State of Iowa v. Brenton Harmison

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0371
Filed April 1, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Brenton Harmison,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County,
The Honorable Crystal S. Cronk, Judge.
_______________

AFFIRMED
_______________

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

1
CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Brenton Harmison appeals the sentences imposed after a jury
convicted him of four controlled-substance offenses. He argues the district
court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors in imposing the
sentences. Upon our review, we affirm Harmison’ sentences.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In April 2022, Harmison and a friend checked into a Fairfield Inn in
Oskaloosa. As the two men checked in, staff at the hotel became concerned
for various reasons. The men arrived without any bags or luggage and paid
for the room in cash. Because the staff were concerned about the safety of
those at the hotel, they called the police. Soon after, cleaning staff found
needles in a lobby trash can and a marijuana vapor pen in the bathroom.

Having all this information, the hotel manager decided to cancel
Harmison’s room and ask him and his friend to leave. But the men had
already left, so the manager went to check if their belongings were in the
room. Upon entering the room, an employee found a bag of pills under a
pillow. The manager then notified the police of their findings. Later testing
of these pills revealed they were methamphetamine.

The police later located Harmison and his friend at the hotel and
searched them both. The search of Harmison revealed a glass pipe with
methamphetamine residue and a single white pill later identified as
oxycodone. A search of Harmison’s prosthetic leg revealed more oxycodone
pills.

Officers then searched Harmison’s hotel room. Their search revealed
a black bag containing $6,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia, and a digital scale
consistent with the sale of drugs. When interviewed by police, Harmison

2
admitted the black bag and its contents were his, as was the
methamphetamine found in the room.

As a result, the State charged Harmison with four crimes:
(1) possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, second or
subsequent offense, a class “B” felony in violation of Iowa Code sections
124.401(1)(b)(7), 124.411, and 124.413 (2022); (2) possession of oxycodone
hydrochloride, third or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony in violation of
section 124.401(5); (3) failure to affix a drug tax stamp on the oxycodone, a
class “D” felony in violation of sections 453B.1, 453B.3, 453B.12; and
(4) failure to affix a drug tax stamp on the methamphetamine, a class “D”
felony in violation of sections 453B.1, 453B.3, 453B.12. The State also
charged the habitual-offender sentencing enhancement in violation of
sections 902.8 and 902.9.

The case proceeded to trial in November 2024. The jury convicted
Harmison as charged. Harmison then stipulated to being a habitual offender
and to his prior drug convictions.

At sentencing, Harmison asked the court to impose a twenty-five-year
sentence with a mandatory term of one-sixth of the sentence imposed on the
first count, concurrent with fifteen-year sentences with three-year mandatory
minimums on each of the remaining counts. Instead, the district court
adopted the State’s recommendation and imposed concurrent sentences of
seventy-five years with a mandatory term of twenty-five years on the first
count, and fifteen years with a mandatory term of three years on each of the
remaining counts. Harmison now appeals his sentences.

3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s sentencing decisions for correction of
errors at law. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). The
sentencing court has “broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines
is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.” State v. West
Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). The decision “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). An abuse of discretion
occurs when “the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were
clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id.

DISCUSSION
The sentencing court weighs “the nature of the offense, the attending
circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the
chances of reform” along with the defendant’s criminal history, employment
status, family circumstances, and the societal goals of sentencing. Damme,
944 N.W.2d at 106 (citation omitted). The district court’s statement
explaining its reasons for a particular sentence may be “terse and succinct”
if “the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the
statement and the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d
402, 408 (Iowa 2015). Due to the discretionary nature of sentencing, the
court’s consideration of proper factors “will not always lead to the same
sentence.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. “Yet, this does not mean the choice
of one particular sentencing option over another constitutes error.” Id.

Harmison argues the district court abused its discretion by failing to
adequately consider mitigating factors in fashioning his sentences.
Harmison’s arguments are that the district court (1) stated it considered age,

4
prior criminal history, employment history, the nature of the offense,
whether a weapon was used, etc. but did not specifically address how they
relate to Harmison, (2) said it reviewed letters of support for Harmison but
did not address if they were considered as a sentencing factor, and
(3) “should have taken more time to evaluate the needs of the defendant and
the circumstances surrounding him and imposed a more proper sentence that
took into account more than just his previous criminal record.”

We disagree with Harmison and find the district court exercised
proper discretion in imposing his sentences. At sentencing, the court stated:
Sir, I have selected these particular sentences for you after
considering your age, prior criminal record, employment, family
circumstances, nature of the offense committed, and harm to the victim, if
any, whether a weapon or force was used in the commission of the offense,
your need for rehabilitation and potential for rehabilitation, the necessity
of protecting the community from further offenses by you and others, and
the contents of the PSI.

It’s noteworthy, sir, in your criminal history you have a long history
of drug offenses. I’m not sure I followed your attorney’s calculation that
you went fourteen years, although he did say you only had a few possession
charges. That’s not a minor thing for someone who already had drug
convictions as you did at the time. It doesn’t appear that rehabilitation
worked. You didn’t go very long between committing more drug offenses.
It is important that we protect the members of the community from further
offenses by you and others. Drug offenses are very serious in nature. I
find, though, that it’s appropriate to run your sentences concurrently, and
also allow you the possibility of parole according to those time guidelines.

The district court also expressly noted it reviewed Harmison’s letters of
support.

We find each of the factors the district court discussed is a proper
sentencing factor which it was required by statute to consider. See Iowa Code
§ 901.5. While the district court’s discussion of the factors was “terse and

5
succinct,” that is all that is required for our review. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at
408. Our review of the record clearly demonstrates the district court
properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Harmison.

While the district court did not discuss every mitigating factor on the
record, it did hear and acknowledge Harmison’s arguments before imposing
the sentence. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)
(“[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing circumstance does
not necessarily mean it was not considered.”). And even if the district court
gave more weight to aggravating factors than mitigating factors, that does not
amount to an abuse of discretion. See State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208,
216–17 (Iowa 2006) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court
“placed considerable emphasis on the serious nature of the crimes” but also
“considered other factors pertinent to sentencing”). Because we find no
abuse of discretion, we affirm Harmison’s sentences.

AFFIRMED.

6