State of Iowa v. Katrina Lashay Barnes

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2075
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

KATRINA LASHAY BARNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Patrick H. Tott,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Two confidential informants (CIs) set up a controlled buy of fentanyl pills at

the direction of the Sioux City Police Department. Under the supervision of a

department detective, the CIs planned to meet with a drug-dealing brother-sister

duo at a local residence. The residence was a conjoined duplex on a corner of

two streets. One duplex unit’s address was on one of the two streets and the other

unit’s address was on the other street. The CIs arrived at the duplex before the

dealer siblings and noted they recognized the duplex as Katrina Barnes’s

residence. They also noted that Barnes was a known dealer of fentanyl pills.

Once the dealer siblings arrived, CI #1 got into their vehicle. The brother

said that CI #1 needed to give the sister the money and she would go up to the

door of one of the duplex units to exchange the money for the fentanyl. CI #1

refused to conduct the transaction that way and insisted on going with the sister.

The sister relented, and the sister and CI #1 went to the door of the duplex unit

(we will refer to this duplex unit as “unit number 1”). The sister knocked on the

door, and Barnes answered. Barnes was not happy that the sister was not alone

and turned the sister and CI #1 away. The sister and CI #1 returned to the siblings’

vehicle. The siblings again told CI #1 to give the sister the money and she would

enter the residence and come back with the fentanyl, but CI #1 called the deal off

and left with CI #2.

Barnes’s probation officer confirmed to investigators that she listed her

address as one of the duplex units (we will refer to the duplex unit Barnes listed as

her address as “unit number 2”), though she answered the door at unit number 1.

Because the duplex units were in the same structure, investigators believed the
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units could have access to each other, so they sought and obtained a search

warrant for both units. While searching unit number 2, investigators found 1295

fentanyl pills and arrested Barnes. Following her arrest, Barnes waived her

Miranda1 rights and admitted to selling the pills.

The State charged Barnes with possession of controlled substances with

intent to deliver, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and two counts of child

endangerment. Barnes “move[d] to suppress all the evidence allegedly recovered

and all incriminating statements as a result of [the] search,” claiming the search

warrant was not supported by probable cause. The district court denied her

motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court found Barnes

guilty of all charges.

Barnes appeals. She challenges the district court’s ruling on her motion to

suppress. She claims the search violated the federal and state constitutions

because the warrant was issued without probable cause.2 Because Barnes raises

a constitutional challenge, our review is de novo. State v. Bracy, 971 N.W.2d 563,

567 (Iowa 2022).

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring warnings to

suspects before subjecting them to custodial interrogation).
2 Although Barnes argues the search violated both the Fourth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, she
does not raise differing arguments under the state constitution from its federal
counterpart. So “we will apply the general standards as outlined by the United
States Supreme Court for addressing a search and seizure challenge under the
Iowa Constitution.” See State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 291–92 (Iowa 2013)
(“Where a party raises both state and federal constitutional claims but does not
argue that a standard independent of the federal approach should be employed
under the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal standards
but reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion different from federal
precedent.”).
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In relation to challenges to the issuance of a search warrant, “[t]he test for

probable cause is whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime

was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a crime could be

located there.” Id. (cleaned up). However, when conducting our review, we do not

make an independent probable-cause determination. Id. Instead, we “determine

whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause

existed.” Id. (cleaned up).

When reviewing a search warrant application, we only consider information

presented to the issuing judge or magistrate. Id. In doing so, “we do not strictly

scrutinize the sufficiency of the underlying affidavit.” Id. (citation omitted). “The

affidavit of probable cause is interpreted in a common sense, rather than a

hypertechnical, manner.” Id. (cleaned up). “We draw all reasonable inferences to

support the . . . finding of probable cause and decide close cases in favor of

upholding the validity of the warrant.” Id. (citation omitted).

Barnes argues that the affidavit presented to the issuing judicial officer

“rested solely upon information provided by the [CIs] and an unsuccessful

controlled purchase, [so] the probable cause findings are inherently weak.” She

contends the warrant rests on the CIs’ conclusory statements and the CIs’

credibility was not properly established, invalidating the warrant.

Barnes is correct that when grounds for a warrant are supplied by an

informant, “the application must establish the credibility of the informant, or the

credibility of the information given by the informant.” Iowa Code § 808.3(2) (2023).

But Barnes’s assessment of the evidence supporting the warrant misses the mark

by looking at each component in isolation. Instead, we look at the totality of the
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circumstances. See State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997) (recognizing

the issuing judge or magistrate considers the totality of the circumstances when

making a probable cause determination). So we turn to those circumstances.

First, the affidavit accompanying the warrant application established the

CIs’ credibility. The affiant officer stated that both CIs had previously provided

reliable information and had not provided false information in the past. In this

investigation, the CIs told the investigator they knew of people (the siblings) who

could sell them fentanyl pills, otherwise known as “blues.” After contacting the

siblings about buying “blues,” the brother agreed to make the sale and set up a

time and place to carry it out. That supported the CIs’ credibility. When the CIs

arrived at the duplex, they identified it as Barnes’s home without prompting.

Barnes answered the sister’s knock when the sister and CI #1 went to the door of

unit number 1, further establishing the CIs’ credibility. This was all monitored by

law enforcement as it occurred. Given the officer’s sworn statement that both CIs

had a history of providing reliable information and not providing false information

coupled with the CIs corroborated conduct in this investigation, their credibility was

sufficiently established.

As to the evidence supporting the warrant, there was a substantial basis to

conclude that probable cause existed for both units. See Bracy, 971 N.W.2d at

567. The CIs and siblings met outside the duplex. The siblings explained that

someone inside the duplex would have the drugs for purchase. Barnes, the known

fentanyl dealer, answered the door to unit number 1 when the sister and CI #1

approached to complete the drug sale. Even after Barnes turned the sister and

CI #1 away, the siblings still tried to complete the deal. They believed that if the
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sister entered the duplex unit alone, she would be able to complete the sale

because there were fentanyl pills inside for purchase. There was clearly probable

cause to issue a warrant for unit number 1.

As for unit number 2, Barnes contends there was no probable cause to

search it because the sister and CI #1 knocked on the door of unit number 1—

suggesting, Barnes claims, that all the would-be controlled buy activity occurred at

unit number 1. But it was Barnes’s presence at unit number 1 during the attempted

controlled buy, her reputation as a dealer of fentanyl pills, and the siblings’ belief

that the sister would be able to buy the fentanyl pills from Barnes if she returned

alone that put the focus of the investigation squarely on Barnes. Given that unit

number 2 was immediately next door to unit number 1 and within the same

structure, coupled with unit number 2’s strong connection to Barnes, there was

reason to believe there was evidence of a crime inside unit number 2 as well.

The district court correctly upheld the search warrant, as it was supported

by probable cause, and correctly denied Barnes’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.