conditioned on continued treatment. The
prosecutor did not argue the test warranted incarceration or otherwise
suggest a more severe sentence.

Likewise, the prosecutor’s characterization of Allen’s driving as “quite
egregious” was made in rebuttal to defense counsel’s attempt to minimize
the conduct. Unlike the conduct in Horness, the prosecutor did not use this
description to advocate for a harsher sentence or to suggest the court should
reject the plea agreement. See 600 N.W.2d at 299–300. Nor did the
prosecutor, as in Bearse, invoke the PSI report or the court’s discretion in a
manner that implicitly encouraged incarceration. See 748 N.W.2d at 216–17.

In short, the prosecutor did not “suggest[] more severe punishment
than [the State] was obligated to recommend.” See id. at 216. Instead, the
State consistently urged the court to adopt the agreed-upon recommendation

7
while responding to the court’s inquiries and the defense’s arguments with
relevant information.

Because the prosecutor fulfilled the State’s obligation to recommend
the agreed sentence and did not undermine that recommendation, we
conclude the plea agreement was not breached.

II. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

A sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence
imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The sentencing court weighs “the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and
propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform” along with the
defendant’s criminal history, family circumstances, and the societal goals of
sentencing. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation
omitted). The district court’s statement may be “terse and succinct” if “the
reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and
the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408
(Iowa 2015). The district court “has broad discretion to impose the sentence
it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”
State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the district court gave a lengthy explanation of its
decision to not suspend Allen’s sentence:
Thank you. First let me acknowledge the family in the room and
the difficulty that this case presents. There are no words that I am going to
say that are going to be magical or pronounce this any more than you have
already felt.

8
I often think to myself as much as I have been in a courtroom that
rarely does anybody walk out of a courtroom happy. The case before us is
an aggravated misdemeanor. The maximum punishment is two years in
prison.

The court has no ability to determine parole eligibility under these
statutory guidelines, place of confinement. Really what this court is
determining today is whether or not Mr. Allen should be granted probation
under certain terms or if he should be sent to prison for a term not to
exceed two years.

I want to acknowledge [S.A.], the victim in this case, and I
appreciate the family being here and [S.A.’s sister] making her statement.
I also appreciate the attorneys and the work they put into this. I know both
of the attorneys. I know how hard they work. I know how good they are at
their jobs. I know and appreciate the fact that they have had this case
significantly longer than this court has.

Mr. Allen, you are a difficult individual to assess. I believe you when
you say you would never intend to hurt people. I think your life based on
the criminal history that I have reviewed indicates pretty well on point
what this case is, which is a reckless disregard for other people, whether
it’s fraud, [or] yourself with substances. But regardless, at the end of the
day, Mr. Gardner and Miss Livingston have pointed out—and the code
states—my goal is to rehabilitate you.

There are no life sentences coming out of this case. At some point
you will be a member of somebody’s community, and if it’s my community
I want you at your best. I want you to be clean, I want you to be sober, I
want you to be productive, I want you to be working, I want you to be
healthy, right?

Tragedy, accident, call it whatever you want to, it’s an awful
situation today. By no means do I want to inhibit your treatment or your
work, but we also need to recognize what occurred in this case. We also
need to recognize your history when you present yourself today in this
courtroom.

One, I acknowledge your hard work today first. You have done what
you need to do in regards to your substance abuse treatment, the terms of
the plea agreement. Seems like you have worked hard. You are getting to
the age where I would expect to start to see a different level of maturity and

9
ability to handle yourself in the community. Substances usually take that
in a different direction.

I also want to acknowledge your accountability today. You pled
guilty today. You acknowledge what you did in October of ’24. You
acknowledge what you did to [S.A.]. My hope is always that that
accountability sticks with you as I hope it sticks with me but regardless of
what happens today, you will never require another adult or person to tell
you to get clean. You always know that’s what you need to do. You don’t
need a court to do that.

The same applies for employment. Same applies with anything
good in your life. You have to work for it. You know what you have to do,
and you keep going for it. I hope that after you handle this sentence, you
put this in a way in your life where you can move forward as a productive
member and none of this happens again.

That’s always my hope after sentencing that nothing ever happens
like this again. I think you can clearly see the level of pain that your reckless
acts have caused in our community.

Taking a look at the sentencing considerations in this case, I’ll just
note if it was not clear for the record, the court is not considering the
specified risk scores, obviously not the dismissed charges. The court is
reviewing this case with the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation for
Mr. Allen, the protection of the community from further offenses, the
nature of the offense, in large part, the attending circumstances,
Mr. Allen’s age, character and propensities, Mr. Allen’s chance at reform,
his substance abuse history as well as any noted mental health history that
was in the [PSI] Report as well as any mitigating circumstances. The court
acknowledges that you served 114 days in the county jail.

The court will adjudge you guilty of involuntary manslaughter. You
will be incarcerated for a term not to exceed two years. I’ll give you credit
for any days that you served. I am going to deny probation. That’s based
on the sentencing considerations that I have noted.

***

Bond on appeal is set at [$]5,000 cash. I’ll note, Mr. Allen,
regardless of what has occurred, . . . you are going to be released from
prison as determined by the [Iowa] Department of Corrections. You have

10
worked hard to improve your life but this sentence is a reflection of the
damage that you have done to the community, and I think if I were in your
position, this is the way that I would look at it:

Despite your best efforts, despite how good you have done, this is
still what occurred. What that would tell me is you can soak that in and
understand what that means and appreciate the damage that you have done
but then understand despite those best efforts that you were still causing
extreme harm in our community and now you need to do better.

Because believe it or not I hope nothing but the best when you
come out. I need you to come out of prison and be better and continue on
this path that you have created for yourself to get clean, to get sober and to
be productive. That’s the best way that you can serve this sentence and to
repay this damage that you have done. I hope nothing but the best in that
regard, Mr. Allen.

Upon our review, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing a carceral sentence. Each of the factors the district court
discussed is a proper sentencing factor. See Iowa Code § 907.5. Given the
sentence is based on proper factors and is sufficiently explained, we discern
no abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb it. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d
at 724. To the extent that Allen asks us to reweigh the factors and grant him
probation, we decline to do so on appeal. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859,
863 (Iowa 2023).

Both parties agree that Allen should be resentenced to address the
issue of whether his imposed prison sentence should run concurrent or
consecutive to his parole. See State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 303–04
(Iowa 2025) (vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing because
the trial court did not state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences);
State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 2016) (same); State v. Minenga, No.
24-1215, 2025 WL 2058266, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (same); State
v. Archer, No. 24-0293, 2025 WL 271628, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2025)

11
(same). And because “[r]emanding this case for resentencing only on the
question of whether [Allen]’s sentence should be served concurrent or
consecutive to another sentence would deprive the resentencing judge of the
full panoply of sentencing options,” we must order a full resentencing. See
Duffield, 16 N.W.3d at 304. Accordingly, we vacate Allen’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.

In sum, we find no breach of Allen’s plea agreement and no abuse of
discretion in the imposed carceral sentence. But we vacate Allen’s sentence
and remand to the district court for resentencing due to the court’s failure to
determine whether his sentence should run consecutively to or concurrently
with his prior parole sentences.

SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.

12