In the Interest of K.W. and N.W., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2065
Filed March 19, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF K.W. and N.W.,
Minor Children,

S.W., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brent Pattison, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children.

AFFIRMED.

Tonya A. Oetken of Oetken Law Firm, Inc., Ankeny, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Erin Elizabeth Romar of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
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TABOR, Chief Judge.

The juvenile court expressed “no doubt” the mother loves these children but

also had “no doubt” she could not meet their needs. In terminating her parental

rights, the court found: “The bottom line is that she is still learning how to meet her

own needs—and struggling mightily in that regard.”

S.W. appeals, contending the court should have preserved her legal

relationship with her two daughters, nine-year-old K.W. and eight-year-old N.W.

She argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the

statutory grounds for termination, termination is not in her daughters’ best

interests, and the court should forgo termination because the girls are in their

father’s custody and because of the strong parent-child bond. Examining the

record anew,1 we agree with the juvenile court’s observations and affirm the

termination order.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

When it discovered the mother was using methamphetamine in the spring

of 2022, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services implemented a safety

plan for the family, placing the children with their maternal grandmother. But when

the mother assaulted the grandmother in the presence of the children, the

department ended the safety plan and removed the children.2 They were placed

1 “We review termination proceedings de novo, examining both the facts and law

and adjudicating anew those issues properly preserved and presented.” In re A.R.,
932 N.W.2d 588, 589 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The juvenile court’s factual findings
do not bind us, but we give them weight, especially on witness credibility. Id.
2 Before the removal, the children lived with their half-sibling Z.B. The proceedings

regarding Z.B. were separate and not relevant here.
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in the custody of their father, B.W. The court adjudicated them as children in need

of assistance (CINA) in May 2023.

During the CINA case, the mother did little to address the department’s

safety concerns and to resume custody of the children. Despite court orders, S.W.

did not complete any substance-use treatment. She completed only one drug

screen for the department while the safety plan was in place, which was negative.

But she did not participate in any further testing—failing to appear for random

screens and tampering with sweat patches.

Unfortunately, the children’s placement with their father was disrupted too.

About eight months into their stay with him, the court ordered an emergency

removal because B.W. was abusing alcohol.3 But then B.W. committed himself to

substance-use treatment. And in May 2024 the court ordered custody returned to

the father under the protective supervision of the department. The children have

remained in his custody since then and, by all accounts, are doing well.

Meanwhile, S.W. did not participate in services needed to ensure a safe

reunion with the children. Thus, after the March 2024 permanency review hearing,

the court ordered the State to petition to terminate her parental rights. S.W. had

not sought substance-use treatment. And while she testified at the termination

hearing that she had participated in mental-health services, she did not release

information for the department. She was also inconsistent with supervised

visitation, which upset her daughters. The caseworker testified that S.W. stopped

attending visits in July 2024 and pretty much stopped communicating with the

3 The children were placed with their aunt during that time.
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department by August. The caseworker did not know where the mother was living,

though S.W. testified that she was living with a friend. For much of the CINA case,

the mother was living in her car.

Despite failing to participate in professionally supervised visits, the mother

continued to show up at B.W.’s house unannounced. B.W. testified that he would

allow the mother contact with the children, even after termination, as long as she

is safe and the children are not “in harm’s way.” But he was concerned S.W. would

not comply if the court entered a bridge order setting custody rather than

terminating her parental rights.

The court held the termination hearing over two days in October and

November 2024. S.W. did not appear in person on the first day but joined by video

conferencing. Her counsel explained she could not appear in person because she

had just entered a local substance-use treatment facility and did not want to risk

losing her bed by going to the court hearing.4 Because the hearing went long, the

court scheduled a second day to allow S.W. to testify. But on the second day,

S.W. did not appear, and the parties agreed to close the record. Her counsel

explained that because of an illness, S.W. was discharged from the treatment

facility without completing treatment. Only then did S.W. appear. The court agreed

to reopen the record for her testimony, during which she admitted using

methamphetamine just four weeks earlier.

The court terminated S.W.’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)

(2024). S.W. appeals.

4 The juvenile court was skeptical of this claim and denied a motion to continue the

hearing.
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II. Discussion

“Terminations follow a three-step analysis.” A.R., 932 N.W.2d at 591. First,

we determine whether the State met the statutory grounds; then we consider if

termination is in the children’s best interests; and, finally, we decide whether

circumstances warrant application of a statutory exception. See id. S.W. raises

an argument at each step of the analysis.5

First, S.W. argues that the State failed to prove the element for termination

at subparagraph (f)(4) of section 232.116(1). In her petition on appeal, she asserts

the State did not offer clear and convincing evidence the children cannot be

returned to her custody at the present time. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4); In

re M.H., 12 N.W.3d 159, 161 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (interpreting “at the present

time” to mean at the time of the termination trial). We disagree. The record

showed that the department did not know where the mother was living, so it could

not determine whether she could provide the children with a safe home. What’s

more, she had not engaged in substance-use or mental-health treatment as

ordered. She also avoided drug testing. Thus, we agree with the juvenile court

that the State showed the children could not be safely returned to her custody at

the time of the termination hearing.

Next, the mother argues that it was not in the children’s best interests to

terminate her rights. In assessing this second step, we give primary consideration

to the children’s safety; to the best placement for furthering their long-term

5 The State disputes the adequacy of the mother’s argument and citations to record

on each issue. We find that the mother raised each issue on appeal to a minimally
adequate standard and address the merits.
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nurturing and growth; and to their physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The mother showed no growth in addressing her

substance-use or mental-health concerns. And her visits were sporadic. Given

this lack of progress, the record shows the children would not be safe with the

mother in either the short- or long-term. It is in their best interests to terminate her

rights.

Beyond best interests, S.W. argues that severing her relationship with her

daughters would harm them and suggests the court should bypass termination

under a statutory exception. See id. § 232.116(3) (providing the court may bypass

termination on clear and convincing evidence it “would be detrimental . . . due to

the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). It is the parent’s burden to

establish that an exception applies. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).

The juvenile court did perceive a bond between the mother and her

daughters. But it found that “it has been damaged by her inconsistent participation

in their lives.” We agree. “[O]ur consideration must center on whether the

child[ren] will be disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage

overcomes [the parent’s] inability to provide for [their] developing needs.” In re

D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). No doubt, the mother loves her children

and wants to have a relationship with them. But she has not made the strides

necessary to resume their custody and has presented no evidence that the

termination of her rights will harm them.

Finally, the mother suggests that termination is not the “least restrictive

alternative” and contends that the court should have entered a bridge order

because the children are in their father’s custody. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a)
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(permitting the court to bypass termination if the children are in a relative’s legal

custody). The juvenile court carefully considered this option and determined that

bypassing termination is not in the children’s best interests. We agree with that

determination.

B.W. testified that he was concerned S.W. would not follow a custody order,

especially if conflicts arose over their parenting. His concern is supported by the

record, which reveals S.W.’s resistance to following court orders. Given that

history, the termination of S.W.’s rights will serve the children’s need for safety and

stability in their father’s custody. B.W. testified that he still considered S.W. their

mother and would allow interactions so long as S.W. did not pose a risk. Like the

juvenile court, we believe that the best interests of the children are served by

terminating S.W.’s rights and allowing B.W. to set those appropriate boundaries.

AFFIRMED.