Ryan Lutze v. Tony L. Seitz and Rebecca A. Seitz

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0250
Filed February 11, 2026
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Ryan Lutze,
Petitioner/Counterclaim Respondent-Appellee,
v.
Tony L. Seitz and Rebecca A. Seitz,
Respondents/Counterclaim Petitioners-Appellants.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Allamakee County,
The Honorable Alan T. Heavens, Judge.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED
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Abram V. Carls (argued), and Joseph J. Porter of Simmons Perrine Moyer
Bergman PLC, Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellants.

Jeremy L. Thompson (argued) of Thompson Casper, P.L.L.C., Decorah,
attorney for appellee.
_______________

Heard at oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

1
SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Tony and Rebecca Seitz appeal an order recognizing an easement by
implication on their property for ingress and egress to Ryan Lutze’s
neighboring property. Because an easement was neither continuously and
obviously used nor reasonably necessary at the time the parties’ properties
were separated, the district court erred in granting Lutze’s claim for an
easement by implication and Lutze’s claim for an easement by necessity also
fails. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for further
proceedings.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In April 2001, Jason Brink purchased a 159-acre property in rural
Allamakee County. Brink divided the property “in two pieces”—a 17-acre
“old-building-site area” with a few dilapidated foundations and a 142-acre
“tillable-woods area” with timber, grasses, and hunting ground.

In September 2001, Brink sold the smaller parcel to Seitz.1 Seitz, who
lived nearby in Lansing, wanted to build a house “in the country.” Seitz’s
property is legally described as “Lot 1 of the Northeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter and Lot 1 of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 11, Township 98 North, Range 4 West of the 5th P.M., in
Allamakee County, Iowa.”

In April 2004, Brink sold the remaining, larger parcel to Lutze.2 Lutze,
who lived in Minnesota, did not intend to build a house on the property.

1
For simplicity, references to “Seitz” include the Seitzes collectively and Tony
Seitz individually.
2
Lutze purchased the property on an installment contract and took immediate
possession. He received a warranty deed in 2008 upon fulfillment of the contract.

2
Instead, he planned to use it for recreational purposes, including hunting.3
When he purchased the property, Lutze understood it was priced favorably
compared to other properties, “maybe by ten percent,” due to a “potential
access issue.”4 Lutze’s property is legally described as:
The West Half of the Northeast Quarter; the Northeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter except Lot 1 therein; Lot 1 of the Southeast Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter; Lot 1 of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter; and Lot 1 of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, all
in Section 11, Township 98 North, Range 4 West of the 5th P.M., in
Allamakee County, Iowa.

On the map below, Seitz’s property ends in *0009 and Lutze’s
property ends in *0010.

3
Lutze later began farming some areas, and he also enrolled grounds in the
Conservation Reserve Program.
4
Lutze did not speak with Brink about an easement or access to the property.

3
Both properties abut Schaffer Hollow Road, a public roadway. In 2001,
when Seitz purchased his property, a deep ditch with “an old wood-plank
bridge” separated Seitz’s parcel from Schaffer Hollow Road, and a thin “rock
path” led into the western side of the property. According to Seitz, “from
there on you couldn’t get up” into the rest of his property because “eight, ten
feet deep,” “washed out” gullies prevented further travel. He described his
property as a valley, with different pieces of ground coming together.

The next spring, Seitz borrowed a bulldozer and with the help of a
neighbor, he moved dirt across the ditch to make “a way to get in there” so
he could start preparing the ground for a concrete crew to pour a foundation
for his home. After consulting with a foreman from the bridge company he
worked for, Seitz installed a beam to “prop up” the old wood bridge to get
small loads of concrete across it.5

Later in 2002, Seitz hired a crew to have more bulldozing done to
reshape and level his property because, due to “the way it was washed out,”
he couldn’t access fields on the other side. As Seitz explained, “So we had [a
bulldozer] come and kind of level it out a little bit so we could get up and
access this property” to “cut hay” and “put food plots in.” The excavation
created a path northeast from Seitz’s home to the “corner post” where the
northeast corner of Seitz’s parcel met the northwest corner of Lutze’s future
parcel, as shown by the arrow in the picture below.

5
Seitz acknowledged “it cost us a lot more because they were more trucks coming,
but that’s all we could get across it at the time.” According to Seitz, three or four years
later, “the county came in and replaced [the bridge]” with a steel culvert after Seitz was
“on them about it because it was pretty rickety.”

4
After Seitz completed the leveling, Brink first accessed his remaining
parcel through Seitz’s property, using the corner-post path. According to
Seitz, over the next few years, Brink used the path “once or twice” to “do a
little bit of hunting” on the other parcel, and he invited Seitz to join his
hunting group.

As noted, Lutze purchased his property in 2004. Lutze used the
corner-post path to get to his property, which Seitz viewed as a neighborly
“trade” because Lutze sometimes allowed Seitz to hunt on his property.
Seitz noticed that as Lutze started using the corner-post path “more and
more,” he left “ruts going up the hill.” Meanwhile, Seitz also had a problem
with rock getting washed out and “ruts were coming down [his] driveway.”
So around 2008, Seitz decided to regrade his property again, building
terraces to control ruts and water runoff. At that point, the corner-post path
was removed and Seitz rerouted a new grassy path in his yard southeast
around his home toward Lutze’s parcel, as shown by the arrow below. That
path remains in place today and is the subject of this appeal.

5
After the new path was created, Lutze constructed a shed on his
property, located near the entrance of the path to his property. Lutze used
the shed for hunting trips and storage. 6

In 2010, Lutze hired a forester, Mark Webb, to advertise and sell
timber from his property. Webb’s advertisement of Lutze’s property required
that a logging road be constructed along Lutze’s property “further down the
main road” in order to remove logs. In 2011, a timber sale took place, and the
successful bidder built a logging road connecting to Schaffer Hollow Road to
remove trees from Lutze’s property. Webb described the road as “basically a
diagonal road across the hill and down,” “[j]ust wide enough for a—say a
straight truck or what we call a pre-hauler in the timber industry, dual

6
The zoning administrator testified that the building and holding tank built by
Lutze do not have an approved permit, as Lutze did not make application with the county
prior to building the same.

6
wheels,” but “not big enough for a semi.” Webb also believed “a tractor,
maybe a narrow plow or disc would make it up and down.”

After the logging road was put in, Lutze continued to use Seitz’s path
to access his property. Lutze testified he helped maintain the path on Seitz’s
property by spreading “seed on there” and he used some crushed rock “to
reenforce [a] low spot.”

The neighborly relations changed in early 2023, when Lutze started
having “all these people” to his property. Seitz also stated that Lutze used
the path when it was wet, which “destroy[ed] it.” At that point, Seitz
informed Lutze that he could no longer use the path through his yard. Lutze
presented Seitz with a proposed agreement for an ingress/egress easement,
which Seitz ignored. Lutze also offered “maybe doing a land swap so we
could trade a couple acres and allow me to get a driveway going up there.”
Lutze then initiated this action by filing a petition to establish an easement by
implication or necessity “for ingress/egress on and over [Seitz’s] driveway
and real estate.” Seitz filed an answer challenging Lutze’s claims and
counterclaiming to quiet title to his property.

Meanwhile, the extra traffic on Seitz’s path coincided with Lutze’s
decision to sell his property. Lutze hired Nicholas Hopp, an agricultural and
recreational land broker, to auction the land. After Seitz refused to allow
Hopp to bring potential bidders through his yard, Hopp learned there
“wasn’t a legal easement.” Although Lutze’s parcel assessed for over
$1.1 million and Hopp received “[f ]airly strong interest” prior to the auction,
the highest bid it received was “about $350,000 short of that.” Lutze
believed “it was the easement question that was resulting in the drop in
value” and decided not to proceed with the sale.

7
The case proceeded to a bench trial, during which the court received
numerous exhibits and heard testimony from the parties and other witnesses.
Ultimately, the court declared an easement in favor of Lutze over Seitz’s
property and dismissed Seitz’s counterclaim. In its order, the court focused
on Lutze’s easement-by-implication claim, agreeing with Lutze that Seitz’s
driveway was “the only reasonable way that Lutze can enjoy his property.”
The court further found that “[t]o the extent that Iowa law allows Lutze, as
a remote grantor, to make a claim for an easement by necessity, Lutze has
established all elements of that claim by clear and convincing evidence as
well.” The court ordered that “Lutze may create and record a plat of survey
of this permanent ingress and egress easement at Lutze’s expense.”

Seitz filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend, pursuant to Iowa
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), and the court entered an order clarifying
its ruling against Seitz in several respects. Seitz appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This matter was tried in equity, so our review is de novo. Iowa R. App.
P. 6.907; Myers v. Myers, 955 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). Our job
is to “examine the entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues
properly presented.” Alcor Life Extension Found. v. Richardson, 785 N.W.2d
717, 722 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). We give weight to the district court’s factual
determinations, especially concerning witness credibility, but they do not
bind us.7 Myers, 955 N.W.2d at 229.

7
As Lutze points out, Seitz’s brief “spends a considerable amount of time
attacking Brink’s testimony and credibility in arguing that the District Court erred in
relying upon it,” but “credibility is for the factfinder.” Indeed, “[w]ith de novo review, we
are able to consider the entire record and formulate our own conclusions.” Easton-Cole v.
Williamson, No. 22-0734, 2023 WL 2671910, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023).

8
DISCUSSION
“There are four ways to create an easement: (1) by express grant or
reservation, (2) by prescription, (3) by necessity, and (4) by implication.”
Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Iowa 2004). Lutze has not
claimed an easement by written grant or prescription. Rather, his claim is
based solely on rights he maintains arose either by implication or necessity.
Because the district court focused on Lutze’s easement-by-implication claim,
we start there.

I. Easement by Implication

“An easement by implication is one which the law imposes by inferring
the parties to a transaction intended that result, although they did not express
it.” Brede v. Koop, 706 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Schwob v. Green,
215 N.W.2d 240, 242–43 (Iowa 1974)). It arises under the following
conditions:
(1) a separation of the title; (2) a showing that, before the separation took
place, the use giving rise to the easement was so long continued and
obvious that it was manifest it was intended to be permanent; and (3) it
must appear that the easement is continuous rather than temporary, and
(4) that it is essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or
retained.

Id. (citation omitted). Relating to the fourth element, our supreme court has
observed that “[a]n easement is ʻessential’ when it is reasonably necessary,
as distinguished from being merely convenient.” Id.

Here, the district court found there was “no real dispute over the first
three elements,” and “[t]he fourth element is the pivotal one.” On that
element, the court concluded that Lutze’s use of Seitz’s driveway and path
was reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of his property. In
reaching that conclusion, the court rejected the idea that “Brink could have

9
built an access road off Schaffer Hollow Road,” despite having one-half mile
of road frontage. The court reasoned, “Brink wouldn’t think of doing that
because he already had a perfectly fine access road [on Seitz’s property]
which he was expecting to have going forward.” The court acknowledged
that a logging access road was later added to Lutze’s frontage but found it was
“too narrow for modern-day farm equipment.” Finally, the court found that
necessary modifications to the access road’s slope gradient were
“prohibit[ed]” by an Allamakee County bluffland protection ordinance and
a “discretionary variance” would be needed before such modifications could
be made.

Although the court did not elaborate much on the other elements,
relating to the second element of whether the use of the alleged “easement
was so long continued and obvious before 2001 that it was manifest it was
intended to be permanent,” the court found:
Jason Brink testified credibly about how he and his invitees used the
property from 2001 to 2004, and Brink made no distinction on how the
easement area was used between before September 2001 and after
September 2001 when title was severed. The frequency, extent, and
character of the entire time of pre-existing use is the same as the frequency,
extent, and character of the post-existing use.

An inherent problem with these findings is that they mainly depend on
facts and circumstances that occurred after the time a viable easement-by-
implication claim arose. “Whether an easement by implied reservation is
created is primarily a question of the intent of the parties,” which is “to be
inferred by the circumstances of the transaction.” Bray v. Hardy, 82 N.W.2d
671, 674 (Iowa 1957). In other words, “[t]he intent to grant or reserve an
easement by implication must be determined as of the time of the severance of
the unity of ownership.” Brede, 706 N.W.2d at 830 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). And “[a] reservation of an easement will be less readily implied

10
than a grant thereof.” Bray, 82 N.W.2d at 673. Upon our review, we cannot
find by clear and convincing evidence a showing of any of the necessary
elements aside from separation of title.8

Relating to the second element, the evidence shows that Brink could
not have intended to reserve an ingress/egress easement over a path or other
access way through Seitz’s property because no such access existed at the
time Brink separated the properties. Seitz’s wife, Rebecca, testified that
when she and Seitz walked the property, it was “overgrown” and “washed
out.” Rebecca testified there was no way anyone “could get a vehicle up into
Mr. Lutze’s property . . . when [they] purchased it back in 2001.” Seitz
testified that the “rock path” leading into the property ended on the western
side of the parcel and he was unable to get to his fields on the other side of
his property until “sometime in 2002”—after he built his home and
subsequently bulldozed, leveled, and reshaped the surrounding grounds.
According to Seitz, it was only then that Brink “started” using the new
corner-post path to access the other parcel.

Brink’s testimony on this point was no more availing. Brink stated that
he purchased his property for “[m]ainly hunting” and “to resell down the
road.” He maintained that he couldn’t remember looking at the property
when he bought it in April 2001, but “obviously” he did. Brink only had title
to both properties for five months. During that time, Brink couldn’t recall
how many times he was on Seitz’s parcel specifically, but he “thought they
8
Because Brink had unity of ownership of the properties for five months in 2001,
the first element was established. See Fink v. Lawson, No. 23-1845, 2025 WL 407303, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025) (observing “an entity must first have unity of ownership
of the properties to then be able to separate the titles”), vacated on other grounds by, Fink
v. Lawson, ___ N.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 70528 (Iowa 2026).

11
probably did some cleanup.” Brink thought he rented Lutze’s parcel to a farm
tenant at some point, but he couldn’t remember. Brink also didn’t recall how
a farm tenant would have accessed Lutze’s parcel; he acknowledged they
could have “came through a neighbor’s field or something of that nature.”

Brink’s vague testimony does not support a finding that he was on
Lutze’s parcel on any instances during that same period. And given the
timing of hunting seasons, Brink agreed he was not on the property to deer
hunt between April and September 2001 (which, according to Brink, would
have required access through Seitz’s property to reach the farther parcel),
and he didn’t “know if turkey season’s in there or not.” In short, there is no
evidence that anyone used a path through Seitz’s parcel to access Lutze’s
parcel during the five months Brink owned both properties. See Fink, 2025
WL 407303, at *4 (finding the plaintiffs could not establish the second
element for an easement-by-implication claim, because there was “no
evidence that anyone used the path from lot 21 cutting through lots 19 and
20 during the forty-six days” of mutual ownership); Gibson v. Hatfield,
No. 09-1918, 2010 WL 5394445, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2010) (finding
the plaintiff presented “no evidence regarding the activities giving rise to
beneficial enjoyment on the rear portion of [her] land nor evidence
establishing the necessity of the [gravel road] easement prior to the
separation” of the properties).

Moreover, specifically relating to intent, Brink stated he had “a lot of
different properties [he’d] bought and sold” over the years. He did not recall
whether there was an easement on Seitz’s, although he “would have thought
there would have been.” However, given his familiarity with real estate, he
agreed that if he “intended to reserve an easement,” “that’s something you
do in writing.” Indeed, a survey of the two properties prepared for Brink in

12
July 2001 showed “[n]o easements besides the county road, Schaffer Hollow
Road easement.” At best, Brink’s “testimony was ambiguous with respect to
his intent to create an easement,” and it “fell short of establishing an intent
to create an easement.” See Gibson, 2010 WL 5394445, at *6.

Although Lutze’s claim fails on the second element,9 we also address
the fourth element, as our analysis also implicates Lutze’s easement-by-
necessity claim. Here, Lutze’s property had one-half mile of frontage on a
public roadway—more frontage than Seitz’s property. In short, Lutze’s
property was not landlocked; there were ways to reach the property other
than through Seitz’s property. Compare Brede, 706 N.W.2d at 831 (finding the
defendants had not reserved a driveway easement despite knowing the
plaintiff’s property would become landlocked because they had contracted to
provide for an access easement “along the eastern edge of the parcel”) with
Bray, 82 N.W.2d at 675 (determining an established sidewalk over the
defendant’s property was reasonably necessary for the use of the plaintiff’s
property because “[t]here is no way of reaching plaintiff’s front door except
by this walk”).

Inconvenience or expense is not the type of “necessity” that shows
Brink intended to reserve an easement. See Schwob, 215 N.W.2d at 244
(acknowledging “it would be both inconvenient and expensive to provide
access” to public roads on either side of the defendant’s property, “but mere
inconvenience or expediency is not the sort of ʻnecessity’ which permits a
finding the parties must therefore have intended to grant such an easement”).

9
Coupled with this determination, we also conclude the evidence does not
support the third element—that the easement was continuous rather than temporary.

13
Indeed, Lutze admitted he could have alleviated his “access problem” by
constructing a driveway directly to his property at the time he purchased it:
Q. You acknowledge you could have put an access point off
Schaffer Hollow Road after you took possession in 2004? A. It would have
been cost prohibitive, but legally, with the county permission, I believe I
could have.

Q. When you say “cost prohibitive,” what do you mean by cost
prohibitive? A. That the estimates at the time would have been probably
around 20 percent of the overall purchase price of the property. Not
something I was able to afford.

Q. The estimates that you’re talking about were estimates that you
gave yourself; correct? These are not estimates that you sought
professionally? A. Yeah. I believe the culvert I got a $15,000 for two-
culvert estimate at the time, and then the rest I was just able to factor in
dozer time and gravel cost and things like that, yep.

Q. And certainly something that you could have done; correct?
A. Legally, yes.

As an aside, we observe that in 2011, Lutze gained access directly to
his parcel via the logging road. Although some of Lutze’s witnesses testified
that the logging road, as currently constructed and maintained, was not a
“suitable primary access point” for Lutze’s property, they did not dispute
the fact that the road allowed ingress to and egress from the parcel. Even
Lutze agreed the logging road provided access to the “top of the hill,” which
opened up to the rest of his parcel:
Q. You’re also not disputing your ability to access your property
along Schaffer Hollow Road; correct? A. What do you mean by “access”?

Q. You can get onto your property—A. Yes.

....

Q. And you’re not disputing that there is an existing driveway
today that will get you from the bottom of Schaffer Hollow Road—from

14
Schaffer Hollow Road to the hilltop on your property; correct? A. Just
disputing that it wasn’t intended to be a driveway. It’s a logging road that
does connect the road to the property.

Q. Can you drive on it? A. Rarely, but yeah.

Q. It’s a way to drive; correct? A. Correct.

Finally, we are not persuaded by Lutze’s reliance on the county’s
bluffland protection ordinance or other zoning restrictions as precluding
access to his property. Lutze admitted he “ha[d]n’t had any of [his] property
surveyed to see if it all falls within the bluffland protections.” And the
ordinance was enacted in 2008, years after the relevant timeframe for
establishing an easement by implication. Lutze cannot rely on post-property-
separation developments, changed circumstances, or current needs to
establish an implied easement. Rather, the evidence centers on the
circumstances at the time of property separation. See Brede, 706 N.W.2d at
831. Moreover, Lutze agreed he had not submitted any zoning-related
application to the county engineer or the county board of adjustment. Nor
had his property been surveyed to determine whether it fell within the
bluffland protected area. In sum, Lutze has not proven an easement by
implied reservation. See id.

II. Easement by Necessity

The district court also found Lutze had established an easement by
necessity. “An easement by necessity is a form of implied easement, but it is
separate . . . .” Nichols, 687 N.W.2d at 568 (internal citation omitted). “One
significant difference is that an easement by implication requires a showing
the parties intended such a right to exist. An easement by necessity involves
no such intent.” Schwob, 215 N.W.2d at 244; see also Nichols, 687 N.W.2d at
568–69 (listing the elements of both claims).

15
To establish an easement-by-necessity claim, the claiming party “must
establish: (1) unity of title to the dominant and servient estates at some point
prior to severance, (2) severance of title, and (3) necessity of the easement.”
Nichols, 687 N.W.2d at 568. This doctrine “is most commonly applied when
a landowner parcels out a landlocked portion of his or her land and conveys
it to another.” Id.; see JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Nichols, No. 12-0301, 2013
WL 85779, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (“Where there is a conveyance
of a landlocked portion of a larger tract of land, which has access to a public
road, the courts find there was implied in the conveyance an easement by
necessity so as to permit the owner of the landlocked portion access to his or
her land.”).

The district court acknowledged “an extra challenge” to this claim,
namely, that Lutze was not an immediate party to the transaction. See Schwob,
215 N.W.2d at 244 (Iowa 1974) (distinguishing easement-by-implication and
easement-by-necessity claims and noting “[a]n easement by necessity
ordinarily may not be claimed by any except the immediate parties to the
transaction”). In Schwob, the court found that “[u]nder that rule,” the
defendant’s easement-by-necessity claim to an access road “would fail,”
because he purchased his parcel two years after the property was separated.
Id. More recently, however, a panel of this court characterized Schwob’s
remote-grantee statement as “not controlling” “dicta,” because the Schwob
court had already found an easement by necessity could not exist because the
property at issue had access to a public road. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2013
WL 85779, at *4–5. We can avoid the lack of clarity on that question for the
same reason.

Here, it is undisputed that Lutze’s property has access to Schaffer
Hollow Road, a public roadway. Accordingly, “there was no need to establish

16
an easement by necessity.” Id. at *5; Kroeze v. Scott, No. 07-0995, 2008
WL 680748, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008) (concluding an easement by
necessity was not shown because the plaintiffs “have access by foot or tractor
to their property”). But see Poweshiek Twp. v. Robert F. Gannon Separate Prop.
Tr. Dated Dec. 10, 2015, No. 20-0297, 2021 WL 3073771, at *8 (Iowa Ct.
App. July 21, 2021) (finding an easement was necessary because it provided
the only access for the public to the cemetary). Accordingly, Lutze has not
proven his claim by clear and convincing evidence.

DISPOSITION
Because an easement was neither continuously and obviously used nor
reasonably necessary at the time the parties’ properties were separated, the
district court erred in granting Lutze’s claim for an easement by implication
and Lutze’s claim for an easement by necessity also fails. Accordingly, we
reverse the order establishing an easement on Seitz’s property for ingress and
egress. We remand to the district court for entry of an order quieting title in
favor of Seitz.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

17