State of Iowa v. Jesus Isai Diaz

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0496
Filed June 18, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JESUS ISAI DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Tod Deck, Judge.

The defendant challenges his conviction for murder in the second degree.

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer (argued),

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

There is no dispute that Jesus Diaz stabbed his brother—Eduardo “Eddie”

Diaz III—to death. A jury determined the stabbing constituted murder in the

second degree. Jesus1 appeals.

I. Factual Background

Jesus and Eddie had a history of fighting during their childhood, with

Eddie—who was larger—often acting as the aggressor. Although the fighting had

diminished during their adulthood, the tension between the brothers resurfaced on

November 13, 2022, after they spent the afternoon drinking and watching football.

Eddie was trying to get his girlfriend to pick him up, while Jesus became

increasingly upset that Eddie refused to leave Jesus’s house. The situation quickly

escalated into a physical altercation. No one witnessed the entire fight, but at

some point, Jesus stabbed Eddie thirteen times and Eddie died as a result. Jesus

does not dispute that he stabbed Eddie. Instead, he argues his actions were a

result of serious provocation.

The State charged Jesus with murder in the first degree. The jury found

him guilty of the lesser offense of murder in the second degree.

II. Issues

On appeal, Jesus contends the evidence was sufficient to support a

voluntary-manslaughter charge but was insufficient to support a second-degree-

murder charge. He also contends the district court erred in instructing the jury

about inferences of malice related to use of a dangerous weapon and in denying

1 To avoid confusion due to the shared surname of the brothers, we refer to them

by first names.
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his motions for a mistrial. We address each contention in turn, starting with his

sufficiency challenge because success on that challenge would require us to

remand for judgment of acquittal, making it unnecessary to address his remaining

challenges. See State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 597 (Iowa 2003).

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Before tackling the merits of Jesus’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge,

we first address the State’s contention that Jesus did not preserve error for the

portion of his argument that suggests the evidence was insufficient because the

jury should have been required to consider the lesser-included offense of voluntary

manslaughter prior to rendering a verdict on the greater charge of second-degree

murder. We conclude this is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. It is a

challenge to the jury instructions. And to make this challenge to the jury

instructions, Jesus was required to object to preserve the issue for appellate

review. See State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015) (finding a failure

to preserve error by failing to object to jury instructions because “[t]he district court

never had an opportunity to consider the underlying legal merits of not allowing the

jury to consider a lesser offense until the defendant was acquitted of the greater

offense”). As Jesus did not object to this aspect of the jury instructions, he did not

preserve the issue for appeal.

Turning to the merits of his sufficiency challenge, Jesus argues that the

evidence presented at trial was sufficient only to support a conviction for voluntary

manslaughter, not murder in the second degree. We review challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. State v. Cook, 996

N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). We uphold a jury verdict supported by substantial
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evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational factfinder of

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In assessing the sufficiency

of the evidence, we view the evidence, including legitimate inferences and

presumptions that can be fairly and reasonably deduced from it, in the light most

favorable to the State. Id.

The district court gave the jury a marshaling instruction for murder in the

second degree that required the State to prove:

1. On or about November 13, 2022, Jesus Diaz stabbed
Eduardo Diaz III.
2. Eduardo Diaz III died as a result of being stabbed.
3. Jesus Diaz acted with malice aforethought.
4. The defendant was not justified.

Jesus contends the State failed to prove the third element. He claims the evidence

only supports a finding he acted due to serious provocation (supporting a

conviction for the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter) and not with malice.

The same argument was made to the jury, which rejected it in finding Jesus guilty

of murder in the second degree. Jesus’s sufficiency challenge on appeal is little

more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence and substitute his view of the

facts for that of the jury—a task outside of our authority. See State v. Brimmer,

983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022).

Based on the evidence, a reasonable juror could have found any number of

narratives that did not involve Jesus being seriously provoked into killing Eddie.

One of those narratives would consist of these facts. Jesus and Eddie frequently

fought during their childhood, and Eddie was often the instigator. However, as the

brothers grew older, the frequency of physical altercations diminished. There was

only one confrontation between the brothers in adulthood, which occurred
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approximately one year before Eddie’s death. During that incident, Jesus asked

Eddie to leave his home, and when Eddie refused, the brothers began fighting. It

escalated to the point of Eddie placing Jesus in a headlock. The fight ended when

Jesus’s then-girlfriend intervened and threatened to strike Eddie with a skillet.

After that, Eddie left the residence. In the year following this event, witnesses

testified that the brothers maintained a good relationship.

On the night of Eddie’s death, the brothers had been drinking and watching

football throughout the afternoon. Jesus had his two-year-old daughter with him,

and Eddie’s two children were also present. Around 5:30 p.m., Eddie’s girlfriend

picked up their children. The brothers appeared to be in good spirits, though both

seemed intoxicated. One hour later, Jesus informed the mother of his child that

the child had gotten a black eye. Both Jesus and Eddie assured her that the injury

was accidental, but the mother informed Jesus that she was going to pick up the

child. At 7:16 p.m., Eddie texted his girlfriend asking to be picked up because

Jesus and the child’s mother were arguing. At 7:32 p.m., the mother of Jesus’s

child called to notify him that she was on her way to pick up the child. During the

call, Jesus was in his vehicle and upset because Eddie refused to leave. Jesus

could be heard telling Eddie that he was trespassing, while Eddie could be heard

yelling back, though his exact words were unclear. It is at this point of the night

that the sequence of events becomes harder to piece together, as witnesses only

observed fragments of the altercation between Jesus and Eddie.

Three teenage friends were driving around when they noticed a fight

occurring in front of a house. They decided to continue driving but wanted to circle

back to watch the fight. At first, the men involved were standing and facing each
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other. When the teenagers returned after circling the block, the men were

wrestling on the ground. They described the men as “one bigger man” and “one

smaller man,” which aligned with the fact that Eddie was notably larger than Jesus.

One of the men appeared to be choking the other with his arm. The teenagers

believed the bigger man was on top but were not entirely sure.

On the third pass, they saw the smaller man punching the bigger man with

uppercuts. Eventually, the teenagers parked in a nearby alley with a limited view

of the front of the house. From there, they saw the bigger man being kicked out of

the house and running across the street. He appeared exhausted before he

stumbled backward and collapsed to the ground. This prompted the teenagers to

drive away, but as they did so, they observed the smaller man cross the street and

begin stomping on the bigger man’s head. The bigger man did not appear to fight

back. On their final pass, the friends saw the smaller man placing something into

his car while the bigger man remained on the ground.

When the mother of Jesus’s child arrived around 7:40 p.m., she noticed

blood on the trunk of his car. Before she could knock, Jesus opened the door while

holding the child. Both he and the child were covered in blood. By the time first

responders arrived, Eddie had died from thirteen stab wounds. The knife used in

the stabbing was discovered behind the driver’s seat of Jesus’s car—the same car

into which the teenagers saw Jesus place an item.

On appeal, Jesus asks the court to accept a single narrative of what

happened that night—that he was provoked into stabbing Eddie and is therefore

only guilty of voluntary manslaughter. But no evidence was presented of Eddie

provoking Jesus that night. While jurors could have believed Eddie had done or
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said something to provoke Jesus, they just as reasonably could have found that

Jesus acted with malice, not from serious provocation or justification, when he

chose to exit his home after he had locked Eddie outside, grab a knife, chase after

Eddie, and stab him thirteen times. See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 556

(Iowa 2006) (“Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases

is the recognition that the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other

evidence.” (citation omitted)). He then hid the knife. See Williamson v. Jones, 936

F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting evidence of attempted concealment of a

murder weapon may be considered by the jury as evidence tending to show a

consciousness of guilt).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all

reasonable inferences and presumptions that can be deduced from it, substantial

evidence supports the jury’s finding that Jesus committed murder in the second

degree. Accordingly, Jesus’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.

IV. Inference of Malice

Jesus also contends the district court erred in giving jury instructions that

permitted the jury to infer malice from use of a dangerous weapon. He contends

such inference is improper when “the defendant had adequate provocation.”

The State asserts that Jesus failed to preserve error on this issue, and we

agree. While Jesus objected to the instructions addressing inference of malice

from use of a dangerous weapon, his objection was based solely on the claim that

the evidence supported a claim of self-defense and, therefore, the instructions

should not be given. This is not the same as the objection he lodges on appeal,

which is that the jury could only infer malice from the use of a dangerous weapon
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after it had first considered and rejected the serious provocation necessary to

support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. To preserve error for appeal on

a claim of a faulty jury instruction, a specific objection to the instruction must be

made. See State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997) (“A party’s objection to

the court’s instruction must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the

basis for the complaint so that if there is an error the court can correct it before

submitting the case to the jury.”). A party may not change the basis of an objection

from that made at trial. Id. (“[A] party is bound by the objection the party makes to

the district court’s instructions and may not amplify or change the objection on

appeal.”). As Jesus is lodging an objection to the challenged instructions on

appeal that differs from the objection made to the district court, he has not

preserved this issue for our review.

V. Motions for Mistrial

For his final challenge, Jesus contends the district court erred in denying

his motions for mistrial. He contends the motions should have been granted

individually and based on the cumulative effect of the State’s actions that led to the

mistrial motions. The mistrial motions were based on testimony from three

witnesses called by the State: (1) Eddie’s girlfriend briefly mentioned during direct

examination that Jesus had previously been to prison; (2) a deputy sheriff testified

that Jesus exercised his right to remain silent during questioning; and (3) a special

agent from the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) testified that Jesus

recorded himself driving 105 miles per hour in the afternoon of the day of the

stabbing. The district court denied all three motions.
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A. Error Preservation as to the Second Motion for Mistrial

Before we get to the merits of Jesus’s challenge, we first address the State’s

contention that Jesus failed to preserve error as to the second event underlying

the mistrial motions—the testimony that Jesus exercised his right to remain silent

during questioning. Although Jesus objected to this testimony, the objection was

not made until after the deputy’s examination had concluded, the State’s direct

examination of the next witness had finished, and the defense’s cross-examination

of that witness was under way. While a break was taken for the new witness to

refresh his memory, Jesus’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prior

witness’s testimony.

“[A] motion for mistrial must be made when the grounds therefore first

become apparent.” State v. Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App.1992). We

recognize that defense counsel may have been reluctant to draw further attention

to the testimony, but the record reflects that counsel recognized the issue

immediately yet waited a substantial amount of time to raise it. See id. at 796–97.

As the State correctly points out, waiting as long as Jesus did to make the objection

deprived the court of the opportunity to remedy the situation by striking the

testimony and giving an immediate curative instruction—both recognized methods

for alleviating prejudice from improper testimony. See, e.g., State v. Kieffer, 17

N.W.3d 651, 658 (Iowa 2025) (“When evidence is introduced contrary to an order

in limine, but the district court promptly strikes the evidence and admonishes the

jury to disregard it, a mistrial may be granted only when the forbidden evidence is

so prejudicial that its effect on the jury could not be erased by the district court’s

admonition.”). We find the delay between the challenged testimony and the motion
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for mistrial in this instance was too long to preserve error. See State v. Stock, No.

22-1432, 2024 WL 466570, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2024) (finding that waiting

until after the witness was excused to make a motion for mistrial based on the

witness’s testimony was too late to preserve error); State v. Brown, No. 14-0667,

2015 WL 5577971, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015) (same). As a result, we

do not address Jesus’s second claimed basis for a mistrial.

B. Preserved Claims

As to the denials of Jesus’s motions for mistrial related to the other two

grounds, error is preserved. We review a ruling on a motion for mistrial for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611, 614–15 (Iowa 2024). An abuse

of discretion occurs “where there is no support in the record for the trial court’s

determination.” Jirak, 491 N.W.2d at 796. A new trial is only appropriate “if the

prejudice resulting from the denial prevented the defendant from having a fair trial.”

State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted).

1. Prior Incarceration

While describing the changing dynamic between Eddie and Jesus, Eddie’s

girlfriend explained why the brothers had grown distant at a certain point in their

relationship:

Q. And so when you say you wouldn’t really be around them,
how often do you mean?
A. Well, I don’t remember the year that he got sentenced to
prison so—
Q. So 2018 you moved out. Do you know when Jesus moved
to Galva?
A. After he got out.

Jesus immediately requested a recess, and the jury was excused. Jesus then

moved for a mistrial. He argued that the reference to his prior incarceration
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constituted improper character evidence and would potentially force him to

address the issue if he chose to testify at trial. As it was late in the day, the district

court reserved its ruling until the following morning.

The next morning, the district court denied the motion because the comment

was an isolated incident and there was no observable reaction from the jury

suggesting that it had prejudiced the proceedings. See Kieffer, 17 N.W.3d at 658

(recognizing the considerable discretion given to the district court in ruling on a

motion for mistrial because that court is in a better position to gauge the effect on

the jury). The court offered Jesus an opportunity to propose a limiting instruction

or to renew the mistrial motion at the close of evidence. Jesus declined both

options.

Nothing in the record indicates that the district court abused its discretion in

denying Jesus’s motion for a mistrial. The statement was isolated and made early

in the presentation of evidence, and, at the time of the ruling, the court acted

promptly to offer appropriate remedies. See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 32

(Iowa 2006) (finding that an isolated reference to the defendant’s prior charges did

not warrant a mistrial when considered in the context of the entire trial). As we find

no abuse of the district court’s discretion, we deny this claim for relief.

2. Speeding

Later in the trial, the State presented testimony to describe the events

leading up to the altercation between Jesus and Eddie. A DCI agent testified that

Jesus had recorded a video of himself driving 105 miles per hour that afternoon.

Jesus immediately requested a recess and moved for a mistrial. He argued that

the speed at which he was driving was wholly irrelevant to the issues at trial.
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Defense counsel also observed that one of the jurors “literally turned their head to

look at our client in what I could only expect was something negative, perhaps

alarm.”

Following a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the attorneys and

court agreed that the jurors would be brought back into the courtroom, defense

counsel would formally object to the testimony on the grounds of relevance and

unfair prejudice, the court would sustain the objection, and the court would strike

the testimony about Jesus’s driving speed. That is what transpired, with the court

also giving this verbal instruction:

The jury will disregard the last part of the answer. . . . It is not
relevant to the issues that you have to decide what speed the
defendant was traveling at the time referenced in the witness’s
testimony. That is not an issue—that is not a fact that is relevant to
your determination.

For a mistrial, Jesus would need to establish the statement regarding his

speeding was so prejudicial the effect upon the jury could not be erased. See

State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 659 (Iowa 2019). He has not done so here.

In general, and in this instance, curative instructions are sufficient to remedy the

error. See id. While the juror who reacted may have been momentarily surprised

by the testimony, the district court instructed the jury to disregard it. We have no

reason to believe the jury failed to follow that instruction. See State v. Davis, 951

N.W.2d 8, 17 (Iowa 2020) (“We presume juries follow the court’s instructions.”

(citation omitted)). The district court adequately remedied the issue and did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial on the basis of the DCI

agent’s testimony about Jesus speeding.
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C. Cumulative Effect

Jesus argues that even if no single error warranted a mistrial, the cumulative

effect of multiple errors deprived him of a fair trial. We assess this claim only with

respect to the two mistrial motions for which Jesus preserved error. He has the

burden of establishing prejudice. See State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70, 80-81 (Iowa

2013), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699,

708 (Iowa 2016).

Upon reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the combined effect of

the two challenged statements for which Jesus preserved error did not result in

sufficient prejudice to warrant a mistrial. The statement about Jesus’s

incarceration was a passing comment made during the first day of testimony in a

trial that spanned roughly two weeks. The officer’s testimony about Jesus driving

105 miles per hour was promptly met with an objection, and the court sustained

the objection, struck the testimony, and gave a curative instruction. Iowa courts

have consistently held that juries are presumed to follow such instructions. See

Davis, 951 N.W.2d at 17.

In light of the isolated and brief nature of both statements, the swift actions

to remedy their admission by the district court, and the lack of evidence to establish

prejudice, Jesus has not shown that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors

denied him a fair trial. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motions for mistrial, and we affirm its rulings.

VI. Conclusion

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict

finding Jesus guilty of second-degree murder. Because Jesus’s challenge to the
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jury instructions was not preserved for appellate review, we do not address it. As

to the challenges to the district court’s rulings on Jesus’s motions for mistrial that

were preserved, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying them and

those denials did not deprive Jesus of a fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the

conviction.

AFFIRMED.