Richard James Arnold v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1283
Filed January 7, 2026
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Richard James Arnold,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
The Honorable Margaret Reyes, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Katie Frank Carl, Assistant State Public Defender
Wrongful Convictions Unit, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.

Richard Arnold pleaded guilty to child endangerment resulting in
serious injury for depriving his four-year-old daughter, G.A., of necessary
medical care. At Arnold’s sentencing, G.A.’s great-uncle delivered a victim
impact statement on the child’s behalf. In his application for postconviction
relief (PCR), Arnold contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to
object to that victim impact statement. He also contends the PCR court
applied an incorrect prejudice standard to his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim. First, Arnold did not show he was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance. And Arnold failed to preserve error on his second claim.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Arnold and his wife, Berlyn Coleman, were visiting Iowa with their
children when a family member observed G.A.’s condition and called police.
Eight months earlier, G.A. had injured her foot. By the time police officers
saw her in the family’s hotel room in Council Bluffs, the foot was swollen and
infected; the infection had spread to her groin and back. Witnesses said she
was “skin and bones” and in such pain she could no longer walk. When her
great-uncle, Scott Fox, took G.A. to the children’s hospital in Omaha,
doctors discovered she had stage 4 cancer with tumors spread throughout her
body.

The State charged both parents with child endangerment as a class
“C” felony. See Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(d) (2022). At Arnold’s plea hearing,
the court noted that Coleman’s charges were still pending and that based on
the minutes of testimony neither parent had “more culpability over the
other.” So the court continued Arnold’s sentencing to ensure both “co-
defendants can be treated comparably.”

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Coleman struck a deal to plead guilty to child endangerment as a class
“D” felony and received a suspended five-year prison term. The sentencing
court noted Coleman’s cooperation with law enforcement and her
disclosures that Arnold was controlling, abusive, and distrustful of
government and medical providers. Their three children had no birth
certificates or social security numbers and had never seen a doctor. At
Arnold’s insistence, Coleman had no prenatal care and delivered the children
at home without assistance. Coleman also explained that she wanted to take
G.A. to a doctor for her foot, but Arnold wouldn’t let her.

G.A. was hospitalized from the time of Arnold’s arrest in August 2022
until his sentencing in March 2023. She was undergoing radiation therapy,
and some of her tumors had shrunk. But she had lost all function in her legs
and was incontinent. Given the gravity of her condition, the State asked the
court to impose the maximum sentence. The prosecutor also introduced Fox
to give a victim impact statement “on behalf of the victim and the family.”
Fox told the court: “These things have greatly impacted our family in several
ways. That’s why I’m here in court today to ask for the max sentence.”

Arnold’s trial counsel didn’t object to Fox’s statement. On behalf of
his client, counsel said Arnold was “absolutely remorseful for this situation”
and “did not intend for any of these injuries to come upon the child.”
Counsel asked the court to impose a deferred judgment.

But the court instead imposed the maximum sentence of ten years in
prison. The court told Arnold: “This is your responsibility as a parent to
watch out for your little girl, to make sure that she’s safe and free from harm.
And I find that your lack of follow-through has put you in this situation.”

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Arnold did not file a direct appeal but applied for PCR, raising several
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court denied the
application, and Arnold appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Generally, we review the denial of PCR for errors at law. Sothman v.
State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). But our review of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims is de novo. Id.

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Arnold must show that
(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) that failure resulted in
prejudice. Smith v. State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 726 (Iowa 2024). “Both elements
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ledezma v. State, 626
N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). If an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
fails on either prong, “it can be decided on that ground alone.” Id.

III. Discussion

Arnold raises two challenges on appeal.

First, he contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
Fox’s victim impact statement because the great-uncle was not properly
designated as G.A.’s representative. Arnold also argues counsel should have
objected because of Fox’s “personal involvement in the case, because of his
family relationship with [Coleman], because he was unqualified . . . , and
because he testified beyond the scope of what is permitted in a victim impact
statement.” Arnold further argues that Fox’s “unauthorized statement
injected impermissible considerations and inflammatory, unproven
allegations into the sentencing proceeding, resulting in prejudice.” The State
challenges Arnold’s error preservation.

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The PCR court found Fox was authorized to speak at sentencing under
Iowa Code sections 915.10 and 915.21(1)(e), which allow a “victim’s attorney
or a designated representative” to make an impact statement if the victim is
unable because of age or incapacity. Thus, the PCR court found an objection
would have been meritless. See, e.g., Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293,
306–07 (Iowa 2018) (“Failure to raise a meritless issue does not establish
counsel’s performance was deficient.”).

But, as the State contends, Arnold’s appellate briefing goes beyond
Fox’s authorization to give an impact statement and raises issues not decided
by the PCR court; so those claims are unpreserved. See State v. Schooley, 13
N.W.3d 608, 617 (Iowa 2024) (finding error is preserved if (1) a party raises
the issue, (2) the district court rules on it, and (3) the party reprises it on
appeal).

And we need not decide whether Fox was “properly designated” to
speak on G.A.’s behalf because counsel’s failure to object didn’t prejudice
Arnold. Even an improper victim impact statement is only prejudicial if the
sentencing court relied on it. See State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762
(Iowa 1998). In his statement, Fox explained his involvement with the family,
criticized Arnold’s parenting decisions, and described G.A.’s condition from
his personal experience as well as his training as an emergency responder.

In giving reasons for its sentence, the court blamed Arnold for not
taking G.A. to a doctor despite months of debilitating infection and pain,
which the court found “absolutely incredible.” The court also cited the
“incredibly upsetting” photographs of G.A.’s infected foot and groin tumors
taken on the day of Arnold’s arrest. Both the prosecutor and Fox asked for
the maximum sentence. The presentence-investigation report also

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recommended imprisonment because the risk assessments placed Arnold in
the moderate to moderate/high ranges for recidivism.

Given the disturbing facts already in the trial record, Fox’s statements
did not change the sentencing decision. The sentencing court did not cite
anything he said.1 Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 619. We rely on sentencing courts to
“filter out improper or irrelevant evidence” from victim impact statements,
which are by their nature “unabridged expression[s] of the impact of the
offense.” Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 761, 764. This record was full of evidence
showing the egregiousness of Arnold’s actions and their devastating impact
on G.A. See State v. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 8–9 (Iowa 1989) (finding
unauthorized impact statements from victim’s aunts and uncles were
“hostile and bitter” and allegedly “inflammatory” but nonprejudicial
because they weren’t outside what the court already knew). Thus, there is no
reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different had
Arnold’s counsel successfully blocked Fox’s statement. Arnold failed to
show he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.

Arnold’s second contention is that the PCR court applied a higher
prejudice standard than the law requires, citing two sentences in its ruling.
First, the court found certain evidence wouldn’t “have changed the outcome
of Arnold’s case or sentence” and second, the court concluded, “Arnold has
offered no convincing evidence . . . to overcome the presumption that his
counsel was effective.” From those references, Arnold argues the court
required more than a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would be

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Arnold points out that the PCR court noted Fox’s statement that G.A. “might
lose her swollen and infected foot.” But that was mentioned in the context of Arnold’s
contention that counsel was ineffective for not informing the sentencing court about his
plan to take G.A. to a doctor as a mitigating factor. The sentencing court did not rely on
that statement. See Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762.

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different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”). But Arnold did not raise this perceived deficiency to the PCR
court, so it is not preserved. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 617; see also Iowa R. Civ.
P. 1.904. Even if preserved, the PCR court cited the correct prejudice
standard, and those statements read in context do not support Arnold’s
assertion that the court imposed a higher burden.

AFFIRMED.

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