In re the Marriage of Wilker

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0323
Filed January 28, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Joseph William Wilker and Megan Sue Wilker
Upon the Petition of
Joseph William Wilker,
Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning
Megan Sue Wilker n/k/a Megan Sue Schollmeyer,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jamie A. Splinter of Splinter Law Office, Dubuque, attorney for appellant.

Kevin Stinn of Swartz & Stinn Law, PLLC, Waukon, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

1
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Megan Schollmeyer appeals an order modifying the physical care and
child support provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to Joseph
Wilker. Megan also contests the district court’s award of trial attorney fees,
and both parties request appellate attorney fees. Upon our review, we affirm
the district court’s modification order, and we decline to award appellate
attorney fees to either party.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Megan and Joseph married in 2008 and divorced in 2016. Their two
children, M.W. and B.W., were born in 2010 and 2012. The parties’ stipulated
decree ordered joint legal custody, physical care with Megan, and weekly
visitation to Joseph “from Friday after school to Sunday night.”1

Joseph remained in the family home in Garnavillo. Megan began
another relationship and moved to Wisconsin. That relationship ended, and
after several moves, Megan eventually settled in Dubuque, approximately
one hour from Joseph’s home in Garnavillo. After the parties’ divorce,
Joseph “still wanted to pursue a relationship” with Megan. But after
approximately five years, Joseph realized they “were officially done.”
Meanwhile, Megan began a relationship with Jeff in 2021, whom she married
in 2023. Joseph began a relationship with Jamie in 2022, whom he married
later that year. Jamie and her two teenage children moved into the Garnavillo
home.

By all accounts, the parties’ co-parenting relationship went smoothly
until 2022. Their ability to co-parent began to decline when Joseph, for the

1
The parties agreed to “one week ‘on’ one week ‘off’” summer visitation.

2
first time since the divorce, began a new relationship. Megan stated that
M.W., who was diagnosed with autism in 2018, “struggles with change” and
had “sensory overload” with Joseph’s new relationship. Megan complained
that Joseph’s relationship progressed too quickly for M.W. and B.W., and
“they didn’t have the option of getting a bond with Jamie beforehand.”
Megan also stated that she and Joseph had retained “a very close friendship,”
which “just suddenly changed drastically” when Joseph and Jamie got
together. Megan admitted she was “a very jealous mom” and she wished that
she and Joseph could “still co-parent” the same way.

Joseph noticed that “as soon as” he told Megan he was moving on with
another person, “child support became an issue.” Per the parties’ decree,
Joseph was ordered to pay $250 per month in child support. In November
2022, Joseph and Megan entered a handwritten agreement that Joseph would
pay $869 per month.2 But by early 2024, Joseph felt like the parties “had
gotten so far into the woods with . . . not being able to co-parent,” and he
reverted to paying the original amount of child support ordered by the court.

Meanwhile, a poignant event took place in early February 2024. Joseph
recalled that M.W. and B.W. had “a very typical weekend” in Garnavillo. As
the children left on Sunday to return to Megan’s house, M.W. “gave Jamie a
hug,” “expressed how much she enjoyed the weekend,” and stated she was
“looking forward to being here next weekend.” A few days later, Megan and
Joseph had an argument, and according to Joseph, things “spiraled” from
there. Within a few days, M.W. had an incident at school, during which she
became “distraught and inconsolable.”

2
They did not file the agreement with the court.

3
The next day, Megan took M.W. to the emergency room, reporting that
M.W. expressed that she “wanted to hurt Jamie” and herself. While at the
hospital, Megan had a teleconference with a psychiatrist. According to
Megan, the psychiatrist recommended that M.W. have “a break from dad”
and participate in counseling to “feel better about going back to dad’s.”
Megan stated that after the hospitalization, M.W. “spent a lot of time in the
bedroom, very depressed” and was unable to articulate her feelings.

M.W.’s hospitalization “took [ Joseph] by surprise” because he felt
things had been going well. Joseph believed M.W. had developed a close
relationship with Jamie, whose younger child was the same age as M.W. and
was also on the autism spectrum. Joseph initially agreed to have visits with
only B.W., but he soon began to resist Megan’s refusal to bring M.W. to visits,3
maintaining there was another “side of the story.” Although Megan refused
to bring M.W. to visits, she told Joseph she would allow him to see M.W. “on
[her] time” if he came to see the children at her house.

In March, Megan filed a petition for modification, requesting sole legal
custody of the children and reduction of Joseph’s parenting time. To support
her petition, Megan alleged the following change of circumstances:
A. [M.W.] has had significant mental health issues recently. Her doctor
has advised she should not return to [Joseph]’s care until family counseling is
accomplished.

B. When [M.W.] is at [Joseph]’s home for parenting time, [Joseph]
refuses to allow [M.W.] to have contact with [Megan].

C. The stepmom, Jamie Wilker, has been emotionally abusive to
[M.W.].

3
Joseph filed an application for rule to show cause based on Megan’s refusals to
comply with the decree’s visitation schedule. The application was dismissed by the court.

4
D. [Joseph] and stepmom tell [M.W.] that [M.W.] will go to prison
if [M.W.] lies.

E. [M.W.] has escalated to threatening to self-harm because of the fear
she has of going to [Joseph]’s home. [M.W.] was seen at the Finley Emergency
Department and is getting further care from Dubuque Pediatric Psychiatry, and
Covenant Family Solutions.

Joseph filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting the court maintain
joint legal custody and modify the decree to place physical care of the children
with him and order reasonable visitation for Megan. Joseph agreed with Megan
that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the
decree was entered,4 including:
A. [Megan] has refused to have [M.W.] participate in visitation with
[Joseph] since February 2024;

B. [Megan] has refused to support the relationship between [Joseph] and
[M.W.];

C. [Megan] has encouraged [M.W.]’s lack of participation in family
counseling with [Joseph] and his wife; and

D. [M.W.]’s mental health continues to deteriorate because of [Megan]’s
projections of her issues with [Joseph] onto the child.

Joseph further alleged his “home is better suited to handle a child with special
needs such as [M.W.]’s.”

Around this time, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
initiated a child abuse assessment concerning allegations that Jamie was “locking
[M.W.] in her room for extended periods of time,” M.W. “does not feel safe with

4
Specifically, the district court noted that Joseph “argues there is no change of
circumstance to justify the modification but alternatively argues that if the Court finds a
change, that he be awarded primary care of the minor children and appropriate child
support.”

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Jamie,” and Joseph “refuse[d] to suspend visitation despite knowing the trauma
it is causing [M.W.]” The department determined the allegations were
unfounded.

In April, Megan brought M.W. to the emergency room again because
M.W. stated that “she was planning to hurt herself.” M.W. spent two weeks
in inpatient treatment. Shortly thereafter, M.W. “changed her story”; she
acknowledged she had fabricated the allegations about Jamie and stated she
was not fearful of Joseph’s home. The parties, as well as M.W.’s medical
providers, agreed she “struggles” with telling the truth at times, which is
common for children with autism. Throughout this turmoil, Joseph
maintained that M.W.’s behavior at his home “doesn’t match” what Megan
described. At the same time, the parties agreed their younger child, B.W., was
doing well and had adapted given the circumstances.

Trial took place over three days in December. At the close of trial,
Megan retracted her request for sole legal custody but stated she did not want
to dismiss her petition.5 She filed a proposal asking for physical care to remain
the same except “that she gets weekend time with the children, specifically
every other weekend,” and that “the summer schedule . . . remain[s] as the
school year schedule, with the change that Megan gets weekends as
requested.” She also asked that Joseph pay child support “based on the child

5
In her brief on appeal, Megan states, “Nowhere in the trial did Megan ask for
sole legal custody,” which the district court “takes significant offense to.” Yet Megan’s
petition specifically requested an order of sole legal custody. But at the end of the third
day of trial, Megan stated, “I would still like [ Joseph] to be able to have some decision-
making.” The court responded, “I can’t do that,” and explained that if an order for sole
custody was issued it would “cut this man out completely.”

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support guidelines,” “back date[d] to three months from the filing of the
petition.”

The district court found a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred. Specifically, the court noted that although the parties had co-
parented well for a few years after they divorced and neither was remarried,
“the hammer fell” when Joseph “decided to move on” and got remarried to
Jamie. The court found that since then, “Megan has placed M.W. in a
position of polarity with her feelings for both parents, which has caused her
mental anguish contributing to her attempts at self-harm.” After weighing
the parties’ relative caretaking abilities and the best interests of the children,
the court found Joseph “is the better parent to provide care to the girls,
especially M.W.”

Accordingly, the court modified the decree to place physical care with
Joseph. The court ordered visitation for Megan on the second, third, and
fourth weekends each month, from after school on Friday to Monday
morning, and alternating weeks in the summer. The court ordered Megan to
pay $622 per month in child support.6 Finally, the court ordered Megan to
pay $13,000 toward Joseph’s attorney fees. Megan appeals.

II. Standard of Review

An action to modify a decree of dissolution of marriage is an equitable
proceeding, which we review de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage
of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015). “While we are not bound by the
fact-findings of the district court, we give them weight, especially as to
credibility determinations.” Venechuk v. Landherr, 20 N.W.3d 471, 475 (Iowa

6
When only one child qualifies for child support, the amount is reduced to $421
per month.

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2025) (citation omitted). The children’s best interests are our primary
consideration. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(n); Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32. We
also review issues concerning child support de novo. Markey v. Carney, 705
N.W.2d 13, 19 (Iowa 2005).

III. Modification of Physical Care

Megan challenges the court’s modification of physical care. She
reasons that if the district court found that shared care is “appropriate . . .
during the summer, then primary care should have remained with her as the
primary care parent and Joseph failed to meet his very heavy burden of a
material and substantial change in circumstances.” Megan further claims
Joseph failed to show “that he and his home would be superior for the girls,
specifically M.W.”

The principles relating to modification of the physical-care provisions
of a dissolution decree are well-established:
To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the applying
party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that conditions since
the decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that the
children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change.
The changed circumstances must not have been contemplated by the court
when the decree was entered, and they must be more or less permanent, not
temporary. They must relate to the welfare of the children. A parent seeking
to take custody from the other must prove an ability to minister more
effectively to the children’s well being. The heavy burden upon a party
seeking to modify custody stems from the principle that once custody of
children has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent
reasons.

In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983).

Here, the district court found that after reviewing all the relevant
factors, a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred

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since the decree that would justify changing the physical-care provisions of
the parties’ dissolution decree. Indeed, the parties agreed there was sufficient
change in circumstances for modification in that they were no longer able to
co-parent effectively and the children, especially M.W., were being impacted
to their detriment by the turmoil and lack of consistency between their
parents’ households.7 “Discord between parents that has a disruptive effect
on children’s lives has been held to be a substantial change of circumstance
warranting modification of a custody decree.” In re Marriage of Malloy, 687
N.W.2d 110, 114 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004); see also Rolling v. Hoffman, No. 14-
0102, 2014 WL 2600315, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 11, 2014) (“In custody
modification cases, stability is the trump card.”). Under the facts and
circumstances presented here, the parents’ inability to resolve issues
between them and prioritize the children’s best interests made their previous
physical-care arrangement unworkable. We concur with the court that Joseph
has shown a substantial change of circumstances.

We turn to whether Joseph has shown he can render superior care.
Joseph continues to live in the family home, where he has lived for more than
ten years. He has been employed at the same company since 2017. Joseph
lives with his wife, Jamie, and her two teenage children. Jamie is “in tune”
with parenting children with autism like M.W., and Joseph has “embraced”
“different things [from what] Jamie was doing with [her son].” In Garnavillo,
the children would attend a “much smaller,” “close knit” school, which they
had visited “on a couple different occasions” and “they have friends” who

7
Both Megan and Joseph alleged that a substantial change of circumstances
warranted modification of the decree, and Megan testified to such at trial. To that end, we
find it somewhat disingenuous that Megan now disputes there was a change of
circumstances, only after the court entered a modification order denying her request and
granting Joseph’s.

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attend school there. M.W. would be in the same grade as Jamie’s son with
autism, with whom the school had been “very welcoming as far as making
accommodations.”

Further, Joseph has shown the ability to support the children’s
relationship with Megan and her husband, Jeff. Joseph testified that both
Jamie and Jeff “bring a lot to the table” and that he considers both parties
and their new spouses “to be in this together.” Joseph is also supportive of
Megan’s parenting time with the children, stating, “I . . . know that both the
girls love Megan, both girls love Jeff. I would not want to disrupt that any
more than it has to be.” This testimony is in stark contrast to Megan’s relative
lack of support for Joseph’s relationship with M.W. As the court stated:
Joe has been and continues to be supportive of the girls’ relationship
with their mother and her new spouse. Jeff is a kind person and expresses
support for his wife; he has no experience in raising children, let alone one
with autism. Jamie is supportive of her husband and the children. She was
much more supportive of the relationship the children had with their mother
until all the turmoil surfaced and DHHS became involved. She has been
emotionally hurt, which was evident in her posture during her testimony.
She is understandably defensive. Jamie has experience raising children and
one with autism. Jamie’s son’s therapist noted that Jamie is well-equipped
to provide guidance and skill building with an autistic child.

There was little testimony about Jeff’s role in the girls’ lives as it
appears all the child rearing is in the hands of Megan in the Schollmeyer
home. B.W. has a good relationship with Jamie and her children. Joe and
Jamie show concern and respect for one another. Joe is accepted and loved
by Jamie’s children. Jamie recognizes the importance of Joe’s relationship
with his daughters. Both stepparents are incredibly supportive of parental
involvement and the needs of the girls.

....

Megan is not accepting of Joe’s relationship with his new wife. As a
result, she has used M.W. to gather information and to express discontent

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about what is going on in the Wilker home.[8] Megan has placed M.W. in an
unenviable position. Where B.W. is able to see the forest for the trees and
just rolls with the changes, M.W. cannot due to her lack of adaptable thinking
and inability to express her frustration properly. The best interest of M.W.
dictates that she sees more of her father. The Court does not deem it fit to
separate the children to accomplish this. In making changes to the custodial
arrangement and the visitation, the Court recognizes that the continuity
required by a child like M.W. will be disrupted. The Court finds that based
on the personalities of the parents and their composure viewed in the
courtroom, Joe is more capable than Megan of making the changes in a way
that will have less impact on M.W.

We concur with the court’s analysis. We find no error with the court’s
modification of physical care. We affirm on this issue.

IV. Child Support

The district court used the child support guidelines to calculate child
support, using $37,000 yearly income for Megan and $82,879 yearly income
for Joseph. Megan claims the court’s calculation of child support is incorrect
because the court imputed income to her but failed to impute additional

8
Repeatedly in her brief, Megan points to exhibits that include recordings of
Joseph and Jamie talking to M.W., claiming they prove that Joseph is not supportive of
Megan’s relationship with M.W. According to Megan, “Joseph and Jamie were clearly
badgering M.W. about her mom and trying to make her believe her mom was a liar.”
Although we—like the district court—do not condone the parents recording the children,
we have reviewed the exhibits. They do not support Megan’s claims. Instead, the
recordings show, as the district court found:
[ Joseph] is calm and attentive to his daughter when he speaks with her. He
explains situations and tries to help her find ways of dealing with them,
expressing how she feels about them and what they mean to all concerned.
He also does not pressure her to tell him what is happening in her mother’s
home. He tries to help her see that escape and avoidance will not resolve a
situation.

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income to Joseph for his self-employment. Relating to the parties’ income,
the district court stated:
Megan is not employed. She was previously employed by Hobby
Lobby and reported an income of $37,079.32 in 2023. She does not have any
mental or physical ailments or other issues that would prevent her from
being employed. The girls are at school all day, so they are not in need of
Megan’s care during those hours. Jeff is employed at John Deere Dubuque
Works. He has employer provided insurance that covers the girls. The Court
attributes income to her in the amount she was able to previously earn.

Joe is employed full-time at Pattison Company. He also does some
custom work for farmers. He has employer provided insurance. His income
for 2023 was $73,279.78 as reported on his 2023 W-2. He is enrolled in a
Health Savings Account, a 401K plan and a Café 125 plan that are deducted
pre-tax. His taxable income was reported as $61,901.29. He has health
insurance available to him through his employer. The health plan is $50 for
an individual and $270 for family. Dental coverage is $20 for an individual
and $85 for family. Vision coverage is $3 and $9.50 for family. His custom
farming operation shows monthly income of $4,800.00. No taxes are
deducted from the income. His welding business reports $4,898.00 in
receipts. No taxes are deducted from the income. He deducts depreciation
of tools, hog buildings, insurance expenses and supplies. He reports a loss
for both the custom farming and the welding businesses.

Megan claims her child support obligation should be “based on [her]
actual earnings,” which she estimated to be $18,849 for 2024. Megan stated
she works “[p]art-time” at her parents’ farm earning $25 per hour. She
testified there was nothing physically preventing her from working forty
hours per week “[o]ther than the kids’ schedules.” Megan testified she had
“done a lot of different jobs,” including working at schools and at Hobby
Lobby, but she preferred to maintain flexibility “to work with the kids’
schedule” and “be home with them.”

Relating to Joseph’s income, Megan claims the court “used no income
for Joseph’s earnings from his welding or farming.” However, the court

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added approximately $10,000 to Joseph’s reported earnings and
approximately $20,000 to his taxable earnings. Joseph testified his Pattison
income included some overtime and he did work a little on the side, but he
was trying not to add too many extra jobs due to his history of “working a
lot” and he “did not want to fall into that again.” With regard to hog feeding,
Joseph stated he could make up to $4,800 per month, but he paid for
deductions and debt from that amount. Relating to welding, Joseph stated his
“biggest” job, which he rarely had time to do, “was under $500.”

In considering a party’s income, the court must consider all
circumstances relating to that party’s income. In re Marriage of Powell, 474
N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). As a reviewing court, we realize that
determining self-employment income may be difficult. In re Marriage of
Chickering, No. 25-0658, 2025 WL 3171342, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13,
2025). “As a whole, the parties’ income must be determined from the most
reliable evidence presented.” Id.; see also In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601
N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1999) (“In calculating child support, the first step is to
determine the parents’ current monthly net income from the most reliable
evidence presented.”). Under this record, we decline to disturb the court’s
findings of the parties’ income for child support purposes.

Megan also argues “the court failed to provide a written determination
as required under the child support rules as the basis for imputing income.”
To the contrary, we believe the court provided adequate basis for its income
determinations based on the evidence presented. In any event, we “see no
reason to extensively rehash how the district court arrived at this figure.”
Chickering, 2025 WL 3171342, at *5. We affirm on this issue.

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V. Trial Attorney Fees

Megan challenges the court’s order that she pay $13,000 toward
Joseph’s attorney fees. Iowa Code section 598.36 (2024) governs the award
of attorney fees in a modification proceeding. The statute provides that, in
such a proceeding, “the court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party
in an amount deemed reasonable by the court.” Iowa Code § 598.36
(emphasis added). Section 598.36 gives the district court considerable
discretion in determining whether the district court should award such fees.
In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Iowa 1999). An award of
attorney fees in an action to modify a dissolution decree rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Romanelli, 570 N.W.2d 761, 765
(Iowa 1997). “We reverse the district court’s ruling only when it rests on
grounds that are clearly unreasonable or untenable.” In re Marriage of
Erpelding, 917 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

After trial, Joseph filed an affidavit of trial attorney fees stating his
expenses incurred “to date” totaled $23,902.27, and his outstanding fees
totaled $18,962.07. As noted, the court ordered Megan to pay $13,000
toward Joseph’s outstanding balance, a portion of his trial attorney fees.

Megan maintains that considering her income of $18,849 per year,
“[a]fter payment of the attorney fee judgment, [she] would only have income
of $5,849.” She claims that she “does not even earn sufficient funds to pay
the child support and the judgment for attorney fees.” Given the totality of
the circumstances presented here, we cannot say the district court’s award
of $13,000 to Joseph was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

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VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties request appellate attorney fees. Neither requests a
particular amount nor filed an affidavit supporting their request. An award of
appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests within our discretion.
In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). In
deciding whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider “the needs of
the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the
relative merits of the appeal.” In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270
(Iowa 2005). In consideration of these factors, we deny the parties’ requests.

VIII. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s modification order. We decline to award
appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are taxed to Megan.

AFFIRMED.

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