State of Iowa v. James Russell Ellis

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1852
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMES RUSSELL ELLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Tod J. Deck

(State’s motion for continuance) and Zachary S. Hindman (Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, motion for substitution of counsel, and motion for new trial), Judges.

A defendant found guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree appeals his

conviction, raising multiple claims of procedural error. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

After more than a year of extended deadlines and continuances, James Ellis

was finally tried and found guilty by a jury of third-degree sexual abuse. On appeal

from his conviction, Ellis brings multiple claims of procedural error, challenging the

(1) continuance of his case beyond the one-year speedy trial deadline, (2) denial

of his motions for a mistrial and new trial after prospective jurors saw him in

shackles and handcuffs, and (3) denial of his motion for substitute counsel. We

affirm the court’s rulings on those issues in this long-lived and procedurally tangled

case.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In May 2019, James Ellis, Geoff Oolman, and Oolman’s girlfriend, R.H.,

spent several days and nights using methamphetamine and hiding out from the

police, who were looking for Oolman. After Oolman was caught, Ellis took R.H.

back to her apartment. There, she fell asleep for the first time in three days. When

R.H. woke up, her pants were off, and Ellis was lying on top of her with his penis

exposed. R.H. screamed at Ellis to leave. Once he was gone, R.H. called a friend,

who drove her to the hospital. Staff there examined R.H. and collected evidence

from her. Male DNA recovered from R.H.’s vaginal swab was later matched to

Ellis.

Two years later, the State charged Ellis with third-degree sexual abuse in

violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1) (2019). Ellis, who was released on bond,

filed a written arraignment on September 20, 2021. The district court set trial for

March 2022. That date was continued twice on Ellis’s motion and a third time at

the request of the State. The court also granted seven motions that Ellis filed to
3

extend the deadlines for his pretrial motions and notices. Trial was ultimately

scheduled for September 13, 2022—one week shy of Ellis’s one-year speedy trial

deadline. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c).

In mid-August, Ellis made a flurry of pretrial filings. First, under Iowa Code

section 691.2, Ellis filed a notice requesting that employees from the Iowa Division

of Criminal Investigation (DCI) who tested the DNA samples collected from Ellis

and R.H. testify in person at his trial. He also filed motions requesting disclosure

of R.H.’s confidential medical records and an opportunity to depose one of the

State’s witnesses, as well as a notice of potential defense witnesses. And finally,

on August 26—the last day of his extended deadline for pretrial motions—Ellis

moved to suppress a DNA sample collected from him nearly two years earlier,

arguing that the evidence was obtained under an expired warrant.

On September 2, the State moved to continue trial and extend the speedy-

trial deadline. As “the primary basis” for its motion, the State asserted that one of

the witnesses from the DCI whose testimony Ellis had demanded would not be

available for the September 13 trial. The State also explained it had secured a

new warrant for Ellis’s DNA but would need more time to obtain and test a sample.

Additionally, the State noted that Ellis’s witness disclosure was incomplete and that

the cumulative delay in bringing the case to trial was caused in part by Ellis’s own

motions to continue. Ellis resisted the State’s motion.

At a hearing on the motion, the court noted the State’s desire to develop

new DNA evidence in response to Ellis’s warrant challenge was “[not] persuasive

at all.” But it found other factors favored a continuance, including Ellis’s prior

requests for extensions of time, the need for a hearing on the pending motion to
4

suppress, and the court’s own concerns about “room availability and staffing.”

Weighing all these considerations, the court found good cause to grant the State’s

continuance and extend the speedy-trial deadline. It continued trial to

November 8—one year and seven weeks after Ellis’s arraignment. Although the

State was ready to proceed as early as September 22, the court explained that

earlier dates were unavailable due to a “scheduling logjam” caused by other jury

trials set for the intervening weeks.

On October 25, Ellis moved to dismiss his case based on a violation of his

speedy-trial rights.1 Although the court agreed with the State that the issue had

already been resolved by a different judge, it elaborated the reasons supporting

good cause for the seven-week extension. Those included the unavailability of the

State’s witness, Ellis’s incomplete disclosures, a competing murder trial, Ellis’s

late-filed motion to suppress, the “[not] excessively long” delay, and the lack of

prejudice to Ellis.

On November 3, 2022—five days before trial—Ellis asked for another

continuance. The district court denied that motion, and trial commenced on

November 8. Ellis, however, did not appear. He was apprehended the same day,

and trial was once again rescheduled—this time for January 31, 2023.

Over the next few months, Ellis cycled through several court-appointed

attorneys. The attorney who represented him from the beginning of the case

sought to withdraw after Ellis failed to appear at his first trial. A second attorney

1 In the time that elapsed between the hearing on the State’s motion to continue

and Ellis’s motion to dismiss, the State obtained a new buccal swab from Ellis,
mooting his prior motion to suppress.
5

had a conflict of interest, and a third cited a “breakdown of the attorney-client

relationship” from his representation of Ellis in a different matter. Ellis’s fourth

attorney was appointed at the end of December 2022. Just a few weeks later, Ellis

filed a pro se motion asking for a replacement. The district court denied the motion,

noting “the proximity of the trial date,” “the age of th[e] case,” and “the history of

[Ellis’s] attorney/client relationships.”

In the days leading up to the second attempt at trial, Ellis’s attorney filed a

motion asking that Ellis—who remained in custody—be permitted to appear in

“civilian” clothes. The district court granted that request. It also entered a separate

order discussing its expectations for Ellis’s treatment at trial, including “that

arrangements will have to be made with the Plymouth County Sheriff to ensure

that the potential jurors and jurors are not aware of the fact of the Defendant’s

custody.” On the first morning of trial, however, Ellis was transported to the

Plymouth County courthouse in handcuffs, ankle shackles, and a body chain.

Although he wore civilian clothes, some of Ellis’s restraints were visible as a

sheriff’s deputy escorted him through the public areas of the courthouse. His path

crossed briefly through the atrium on the third floor, where several members of the

jury pool were waiting for jury selection to begin.

The prosecutor immediately notified the court about Ellis’s exposure to the

jury pool, and the deputy who transported Ellis to the courthouse provided more

details on the record. The deputy testified that he had been directed to ensure

Ellis was dressed in “street clothes” and at the courthouse at 8:20 a.m., but the

deputy had not received word that Ellis should be transported through the

courthouse without restraints. Ellis’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing Ellis’s
6

appearance in the atrium had tainted the entire jury pool. The district court

reserved ruling but encouraged the parties to explore the possibility of prejudice

during jury selection.

The State did not mention the issue during its voir dire of the potential jurors,

but defense counsel did, asking, “Did anybody see Mr. Ellis arrive this morning?”

Four jurors raised their hands. Counsel then pressed one about what she saw:

Can you tell me in your own words what you saw?
JUROR NO. 1: Yes. I saw him come in. I was standing at the
back and I saw him come in towards the front.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And what about that? I need
some more details.
JUROR NO. 1: It appeared that he had handcuffs.

After the prosecutor requested a sidebar, the parties moved to the court’s

chambers and individually questioned the four potential jurors who had seen Ellis

arrive. Each affirmed that they would disregard their observations and comply with

the court’s instructions on the presumption of innocence. Three of them served on

the jury that would later find Ellis guilty.

Following his conviction, Ellis moved for a new trial, arguing among other

grounds that his exposure to the jury while in shackles violated his due process

rights. The district court denied relief in a thorough written ruling that also

addressed its reserved ruling on Ellis’s motion for mistrial. Ellis now appeals,

challenging: (1) the seven-week extension of his one-year speedy trial deadline,

(2) the denial of his motions for mistrial and new trial after members of the jury pool

saw Ellis in shackles, and (3) the denial of his request for substitute counsel.
7

II. Analysis

A. Speedy Trial

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33 provides in part that “[a]ll criminal

cases must be brought to trial within one year after the defendant’s initial

arraignment.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c) (2022). A charge that is not tried within

the one-year window generally must be dismissed. See State v. Rodriguez, 511

N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1994). But this rule is not without exceptions. The district

court may extend the deadline to commence trial if the State shows that (1) the

defendant has waived the right to speedy trial, (2) the delay is attributable to the

defendant, or (3) other “good cause” exists. Id.; see also State v. Elder, 868

N.W.2d 448, 453 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).

Challenging both the district court’s grant of the State’s motion to continue

and denial of his motion to dismiss, Ellis claims the State failed to establish good

cause. This court reviews a good-cause determination for an abuse of discretion.

See State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017). In the speedy-trial

context, the district court’s discretion is “circumscribed by the limited exceptions”

available under Rule 2.33. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001);

accord Elder, 868 N.W.2d at 453.2

2 Ellis argued in his appellate brief that because his speedy-trial challenge
implicates a constitutional right, we should apply a de novo review. The Iowa
Supreme Court rejected that argument in State v. Grady, 231 N.W.2d 869, 873
(Iowa 1975). Since then, the court has consistently held that a good-cause
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d at 703;
accord State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005) (reviewing for abuse of
discretion); Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204 (same); State v. LaPlant, 244 N.W.2d 240,
242 (Iowa 1976) (“[R]eview of a determination of good cause is not de novo.”). As
Ellis acknowledged at oral argument, we are not free to rewrite that standard.
8

The key focus of the good-cause analysis is “the reason for the delay.”

McNeal, 897 N.W.2d at 704 (citation omitted). Of course, “delay cannot be

evaluated entirely in a vacuum,” and so courts also consider “surrounding

circumstances such as the length of the delay, whether the defendant asserted his

right to a speedy trial, and whether prejudice resulted from the delay.” Id. (citation

omitted). But these considerations are relevant “only insofar as they affect the

strength of the reason for delay.” State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335

(Iowa 1980). As our supreme court has explained:

This means that, to whatever extent the delay has been a short one,
or the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial, or is not
prejudiced, a weaker reason will constitute good cause. On the other
hand, if the delay has been a long one, or if the defendant has
demanded a speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger reason is
necessary to constitute good cause.

McNeal, 897 N.W.2d at 704 (quoting Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 205). According to

Ellis, none of the reasons submitted by the State established good cause to extend

the speedy-trial deadline. We disagree.

The State points to the unavailability of its DCI criminalist as the chief

justification for extension of the rule 2.33 deadline. Several cases recognize that

circumstance as a basis for good cause. See id. at 705–06 (finding good cause

where a “trial date conflicted with the schedule of at least one material expert

witness, a fact which the State brought to the court’s attention before trial”); State

v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Iowa 1991) (noting the last available trial date

before expiration of the rule 2.33 deadline was unworkable because “some of the

State’s witnesses would not be available”); Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335 (finding

trial court had good cause to extend the speedy-trial deadline by fourteen days
9

where one of the State’s expert witnesses was on vacation); State v. Tennant,

No. 17-0648, 2018 WL 2084858, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (collecting

cases in support of district court’s finding that the scheduled vacation of a central

State witness provided good cause for an extension).

Ellis, however, argues that the State knew its witness was unavailable but

needlessly delayed seeking a continuance until shortly before trial. That argument

is belied by the record. The State named two DCI criminalists as trial witnesses in

its minutes of testimony filed in August 2021. On August 16, 2022, Ellis gave notice

of his demand for those witnesses to testify in person. See Iowa Code § 691.2(2).

The next day, the State filed a motion requesting the court’s permission for its DCI

witnesses to testify by deposition, citing their unavailability for trial because of a

mandatory training. Two days after the district court denied that motion, the State

moved for a continuance, arguing that one of those witnesses was essential to its

case—the criminalist who “actually performed the testing on the sex assault kit and

the buccal swab of Mr. Ellis.”

True, the State could have raised its scheduling problem before Ellis’s

section 691.2 demand. But until the demand was filed, the State may have been

planning to rely on the admission of the DNA report without live testimony. See id.

§ 691.2(1) (providing such reports “shall be received in evidence,” without live

testimony, unless the defendant demands the criminalist to testify at trial). And

cases finding good cause based on the unavailability of a material witness do not

require that the State be entirely blameless in retrospect. See McNeal, 897

N.W.2d at 705 (noting that while the State’s “diligence could have been criticized

in hindsight,” the unavailability of a material expert witness was “enough to justify
10

a brief extension past the speedy trial deadline”). Ellis does not dispute that the

State’s criminalist was a material witness. Nor does he claim any prejudice or

harm to his defense from the delay. See id. at 704 (noting that while this

consideration does not eliminate the State’s duty to show a valid reason for the

delay, the reason does not have to be as strong).

Ellis also argues that cases finding good cause because of unavailable

witnesses for the State have generally approved much shorter delays. Cf. id.

at 699 (eight days); Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335 (fourteen days); Tennant, 2018

WL 2084858, at *2 (thirteen days). The seven-week continuance here, however,

was a product of compounding factors that add further support to the court’s good-

cause findings.

One of those factors was an ongoing first-degree murder trial expected to

spill over to the first day of Ellis’s trial. In discussing that issue, the court noted

that the courthouse only had space for one jury trial and the clerk’s office was

short-staffed, meaning it was unlikely that Ellis’s trial could have started on its

scheduled date. See State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984)

(finding good cause for a delay where “the unexpected length of a previous trial

[left] no other available space for defendant’s trial”). And while the State required

only a modest extension to produce its DCI witness, conflicts with other trials and

defense counsel’s upcoming vacation prevented immediate rescheduling. These

scheduling conflicts were not the product of chronic court congestion, as Ellis

argues, but instead “unique, non-recurring events which create[d] a particular

scheduling problem.” State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983); cf. Miller,

637 N.W.2d at 206 (finding court’s decision to delay until a “regular” trial date
11

showed its “deference to the established trial schedule” and not a unique

scheduling problem sufficient to extend the speedy-trial deadline).

Considering the reasons advanced by the State within the context of the

surrounding circumstances, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in

determining the State had established good cause to extend the speedy-trial

deadline.

B. Exposure of Custodial Status to Jury Pool

The presumption of innocence is “axiomatic and elementary, and its

enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Estelle

v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (citation omitted). Consequently, a criminal

defendant is “entitled to the indicia of innocence” while in the presence of the jury.

State v. Wilson, 406 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Iowa 1987). This generally means that a

defendant should not be restrained during trial, as “requiring a defendant to appear

in shackles before a jury is inherently prejudicial.” Id. at 449.

Outside of trial proceedings, however, a defendant’s right to the indicia of

innocence is less robust. Iowa courts distinguish “cases in which the defendant is

shackled in the courtroom during trial” from those in which “members of the jury

briefly and inadvertently observe the defendant being moved to and from the

courtroom area in shackles.” Id. at 448. In cases of shackling during trial, prejudice

is presumed, and “[t]he burden is on the State to show the necessity for physical

restraints.” Id. at 449. But in brief-exposure cases, “the defendant has the burden

to show the incident prejudicially affected the jury or that his ability to present his

defense was impaired as a result of his being seen in shackles.” Id. at 448; accord

State v. Ellis, 350 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1984).
12

This is a case of brief exposure. Ellis was not restrained in the courtroom

during trial. But he was wearing shackles on the first morning of trial when he was

escorted past several prospective jurors in the courthouse atrium. The district

court determined neither a mistrial nor a new trial was warranted because Ellis

failed to establish prejudice. It cited the affected jurors’ unequivocal promises to

be fair and impartial, as well as its modified preliminary instruction on the

presumption of innocence and irrelevance of Ellis’s custodial status.3

“No trial is perfect” when it comes to balancing a defendant’s rights against

concerns for public safety. Ellis, 350 N.W.2d at 183 (quoting State v. Kile, 313

N.W.2d 558, 562 (Iowa 1981)). The district court is in the best position to

determine “whether a reasonable accommodation of the two interests has been

achieved.” Id. (quoting Kile, 313 N.W.2d at 562). Thus, denial of a motion for a

mistrial or a new trial on indicia-of-innocence grounds is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Id.; see also Wilson, 406 N.W.2d at 450. Relevant considerations

include: (1) the length of the defendant’s exposure to the jury; (2) the

circumstances giving rise to the exposure; (3) whether the exposure was inside or

outside the courtroom; and (4) whether “the jury was otherwise aware” the

defendant was in custody. Ellis, 350 N.W.2d at 183.

3 That instruction stated in part:

The defendant is presumed innocent and not guilty. This
presumption of innocence requires you to put aside all suspicion
which might arise from the defendant’s arrest, any time he may have
been in custody after the arrest, the charge, or the present situation
of the defendant. The presumption of innocence remains with the
defendant throughout the trial unless the evidence establishes guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to each count.
13

Courthouse security cameras recorded Ellis’s brief journey through the

courthouse atrium. He wore handcuffs, ankle shackles, and a body chain. His

clothing was otherwise ordinary. A large coat draped over his shoulders obscured

the body chain and handcuffs. However, the position of Ellis’s hands implied

restraint, the chain between his ankles was visible, and he was shuffling a bit. A

sheriff’s deputy followed close behind Ellis, although the deputy did not guide or

touch him. Several prospective jurors seated in the atrium turned their heads as

Ellis passed; others appeared not to notice him. Ellis’s exposure to the pool lasted

only a matter of seconds.

Ellis contends this incident prejudiced his defense, emphasizing that three

of the potential jurors who saw him in shackles later sat on his jury. But, following

an examination of those jurors, the district court concluded they were prepared to

disregard their observations. Ellis points to no evidence that they were prejudicially

affected by the brief sight of his restraints. See Wilson, 406 N.W.2d at 448.

Notably, Ellis did not use his peremptory strikes to remove the three jurors he

claims were affected. And while he hypothesizes that others learned about his

custodial status during voir dire, he did not examine them further. See State v.

Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 237 (Iowa 2015) (“[A] party who fails to avail himself or

herself of procedures for identifying bias waives later challenges for juror

impartiality.”).4

4 Ellis also asserts that the district court inadequately instructed the jury “how to

consider” his appearance in the atrium. But the court’s preliminary instructions did
mention Ellis’s custodial status, and he declined to have that repeated in the final
presumption-of-innocence instruction. So we do not consider this argument
further.
14

What remains of Ellis’s prejudice argument are the bare circumstances of

his appearance in the atrium, and those do not support an inference of prejudice

on their own. Ellis was exposed to the jury pool for a matter of seconds. Only his

ankle chain was in plain view, although he was dressed in civilian clothing. While

his exposure to the jury pool was unfortunate and preventable, it was not of a

magnitude that compels a finding of prejudice. See Ellis, 350 N.W.2d at 183

(affirming denial of mistrial where two to four jurors briefly observed a manacled

defendant being led down the courthouse stairs during transport by officers).

In an overlapping claim of error, Ellis contends that his exposure to the jury

was not “inadvertent” but rather a deliberate violation of the district court’s pretrial

order. Pointing to Wilson, he urges us to find that a defendant whose custodial

status is revealed to jurors through the deliberate conduct of State or court officials

is excused from the requirement of showing prejudice. But while Wilson used the

label “inadvertent observation” to distinguish the brief-exposure category of cases

from those in which a defendant is “actually tried in shackles,” it did not suggest

that intent is the determinative factor for deciding whether a presumption of

prejudice applies. 406 N.W.2d at 448. Nor do other cases addressing brief

exposures stand for that rule. See Ellis, 350 N.W.2d at 183 (making no finding on

whether a restrained defendant was deliberately or inadvertently exposed to jurors

while outside the courtroom); Kile, 313 N.W.2d at 562–63 (same); State v. Evans,

169 N.W.2d 200, 210 (Iowa 1969) (same).

Even if a non-accidental exposure would relieve Ellis of his burden to show

prejudice, such a rule would not apply here. Nothing in the record suggests Ellis

was escorted through the courthouse in a deliberate attempt to prejudice the jury
15

or otherwise deny his due process rights. The deputy who transported Ellis

testified that he was unaware of the need to keep Ellis’s restraints out of public

view. The district court found his testimony credible:

[T]he clear implication of the deputy’s testimony (and especially from
his demeanor during his testimony) was that he realized, when he
saw the prospective jurors in the atrium, that he had made a mistake
by having [Ellis] in restraints in the presence of those prospective
jurors, and that once he realized his mistake he moved [Ellis] as
quickly and directly as possible out of the atrium.

Ellis points to no evidence suggesting his exposure to the jury pool was anything

more than an accident.5 The district court properly denied Ellis relief on this claim.

C. Substitute Counsel

On January 13, 2023—about two weeks before his case was set for another

attempt at trial—Ellis filed a pro se motion requesting appointment of substitute

counsel, alleging “a lack of trust” and “break down of communication” between

himself and his attorney. Defense counsel moved to withdraw the same day. She

had represented Ellis for less than three weeks and was his fourth court-appointed

attorney.

At a hearing on the motions, defense counsel confirmed that she had

investigated the facts of the case, conferred with Ellis about trial strategy, and

would be prepared to proceed with the scheduled trial. When the district court

asked Ellis why he wanted a new attorney, Ellis responded:

I believe that we have no trial strategy. I have suggested a
few things to my attorney, and she’s informed me that she believed
my strategy was incorrect, which her inference or suggestion of what
my trial strategy was [was] incorrect. It’s not the strategy that I was

5 Our resolution of this issue should not be viewed as an approval of how Ellis was

transported. We urge the sheriff to develop a new procedure for transporting
defendants for their jury trials in this county to avoid exposures of this type.
16

wanting to take. It was just a—suggestions or leadings that I thought
would be things to look into or follow.
I don’t know how much—we have—we’re not seeing eye to
eye. I guess I don’t know what her strategy is. I don’t know what it
is. I would be happy to know. The only strategy that I can seem to
come up with is that we communicate through mail, which is
extremely slow. And she stated to me from the get-go that her
intentions were not to put a lot of effort into things or to work hard.
She’s been at this long enough that that’s not her driving force
behind what she does anymore. And she’s also seen people that
were innocent with my type of charge still become incarcerated and
go to prison. And that kind of attitude and approach towards my case
is not one that I could get on board with.
If I can’t adequately be represented by somebody else and
provided adequate time and also the chance to confront my accusers
with new representation, as I was not allowed to with this
representation either, but if I can’t have that done, then what’s the
point of getting another attorney, I guess? I don’t see the Court
cooperating in my interest at all in regards to this entire charge. So
I feel my words hold little to no weight in this situation anyways.

The district court denied Ellis’s request,6 finding the concerns he expressed

did not “rise to the level of [a] complete breakdown of the attorney/client

relationship.” The court emphasized “the proximity of the trial date,” “the age of

th[e] case,” and “the history of [Ellis’s] attorney/client relationships” as additional

reasons to deny the motion. It advised Ellis that he could proceed with his attorney

or choose to represent himself, but he could not “manipulate or delay the trial” by

requesting substitute counsel.

A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, but not necessarily

their counsel of choice. State v. Mott, 759 N.W.2d 140, 148 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008).

“Where a defendant represented by a court-appointed attorney requests the court

appoint substitute counsel, sufficient cause must be shown to justify replacement.”

6 Because Ellis’s attorney had moved to withdraw on the basis of Ellis’s request for

new counsel, the court denied that motion as well.
17

State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2004). Grounds justifying substitution

include a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in

communication. Id. at 749–50. But “general frustration and dissatisfaction with

defense counsel” are not good reasons for substitution. State v. Boggs, 741

N.W.2d 492, 506 (Iowa 2007). This court reviews denial of substitute counsel for

abuse of the district court’s “considerable discretion.” Id.

The district court was within its discretion to deny Ellis’s request for a new

attorney. On appeal, Ellis contends that substitution was mandatory because

“counsel had not discussed trial strategy with Ellis.” But counsel stated otherwise.

And Ellis’s remarks to the court acknowledge that he had communicated with

counsel to some extent, although he was not yet feeling confident in her “attitude

and approach.” The court was not required to appoint a new attorney for Ellis

based on these frustrations. Mott, 759 N.W.2d at 149 (finding defendant’s “general

complaints regarding his dislike of public defenders” and “disagreements over trial

strategy” did not compel substitution); State v. Smith, No. 22-1901, 2023

WL 5093216, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023) (finding that the court was within

its discretion to deny a motion for substitute counsel “based solely on [the

defendant’s] apparent dissatisfaction”). That is especially true given the proximity

of trial and the history of delay in Ellis’s case. See Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 506

(noting “eleventh-hour requests for substitute counsel are generally disfavored”);

see also State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994). Because we find no

abuse of the court’s discretion in denying substitute counsel, we need not address

Ellis’s claims of prejudice.
18

III. Conclusion

Finding no abuse of the district court’s discretion on any of the claims raised

by Ellis on appeal, we affirm his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.