In re Marriage of Foster

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1558
Filed March 5, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CHRISTOPHER DEAN FOSTER
AND ABIGAIL LYNNE FOSTER

Upon the Petition of
CHRISTOPHER DEAN FOSTER,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
ABIGAIL LYNNE FOSTER n/k/a ABIGAIL LYNNE FIEDLER,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

The respondent appeals from a dissolution decree, challenging the district

court’s property division, spousal support award, and assessment of attorney and

expert witness fees. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Amanda Green of Takekawa & Green, PLLC, Ankeny, for appellant.

Ryan J. Baumgartner and Elizabeth S. Longcor of CashattWarren Family

Law, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

During their nine-year marriage, Christopher and Abigail Foster1 amassed

an extensive collection of cars and other personal property. At their dissolution

trial, Abigail placed a much higher value on many of those items than

Christopher—although she did not want to be awarded any of them. The district

court found Christopher’s valuations more credible and awarded him most of the

couple’s property, along with almost all their debt. The court ordered Abigail to

pay Christopher a property settlement of $28,814.99, while Christopher was

ordered to pay Abigail $1000 per month in transitional spousal support for one

year, plus $2000 towards her trial attorney fees. Abigail’s claim for expert witness

fees was denied.

Abigail appeals, challenging the court’s property division, spousal support

award, and assessment of attorney and expert witness fees. Both parties request

an award of appellate attorney fees. We affirm as modified upon our de novo

review of the record.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Christopher and Abigail met online through a dating app. Christopher was

living in Florida and running a trucking company at the time, while Abigail was

finishing her undergraduate degree here in Iowa. Christopher left his company in

Florida and moved to Iowa to be with Abigail in 2012. They got married two years

later.

1 Abigail is now known by her maiden name of Fiedler.
3

After working for another trucking company for a few years, Christopher

started his own company with Abigail. They formed Foster Trucking LLC in 2018.

Christopher drove the semitrucks, at times employing other drivers to help him,

while Abigail did the bookkeeping. They also operated Foster Limo, which

Christopher described as a “limo rental company” for weddings, Christmas light

tours, and similar events. Christopher estimated that he earned between $100,000

to $120,000 annually from these businesses. Along with her bookkeeping work

for Christopher, Abigail was employed as a senior driver recruiter for a different

trucking company. Her gross annual income from that job was $57,134. For

additional income, the couple regularly bought and sold vehicles they flipped.

Christopher petitioned to dissolve the marriage in June 2022. He stayed in

the marital home, while Abigail moved into an apartment. In August, the parties

attended mediation and reached a stipulation on temporary matters, which the

court approved a few days later. The stipulated order included the following

provision: “Christopher shall make a lump sum payment of $17,500 to Abigail by

August 15, 2022. This payment shall be taken into consideration in determining

the settlement of the final decree.” Abigail used the money “for basic living, to

make bills, to help stay on top of attorney fees and the expert fees.”

The dissolution proceeded to trial in July 2023. Christopher was thirty-eight

years old then, and Abigail was thirty-three. Prior to trial, each party filed their

proposed divisions of property and debts. Because of their trucking and limo rental

businesses, the Fosters owned a fleet of semitrucks and vehicles, most of which

Abigail thought were worth more than Christopher did. She also included a laundry

list of household contents in her proposed division, again at much higher values
4

than Christopher. And Abigail testified that Christopher earned more than

$200,000 per year, although her own expert witness set Christopher’s “expected

net taxable income” at $133,000, with an after-tax income of $99,081. Given his

higher income, Abigail asked the court to order Christopher to pay her traditional

or transitional spousal support of $2000 per month for four years, plus attorney

fees and expenses totaling $14,910 and expert witness fees of $9108.

The district court found Christopher’s testimony about his income more

credible than Abigail’s, noting that her “testimony in this regard contradicts that of

her own expert.” The court also found Christopher’s property valuations more

credible, reasoning: “Abigail said she did not want any of these assets at her

proposed value. She would only accept a cash equalization payment for them.

This suggests Christopher’s valuations are more accurate.” The court accordingly

awarded Christopher most of the parties’ assets at his listed values. Although

Abigail received fewer assets in the court’s distribution, she was also assigned

fewer debts. As a result, the property division was lopsided in her favor.

To equalize the division, the court ordered Abigail to pay Christopher

$11,314.99. She was also ordered to repay Christopher the $17,500 that the court

found the parties “agreed would be considered in the Decree in their August 12,

2022 Temporary Matters Stipulation Agreement,” meaning she owed Christopher

a total of $28,814.99. As for Abigail’s request for spousal support, the court

awarded her transitional spousal support of $1000 per month for one year.

Christopher was also ordered to pay $2000 towards Abigail’s attorney fees and

expenses. Her request for expert witness fees was denied. Abigail appeals.
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II. Standard of Review

We review equitable proceedings, like dissolutions of marriage, de novo.

See Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635

(Iowa 2021). “We give weight to the findings of the district court, particularly

concerning the credibility of witnesses; however, those findings are not binding

upon us.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). The

court’s ruling will be disturbed “only when there has been a failure to do equity.”

Id. (citations omitted). We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Iowa 1993).

III. Analysis

A. Property Division

Abigail claims the district court’s property division was inequitable and

resulted in a “significant financial windfall” for Christopher. She challenges the

court’s (1) order requiring her to repay Christopher the $17,500 that she received

from the temporary stipulation; (2) inclusion of two business loans; and

(3) valuation of seventeen items of personal property.

In a dissolution decree, the district court is tasked with dividing “all property,

except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably

between the parties.” Iowa Code § 598.21(5) (2022); see also McDermott, 827

N.W.2d at 678. The court’s division must also include marital debts. See In re

Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Iowa 2006). “To achieve an equitable

division, we apply the factors contained in section 598.21(5), keeping in mind there

are no hard and fast rules governing economic issues in dissolution actions.”
6

McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 682. With these principles in mind, we turn to Abigail’s

challenges.

1. Temporary Payment. Abigail argues that it “was wholly improper” for

the district court to order her to repay the $17,500 that Christopher advanced to

her as part of their temporary stipulation. She contends that because “Christopher

used marital assets to pay the $17,500,” the court should have only ordered her to

“reimburse Christopher $8,750 from those marital funds.” Although Christopher

does not dispute that marital assets were used to make that payment to Abigail,

he argues the “parties explicitly agreed and acknowledged that the full payment

would be considered in the final decree.”

It’s true that the stipulated temporary order stated, “The payment shall be

taken into consideration in determining the settlement of the final decree.”

(Emphasis added.) But we fail to see how taking the payment “into consideration”

required Abigail to repay the entire amount to Christopher. See In re Marriage of

Lawson, 409 N.W.2d 181, 182 (Iowa 1987) (noting a court-approved stipulation “is

to be construed like any other written instrument,” giving force and effect to “every

word, if possible,” to achieve “a consistent, effective and reasonable meaning”).

And we do not think it was equitable for the court to order her to do so, considering

the disparity in the parties’ incomes and the use of marital funds to make the

payment. See Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(f). Because the court made an otherwise

equal property division, which we find was equitable, we agree with Abigail that

she should only be required to repay Christopher $8750. See McDermott, 827

N.W.2d at 682 (noting that while an equal division of assets is not required, equality

is often most equitable); In re Marriage of Duggan, 659 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Iowa
7

2003) (requiring modification of a decree to “accomplish an equal division” of the

couple’s assets).

2. Business debts. Abigail next argues the court “erred in assessing

the parties’ debt allocations.” She first challenges a $25,070.56 debt to Terry’s

Truck and Trailer that Christopher listed on his proposed property division

spreadsheet. The court assigned that debt to Christopher, even though he testified

at trial that it was paid off. Abigail argues it is unclear “[w]hy this debt was still

considered by the district court despite Christopher’s direct testimony.”

Christopher simply responds the “court was correct in including this debt.” We

disagree.

When dividing marital property, “the court can only award assets and debts

that then exist, and it must generally do so based on their value at the time of trial.”

In re Marriage of Rasmussen, No. 23-0805, 2024 WL 3688309, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Aug. 7, 2024). The court did not explain why it included this satisfied debt on

Christopher’s side of the ledger. Cf. In re Marriage of Schaffer, No. 04-0734, 2005

WL 67595, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2005) (giving a wife credit for proceeds

from the sale of her premarital home that she used to pay down her husband’s

debt). And no reason is apparent from the record. We agree with Abigail that

assigning this non-existent debt to Christopher was inequitable and modify the

decree accordingly. See, e.g., In re Marriage Bishop, No. 02-0174, 2003

WL 1524449, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2003) (Vogel, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) (stating it was unclear why any party in a dissolution should be

given “a cash equivalent to a debt long since paid”).
8

The second debt that Abigail challenges is a $113,295.72 Small Business

Administration (SBA) loan that the court included in its property division

calculations and ordered Christopher to pay. Abigail argues that because

Christopher “assum[ed] that loan as part of his trucking company, it is inequitable

to consider it a marital [debt] when the value of Christopher’s business was not

assessed nor was any money given for the company’s value.” In other words,

Abigail contends the trucking company is worth more than the sum of its parts.

The court rejected this argument, reasoning:

Abigail offered no evidence to support this claim despite hiring [an
expert witness] who lists business evaluations as his first area of
specialization. Christopher testified the value of the businesses is
the value of his assets. . . . No other testimony or evidence was
presented regarding [the parties’] companies. . . .

The court concluded that “[t]o not include [the SBA] debt as marital would permit

Abigail to ‘double dip.’”

On our de novo review, we likewise find the record inadequate to support

Abigail’s position on the value of Christopher’s businesses. Considering that the

assets of the trucking and limo rental companies were separately valued and

awarded to Christopher, we agree with the court’s decision to include the SBA loan

in its property division. See In re Marriage of Johnsen, No. 20-0779, 2021

WL 2690019, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021) (modifying property division to

award one spouse all the assets of a cattle-raising operation, along with all the

operation’s debts).
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3. Miscellaneous personal property. Finally, Abigail argues the court

erred in valuing nine items of personal property and excluding eight others.2 She

does so through a chart in her appellate brief that lists each item, the court’s

valuation, and her requested valuation. Aside from some general property division

principles at the start of her argument section, Abigail cites no authority in this

portion of her brief. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority

in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Nor does she provide

much, if any, argument about why the court’s valuations or exclusions of property

are incorrect.

In any event, for the nine items that Abigail claims were misvalued, we find

the court’s valuations—which included credibility findings in Christopher’s favor—

to be within the range of evidence. See In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188,

194 (Iowa 2007) (“A trial court’s valuation will not be disturbed when it is within the

range of evidence.”). We accordingly decline to disturb them on appeal. See id.;

see also In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007) (noting a

property “owner is a competent witness to testify to its market value”).

As for the 1951 Bentley, 2019 Lincoln Navigator, 2021 Ryker motorcycle,

2005 Kenworth, and Gen X arcade that Abigail contends were improperly excluded

from the division, Christopher testified that each of those items were sold and no

longer in his possession. See In re Marriage of Kinser, No. 11-0169, 2012

2 The items that Abigail claims were improperly valued are a 1930 Lincoln,
2021 Harley, 2022 2500 Dodge Ram, 1997 Peterbilt, 2021 Can-Am ATV, zero-turn
mover, snow blower, Tahiti Jet Boat, and zero gravity bed. And the items that she
says were excluded are a 1951 Bentley, 2019 Lincoln Navigator, 2021 Ryker
motorcycle, 2005 Kenworth, Gen X arcade, Venmo balance, wedding ring, and
Tiffany necklace.
10

WL 3194088, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2012) (concluding that the court should

not have included property that had been sold in its division). Abigail did not offer

any evidence to the contrary, and the court generally found Christopher more

credible. We defer to that credibility finding. See Keener, 728 N.W.2d at 193. The

court also credited Christopher’s testimony that he did not have Abigail’s wedding

ring or Tiffany necklace. So we find no error in the exclusion of these items from

the court’s property division.

This leaves Christopher’s Venmo account balance of $5467, which was also

excluded from the court’s division. There was no testimony about this asset.

Instead, the only evidence about the account was an unexplained and undated

screenshot with Foster Limo’s name at the top, the account balance, and a pending

payment request from September 30, 2021. Given this lack of evidence about the

account, we conclude the court did not err in excluding it from the property division.

4. Modification to Property Settlement. We modify the district court’s

property settlement to remove the $25,070.56 debt to Terry’s Truck and Trailer

from Christopher’s side of the ledger. This increases Christopher’s net property

award from $128,041.29 to $153,111.85. Abigail’s net property award remains at

$150,671.26. To equalize the division, Christopher owes Abigail $1220.30. But

because we agree with Abigail that she should only be required to reimburse

Christopher for half of the money that he advanced to her under the temporary

stipulated order, we offset that amount by $8750. This means that Abigail now

owes Christopher $7529.70.
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B. Spousal Support

Abigail next claims the district court’s transitional spousal support award of

$1000 per month for one year “was insufficient in both the amount of the award

and the duration.” In addition to that award, she argues the court should have also

ordered “a hybrid award of traditional/reimbursement spousal support” of $2000

per month for four years. We disagree.

While this court reviews spousal support awards de novo, we “afford

deference to the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons” and disturb

its “determination of spousal support only when there has been a failure to do

equity.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up).

“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined based

on the particular circumstances presented in each case.” In re Marriage of Mills,

983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022). Iowa courts are “to equitably award spousal

support by considering” the criteria listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A(1). In re

Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa 2016).

“In applying these statutory criteria, our precedents have recognized four

forms of spousal support deemed equitable: traditional, reimbursement,

rehabilitative, and transitional.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185. Each type has a

different goal, and the amount and duration of a spousal support award “should be

tailored to achieve the underlying equitable purpose of the spousal support award.”

Id. While these categories are not mutually exclusive, and hybrid awards are

permitted, courts are not “free to award spousal support not corresponding to any
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recognized category of support.” Id. at 186. Abigail does not qualify for either

traditional or reimbursement spousal support.

Traditional spousal support is typically reserved for “long-term marriages

where life patterns have been largely set and ‘the earning potential of both spouses

can be predicted with some reliability.’” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402,

410 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). “Generally speaking, marriage lasting twenty

or more years commonly cross the durational threshold and merit serious

consideration for traditional spousal support.” Id. at 410–11. The Fosters were

only married for nine years. Abigail has not identified any extraordinary

circumstances that would allow us to depart from the general rule. She has a

college degree and was employed for the entire marriage. Cf. In re Marriage of

Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d 481, 486–87 (Iowa 2012) (affirming award of traditional

spousal support after a sixteen-year marriage when the wife’s earning capacity

was negligible). And when the dissolution trial was held, she was just thirty-three

years old and in “very good health.” Cf. Mills, 983 N.W.2d at 73 (affirming award

of traditional spousal support where the mother suffered permanent disability

during childbirth even though the marriage lasted only fourteen years).

We also find that Abigail does not fit within the category for reimbursement

spousal support. “Reimbursement support may be warranted where, for example,

‘a spouse contributed to the other's earning capacity’ by supporting them through

a degree program and where the supporting spouse ‘cannot otherwise be

compensated for their contributions.’” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting In re

Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 544 (Iowa 2022)). While Abigail helped

Christopher with the bookkeeping for his businesses, the record does not show
13

that she made any economic sacrifices to do so. See Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 544

(“Reimbursement alimony ‘is predicated upon economic sacrifices made by one

spouse during the marriage that directly enhance the future earning capacity of the

other.’” (citation omitted)). To the extent that Abigail contributed to Christopher’s

earning capacity, we find that she was adequately compensated for that

contribution through the equal division of the marital property. See id. at 545.

For these reasons, we deny Abigail’s request for a hybrid award of

traditional and reimbursement spousal support.

C. Trial Attorney and Expert Fees

The district court has “broad discretion” in determining whether to award

attorney fees. In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Iowa 1993). “The test

is whether the fee is reasonable and based on the parties’ respective abilities to

pay.” Id. The district court may also consider any expert fees owed in its attorney

fees determination. Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 488.

Abigail claims the district court should have ordered Christopher to pay all

her trial attorney fees, which totaled $14,910, and her expert witness fee of $9108.

She argues that Christopher’s income is nearly double hers and he was “left with

nearly all of the parties’ assets,” which will “continue to generate income for him

and his businesses.” While Christopher does earn more than Abigail, he was

saddled with all the marital debt, plus two credit cards in his name that totaled more

than $30,000.3 He also testified that he was “maxed out” on loans from the bank.

In contrast, Abigail has a steady income, less debt, and more money in savings.

3 This credit card debt was assigned to Christopher but not included in the district

court’s property division calculations.
14

With this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in limiting Abigail’s

trial attorney fee award and denying her request for expert witness fees.

D. Appellate Attorney Fees

This leaves us with each party’s claim for appellate attorney fees.

“Appellate attorney fees are not a matter of right, but rather rest in this court’s

discretion.” In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). We must

consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to

pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (citation omitted). Considering these

factors, we order each party to pay their own appellate attorney fees.

IV. Conclusion

We modify the dissolution decree to reduce Abigail’s property settlement

payment to Christopher to $7529.70. We deny Abigail’s request for a hybrid award

of traditional and reimbursement spousal support, affirm the district court’s

assessment of trial attorney fees and denial of Abigail’s expert witness fees, and

order each party to be responsible for their own appellate attorney fees. The costs

of the appeal are assessed equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.