Raymond Novick v. Hellwig Electric, LLC, Richard Hellwig, Individually, and Phillip Hellwig, Individually

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0765
Filed April 1, 2026
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Raymond Novick,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Hellwig Electric, LLC, Richard Hellwig, Individually, and Phillip
Hellwig, Individually,
Defendants–Appellees.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
The Honorable David M. Cox, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jeremy B. Hahn of Roberts & Eddy, P.C., Independence,
attorney for appellant.

Matthew G. Novak of Pickens, Barnes & Abernathy, Cedar Rapids,
attorney for appellees.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

In 2015, Raymond Novick began smelling a “foul odor” in his home.
Two years later, he discovered the cause: a broken septic pipe in the ceiling
above his lower-level bathroom, with a large black electrical wire stretched
across it. Novick sued Hellwig Electric, LLC in 2022, alleging the company’s
electrical work had caused the pipe to break. The district court granted
Hellwig summary judgment, concluding that Novick was “required to
provide competent evidence to establish his claims, and he simply has not
done so.” We agree and affirm the court’s ruling.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Hellwig Electric is run by the father-son team of Richard and Phillip
Hellwig.1 In 2006, Raymond Novick hired Hellwig to perform electrical work
on his newly built house. Apparently satisfied with Hellwig’s work, Novick
hired them again in 2013 to move a “large black wire” from one subpanel to
another.

Close to two years after that subpanel work, Novick’s home started to
smell. He hired contractors to locate the source of the odor, but nothing was
discovered, and the smell went away. In 2017, Novick alleged the odor
returned with “a much more potent stench that made the house nearly
uninhabitable.” Novick’s friends, Brian Melloy and Timothy Cronquist,
helped him tear out the garage ceiling—from the front of the house to the
back—and remove fiberglass insulation. Melloy was a retired owner of a
technology company, and Cronquist owned a construction company. As
Cronquist was “blind feeling” in the ceiling above him, he came across a

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Novick also brought individual clams against the Hellwigs, but the district court
dismissed those claims. Novick does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

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broken PVC pipe with an electrical wire “very tight up against” it. Because
neither Melloy nor Cronquist was experienced in plumbing or electrical
work, their involvement ended after they found the pipe—which was broken
in two places. The plumber that Novick hired to repair the piping threw the
broken pipe away, although Novick took some pictures of it first.

Based on the position of the electrical wire, Novick believed that
Hellwig broke the pipe by pulling the wire during the 2013 subpanel work.
Novick sued the company in October 2022, alleging claims for breach of
contract, breach of implied warranty of workmanlike construction,
negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

In December 2023, Hellwig designated expert witness Stephen
Hamers, a licensed professional engineer, to “offer opinions on the possible
causes of a broken PVC pipe.” Due to the lack of physical evidence, Hamers
could not determine the cause of the pipe failure. But he did not believe there
was any chance that pulling an electrical wire would break a pipe. After
Hellwig designated his expert, Novick designated himself, Melloy, and
Cronquist as non-retained expert witnesses. The identification stated that
each of them would testify about their “personal knowledge of the work
performed” at Novick’s residence and “the work done in an attempt to
remedy the situation.”

At Melloy and Cronquist’s depositions, neither could explain how the
pipe broke. Melloy testified that although “[y]ou can break PVC pipe by
driving over it or hitting it with a sledgehammer,” he had never seen one
broken like the one they found in Novick’s ceiling. And he had never “heard
of anyone breaking PVC pipe by pulling electrical wire.” Cronquist similarly
testified that while he had experience with pulling electrical wire and knew

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how much tension could be created, he couldn’t recall ever breaking anything
like that and “[c]ertainly not a PVC pipe.” He was also unable “to offer any
expertise on the amount of force it would take to break a piece of PVC pipe.”
For his part, Novick was unable to remember where the pipe was broken or
how it was oriented in the ceiling.2 Like Cronquist, Novick had never broken
anything other than a wire staple or tie by pulling wire. And he had pulled
wire “hundreds of times on jobs” for the technology business that he ran for
almost four decades.

Shortly before discovery closed in February 2025, Hellwig moved for
summary judgment. The company argued that Novick “does not have an
expert witness to offer an opinion as to how a PVC pipe could have been
broken by a wire and relies on mere speculation the pipe was broken in 2013.”
In resistance, Novick argued the undisputed facts established that Hellwig
was “contacted to perform a service, they admitted to performing the work
requested, and the work that was requested required . . . moving a wire
resembling exactly that of a wire that was later discovered to be over a broken
PVC pipe” in the ceiling. Novick also moved to submit “demonstrative”
video evidence of tests that he and Cronquist performed in mid-March to
“debunk” Hamers’ opinion,3 along with affidavits from both detailing the
tests and their results. Hellwig resisted Novick’s motion, arguing the video
evidence and affidavits were untimely and inadmissible.

Novick testified, “My best guess is it was horizonal, but I can’t say for sure.”
2

Cronquist, however, thought the pipe was vertical.
3
According to Cronquist’s affidavit, the tests tried to recreate the PVC pipe and
wire configuration to show that Novick’s causation theory—that Hellwig broke the pipe
by pulling the electrical wire downward—was possible.

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The district court agreed with Hellwig and denied Novick’s motion to
submit the evidence because it was “information that was prepared and
compiled after the expiration of the discovery deadline.” The court then
granted Hellwig’s summary judgment motion, reasoning:
Plaintiff relies on the theory that a pulled wire broke a PVC pipe and caused
the odor and damage. However, Plaintiff is unable to point to any specific
and timely produced evidence on this issue. Plaintiff’s theory on this issue
is largely based on assumption, and on the performance of untimely
experiments that he claims show that the pulled wire caused the damage.
Plaintiff is required to provide competent evidence to establish his claims,
and he simply has not done so. Plaintiff attempts to offer his own testimony
on the issue, but the Court is not persuaded that the question of whether a
pulled wire caused the damage is something that can be resolved by the
testimony of a layperson, and Plaintiff has not established that he is an
expert in this field. The Court believes this is not an issue that is within
the common understanding of a juror.

Because Novick failed to offer “any timely expert testimony to support his
claims,” the court concluded they failed as a matter of law.4

Novick appeals, claiming the district court erred in denying his motion
to submit the video evidence and granting summary judgment for Hellwig.

II. Analysis

“We review summary judgment rulings for correction of legal errors.”
McClure v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 23 N.W.3d 33, 40 (Iowa 2025). The

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The court also agreed with Hellwig’s alternative argument that Novick’s claims
for breach of implied warranty and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred
by the statute of limitations. Although Hellwig did not extend its statute-of-limitations
argument to Novick’s other claims, the court found they would also be time-barred.
Because we agree with the court on the merits of Novick’s claims, we do not reach the
statute-of-limitations issue on appeal.

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court’s grant of summary judgment “is proper if there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Id. When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported,
the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in
the pleadings.” Gries v. Ames Ecumenical Hous., Inc., 944 N.W.2d 626, 627–
28 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “Instead, the resisting party must set
forth specific material facts, supported by competent evidence, establishing
the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

Before considering the merits of the district court’s summary
judgment ruling, we first address its refusal to consider Novick’s videos
because they “consist[ed] of information that was compiled and produced
after the discovery deadline.” Novick challenges this refusal on appeal,
arguing the tests were “conducted at the discovery deadline” and “highly
important” to establishing “that a genuine issue of material fact exists” on
his claims. In response, Hellwig contends that Novick “provided no
explanation to the district court why the untimely evidence could not have
been produced” before discovery closed.

At the outset, we note that both parties frame the issue as a discovery
sanction—even though Novick brought the issue to the court’s attention
through a motion to admit the “experimental evidence” shown in the videos.
While Hellwig resisted the motion because the videos were “taken after the
discovery deadline,” it did not ask the court to impose discovery sanctions
on Novick. Cf. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.517(2); Whitley v. C.R. Pharmacy Serv., Inc.,
816 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2012). We also note that Novick did not ask for a
continuance under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(6) to permit
“discovery to be had.” Cf. Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmnty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d
295, 301–02 (Iowa 1996) (discussing the procedure for continuance requests

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under rule 1.981(6)). Nor did he seek an extension of the discovery deadline.
Cf. Dillon v. Ruperto, No. 09-0600, 2010 WL 2383517, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App.
June 16, 2010) (reviewing a refusal to extend a discovery deadline for a party
resisting summary judgment). Instead, his motion focused on whether the
content of the videos met the admissibility requirements of experimental
evidence. See, e.g., Palleson v. Jewell Co-op Elevator, 219 N.W.2d 8, 15–16
(Iowa 1974).

Setting aside these procedural oddities—and following the parties’
lead in construing the district court’s refusal to consider the videos as a
discovery sanction—we find no abuse of discretion. See Fenceroy v. Gelita
USA, Inc., 908 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Iowa 2018) (“Discovery rulings are
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” (cleaned up)). “The
district court has inherent power to maintain and regulate cases proceeding
to final disposition within its jurisdiction.” Lawson v. Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d
251, 258 (Iowa 2010) (cleaned up). Novick’s videos purported to introduce
new evidence that could have been developed earlier, and injecting them into
the case two months before trial would have been unfair to Hellwig.5 See
Whitley, 816 N.W.2d at 388; Dillon, 2010 WL 2383517, at *3 (finding no abuse
of discretion in denying further discovery where the “events surrounding the

5
Novick also filed affidavits from himself and Cronquist on the question of
causation—even though his discovery responses did not disclose that either of them
would opine about that issue. Although Novick only seems to challenge the exclusion of
the video evidence, to the extent his claim also includes the causation opinions in the
affidavits, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion in not considering that evidence. See
McGrew v. Otoadese, 969 N.W.2d 311, 325 (Iowa 2022) (affirming the exclusion of expert
testimony on causation when it was not disclosed in discovery).

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issues transpired long before the summary judgment hearing and were
adequately fleshed out in the filings prior to the hearing”).

Even if we agreed with Novick that the court abused its discretion in
not considering the videos, it would not be grounds to reverse. In deciding
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court may only consider
those parts of the summary judgment record that “would be admissible in
evidence.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5); see also Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.,
818 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 2012); Willis v. City of Des Moines, 357 N.W.2d 567,
573 (Iowa 1984). Novick never filed the videos he wanted the district court
to consider. And he never asked the court to amend or enlarge its ruling so
that the videos could be part of our appellate record. We are left with no way
to determine whether the videos would have been admissible—nor can we
determine whether they would have raised a genuine question of fact on
causation. As a result, Novick has failed to show a prejudicial error. See
Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa 1994) (“[W]e will reverse a
judgment for error in excluding evidence only when a substantial right of the
party is affected and a proper offer of proof has been made.”).

Moving on to the merits of the court’s ruling, the basis for its grant of
summary judgment was the lack of expert testimony from Novick about how
the pipe broke. Novick, however, claims expert testimony was unnecessary.
He argues that “common sense” supports his claims given the “physical
proximity and tension” of the wire found over the broken pipe. But “[i]t is
well established that speculation is not sufficient to generate a genuine issue
of fact.” Gries, 944 N.W.2d at 628. And that is all we have here.

Novick is correct that no expert is needed when “under the evidence
and facts of common knowledge plaintiff’s theory is reasonably probable, not
merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based thereon.”

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Doe v. Cent. Iowa Health Sys., 766 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Iowa 2009) (citation
omitted). “But on the flipside, when the connection between the defendant’s
negligence and the plaintiff’s harm is outside a layperson’s common
knowledge and experience, ʻthe plaintiff needs expert testimony to create a
jury question on causation.’” Intlekofer v. Reitberry Rental Prop., LLC,
No. 18-2086, 2019 WL 3714835, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2019) (citation
omitted).

The district court correctly rejected Novick’s argument that “whether
a pulled wire caused” the pipe to break is “something that can be resolved”
by a layperson. We considered a similar argument in Intlekofer, where the
plaintiffs tried to rely on “common sense” assumptions about water flow to
support their claim that elevation changes on the defendants’ properties
damaged their building. Id. Our court reasoned that “[w]hile it may be
within the jury’s common knowledge and experience that ʻwater flows
downhill,’ whether changes in topography caused water damage to a nearby
building is a technical or scientific matter calling for an expert opinion.” Id.
(footnote omitted); see also Merrigan v. Boattenhamer, No. 25-0543, 2026 WL
44641, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2026) (concluding expert testimony was
required to establish the causal link between the defendants’ conduct, the
water intrusion into the property, and the damages being sought”). The
same is true here. Whether an electrical wire could break a PVC pipe—and
the force necessary for that to occur—is beyond the understanding of a
layperson. And “[q]uestions of causation which are beyond the
understanding of a layperson require expert testimony.” Vaughn v. Ag
Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Iowa 1990).

Recognizing that reality, Hellwig retained licensed professional
engineer Stephen Hamers, whose report stated that it was “unlikely that

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hand pulling the wire would have created the opportunity to fracture the PVC
pipe.” When asked at his deposition whether there was “any chance” the
wire “is what broke the pipe,” Hamers answered: “Well, I don’t believe so.”
Novick points out perceived weaknesses in Hamers’ opinion—like his failure
to determine what caused the break, visit Novick’s home, or perform
engineering calculations. But Novick had discarded the pipe and repaired
the area where it was removed, leaving Hellwig and its expert no opportunity
to examine the physical evidence. More importantly, Novick failed to present
any contrary causation opinion. His non-retained designated expert
witnesses, Melloy and Cronquist, admitted they had no expertise in
plumbing or electrical work. And they acknowledged that they had never
heard of a pipe being broken by an electrical wire. Novick admitted to the
same in his deposition.

Novick is left with the circumstantial evidence of “the presence of the
large black wire over the damaged PVC pipe.” That is insufficient to establish
causation. See Brewster v. United States, 542 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1996)
(“The mere fact that an accident has occurred, with nothing more, is not
evidence.” (cleaned up)). While “circumstantial and direct evidence are
equally probative,” circumstantial evidence “is sufficient to establish a fact
only where the evidence has sufficient force to allow a factfinder to draw a
legitimate inference from the evidence presented.” Godfrey v. State, 962
N.W.2d 84, 102 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). “An inference is not legitimate if
it is based upon speculation or conjecture.” Banwart v. 50th St. Sports,
L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Iowa 2018) (cleaned up).

No evidence supported Novick’s speculation that—close to two years
before the odor started—Hellwig pulled the electrical wire and broke the
pipe. Novick could not even remember how the broken pipe was oriented in

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the ceiling or “exactly where [Hellwig] pulled that wire.” The Hellwigs
could not remember either, although both doubted they would have routed
the wire in the way that Novick thought they did. In the end, Novick’s
speculative and “personal, conclusory beliefs are insufficient as a matter of
law to generate a fact question.” Godfrey, 962 N.W.2d at 102.

We accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Hellwig. See Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
(finding summary judgment appropriate when expert testimony is needed
but unavailable).

AFFIRMED.

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