State of Iowa v. Garrett Michael Condon

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1797
Filed November 13, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

GARRETT MICHAEL CONDON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Stuart P. Werling,

Judge.

A criminal defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by

considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and

Sandy, JJ.
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SANDY, Judge.

Garrett Michael Condon alleges that the district court abused its discretion

by considering an improper factor in its imposition of a prison sentence. Because

the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, we affirm.

I. Statement of Facts & Procedural Background.

Condon was charged in Scott County, Iowa, following a series of incidents

in April 2024 involving property damage and arson connected to his former

romantic partner, C.M.

Condon and C.M. had been in a relationship for approximately four years

before ending their relationship in November 2023. After the breakup, Condon

continued to contact C.M. by phone and text. In February 2024, the two

encountered one another while driving, during which Condon pursued C.M. and

struck her vehicle. Following that incident, C.M. relocated to another residence

without disclosing her location to Condon.

In the early morning hours of April 7, 2024, a fire occurred at the Davenport

home of C.M.’s mother. Two of her pets were rescued from the second-floor

balcony; a third pet died due to smoke inhalation. Evidence showed that Condon

used an incendiary device to start the fire with the intent to damage the property.

During the same time frame, Condon caused additional damage to the property by

cutting the side of an above-ground swimming pool and spray-painting several

vehicles parked at the residence.

Later that evening, C.M. encountered Condon at a local skate park. He

approached her vehicle, jumped onto the hood, and kicked the windshield until it

cracked. That night, she received a phone call from an unidentified number and
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recognized Condon’s voice. According to the minutes of testimony, he threatened

to “finish the job” if she did not meet him.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. that same day, Condon went to the Davenport

residence of C.M.’s friend where he broke a window, damaged a television by

throwing bricks, and spray-painted both the home and a detached garage. He was

arrested in Moline, Illinois later that month.

The State initially charged Condon with five counts, including first-degree

arson, first-degree criminal mischief, and stalking while in possession of a

dangerous weapon. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Condon pleaded guilty to four

lesser-included offenses: second-degree arson, two counts of second-degree

criminal mischief, and stalking as an aggravated misdemeanor. The State agreed

to dismiss the remaining count at his cost, and the parties were free to make

separate sentencing recommendations while agreeing that any term of

incarceration would run concurrently.

A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The report

recommended a suspended sentence with placement at a residential correctional

facility, noting Condon’s prior successful completion of probation, his employment

history, and documented struggles with mental health and substance abuse. The

PSI concluded that structured supervision and treatment would address these

issues while allowing him to maintain employment and pay restitution.

At sentencing, the State urged the district court to impose imprisonment on

all counts, citing the seriousness of the offenses and their impact on the victims.

The defense sought a deferred judgment or suspended sentences consistent with
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the PSI recommendation. Condon addressed the court, expressing remorse for

his conduct and attributing his actions to a period of mental health instability.

The district court denied the request for deferred judgment or probation and

imposed concurrent sentences of ten years for second-degree arson, five years

on each count of second-degree criminal mischief, and two years for stalking,

along with corresponding fines. The court stated that it had considered the PSI,

the nature and gravity of the offenses, and the impact on the victims, emphasizing

that the arson of an occupied structure was “extremely troubling.” The court

observed that Condon appeared to have done better in a “controlled environment”

than in a less controlled one and concluded that incarceration was appropriate

both to protect the public and to provide rehabilitative programming within the Iowa

Department of Corrections.

Condon filed a timely notice of appeal challenging only the sentence and

asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it relied on an improper

factor. He argues the court’s remarks that Condon appeared to do better in a

“controlled environment” than in a less controlled environment were improper.

II. Standard of Review.

A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within

the statutory limits “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

We afford sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the

“discretionary nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the

appellate process.” Id. at 725. The defendant must overcome the presumption of
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regularity when challenging a court’s sentence. See State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d

490, 494 (Iowa 1983).

III. Analysis.

A sentencing court cannot rely on an improper factor when imposing its

sentence, “even if it was merely a ‘secondary consideration.’” State v. Schooley,

13 N.W.3d 608, 618 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted).

Condon’s challenge is based on the court’s statement that it appeared

Condon did better in a controlled environment as opposed to a less controlled one.

Condon contends that what the court meant by a “less-controlled environment”

was probation, and what it meant by “controlled environment” was prison. And

Condon argues this conclusion is contrary to the information in the PSI because

Condon had not served time in jail or prison on his prior offenses.

In State v. Formaro, the supreme court explained why the sentencing court

is afforded discretion in crafting a defendant's sentence to further goals, including

rehabilitation of the offender and protection of the community:

In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions,
it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal
offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the
protection of the community from further offenses. It is equally
important to consider the host of factors that weigh in on the often-
arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature
of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and
propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform. Furthermore,
before deferring judgment or suspending sentence, the court must
additionally consider the defendant's prior record of convictions or
deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and
any other relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options
would satisfy the societal goals of sentencing. The application of
these goals and factors to an individual case, of course, will not
always lead to the same sentence. Yet, this does not mean the
choice of one particular sentencing option over another constitutes
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error. Instead, it explains the discretionary nature of judging and the
source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.

638 N.W.2d at 724–25 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

Here the district court gave valid reasons for declining to suspend Condon’s

prison sentence and did not rely on an improper factor by mentioning a controlled

environment as one in which Condon will better be rehabilitated. Considering

Condon’s behavior and failure to manage his mental health and substance abuse

issues on his own, prior to his arrest and jailing, it was reasonable for the court to

determine that Condon did better in a “controlled environment” such as jail or

prison. These were proper considerations by the court that speak to the

sentencing goals of protecting the public and providing for Condon’s rehabilitation.

See Iowa Code § 901.5 (2024).

Condon had to “overcome the presumption in favor of the sentence by

affirmatively demonstrating the court relied on an improper factor.” State v. Goble,

4 N.W.3d 700, 704 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106

(Iowa 2020)). He has failed at doing so. We find the district court properly

exercised its discretion in making its sentencing decision and did not rely on an

improper factor. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed.

AFFIRMED.