State of Iowa v. Sheila Marie Sundall

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0198
Filed August 20, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SHEILA MARIE SUNDALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for O’Brien County, Nancy L.

Whittenburg, Judge.

A defendant appeals her convictions for introducing a controlled substance

into a detention facility and possessing a controlled substance. AFFIRMED IN

PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL IN PART.

Jamie Hunter (argued) of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des

Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Twice in 2022, law enforcement arrested Sheila Sundall while she

possessed methamphetamine in her bag. Both times, she tried unsuccessfully to

convince the officers to let her leave the bag unattended at the place of arrest. The

first time, the officer refused and carried her bag in the front of the patrol car to the

county jail. After a jailer found the methamphetamine during a booking search, the

State charged her with introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility.

The second time, a different officer searched the bag with Sundall’s consent—

finding methamphetamine. The State charged her with possessing a controlled

substance. In separate prosecutions, juries convicted her as charged.1

Sundall challenges both convictions. On the first offense, we find

insufficient proof that she introduced the methamphetamine into the detention

facility. So we reverse that conviction and remand for dismissal. On the second

offense, ample evidence supports the jury’s verdict that she possessed the

methamphetamine discovered in the bag that she had been carrying. And the

district court properly denied as untimely her new-trial motion alleging the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. So we affirm that conviction.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

First Arrest. In May 2022, law enforcement was investigating an alleged

assault at a residence in Sheldon. The victim named Sundall as the suspect.

While he was securing the residence awaiting a search warrant, O’Brien County

Sheriff’s Deputy Keven Van Meeteren saw two women approach the residence.

1 The court held a joint sentencing hearing for the two convictions. And Sundall
filed a single notice of appeal listing both district court numbers.
3

The deputy told them the residence was “off limits.” He recognized one of them

as Sundall, who was carrying a large bag. Because she was the suspect of the

assault investigation, the deputy cuffed Sundall’s hands behind her back.

After handcuffing her, Deputy Van Meeteren asked “if her name was Sheila

Sundall, even though [he] knew Sheila from [his] years of law enforcement.” Then

Sundall retrieved her wallet from the bag she was carrying and pulled out her

identification card for the officer. The deputy “thought it was odd” that Sundall

insisted on showing her identification, given that he knew who she was. After that,

the wallet and identification card were returned to the bag.2

Deputy Van Meeteren then secured Sundall in the backseat of the patrol

car driven by Deputy Lee Vellema. Until then, Sundall had been cooperative. But

when the deputy placed her bag on the floorboard of the front passenger seat of

the patrol car, her demeanor changed. Sundall “started arguing” and said she

“didn’t want the bag along with her in the car.” Instead, she wanted to leave it

there. But Deputy Van Meeteren refused her request: “Due to her personal items

being in the bag in terms of her wallet with her ID and stuff like that, I wasn’t just

going to leave it sit out there on the driveway or on the common drive area of that

trailer park.” The deputy also testified that he did not know whether Sundall lived

at the residence that was to be searched.

From there, Deputy Vellema transported Sundall and her bag to the county

jail, where she was searched by Sergeant Barb Jacobsma. The sergeant found

nothing on Sundall’s person. Deputy Vellema also carried Sundall’s bag inside

2 The deputy could not recall whether he or Sundall’s companion dropped the

wallet back into the bag.
4

and placed it on the counter to be searched. When Sergeant Jacobsma took out

the wallet that contained Sundall’s identification card to search, she also found “a

partial like Slurpee type straw and a little baggie of a clear rock substance.” That

substance field tested positive for methamphetamine, and further testing by the

Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) confirmed that it was methamphetamine.

Sundall had not revealed that the methamphetamine was in her bag.

The State charged Sundall with introducing a controlled substance into a

detention facility, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.8 (2022).

A jury convicted her of that offense after a one-day trial in June 2023. After that

verdict, Sundall moved for judgment of acquittal and in arrest of judgment—arguing

the State offered “insufficient evidence” of the “introducing” element. The court

denied that post-trial motion.

Second Arrest. In September 2022, Sheldon Police Officer Timothy

Loeschen saw Sundall driving without a valid license. She parked at a fast-food

restaurant and left the car carrying a backpack and a duffel bag. The officer

intercepted Sundall about half a block from where she parked. After Officer

Loeschen arrested Sundall for the driving offense, he asked if she wanted to take

her bags to the jail. She said no; she wanted to leave them in the car that she had

been driving because its owner would pick it up soon. She expressed this wish

even though one of the car’s windows was malfunctioning and would not close.

Soon, Officer Eric Meinecke arrived at the scene. When he asked Sundall

if there was anything illegal in her bags, she said no. He then asked if he could

look in the bags, to which Sundall responded, “I don’t care.” While Officer

Loeschen placed Sundall in the car, Officer Meinecke searched her bags. He
5

found an eyeglass container holding two baggies of “a white crystalline substance,”

as well as a glass pipe with a bulb. He found another baggie containing the same

substance in the backpack.3 Also in the backpack was Sundall’s wallet and

identification card.

The State charged Sundall with possession of methamphetamine, third or

subsequent offense, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa Code

section 124.401(5)(a). A jury convicted her of that offense after a two-day trial in

October 2023. Sixty-nine days after the verdict, Sundall moved for judgment of

acquittal and motion in arrest of judgment, or alternatively for a new trial. The court

denied the motion as untimely. Sundall moved to reconsider, arguing that her

counsel had been busy with another case and missed the deadline. She asked

the court to consider the motion on its merits. But again, the district court denied

the motion.

The court scheduled a joint sentencing hearing for the two convictions in

January 2024. After that hearing, the court imposed concurrent five-year

suspended prison sentences and placed Sundall on probation for two years.

Sundall now appeals, challenging both convictions.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

We generally review the denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 2008). That

means “the trial court’s discretion was exercised on clearly untenable or

unreasonable grounds.” Id. But when the question is one of statutory

3 The substances in the baggies tested positive for methamphetamine in the field.

DCI Laboratory testing later confirmed the field test results.
6

interpretation—whether the terms of the statute are broad enough to cover the

actions of the accused, see State v. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Iowa 1981)—

our review is for errors at law. See State v. Flynn, 13 N.W.3d 843, 846

(Iowa 2024).

We also review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction

of errors at law. See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). The jury’s

verdict is binding on us if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is

substantial if it would “convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State . . . .” Id.

As for Sundall’s challenge to the denial of her motion for new trial on the

possession offense, we review for an abuse of discretion. State v. Shanahan, 712

N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006). “[T]he district court has considerable discretion

when determining a motion for new trial under the weight-of-the-evidence test.” Id.

III. Analysis

A. Introducing a Controlled Substance into a Detention Facility

Motion in Arrest of Judgment. Sundall first claims that her conviction for

introducing a controlled substance into the detention facility cannot stand as a

matter of law. She contends the district court should have granted her motion in

arrest of judgment under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(c) (“Such motion

shall be granted when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be

pronounced.”). True, she cited rule 2.24(3)(c) in her post-trial motion. But that

motion blurred the sufficiency of the evidence with the applicability of

section 719.8. See Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d at 762 (“A motion in arrest of judgment
7

may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of evidence.”). In Oldfather, the court

analyzed whether the defendant’s act could conceivably fall within the language of

the charging statute. Id. at 764. By contrast, Sundall’s motion focused on the

sufficiency of the evidence for introducing contraband. Because her motion in

arrest of judgment was in fact a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence, we move

to that issue.

Substantial Evidence. The State charged Sundall with introducing a

controlled substance into a detention facility. See Iowa Code § 719.8.4 The court

instructed the jury on the crime’s three elements:

1. The O’Brien County Jail is a detention facility.
2. On or about the 13th day of May, 2022, [Sundall] introduced
methamphetamine into the O’Brien County Jail.
3. Methamphetamine is a controlled substance.

Sundall contests the second element, arguing the State did not prove that she

introduced methamphetamine into a detention facility when it was Deputy Vellema

who carried her bag into the jail. Sundall adds that the statute allowed the deputy

as a person “authorized by law” to bring a controlled substance into the facility. Id.

The State does not dispute those facts. Without question, Sundall no longer

possessed the methamphetamine when it was introduced into the jail. But

possession doesn’t matter, according to the State. It cites State v. Caquelin, for

the notion that “one might introduce a controlled substance into a detention facility

without necessarily being in possession of the substance.” 702 N.W.2d 510, 512

4 The statute reads in whole: “A person not authorized by law who furnishes or

knowingly makes available a controlled substance or intoxicating beverage to an
inmate at a detention facility, or who introduces a controlled substance or
intoxicating beverage into the premises of such a facility, commits a class ‘D’
felony.” The State did not charge Sundall under the furnishing alternative.
8

(Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (discussing federal case where outside sender transmitted

unapproved mail through a courier); see also State v. Stewart, 858 N.W.2d 17, 21

(Iowa 2015) (noting defendant could “instruct a third party to cause illegal drugs to

be smuggled into a detention facility without ever possessing them”).

But neither Caquelin nor Stewart addressed a situation where the container

holding the contraband was seized by law enforcement before it was introduced

into the detention facility. Those cases dealt with merger and decided it was not

“legally impossible” to be convicted of introduction without also being convicted of

possession. But unlike the introduction-without-possession scenarios floated in

Caquelin and Stewart, Sundall did not employ a courier or a smuggler to get her

methamphetamine into the O’Brien County Jail. In fact, she lobbied mightily to

have her bag left behind at the scene of the arrest.

Not deterred by that fact, the State suggests that the deputy is no different

from the hypothetical courier or smuggler, acting on behalf of an accused. That

suggestion overlooks the element of intent. A defendant who enlists a courier or

smuggler acts with the intent to have that agent carry the contraband into the

detention facility. By contrast, Sundall did not want her bag containing the

methamphetamine to be taken into the jail. It also overlooks Sundall’s relationship

with the contraband. Once deputies lawfully seized her personal effects and

retained them for safekeeping, she lost any ability to exert control over them. Cf.

State v. Bentler, 759 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). Sundall neither

possessed the controlled substance when it was introduced nor did she intend its

introduction.
9

Granted, introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility is not a

specific-intent crime. See State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 496 (Iowa 1999)

(finding statutory language did not “require an intent to do any further act or achieve

some additional consequence other than the prohibited conduct of introducing a

controlled substance into a detention facility”), overruled in part on other grounds

by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001). But even a general-

intent crime requires proof of intent. See Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 323

(Iowa 1986) (observing for general-intent crimes, we ask: did the accused intend

to do the proscribed act?). And the State did not prove that Sundall intended to

introduce a controlled substance into the jail. Instead, the deputy transported her

bag to the jail for an inventory search against her wishes. The deputy testified:

“She just wanted to leave it there.”

So possession is not required. And intent to introduce doesn’t matter. So

what is the crime? In the State’s view, “the act here is omission.” Because Sundall

didn’t declare that she had methamphetamine in her bag, the State contends that

she was responsible for the deputy’s introduction of that controlled substance into

the jail.

Cue Canas. The State reads that case as creating a duty to “alert police

officers to the presence of contraband before entry into a detention facility.” See

Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 496. Failure to do so, in the State’s estimation, violates the

statute. See id. But the State’s position stretches Canas beyond its limits.

A close look at Canas shows a far different situation. Police arrested Canas

on an outstanding warrant; after his arrival at the jail, “he was directed to take a

shower.” Id. at 491. The jailer grew suspicious because Canas kept his underwear
10

with him while he showered. Id. at 492. When the jailer asked to see the

underwear, Canas shoved the jailer, and later two baggies of methamphetamine

were found in the shower. Id. Not surprisingly, Canas was charged with

introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility. Id. Unlike Sundall,

Canas possessed the methamphetamine inside the jail. But on appeal, Canas

claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for not making two arguments: (1) that

Canas did not voluntarily commit the offense because he had to submit to police

authority when arrested and (2) to avoid the charge Canas would have been

required to admit possessing the drugs, an impermissible burden on his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent. Id. at 495–96. Our supreme court rejected

those arguments, deciding that Canas’s ability to act voluntarily was not negated

by his submission to police authority and his conviction did not impermissibly

burden his right against self incrimination. Id. at 497 (noting he “had the option of

disclosing the presence of the drugs concealed on his person before he entered

the jail”).

But the supreme court did not hold that Canas’s failure to confess his

possession of the drugs before he entered the jail was the essence of the

introduction offense. That’s because Canas personally introduced

methamphetamine into the jail’s shower in his underwear. The prohibited act was

introducing the controlled substance, as provided in the statute. See id.

Unlike Canas, here the deputy did the introducing. Sundall did not have the

methamphetamine concealed on her person. And the State does not cite any case

applying Canas to the search of containers seized from an arrestee and

transported to the detention facility by law enforcement. Rather, the State relies
11

on cases involving contraband introduced into the premises by defendants on their

persons. See State v. Clark, No. 15-0527, 2016 WL 2748288, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct.

App. May 11, 2016) (marijuana found in sock); State v. Gully, No. 11-1961, 2012

WL 3860795, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2012) (marijuana found in pants

pocket); State v. Sanders, No. 19-0342, 2020 WL 1548505, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Apr. 1, 2020) (baggie of marijuana found in defendant’s mouth).5

The State maintains that having her bag brought into the detention facility

was the “natural consequence” of Sundall’s arrest and that it would have been

“clearly improper” for the deputy to leave it unattended at the scene of the arrest.

Maybe so. But these are not principles drawn from Canas. And they do not go to

the heart of the offense—which is the introduction of controlled substances into the

jail.6 As we noted in Borchers, the legislature did not define the verb “introduce” in

chapter 719. 2024 WL 467375, at *4. So we look to dictionary definitions. Id. For

example, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1186 (unabr. ed. 1993),

defines “introduce” as “to lead, bring, conduct, or usher in especially for the first

time.” See Laster v. State, 64 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (construing

introduce to mean “bring into from outside”). Under that definition, in Canas, Clark,

5 The only case cited by the State where the contraband was carried into the

detention facility by the police was State v. Borchers, reversing a conviction for
knowingly introducing contraband under Iowa Code section 719.7. No. 22-1454,
2024 WL 467375, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024). The State asserts
Borchers was wrongly decided, but such unpublished decisions are persuasive
authority. See State v. Lindsey, 881 N.W.2d 411, 414 n.1 (Iowa 2016) (noting
“unpublished decisions of the court of appeals do not constitute binding authority
on appeal” but may help “define the issues”).
6As defense counsel told the jury in closing argument: “The word introduce is

important here because that is the crime. If she did nothing at all to introduce the
drugs into the facility, she cannot be held accountable for it.”
12

Gully, and Sanders, it was the defendant who introduced the contraband into the

jail. Not so here. The methamphetamine, concealed within a wallet, was brought

into the detention facility by a deputy—who seized the larger bag that Sundall was

carrying at the time of her arrest.

The State advocates for a broader definition of “introduce”—describing how

the methamphetamine ended up inside the detention facility without being carried

by Sundall: “when the arrested person fails to alert the officer to the presence of

contraband accompanying them before it enters the place of detention, they are

knowingly introducing it.” The State’s definition does not advance the goal of

section 719.8. When interpreting criminal statutes, we consider “the evil sought to

be remedied” by its enactment. State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008)

(citation omitted); see also State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 230 (Iowa 2019).

“[S]ection 719.8 prohibits the introduction of a controlled substance into a detention

facility because the introduction of contraband threatens the security and disrupts

the balance of Iowa’s penal institutions.” Caquelin, 702 N.W.2d at 513. But there

was no security threat or potential for disruption once Sundall’s bag was in the

deputy’s control. And we are not convinced by the State’s suggestion at oral

argument that there remained a risk because an inept booking search may have

overlooked the controlled substance.7 Even if a booking search failed to uncover

the presence of the controlled substance, Sundall would not have had access to it

in the jail.

7 The jailer testified the bag would be placed in a locker after the search and not

be returned to Sundall until she left the jail.
13

Because the deputy—and not Sundall—controlled and transported the bag

containing the contraband to the jail, the State did not prove that she introduced

methamphetamine into the detention facility. She could not introduce an item that

she no longer exercised dominion and control over. Even taking the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State and making all reasonable inferences, there

is insufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that Sundall

introduced contraband into the detention facility. We reverse that felony conviction

and remand for dismissal.

B. Possessing a Controlled Substance

Sundall urges two challenges to her conviction for possessing a controlled

substance, third offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5)(a). First,

she argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. Second,

she contends that her motion for new trial should have been granted because the

jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence. The district court instructed the jury that to find

Sundall guilty of possessing a controlled substance, it must find that the State

proved: (1) that “Sundall knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine”

and (2) that she “knew the substance she possessed was methamphetamine.”

See Iowa Code § 124.401(5)(a) (making it “unlawful for any person knowingly or

intentionally to possess a controlled substance” with exceptions not relevant here).

Sundall does not dispute that she possessed methamphetamine by carrying the

bag in which it was found. But she argues that there was insufficient evidence that

she knew the methamphetamine was in the bag. We disagree.
14

The record contains ample evidence from which the jury could find she

knew she possessed methamphetamine. An officer saw Sundall get out of a

vehicle, holding the bag that contained the methamphetamine. She requested that

the bag be left in an unsecure car rather than being brought with her to the jail.

Her request sparked suspicion for the officer, who testified that in his “training and

experience, when someone knows they’re about to go to jail, if they have

something illegal on them, they tend to want to distance themselves from those

objects.” As it turned out, the bag contained not just methamphetamine and drug

paraphernalia, but also Sundall’s wallet and her identification card. And not only

did the jury hear the officers testify about the encounter, but it also watched body

camera footage of the incident and the search.

True, some evidence supported Sundall’s contrary view. She was driving

someone else’s car when she was stopped. And she consented to the search of

the bag. But that is not the question on substantial-evidence review—we ask only

whether the evidence supports the verdict that the jury actually rendered. See

Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339. It does here. And so, we affirm the jury’s verdict as

supported by substantial evidence that Sundall knowingly possessed

methamphetamine.

Motion for New Trial. Under our rules of criminal procedure, a defendant

may request a new trial when a verdict is “contrary to law or contrary to the weight

of the evidence.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(7); see State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d

554, 570 (Iowa 2018). Motions for new trial must be filed no later than forty-five

days after a guilty verdict and at least five days before sentencing. See Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.24(2)(a). So when sentencing is set for more than fifty days after the
15

verdict, a defendant must file the motion within forty-five days of the verdict. Smith,

753 N.W.2d at 564. But that deadline “may be extended by the court for good

cause.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(4)(a). We review a court’s ruling denying a motion

for new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202

(Iowa 2003).

Sundall argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her

motion as untimely “without reaching its merits,” and urges that we should decide

in the first instance that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. But as

the State argues on appeal, the only question before us is whether the court

abused its discretion in denying the motion as untimely. And Sundall’s motion was

untimely because she filed it sixty-nine days after the verdict—well past the forty-

five-day deadline. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(a); Smith, 753 N.W.2d at 564;

State v. Alexander, No. 07-2048, 2008 WL 5412283, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 31,

2008) (affirming denial of motion for a new trial filed fifty-two days after verdict as

untimely). Sundall did not ask for an extension before the court ruled on the

motion. And while she did move to reconsider that denial, arguing she had good

cause for the late filing, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s reasoning that

it was too late to seek an extension.8 We thus affirm the district court’s denial of

her motion for a new trial and Sundall’s conviction for possessing

methamphetamine.

8 Sundall does not argue that the district court improperly thought it lacked authority

to excuse the late filing in a reconsideration motion. So we need not decide here
whether a court could find good cause and extend the deadline even after it has
denied the motion as untimely.
16

IV. Summary

We reverse Sundall’s conviction for introducing methamphetamine into a

detention facility and remand for dismissal. But we affirm her conviction for

possession of methamphetamine, as a third or subsequent offense.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL IN

PART.

Ahlers, J., concurs; Langholz, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
17

LANGHOLZ, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Under Iowa law, a person can commit the offense of introducing a

controlled substance into a detention facility even when the person doesn’t want

to enter the facility—it is enough that she is arrested with the drugs concealed in

her clothes or body and does not disclose them before being taken into the facility

by the arresting officer. See State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 495–96 (Iowa 1999),

overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2

(Iowa 2001). And the offense is a general-intent crime that does not require proof

that the person specifically intended to introduce the drugs into the facility. See id.

What’s more, the person need not personally bring the drugs into the facility—or

even ever possess them—so long as she causes the drugs to be introduced into

the facility. See State v. Stewart, 858 N.W.2d 17, 21–22 (Iowa 2015).

Putting these past holdings together, it follows that a person also commits

this offense when she is arrested carrying a bag concealing drugs, the arresting

officer refuses her requests to abandon the bag and instead takes control of it and

brings it along with the person into the facility, and the person chooses not to tell

law enforcement of the drugs in the bag. The jury could have found that Sundall

did just that. She was arrested carrying her bag concealing methamphetamine,

unsuccessfully tried to get the officer to leave the bag on the side of the road rather

than putting it in the front seat of the car that she knew was taking her to the jail,

and still chose not to alert any officer that it contained methamphetamine.

I would thus affirm both of Sundall’s convictions. And so, I respectfully

dissent from the majority’s reversal of her conviction for introducing a controlled

substance into a detention facility in violation of Iowa Code section 719.8 (2022).
18

In arguing that she did not introduce the drugs into the detention facility,

Sundall focuses on two aspects of the facts here: (1) that “[t]he bag was brought

to the facility by law enforcement” and (2) that “she did not want the bag brought

into the jail.” Neither is a basis for distinguishing the governing precedents.

As for the first, while Sundall no longer had possession of the bag once the

officer took it from her and placed it in the front seat, “possession is not a necessary

legal element of introducing a controlled substance into a detention facility.” State

v. Caquelin, 702 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005); see also Stewart, 858

N.W.2d at 21–23 (agreeing with the reasoning of Caquelin to hold that dual

convictions for introducing a controlled substance and possessing a controlled

substance do not merge or violate the Double Jeopardy Clause). And the bag

containing the drugs was only along for the ride into the detention facility because

of Sundall’s actions—carrying it when she was arrested and deciding not to alert

the officer that it had drugs in it.9

To be sure, law enforcement officers had seized the bag and had control

over whether Sundall could access it and where it would ultimately be taken in the

car. But that’s no different than the common case where the drugs are concealed

in the arrestee’s clothes rather than a carried bag. Even then, the officer seizes

the arrestee—including the clothes she is wearing and any drugs concealed in

them—and has control over what can happen with the clothes and where they will

be taken. Consider if an arrestee had drugs in a coat pocket, would the officer let

9 It would be a very different case if Sundall had not been carrying the bag with the

drugs when stopped and arrested by the officer and Sundall were still charged with
introducing drugs that the officer had found another way—like executing a search
warrant or seized from another nearby person.
19

her remove the coat and throw it out the car window? Of course not. And yet

despite that lack of control by the arrestee, when drugs are on the seized person

Iowa appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed convictions for introducing a

controlled substance into a correctional facility. See Canas, 597 N.W.2d

at 496–97; State v. Clark, No. 15-0527, 2016 WL 2748288, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 11, 2016); State v. Gully, No. 11-1961, 2012 WL 3860795, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Sept. 6, 2012). I see no reason that this case should be treated any differently

merely because the officer exercised his control over Sundall and her belongings

by placing the bag in the front seat rather than giving it back to her to carry as he

took Sundall and her concealed drugs to the jail.

Sundall’s second proposed distinction fares no better. True, the undisputed

evidence shows that Sundall wanted to leave her bag on the side of the road where

she was arrested and she objected when the officer put it into the front seat of the

car. And so it was only because of her arrest—not any purpose to bring the drugs

into the jail—that they were introduced. Yet that purpose is not required because

this is a general-intent crime. See Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 495–96. And when the

officer refused Sundall’s requests to abandon the bag—letting her know that she

and her bag with the methamphetamine were both headed to the jail 10—Sundall

chose not to disclose that she had methamphetamine in the bag. With that choice,

10 Given the evidence or Sundall’s knowledge that the bag was being transported

with her to the jail and the statute under which Sundall was charged, I do not find
State v. Borchers to be relevant to the proper analysis of this case. See State v.
Borchers, No. 22-1454, 2024 WL 467375, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024)
(reversing conviction under different statute—section 719.7—that prohibits
“knowingly introduc[ing] contraband” when “the State offered no evidence that [the
defendant] knew the whereabouts of his bag after his arrest” or that “he knew about
police procedures for handling personal effects after an arrest”).
20

she caused the introduction of the methamphetamine into the jail. See id. at 496

(reasoning that the defendant “had the option of disclosing the presence of the

drugs concealed on his person before he entered the jail and became guilty of the

additional offense of introducing controlled substances into a detention facility”).

Again, I see nothing about the different location of concealment of the drugs here

that permits us to depart from applying that same logic.

Carving Sundall’s conduct out of the scope of this offense thus requires

undermining one of these governing supreme court precedents. And that is not

our role as an intermediate appellate court. To be sure, a few states have chosen

a different path than Canas and have held that their similar statutes do not apply

when an arrestee and her drugs are taken to a jail by law enforcement. See State

v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 457–60 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024,

1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Eaton, 177 P.3d 157, 161–62 (Wash. Ct.

App. 2008). Indeed, as one might expect given that stricter rule, one of those

states likewise rejected the applicability of its statutes when the drugs were in a

wallet seized during the arrest rather than in the arrestee’s clothes. See State v.

Getzinger, 76 P.3d 148, 149 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).11 But Iowa is in good company

by taking the prevailing path in Canas. See, e.g., State v. Hinostroza,

11 And another state followed the reasoning in Getzinger, 76 P.3d at 149, to hold

that its statute did not apply when the arresting officer put a seized bag in the front
seat. See M.A.F. v. State, 80 So. 3d 1088, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Conversely, one state reached the opposite result, holding that arrestee caused
contraband in her purse to be introduced into a jail even though the officer put the
purse in front seat—after she had asked for medication she said was in her purse—
and she never touched the purse before contraband was found at the jail. See
State v. Arredondo, No. A22-0984, 2023 WL 4074020, at *1–2, 4 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 20, 2023).
21

552 P.3d 1202, 1207–10 (Kan. 2024) (adopting the nationally prevailing view and

collecting cases); Beltz v. State, 551 P.3d 583, 588–92 (Alaska Ct. App. 2024)

(same); State v. Gneiting, 468 P.3d 263, 267–71 (Idaho 2020) (adopting the

prevailing view—relying in part on our supreme court’s decision in Canas).

Bottom line, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Sundall

introduced a controlled substance into the jail when she knew her bag containing

methamphetamine was being brought along with her into the jail and she chose

not to alert law enforcement that it contained the methamphetamine. Because the

majority nevertheless reverses Sundall’s conviction for introducing a controlled

substance into a detention facility, I respectfully dissent.