State of Iowa v. Stephen Kyle Littlepage

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0163
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Stephen Kyle Littlepage,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County,
The Honorable Kathryn E. Austin, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Stephen Littlepage appeals his concurrent two-year sentences for
assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and first-degree harassment
after pleading guilty to those offenses. He argues that the district court
considered unadmitted and unproven conduct discussed in the minutes of
testimony. But Littlepage has failed to meet his burden to show that the
district court improperly considered unproven and unadmitted parts of the
minutes of testimony rather than only facts he admitted to as part of his guilty
plea. We thus affirm.

Littlepage entered a written guilty plea to two aggravated
misdemeanors: assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and first-degree
harassment. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1(2)(c), 708.2(3), 708.7(1)(b),
708.7(2)(a)(1) (2024). In the plea, he admitted that he “committed an act
which was intended to result in contact with [the victim], which would be
injurious, insulting, offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to commit
the act and in doing so [he] caused bodily injury to the victim; at the same
time [he] displayed a dangerous weapon: to-wit: a shotgun.” 1 And he
admitted that he “without legitimate purpose, had personal contact with [the
victim], and threaten[ed] to commit a forcible felony.” He also agreed that
“[t]he Court may rely on the record, including the minutes of testimony to
find a factual basis.”

After hearing testimony and an allocution from Littlepage, argument
from both parties, and a victim-impact statement, the district court imposed

1
Although Littlepage admitted to causing bodily injury, that is not an element of
either offense to which he pleaded guilty. See Iowa Code §§ 708.1(2)(c), 708.2(3),
708.7(1)(b), 708.7(2)(a)(1). And the district court did not rely on this admission.

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concurrent indeterminate two-year prison sentences for each conviction. The
court reasoned:
When I consider a sentence in a case such as this, Mr. Littlepage, I consider
factors such as your age, which I believe to be 34 years old; your criminal
history or lack thereof; as well as the facts and circumstances of the case
and the circumstances of the parties; as well as the argument made by the
attorneys.

I want to be clear as I hand down this sentence that Mr. Littlepage’s
current pending charges are not being considered by me in making this
sentence. I do not believe that would be appropriate since he has neither
pled guilty nor been found guilty of those charges and they are still
pending. He is innocent until proven guilty on those charges, and I am not
considering those.

....

Mr. Littlepage, I consider that your behavior on the night of this
incident to be incredibly concerning. I believe, based on the information
contained in the Minutes of Testimony, that the impact both on yourself
and on the victim in this case cannot be overstated.

So at this time I am not going to suspend that prison sentence.

On appeal, Littlepage homes in on this final explanation for the court’s
decision not to suspend the sentence. He argues that the court’s reference to
the minutes of testimony as a basis for finding his “behavior on the night of
the incident to be incredibly concerning” and of significant impact to him and
the victim shows that the court considered unproven and unadmitted parts
of the minutes of testimony.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023).
This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724

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(Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision
made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.

Even so, a district court “cannot consider unproven or unprosecuted
offenses in fashioning a defendant’s sentence unless the defendant admits
them or facts are presented to prove them.” State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608,
616 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). This prohibition includes “[i]nformation
contained in the minutes of testimony” unless the facts “are admitted to or
otherwise established as true.” State v. Lovell, 857 N.W.2d 241, 243
(Iowa 2014) (cleaned up). “[W]here portions of the minutes are not
necessary to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea, they are denied by the
defendant, and they are otherwise unproved, we find no basis to allow the
sentencing court to consider and rely on these portions.” State v. Black, 324
N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982). Relying on such an improper consideration in
sentencing is an abuse of discretion that requires resentencing, “even if it was
merely a secondary consideration.” Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 618 (cleaned up).
But a defendant has the burden to “show that the sentencing court relied on
improper evidence.” State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554, 572 (Iowa 2018).

Littlepage has failed to meet his burden to show that the district court
considered unadmitted parts of the minutes of testimony rather than parts he
admitted as the part of the factual basis for his guilty plea. See id. Even his
admitted conduct of assaulting the victim while displaying a shotgun and
making personal contact while threatening a forcible felony could reasonably
be considered “incredibly concerning” and to have impacted him and the
victim. And the court made clear it was aware it cannot consider unproven
conduct in disclaiming any consideration of Littlepage’s other pending
charges. So the court’s reasoning relied on by Littlepage is not a basis for us

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to conclude that the court considered an improper factor. Because Littlepage
makes no other challenge to the exercise of the district court’s sentencing
discretion, we affirm his sentences.

AFFIRMED.

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