State of Iowa v. Bryce D. Murphy

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0537
Filed March 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Bryce D. Murphy,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
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SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED
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Bryce Murphy, Moline, Illinois, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Bryce Murphy appeals his concurrent ten- and five-year indeterminate
prison sentences imposed after pleading guilty to first-degree fraudulent
practice and insurance fraud. He argues that the district court improperly
considered much unproven and unadmitted conduct, abused its discretion in
selecting prison sentences rather than deferred judgments, and violated his
constitutional due-process rights by considering the unproven conduct.

We agree with Murphy that the district court improperly considered
unproven and unadmitted conduct in the minutes of testimony for this case
and new charges against Murphy that were still pending at the time of
sentencing. But it was not improper for the court to consider evidence of
Murphy’s similar previous conduct described in an administrative law
judge’s decision denying Murphy unemployment benefits or Murphy’s
guilty pleas to offenses in Illinois even though he had successfully completed
“Second Chance Probation” so they were not convictions under Illinois law.
And because resentencing is required, we need not consider Murphy’s other
arguments. We thus vacate Murphy’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

* * *

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions,
including the refusal to grant a deferred judgment, for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This deferential
standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a
particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong
presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724
(Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision
made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

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Even so, a “court cannot consider unproven or unprosecuted offenses
in fashioning a defendant’s sentence unless the defendant admits them or
facts are presented to prove them.” State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616
(Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). Relying on such an improper consideration in
sentencing is an abuse of discretion that requires resentencing, “even if it was
merely a secondary consideration.” Id. at 618 (cleaned up). But a defendant
has the burden to “show that the sentencing court relied on improper
evidence.” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018).

“When a challenge is made to a criminal sentence on the basis that the
court improperly considered unproven criminal activity, the issue presented
is simply one of the sufficiency of the record to establish the matters relied
on.” Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 618 (cleaned up). So a court cannot rely on
“[i]nformation contained in the minutes of testimony” unless the facts “are
admitted to or otherwise established as true.” State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241,
243 (Iowa 2014) (cleaned up). “[W]here portions of the minutes are not
necessary to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea, they are denied by the
defendant, and they are otherwise unproved, we find no basis to allow the
sentencing court to consider and rely on these portions.” State v. Black, 324
N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982). Neither can a court consider the defendant’s
mere arrest or the filing of other charges that are still pending unless the
defendant has admitted to the underlying conduct—such as by pleading
guilty—or it has been proved to the sentencing court. See State v. Fuqua,
No. 05-1440, 2006 WL 2265458, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2006).

Unproven and Unadmitted Conduct in the Minutes of Testimony. In
explaining its reasons for the prison sentence, the district court—after
highlighting that it had “read the Minutes of Testimony probably about four

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or five times now at this point, so I clearly understand all the dates, the
timeframes, and the manner by which things occurred”—explained:
And what concerns me the most, Mr. Murphy, is that you claim to not have
a good relationship with your father. I don’t know why you did this, but you
used him in order to get the first or the second payout on those Rolexes.
You had someone impersonate him in order to bolster your position that
those Rolexes were stolen.

Trouble is, the scheme involving Murphy’s father that “concern[ed the
district court] the most” was described only in the minutes of testimony. And
the conduct was neither admitted to by Murphy in his guilty pleas nor
necessary to establish a factual basis for the fraudulent-practice or insurance-
fraud offenses.

In a written guilty plea, Murphy admitted to engaging in insurance
fraud in June 2022 when he “did present to an insurer an oral statement in
support of a claim for payment, knowing that such statement contained false
information concerning a material fact, with the intent to defraud the
insurer.” During the plea hearing he likewise admitted to engaging in
fraudulent practice in September 2022 by creating a false purchase
agreement for two Rolex watches, overstating the value of the watches and
submitting it to his insurance company with the intent to defraud the
insurance company.

The minutes of testimony alleged that witnesses would testify that the
insurance company discovered Murphy had made an earlier insurance claim
to a different insurer for two allegedly stolen watches in December 2019. That
discovery caused further investigation showing that back in 2019, Murphy
had falsely claimed his father could corroborate the loss, gave a false phone
number for his father, had someone impersonate his father when the insurer
called, all resulting in a payment of nearly $10,000 to which Murphy was not

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entitled. None of this 2019 conduct gave a factual basis for the 2022 offenses.
And Murphy never otherwise admitted to it. So it was improper for the
district court to consider this 2019 conduct in selecting Murphy’s sentence.
See Black, 324 N.W.2d at 316.

The State argues that because Murphy did not object to the
presentence investigation report (“PSI”)—which “described that [Murphy]
submitted an insurance claim for the Rolexes in 2022 even though he had
claimed they were stolen in a claim in 2019”—it was proper for the court to
consider the minutes of testimony “to better understand the PSI.” But the
State offers no authority supporting that argument. And it runs afoul of
longstanding Iowa precedent prohibiting consideration of the minutes—
however illuminating they may be to understanding the offense—unless a
defendant admits to the information or it is otherwise proved. See id.

Murphy has met his burden to show that the district court considered
unproven conduct from the minutes of testimony. So we must vacate
Murphy’s sentences and remand for resentencing based on this error alone.
But as the other claimed errors of improper consideration of unproven
conduct may reoccur at resentencing, we proceed to address those claims too.

Other Pending Charges. Later in the district court’s explanation of
sentencing reasons, it explained:
And although I don’t take into consideration the facts associated with
anything that has not been either reduced down to a plea or a judgment,
while on probation—or excuse me, pretrial supervision, but I do take into
consideration the fact that something has been reported while you were on
pretrial supervision. While you are under the scrutiny of the Court, having
new charges come against you is pretty much a smack in the face to the
Court. So your character is still being defined not by the things that you
have said you’ve done with regard to the counseling and the biblical
studies, but by the actions that you’ve continued to practice the same

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manner of deception that you did at the time you got arrested for these
things.

And the court doubled down, concluding “that a prison term is the only
manner by which this is resolved . . . [b]ecause while on pretrial supervision,
you could not stop doing what you did before” and “[s]o the way I need to
stop you is to put you in an incarcerated setting in the prison system.”

Here again, the district court improperly considered unproven
criminal conduct. It is not enough to avoid considering the specific facts
underlying the pending charges. The court still considered that Murphy had
charges filed and the court held it against him—finding “you’ve continued
to practice the same manner of deception” and “you could not stop doing
what you did before.” But charges are mere allegations. Unless Murphy
admitted to the offenses with which he was charged or the State presented
other evidence to establish that he committed the offenses, there is
insufficient evidence for the court to find that Murphy “continued to practice
the same manner of deception” or “could not stop” committing offenses.1
So this error too entitles Murphy to resentencing.

Administrative Law Judge’s Unemployment Insurance Decision. The
district court also explained its concern that Murphy “defrauded the very
company that you wanted to build up” and “misrepresented information to
the company you worked for.” And the court explained “that doesn’t seem

1
The State correctly notes that Murphy’s pending charges were relevant to
assessing the State’s compliance with the plea agreement and its sentencing
recommendation. In the plea agreement, the State agreed it would recommend a
suspended sentence unless Murphy “fails to appear for sentencing as ordered or receives
any additional law violations or violations of pretrial supervision before sentencing.” But
the district court did not consider the pending charges for only this purpose. It considered
them as a key reason “that a prison term is the only manner by which this is resolved.”

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to be outside your character, because you did that problematically with
[another employer] when you were working with them.” The only
information about that other employer before the court was an administrative
law judge’s decision denying Murphy unemployment benefits because he
“was discharged for job-related misconduct” that was admitted as an exhibit
over Murphy’s objection. That decision detailed Murphy’s conduct in 2020
altering and depositing three payroll checks to fraudulently obtain more
money and altering an employment verification letter and paycheck
submitted to a credit union.

Murphy argues that the court could not consider this evidence because
“critical differences between administrative and criminal proceedings pose
high risk of improper consideration” and the “decision causes extreme
prejudice, as it is completely unrelated to the conduct giving rise to the
counts Murphy pled guilty to.” But Murphy has cited no authority holding
that a district court cannot consider the factual findings of an administrative
decision at sentencing. Nor do we see anything impermissible about the
district court’s consideration of the decision here.

A district court has broad discretion to consider evidence bearing on
its sentencing decision. And as the court aptly reasoned when admitting the
decision, “[i]t has similar characteristics with regard to the conduct” and
shows “the character and nature of [Murphy’s] patterns.” The court did not
treat the decision as binding at sentencing. Cf. Iowa Code § 96.6(4) (“A
finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made pursuant to
this section by an . . . administrative law judge . . . is binding only upon the
parties to proceedings brought under this chapter, and is not binding upon
any other proceedings or action involving the same facts brought by the same
or related parties before . . . [a] court, or judge of this state or the United

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States.”). Murphy had the chance to rebut its factual evidence—he just did
not do so. Murphy makes no claim that he was unfairly surprised—indeed,
the State filed its exhibit list with this decision twenty-four days before
sentencing. Cf. State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 282–83 (Iowa 1990). Neither
do we see any sign that the court mistakenly equated the denial of benefits
decided by the administrative law judge with a criminal conviction.

To be sure, the decision was hearsay evidence rather than direct sworn
testimony before the sentencing court. But the rules of evidence do not apply
at sentencing, and hearsay evidence is permissible. See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.1101(c)(4) (excepting “sentencing” as a proceeding at which “[t]he
Iowa Rules of Evidence—except for those on privilege—do not apply”); see
also State v. Delano, 161 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 1968) (“Once the guilt of the
accused has been properly established, the sentencing judge, in determining
the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed, is not restricted to evidence
derived from the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open
court but may, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, consider responsible unsworn or out-of-court information
relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person’s life
and characteristics.” (cleaned up)). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in considering the administrative law judge’s decision.

Illinois Guilty Pleas. Finally, Murphy challenges the district court’s
consideration of Illinois court records that were offered into evidence by the
State to provide more details about two offenses to which Murphy pleaded
guilty but were ultimately dismissed and expunged after his successful
completion of probation in January 2020. Murphy argues that it was
improper to consider these offenses because he was sentenced to “Second
Chance Probation” on one of them. See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-6-3.4 (2016).

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First, he highlights that his probation sentence under that statute is not
“considered a conviction under Illinois law” because he was successfully
discharged from probation. See id. at 5/5-6-3.4(a), (g). And second he
contends that “[u]nder Illinois law, a discharge and dismissal following
successful Second Chance Probation may only be introduced in sentencing
as aggravating evidence if the defendant is convicted of a subsequent offense
within five years of the discharge.”

Murphy’s arguments do not hold up. For starters, there is no basis in
the record to conclude that the district court considered the offenses as
convictions.2 And the Illinois court records—which Murphy’s counsel
agreed were authentic—showed that Murphy pleaded guilty to the offenses
and thus admitted to engaging in that conduct. So there was nothing
improper about the court considering that admitted criminal conduct in
selecting a sentence.

What’s more, even assuming that the Illinois statute regarding the
admissibility of the dismissed offenses as aggravating evidence at sentencing
in Illinois courts has any relevance to this Iowa proceeding, the offenses
would be admissible under the statute. That statute provides that “the
discharge and dismissal . . . shall be admissible in the sentencing proceeding
for [a] conviction” when “a person is convicted of any offense which
occurred within 5 years subsequent to a discharge and dismissal.”
Id. at 5/5-6-3.4(i). Under the statute, what matters is the date of the
“discharge and dismissal” and the date that the new offense “occurred.” Id.

2
The court said nothing specific about the Illinois offenses at all, aside from
generically saying that “I’ve read through all of the materials and information that have
been provided to the Court,” and “I have reviewed all of the exhibits that you have offered
in support of your position today.”

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If the new offense “occurred” within five years of the discharge, the
discharge is admissible. Id. Murphy’s focus on the date of conviction for the
new offense is thus misplaced. And because Murphy’s offense under the
Illinois statute was discharged in January 2020 and these new offenses
occurred in June and September 2022, they are well within the applicable
five-year window for admissibility under that statute. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in considering the Illinois court records.

We need not address Murphy’s other arguments. Because we are
vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing, his arguments that the
district court abused its discretion in selecting a prison sentence rather than
a deferred judgment and violated his constitutional right to due process by
considering unproven criminal conduct are both merely academic. On
remand, the district court will have the opportunity in the first instance to
select an appropriate sentence based on the newly developed record before
the court at the time of resentencing.

SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.

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