In the Interest R.H. and J.H., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2028
Filed April 9, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF R.H. and J.H.,
Minor Child,

K.H., Mother,
Appellant,

C.H., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Karen Kaufman

Salic, Judge.

A mother and father both appeal the termination of their parental rights to

their twin sons. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Jane M. Wright, Forest City, for appellant mother.

Theodore J. Hovda, Garner, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Carrie Rodriguez, Garner, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child,

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy,

JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

In cases terminating parental rights, we often emphasize that the best

interests of the children are paramount. But typically left unsaid is the related point

that termination may be in the children’s best interests even when their parents

have not tried to harm the children and indeed may be trying their best to improve

their parenting and offer a safe home. This second point comes to the fore here.

One-month-old twin boys were removed from their parents’ custody after

they were diagnosed with failure to thrive at their one-month checkup and their

home was discovered to be unlivable—overflowing with clutter, hosting an

infestation of mice, lacking finished floors, and reeking of rotting garbage and

cigarettes. Despite the parents participating in many services—by most accounts

earnestly and to the best of their abilities—after nine months neither was yet

capable of caring for the twins alone or as a team. So the juvenile court terminated

the parental rights of both to their sons. And both appeal.

On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. The State proved

the statutory ground for terminating the mother’s and father’s rights under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2024) because the sons could not safely be returned

to either parent at the time of the termination hearing. And termination of the

mother’s and father’s parental rights is in the sons’ best interest given that the sons

are flourishing in their new home and both parents still struggle to develop the

basic parenting skills needed to provide a safe home. We do not doubt the parents

love their sons and are doing their best. But unfortunately, that is not enough—

the sons need a permanent, safe home now. We thus affirm on both appeals.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The mother and father welcomed twin sons to their family in January 2024.1

The father was in his mid-fifties; the mother was twenty-nine. They also have an

older daughter who was six years old when the sons were born.

At the twins’ one-month doctor’s appointment, they were diagnosed with

failure to thrive because they were well below where they should have been on the

growth charts. Both had gained less than a pound since birth, weighing in at about

five and six pounds respectively and putting them at the 0.01 and 0.2 percentiles.

An Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) social worker

visited the family’s home to investigate further and found it “uninhabitable.” Many

rooms were described as “unpassable” with clutter, boxes, and household goods

piled waist high on the floor and covering “[e]very horizontal surface.” The interior

exuded an overwhelming smell of cigarettes and rotting garbage. Eventually, it

was discovered that the house had an infestation of mice and was missing any

finished flooring—having only unsanitary subfloors.

At first, HHS provided the parents family-preservation services and

developed a safety plan for the mother and children to live with a family friend from

their church while the father worked to clean up their home. But within a week,

HHS became concerned with the safety of the children even in this arrangement.

The mother needed “constant prompting” to remain focused on proper feeding and

would get distracted and stop after only feeding a minimal amount, even when the

1 We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—

unlike the juvenile court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2)
(2024), with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110.
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baby would start crying for more. And the parents were not properly supporting

the babies’ heads when holding them, failed to practice good hygiene practices,

and had used a weighted blanket when the babies were too weak for that. For

these and other reasons, the juvenile court ordered the twins temporarily removed

from the parents’ custody and placed in foster care at the end of February. The

sons were eventually both adjudicated in need of assistance. And they have

remained in foster care throughout this proceeding.2

Since removal, the mother and father have had only supervised interactions

with the sons. They have been offered, and participated in, many services to try

to improve their essential parenting skills through varied educational techniques.

But both parents still struggle with meeting the sons’ needs without being

instructed to do so by the HHS worker or services provider. Although the father’s

interactions with the sons seem to be better in separate visits without the mother

distracting him, the father testified that it is the plan for them to “be a team

parenting” the sons. And even when separated, he still needed “prompts on basic

repetitive parenting skills.” As for the mother, she “often loses focus on the task at

hand whether it be changing a diaper or feeding the boys.” And the guardian ad

litem explained she “appears oblivious to their needs at times,” failing to

comprehend that “[t]heir fussing, whining or crying” meant “that some action in their

care was needed.” The guardian ad litem also noted that the mother “seems

2 The six-year-old daughter was also removed, adjudicated in need of assistance,

and placed with the same foster family as the sons. The mother’s and father’s
parental rights to the daughter are not at issue in this termination proceeding; the
juvenile court noted in its termination order that a decision on the daughter’s
permanency goal would “be made at a later date.”
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disconnected” from the sons during visits, referring to them as “this one,” “that

one,” or “the other one,” rather than by name. And the guardian ad litem

“question[ed] whether [the parents] have made caring for their children a priority,”

as they seem to place other people and things above the care of the sons.

HHS has offered services to the mother and father focused on improving

the cleanliness of their home so that it is safe for the sons to live in. And to be

sure, some improvement has been made. Much of the flooring has been

installed—mostly through the help of the parents’ friends. HHS and the family-

services provider have tried to help the parents implement strategies for working

on the condition of the home, including a chore chart, but the mother and father

“have continued to lack follow through,” and “have not been able to consistently

maintain progress from home check to home check.”

Both the mother and father have completed parenting assessments and

psychological assessments. The father has done some individual therapy, while

the mother has still been working to set up individual and couples therapy.

The father works part-time—generally a couple of days a week—at a pizza

restaurant and had applied for Social Security disability benefits. The mother does

not work but receives around $900 a month in Social Security benefits. And she

sometimes helps out at the pizza restaurant but receives compensation through

free food. HHS has tried to help the mother and father with budgeting, but they

continue to struggle. And most of their bills are paid by the mother’s uncle.

The sons are doing well in foster care, with HHS reporting that they “have

blossomed” and “are doing amazing.” They both have gained weight and are now

within the standard weight range for their age. One of them is meeting his
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developmental milestones since being in foster care, and the other has also made

significant progress. Both boys are happy, alert, and interactive.

The State petitioned to terminate the mother and father’s parental rights,

and a hearing was held in December 2024. Only the father and an HHS worker

testified. The sons’ guardian ad litem recommended termination. And the juvenile

court agreed, terminating the parental rights of both parents to the sons.

First, the juvenile court found that the State proved termination was

warranted for both parents under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).3 The court

reasoned that the sons were younger than three years old, had been adjudicated

in need of assistance, had been removed from their parents care for at least six of

the last twelve months, and “[t]here exists clear and convincing evidence that the

child[ren] cannot at the present time be returned to the custody of” the mother and

father. This conclusion rested on the court’s findings that the home was still

“unsafe for two small, crawling children” and that the parents’ inability to care for

the sons made it “unsafe for these children to be alone with either parent for any

length of time.” The court also found that “it is unlikely that an additional six months

would be any more effective in correcting [their lack of parenting abilities] than the

last nine months have been.”

3 Although the court’s reasoning analyzed only paragraph “h,” in its decretal
language at the end of its ruling, the court ordered that the parents’ rights were
terminated under paragraphs “a” and “d” and did not mention paragraph “h.” The
supreme court granted the State’s motion for a limited remand to resolve the
conflict in the ruling. And on remand, the court corrected what it described as “an
obvious scrivener’s error,” and ordered that the allegations were proved under only
paragraph “h” and not under paragraphs “a” or “d.”
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Second, the court found that it was in the sons’ best interest for both parents’

parental rights to be terminated, reasoning that termination would best serve the

children’s “safety” and their “mental and emotional condition and needs” and would

give the “best opportunity for furthering [their] long-term nurturing and growth.”

And third, the court declined to apply any permissive exception to termination. In

rejecting the parent-child bond exception, the court explained that “[a]ny sadness

the child[ren] may experience because of termination does not overcome the likely

long-term hardship and neglect the child[ren] will suffer if in the care of [the mother]

and [father].” Both parents now appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their

parental rights to the sons.

II. Ground for Termination

Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a three-

step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the State must

prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State must show that

termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And finally, the parent bears the

burden to show whether a discretionary exception applies that should preclude

termination. Id. We review a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful

consideration” to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on

credibility determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

On the first step, the parents argue that the juvenile court erred in

terminating their rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), pointing to their

improved housing, the father’s employment and mother’s disability income, their

bond with their sons, and the strong support they have from their church friends.

They contend “that the record in this case does not rise to the level of proof
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necessary to warrant termination of their parental rights.” But we agree with the

juvenile court that the State proved this ground for termination.

The first three elements of this ground for termination are not in dispute—

the sons are under three years old, were adjudicated in need of assistance, and

have been removed from the home for more than six of the last twelve months.

See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(1)–(3). And on the fourth element, we find clear

and convincing evidence shows the sons could not be returned to the mother and

father’s custody at the “present time.” Id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4); see also In re A.M.,

843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (explaining that the issue is whether the sons

could be returned “at the time of the hearing”).

At the termination hearing, the father conceded that the sons could not be

returned home at that time, testifying that he “would like another couple weeks to

work on the house . . . because we still need to baby proof the house a little more.”

While the mother and father have made progress in the cleanliness of their home,

the HHS worker testified that she too was still concerned with “two crawling infants

in the shape that the house is as it” stood at the time of the hearing. And based

on the latest photographs of the home provided in the record, we share the same

concern.

But more important, the mother and father were both still struggling with

basic parenting skills needed to maintain a safe environment, especially proper

feeding and diaper changing, at the time of the hearing. Despite extensive

services trying to teach them these basic skills, neither parent seems able to retain

and apply the knowledge. They fail to realize when a diaper needs to be changed

and how to do so or when a son is hungry and how to prepare and feed from a
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bottle. Indeed, their six-year-old daughter appears to know better how to handle

these tasks and has been observed trying to offer suggestions to the parents.

So we agree with the juvenile court that there is clear and convincing

evidence that the sons could not be returned to the mother and father’s care at the

time of the termination hearing. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010)

(“[H]ope” that a parent “might eventually be able to parent [the child] safely and

consistently” based on some improvements is “gambl[ing] with the children’s future

by asking them to continuously wait for a stable biological parent.” (cleaned up)).

And thus, the State proved this ground of termination.

III. Best Interests of the Children

The parents also challenge the second step—whether it is in the sons’ best

interests to terminate their parental rights. In arguing that termination is not in the

sons’ best interests, the mother and father argue that “[t]he record shows that

[they] have adequate income to support the children and were residing in an

appropriate residence.” They contend that the sons have a close bond with them

and that “termination would be detrimental” to the sons because of this bond.

The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a termination

proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the sons’ long-range

and immediate best interests. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).

And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016).
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The parents’ best-interests arguments overlook the serious safety concerns

that prevented returning the sons to their custody at the time of the termination

hearing. Even if the parents are correct that they have sufficient income and

housing (despite the father’s contrary testimony about the state of their home), as

discussed above, the parents have shown repeatedly that they cannot safely care

for the sons on their own. And we agree with the juvenile court that the prospects

of that changing with six more months are dim for either parent given the many

unsuccessful attempts up to that point.

Meanwhile, the sons are doing well in foster care placement. HHS reports

that both sons “have thrived in foster care and are doing amazing.” We do not

doubt that the mother and father love the sons, but it is in the sons’ physical,

mental, and emotional best interest to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental

rights. We thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother and father’s

parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.