In the Interest of A.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0002
Filed April 1, 2026
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In the Interest of A.M., Minor Child,
A.S., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Cynthia S. Finley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant Public Defender,
Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Julie F. Trachta of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

1
BADDING, Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to an infant
son—born in 2025—under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025).1
Although he agreed that he was unable to care for the child at the time of the
termination hearing, the father argues that would change with more time and
services. He also contends that termination is not in the best interests of the
child. Our review is de novo. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019).

The child was placed in the temporary custody of the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services in March 2025, having been
removed from his mother just three days after birth. One month later, the
infant was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance. The father first
learned about the child when a sheriff’s deputy served him notice of the
juvenile court proceedings. He lacked housing at the time, traveling
frequently for his job as an ironworker. He was also struggling with
methamphetamine.

After genetic testing confirmed his paternity, the father began to
participate in services through the department. He obtained a substance-use
evaluation and started intensive outpatient treatment, but he was
unsuccessfully discharged in July. Court-ordered drug tests—for which the
father mostly failed to appear—were positive for methamphetamine in
August, October, and November. And the father admitted to ongoing drug
use at a December termination hearing. When asked whether he could care
for his son, the father responded: “Honestly, no.”

1
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother, but
she does not appeal.

2
On appeal, the father contends that the department failed to make
reasonable efforts to unite him with the child. See Iowa Code
§ 232.102(4)(b), (6) (Supp. 2025).2 He alleges that he was not connected
with a family-centered services worker until mid-October, delaying him from
securing an apartment and completing parenting classes. Because the father
never objected to the adequacy of the department’s services before the
termination hearing, his challenge comes too late. In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d
835, 840 (Iowa 2017). But even if his claim were timely, we would find no
lack of reasonable efforts here. The father received evaluations, testing, and
treatment for his substance use. And he testified that he was grateful for the
several housing referrals his case worker provided. His failure to achieve
stability was not for lack of the department’s help.

The father also asserts that a six-month extension would allow him
time to make the progress necessary to safely parent the child. However, we
cannot find that the barriers to reunification would “no longer exist at the end
of the additional six-month period.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323
(Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). The father admitted
using methamphetamine just two days before the termination hearing, even
while he was wearing a sweat patch. And although he had re-enrolled in
outpatient treatment, his drug counselor reported inconsistent attendance.

2
The father frames his reasonable-efforts argument as a challenge to the State’s
proof under section 232.116(1)(h). While compliance with the reasonable-efforts mandate
“is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement” for termination of parental rights, “the
State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely
returned to the care of a parent.” L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 527 (cleaned up). But see In re F.W.,
No. 24-0111, 2024 WL 2044610, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (Tabor, P.J.,
concurring) (questioning why reasonable efforts are not a “strict substantive
requirement” for termination since section 232.102(4)(b) requires such efforts in every
case unless waived).

3
With no sign in this record that the father is on track toward sobriety, we
decline to extend the child’s time in limbo.

That leaves us with the father’s final argument: that termination is
contrary to the child’s best interests. Giving “primary consideration to the
child’s safety,” to his “long-term nurturing and growth,” and to his
“physical, mental, and emotional” needs, we disagree. Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). Although the father testified that he wanted to become a safe
and sober caretaker, his “journey is likely [to be] a long one and it is far from
complete.” L.M., 904 N.W.2d at 840. We cannot deprive this child of the
permanency he deserves on the hope that the father will be able to parent him
in the future. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014). Even though
a plan for adoption was not yet in place at the time of the hearing, we find
that termination is the better path to long-term safety and stability. See In re
N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (explaining a concurrent plan
for adoption “is not a precondition to termination”).

AFFIRMED.

4