Douglas Matthew Moore v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-2061
Filed February 25, 2026
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Douglas Matthew Moore,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County,
The Honorable Shane M. Wiley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Douglas Moore appeals the denial of his postconviction relief (PCR)
application, following his conviction of assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11(3) (2022), an aggravated
misdemeanor. Moore was sentenced to two years in prison, lifetime sex
offender registration, and ten years of special parole under section 903B.2.
He argues ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his plea counsel failed
to (1) advise him of the consequences of his plea, particularly the ten-year
special parole, (2) seek a binding plea agreement, and (3) file a motion in
arrest of judgment. Because Moore did not meet his burden to show
ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In February 2023, Moore was charged with one count of sexual abuse
in the third degree, a class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code
sections 709.1 and 709.4(1)(a) for forcing a sex act on the victim. Moore and
the State reached a nonbinding plea agreement, and he pled guilty to assault
with intent to commit sexual abuse, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation
of sections 709.11(3), 692A.106, and 903B.2. The agreement recommended
a two-year suspended prison sentence, two years of supervised probation, a
lifetime sex offender registry requirement, and special parole for ten years
pursuant to section 903B.2. At the sentencing hearing both parties advocated
for the agreed-upon terms. The court accepted the written plea by written
order and later, at a sentencing hearing, imposed a two-year prison sentence
with credit for time served, lifetime sex offender registry requirement, and
special parole for ten years under section 903B.2.

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Moore filed several pro se motions to correct an illegal sentence, all of
which were denied. Then, in 2024, Moore applied for PCR and a trial was
held. The PCR court denied his application. Moore appeals.

II. Error Preservation.

The State contests error preservation of Moore’s third claim that his
plea counsel failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment. The State concedes
Moore raised all issues below at the PCR hearing but claims the court did not
consider or decide the claim involving plea counsel’s failure to file a motion
in arrest of judgment. Under this third challenge, Moore argued that the trial
court erred by not explaining the maximum and mandatory minimum
punishment that might result from the guilty plea and thus, his trial attorney
should have filed a motion in arrest of judgment.

To preserve issues for appellate review they “must ordinarily be both
raised and decided by the district court before we decide them on appeal.”
Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). The PCR court found
[Moore] essentially argues that his attorney and the sentencing
judge failed to inform of the consequences of his guilty plea to the crime of
Assault with Intent to Commit Sexual Abuse, an aggravated misdemeanor.
His major issue relates to his sentencing to the “special sentence”
provided for in Iowa Code Section 903B.2. The court finds that the
Application is without merit and denies the relief that is seeks.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(4) allows for written guilty
pleas to serious misdemeanors, aggravated misdemeanors, and nonforcible
class “D” felonies. A written plea is permissible so long as it:

(a) Demonstrates the defendant has been informed
of and understands the matters set forth in rule
2.8(2)(b)(1)–(9).

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(b) Discloses and acknowledges the terms of any
plea agreement, which shall also be acknowledged by the
State.

(c) Informs the defendant that any challenges to the
guilty plea based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings
must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that
failure to raise such challenges precludes or the right to
assert them on appeal.

The court’s review of the “Written Waiver of Rights & Plea of
Guilty” filed May 19, 2023, suggests that . . . [Moore] was fully informed
upon entering his plea. The document contains the information required
under 2.8(4)(a). The plea agreement is addressed on page 5 of the written
guilty plea with the State’s “Plea Proposal” attached. The handwritten
portion of the guilty plea and the plea proposal each refer to the ten-year
special sentence (903B.2).1 Finally, the 2.8(4)(c) requirements are met at
the top of page three with the Applicant initialing below the portion
informing him of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment to
challenge the plea proceeding.

Then, the court found that the plea was binding and denied Moore’s PCR
application in its entirety.

Upon review, the PCR court did not specifically identify each and
every specific issue raised at the PCR hearing. Instead, the PCR court
focused most of the ruling on Moore’s issue that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to advise him of the consequences of his plea,
particularly the ten-year special parole, and not his counsel’s failure to file a
motion in arrest of judgment. But while the court may have generalized all
of Moore’s specific arguments, it did decide that he was informed of the
consequences of his plea after reviewing the detailed written waiver of rights

1
Moore signed the written plea toward the bottom of page 4 and directly to the
left of the handwritten terms of the plea agreement.

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and plea of guilty. So, without specifically deciding whether error was
preserved, we decide to proceed to the merits.

III. Standard of Review.

Because PCR applications that allege ineffective assistance of counsel
implicate constitutional rights, our review is de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

IV. Analysis.

On appeal Moore argues his plea counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to (1) explain the
consequences of the ten-year special parole sentence under section 903B.2,
(2) seek a binding plea agreement, and (3) file a motion in arrest of judgment.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Moore must show both that
“(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted.”
State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa 2012); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We “may consider either the
prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will
preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (citation
omitted).

Failure to perform an essential duty is shown by proving that counsel
“perform[ed] below the standard demanded of a reasonably competent
attorney.” State v. Haas, 930 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted).
We strongly presume “that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. (citation omitted).

Prejudice is established by “showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the [claimant] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

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reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Moore must show by “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

We address each of Moore’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
in turn.

A. Plea Consequences. Moore argues his trial counsel failed to
explain “the relevant circumstances of his guilty plea” to him and thus he
was not fully informed. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the court must
establish the defendant’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, including
that the defendant was aware of “[t]he mandatory minimum punishment, if
any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining
the offense to which the plea is offered.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2). To
satisfy this requirement a defendant may sign a written document
demonstrating to the court that the defendant understands the procedures
set forth in rule 2.8(2)(b)(1)–(4). Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(5); see also State
v. Sutton, 853 N.W.2d 284, 294 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (discussing
requirements for written guilty pleas).

The record shows Moore was informed of the plea agreement terms
along with the potential sentence. He signed a written plea agreement that
referred to the ten-year special sentence under section 903B.2. The plea
agreement included a waiver of rights and specifically set out the range of
punishment related to the level of the charge. In the court order accepting
his plea agreement, the district court found “he fully underst[ood] the
consequences of his plea.” The court also noted that under the plea
agreement he would receive “special parole for 10 years pursuant to Iowa
Code 903B.2.” Moore’s only evidence that he was uninformed was his
personal testimony at the PCR trial. He claimed that he did not learn of the

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ten-year special parole under 903B.2 until after arrival at the correctional
facility to serve his sentence. This claim is further contradicted by the record.

At the sentencing hearing the State stated in specific terms the details
of the plea agreement. Then, Moore’s plea attorney stated, “[Moore]
understands that the probation would be initially for two years, and after that
there’s another ten-year special parole, and any violation could result in being
brought to court, revocation of the suspended sentence, and once that
probation ends, also, there could be issues with regards to parole.”

The sentencing court informed Moore that he was
sentenced to a special sentence, under 903B.2, committing you to the
custody of the director of the Iowa Department of Corrections for a period
of 10 years, with eligibility for parole. The special sentence imposed under
that section shall commence upon completion of the sentence imposed.
Under any applicable criminal sentence provision for the underlying
criminal offense, the person shall begin the sentence under supervision as
if on parole or work release.

Moore’s claim he was unaware of the potential consequences of the
agreement prior to his plea is unsupported by the record. See Doss v. State,
961 N.W.2d 701, 713–14 (Iowa 2021) (rejecting a defendant’s “claim that he
was misled by his counsel and later blindsided by the” special parole
agreements because it did “not ring true in light of everything that was said
at sentencing”). “[W]hen an applicant’s assertions [in postconviction
proceedings] concerning the knowing and intelligent nature of a guilty plea
are directly contradicted by the record, the applicant bears a special burden
to establish that the record is inaccurate.” Arnold v. State, 540 N.W.2d 243,
246 (Iowa 1995). Moore has not met this burden; the record clearly supports
the conclusion that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

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Because Moore cannot prove counsel’s failure to perform an essential
duty, this claim fails.

B. Binding Plea Agreement. Moore next claims ineffective
assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to enter a binding plea
agreement under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10. Trial courts have
“broad but not unlimited” discretion in choosing whether to accept a guilty
plea. State v. Hager, 630 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2001). If a plea agreement
is conditioned on the concurrence of the court in parties’ sentencing
agreement, “the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to acceptance or rejection until receipt of a presentence report.”
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(2). If the court accepts a plea agreement conditioned
on the court’s concurrence, then the court must impose the sentence in that
agreement or a sentence more favorable to the defendant. Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.10(3).

Moore’s trial counsel explained his reasoning for not pursuing a
binding plea agreement. He testified that the binding pleas under rule 2.10
were not common in the area and he “kn[e]w some judges don’t like it.”
Additionally, there was “generally a reluctance of the judges in [the] area to
accept them,” and he did not know if it would have been accepted by the
county attorney. Moore presented no evidence to the contrary.2

Moore failed to show that the State would have offered a binding plea
deal. See Russell v. State, No. 10-2079, 2013 WL 2371207, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 30, 2013) (holding no ineffective assistance of counsel in part when
there was “no indication in the record that the prosecutor had any inclination

2
The PCR court also indicated in the order denying the PCR application, that
although he was recently appointed, he was unaware of judges in the area allowing plea
agreements that bound the court.

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to offer a better plea deal to” the defendant). Nor did Moore present any
evidence that the court would have accepted a plea conditioned on approval
from the court. And it was not a “choice” by plea counsel because a binding
plea agreement also required that the State accept that term, which it had not
in its plea proposal. Thus, Moore failed to prove that but for his counsel’s
“choice” to not pursue a binding plea agreement, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Because Moore failed to prove
prejudice, we affirm on this issue.

C. Motion in Arrest of Judgment. Finally, Moore claims that his
“trial counsel failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment once it was clear
that [he] was not properly informed of the consequences of the plea.”
Specifically, Moore contends that he was not “informed of the maximum
possible punishment that might result from his plea.” As discussed above,
the record shows that he was informed of the consequences of his plea. Filing
a motion in arrest of judgment on the claim that he was not properly informed
would not have changed the result of the proceedings because Moore was
properly informed. We affirm because Moore fails to prove prejudice on this
issue.

V. Conclusion.

All of Moore’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail. Moore
failed to prove counsel’s failure to perform an essential duty to inform him of
his potential consequences under section 903B.2. He could not prove
prejudice on his remaining two issues of counsel’s failures to seek a binding
plea agreement or to file a motion in arrest of judgment. Thus, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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