Bryan Michael Loya v. Carly Jane Flaws n/k/a Carly Jane Collette

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0151
Filed October 15, 2025

BRYAN MICHAEL LOYA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

CARLY JANE FLAWS n/k/a CARLY JANE COLLETTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald,

Judge.

Bryan Loya appeals the order modifying legal custody and physical care of

his child. AFFIRMED.

Jonathon P. Tarpey of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

Ande Skinner of Ramsey Law, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Bryan Loya appeals the district court order modifying legal custody and

physical care of his child with Carly Flaws1. He argues the district court erred by

(1) granting Carly sole legal custody, (2) denying his request for joint physical care,

(3) denying his request for equal visitation time, (4) granting in part Carly’s motion

to reconsider, and (5) awarding Carly trial attorney fees. Upon our review, we

affirm and award Carly $5735 in appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Bryan and Carly were in a relationship for approximately two years. Their

relationship was casual but became more serious when Carly found out she was

pregnant with their child. D.D.L. was born in 2019. Bryan and Carly’s relationship

continued until 2021. During that time, Bryan and Carly lived together.

In October 2021, the parties filed a stipulated agreement to establish

paternity, custody, visitation, child support, and related matters. The stipulation

governed the relationship, and the parties co-parented well until spring 2022.

Under the stipulation, the parties were awarded joint legal custody with the child

placed in Carly’s physical care.

In August 2023, Carly filed a petition for modification requesting sole legal

custody and child support pursuant to the child support guidelines. The parties

agree their co-parenting relationship became ineffective in spring 2022 with each

blaming the other for the breakdown. In September 2023, Bryan filed a counter-

petition for modification requesting joint physical care and child support.

1 Carly is now known as Carly Collette.
3

The district court granted Carly’s request for sole legal custody and physical

care, adjusted the parties’ visitation schedule, denied Bryan’s request for joint

physical care, and set child support under the child support guidelines. Carly

moved to reconsider the provisions regarding communication, holiday schedules,

and visitation. The court granted that motion in part and adjusted the parties’

method of communication, holiday schedule, and visitation. Bryan filed a timely

appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review child custody modification proceedings de novo. See Christy v.

Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). While not binding on us, we

“give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the

credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Discussion

a. Legal Custody

First, Bryan argues the district court erred by granting Carly sole legal

custody. “To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the applying

party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions since the

decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that the

children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change.” In re

Marriage of Winnike, 497 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). “The party

seeking modification of a decree’s custody provisions must also prove a superior

ability to minister to the needs of the children.” In re Marriage of Harris, 877 N.W.2d

434, 440 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted).
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Joint custody arrangements are generally maintained for “parents who

demonstrate they are able to put aside their differences for the sake of their child.”

Id. “On the other hand, modification is generally appropriate when shared custody

provisions incorporated into the decree have not evolved as envisioned by either

of the parties or the court or when the parents simply cannot cooperate or

communicate in dealing with their children.” In re Marriage of Beasley, No. 21-

1986, 2022 WL 16985437, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022) (cleaned up).

Here, we agree with the district court that Bryan is unable to cooperate and

communicate regarding the child. The record is replete with disagreements,

arguments, and name-calling leading to an inability to co-parent. Bryan’s attitude

can best be summarized in this text message to Carly, “I will parallel parent2 [the

child] and, when necessary, communicate with you about his well-being, activities,

and school. Other than that, there is zero reason for you and I to ever contact

each other.” This parallel parenting relationship is not in the best interest of the

child. See id. at *7 (“As a result of [the father’s] preference for ‘parallel parenting,’

the parties did not have equal access to information and they did not participate

equally in important decisions affecting the children.”).

Further instances include Bryan refusing to engage in discussion about

which activities the child would be allowed to participate in, refusing to allow the

child to play with toys that came from Carly’s house, and refusing to coordinate

with Carly in areas requiring co-parenting such as parent-teacher meetings. At

2 The districtcourt found parallel parenting to be a parenting style where the
parents operate with as little contact and communication as possible.
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one extracurricular event, Bryan was recorded on video refusing to allow the child

to hug Carly and telling her “it’s my time” and “no one wants you here.”

There have been instances of conflict during exchanges of the child

including Bryan’s refusal to coordinate exchanges and open hostility with Carly.

On one occasion Bryan’s partner made the child remove his Halloween costume

in Carly’s driveway and leave it on her front doorstep. Then, when Carly sent

Halloween candy for the child’s siblings at Bryan’s house, the candy was returned

with a note reading “[d]o not send things to our kids again.”

Bryan’s conflict stretches further than Carly. This record shows Bryan has

created conflict at the child’s medical appointments and daycare. These instances

include Bryan refusing to give the child prescribed medication and refusing to be

in the same room as Carly at a medical appointment. Further, we agree with the

district court’s findings that Bryan on several occasions used abusive language

towards the child’s daycare provider when disagreeing with policies.

This past school year, the parties had to seek judicial intervention because

they were unable to agree on which school the child should attend. The parents’

disagreement on fundamental issues such as schooling lends further support to

the district court’s modification decision.

Because of Bryan’s disregard for the co-parenting relationship, we agree

with the district court that granting Carly sole legal custody is appropriate and in

the best interests of the child. In determining best interests, we consider the totality

of the circumstances including the conduct of each parent. See Winnike, 497

N.W.2d at 174 (“In determining what is in the best interests of the child we can look

to a parent’s past performance because it may be indicative of the quality of the
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future care that parent is capable of providing.”). The record paints a clear picture

that Carly has shown a willingness to work with Bryan by communicating and

consulting with him on all matters related to the child. Ultimately, we find it is in

the child’s best interests to award Carly sole legal custody because Bryan is

unwilling to cooperate in co-parenting. Harris, 877 N.W.2d at 441 (finding the

parents’ ability to communicate and show mutual respect is an important factor in

determining best interests). A continuation of joint legal custody would leave the

child in continued uncertainty and potential litigation around every parenting

decision. See id. at 444 (suggesting sole legal custody may be in the child’s best

interest when parents cannot cooperate on parental decisions). So, we affirm the

district court’s award of sole legal custody to Carly.

b. Physical Care

Bryan also claims the district court erred by denying his request for joint

physical care. Because we affirmed modification of legal custody in favor of Carly,

we need not address joint physical care because such arrangement is not

authorized with sole legal custody. See Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a) (2024)

(permitting a court to grant joint physical care “[i]f joint legal custody is awarded to

both parents”); In re Marriage of Cowger, No. 22-1254, 2023 WL 6620127, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2023) (“Because Leslie was awarded sole legal custody, a

joint-physical-care arrangement is not an option.”).

c. Visitation

Third, Bryan argues the district court erred in denying his request for equal

visitation. “Liberal visitation rights are in the best interests of the children,” and

children “should be assured the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical
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and emotional contact with both parents.” In re Marriage of Ruden, 509 N.W.2d

494, 496 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); accord Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a). “Although liberal

visitation is the benchmark, our governing consideration in defining visitation rights

is the best interests of the children, not those of the parent seeking visitation.” In

re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).

Overall, we find Bryan’s current visitation schedule serves the best interests

of the child, allowing him to have meaningful time with each parent. We further

find the stability in the current visitation schedule to be in the best interests of the

child. See In re Marriage of Morrison, No. 16-0886, 2017 WL 936152, at *5 (Iowa

Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017). And as the district court noted, this visitation schedule is

a baseline which may be altered if Bryan and Carly can agree. See Cowger, 2023

WL 6620127, at *5.

d. Motion to Reconsider

Fourth, Bryan argues the district court erred in granting in part Carly’s

motion to reconsider. Bryan urges reversal based on a procedural error because

“Carly received improper additional review on the issues of cellphone

communications with the minor child, winter break, spring break, and the removal

of the right of first refusal from the Order to Establish Custody.”

A rule 1.904(2) motion “is essential to preservation of error when a trial court

fails to resolve an issue, claim, defense, or legal theory properly submitted to it for

adjudication.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pflibsen, 350 N.W.2d 202, 206

(Iowa 1984). We find the district court properly granted the motion where its

modification order did not address aspects of the requested relief. It appropriately
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denied those aspects that were improper for a rule 1.904(2) motion. So, we affirm

the district court’s ruling on Carly’s motion to reconsider.

e. Trial Attorney Fees

Fifth, Bryan argues the district court erred in granting Carly trial attorney

fees. Iowa Code section 598.36 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a

prevailing party in a modification proceeding “in an amount deemed reasonable by

the court.” This statute “gives the district court considerable discretion in

determining whether the district court should award such fees.” In re Marriage of

Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Iowa 1999). In modification proceedings, “[w]hether

attorney fees should be awarded depends on the respective abilities of the parties

to pay,” and “the fees must be fair and reasonable.” In re Marriage of Guyer, 522

N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1994). But “[t]o overturn the award, [Bryan] must establish

that the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. He has not done so.

The district court’s award of attorney fees was a proper exercise of

discretion. See In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 668 N.W.2d 840, 849 (Iowa 2003)

(declining to disturb a fee award to the prevailing party in the absent record

evidence of an abuse of discretion). Because the district court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding trial attorney fees, we affirm that award as well.

f. Appellate Attorney Fees

Finally, both parties request appellate attorney fees. An award of attorney

fees is not a matter of right but is a matter of discretion. See Christy, 878 N.W.2d

at 469. “In determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the

needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the

relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). After considering the relevant
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factors, we find Bryan is not entitled to appellate attorney fees in this case. An

award of Carly’s appellate attorney fees is appropriate based on the circumstances

before us. Based on the attorney fee affidavit filed by Carly, we award Carly $5735

in appellate attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s decision in its entirety.

AFFIRMED.