State of Iowa v. Matthew Linden Noehl

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1278
Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge.

On interlocutory appeal, Matthew Noehl challenges the district court’s order

granting the State’s motion to amend the trial information. AFFIRMED.

Raphael M. Scheetz, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Heard by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

On interlocutory appeal, Matthew Noehl challenges the district court’s order

granting the State’s motion to amend to “change[] the dates of the alleged offense

conduct in three different trial informations in the attempt to maintain the adult

criminal court’s jurisdiction over [him].” Noehl claims the court “lacked jurisdiction

over his case”; the State’s amendments to the trial information “were not

authorized by Iowa law”; and the court erred in “declining to hold an evidentiary

hearing to determine jurisdiction.” Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts

The State alleged Noehl committed acts of sexual abuse against a younger

family member over many years, both before and after Noehl’s fourteenth birthday.

In April 2023, the State filed a trial information charging Noehl as follows:

COUNT ONE
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT
January 1, 2007 through and including January 1, 2011, IN THE
COUNTY OF LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID UNLAWFULLY AND
WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.

COUNT TWO
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT
January 1, 2007 through and including January 1, 2011, IN THE
COUNTY OF LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID UNLAWFULLY AND
WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.
3

COUNT THREE
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT
January 1, 2007 through and including January 1, 2011, IN THE
COUNTY OF LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID UNLAWFULLY AND
WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.

Noehl entered a plea of not guilty and waived his right to a speedy trial.

Noehl moved to dismiss the trial information “on the grounds that the court

lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter of this prosecution because [he] was

under the age of fourteen years old at the time of the alleged offense conduct.”

Noehl alleged:

The minutes of testimony show that the defendant was born
on December 17, 1996. He is currently 26 years old. When the
offenses allegedly occurred, the defendant was between the ages of
10 years old through 13 years old. He turned 14 years old two weeks
prior to January 1, 2011. The State appears to have charged the
dates in the trial information to create a two-week window after the
defendant’s 14th birthday.
....
The district court does not have jurisdiction over the
prosecution of a crime committed by a person under the age of
fourteen.
Based on facts alleged in the trial information and minutes of
testimony, the trial information must be dismissed because the court
has no jurisdiction to try those counts.

The State resisted Noehl’s motion to dismiss, claiming in part that “many of

the sex acts are alleged to have occurred after the defendant’s 14th birthday, which

was December 17, 2010.” The State further alleged, “By the defendant’s own

admissions to law enforcement, he committed sexual abuse of the victim after he

turned 14 years old.” The State countered, “even if the defendant was under the
4

age of 14 during some of the alleged sexual abuse of the victim, the correct motion

would be a transfer back to juvenile court, not a dismissal.”

The State moved to amend the trial information, indicating, “The date range

for the alleged sex acts is actually from ‘January 1, 2007 through and including

December 31, 2014,’ as several of the alleged sex acts occurred after the

defendant turned 14 years old and while the victim was still under the age of 13,”

and requesting amendment of all three counts to allege that date range. The

district court approved the amended trial information.

Noehl moved to dismiss the amended trial information, again alleging the

court lacked jurisdiction. Noehl further claimed that “[b]y charging a potential eight-

year time span during which the offenses could have been committed,” “the

charging document violates [his] right to due process of law by depriving him of

notice of the dates on which the offenses were allegedly committed.”

The matter came before the court for a hearing. Just before the hearing,

the State filed another motion to amend and a proposed second amended trial

information. Noehl resisted the State’s motion to amend, arguing “it shows the

State continues bad faith with this case.” The State countered, explaining that

“ongoing investigation into the years of alleged sexual abuse the defendant

admittedly perpetrated against the alleged victim while she was a child enabled

the State to narrow the date range of the alleged sex acts charged in the second

amended and substituted trial information” and “the defense failed to cite any

authority prohibiting the State from amending the trial information as currently

amended.” At the hearing, the prosecutor added, “But as we have been finally
5

able to fix the date bridges, I believe that it eliminates the subject matter jurisdiction

[claim] as currently charged.” The prosecutor further explained:

[W]e are balancing the need to get accurate information with the fact
that she was a child when this happened and the fact that it re-
traumatizes her every time we have to talk to her about it. So that is
why it has taken the State some time to shore up the dates as
currently charged, and that is where we currently are with the case.
There is ongoing investigation.

The court allowed the parties additional time to respond to the other’s

pleadings, after which it entered an order on the parties’ competing motions,

stating in part:

The Court finds no grounds to reverse the prior order that
granted [the State] the right to grant the first amended trial
information, and the Court finds the second amended trial
information also should be permitted. The Court finds no evidence
of bad faith on the part of [the State] when it comes to making the
amended allegations, and the Court is not persuaded that an
evidentiary hearing is necessary on this issue. Rather, it is clear to
the Court that, as argued by [the State], the newly utilized dates in
the first and second amended trial information filings are the result of
an ongoing investigation of the facts that form the basis for the
charges against [Noehl]. These amended filings do not prejudice the
substantial rights of [Noehl], and do not charge wholly new and
different offenses. . . . [Noehl] will have the right at trial to present
his defense regarding the dates of the allegations in question. The
amended trial information filings, and the redefined date ranges
alleged therein, can be viewed as supporting a finding that [Noehl]
was over the age of 14 when the alleged offenses occurred. The
filing of the initial trial information was approved by the district court,
and thus there was a probable cause determination regarding the
facts made at that time. As in [State v.] Petersen, [678 N.W.2d 611,
613 (Iowa 2004)], at that point in the proceedings, any defect in the
support for the complaint was moot and cannot be grounds for
dismissal of the trial information filings. The Court is not without
jurisdiction to hear the charged offenses, and the Court finds no due
process violation, since [Noehl] will have the opportunity to pursue
discovery and questioning at trial regarding the notice of the dates
on which the offenses were allegedly committed. [Noehl]’s motions
to dismiss should be denied, and [the State]’s motion to amend to file
a second amended trial information should be granted.
6

The State then filed a second amended trial information, charging Noehl as

follows:

COUNT ONE
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT
January 1, 2011 through and including April 13, 2014, IN THE
COUNTY OF LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID UNLAWFULLY AND
WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.

COUNT TWO
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT April
1, 2011 through and including April 1, 2014, IN THE COUNTY OF
LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID UNLAWFULLY AND WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.

COUNT THREE
SEX ABUSE 2ND – CHILD UNDER 12, 1ST OFF
COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
THAT THE SAID MATTHEW LINDEN NOEHL ON OR ABOUT
November 12, 2012 through and including December 30, 2014,
IN THE COUNTY OF LINN AND STATE OF IOWA, DID
UNLAWFULLY AND WILLFULLY:
commit sexual abuse upon RS, a child under the age of twelve,
at [address], Linn County, Iowa
IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 709.1, 709.3(2), 903B.1 IOWA
CRIMINAL CODE A(N) Class B Felony.

Noehl filed an application for interlocutory appeal. Our supreme court

granted the application and transferred such to this court for disposition.
7

II. Standard of Review

Whether an amendment to the trial information charges a wholly new and

different offense or prejudices the substantial rights of the defendant are questions

of law. State v. Vandermark, 965 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 2021). Accordingly, our

review of a challenge to the district court’s order granting the State’s motion to

amend the trial information on that basis is for the correction of legal error. Id.;

accord State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997). And the same is true for

our review of Noehl’s challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. State v.

Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001).

III. Jurisdiction

Noehl claims the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him for

alleged “unlawful conduct prior to his 14th birthday.” Noehl argues where he “has

been accused of conduct when he was 10, 11, 12, or 13 years old, the criminal

court in which he has been charged does not have jurisdiction over his case.”

According to Noehl, the case must be remanded for dismissal of his charges.

The State filed the initial trial information in 2023, charging Noehl with three

counts of second-degree sexual abuse, a forcible felony. Iowa Code § 702.11(1)

(2007) (“A ‘forcible felony’ is any felonious child endangerment, assault, murder,

sexual abuse, kidnapping, robbery, human trafficking, arson in the first degree, or

burglary in the first degree.”)1; see also id. § 709.3(2). “[V]iolations which constitute

a forcible felony are excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and shall

1 The initial trial information alleged the sexual abuse occurred over a period of

time from January 1, 2007 to January 1, 2011. During that time, section 702.11
was amended. However, the phrasing of subsection (1) remained the same.
Compare Iowa Code § 702.11(1) (2007), with id. § 702.11(1) (2010).
8

be prosecuted as otherwise provided by law unless the court transfers jurisdiction

of the child to the juvenile court upon motion and for good cause.” Id. § 232.8(1)(c).

Further, although Noehl was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses, Noehl’s

case was properly initiated in criminal court because he was twenty-six years old—

an adult—“when the allegations arose.” See State v. Duncan, 841 N.W.2d 604,

609 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (citing Iowa Code §§ 232.8(1)(a), 803.5(1)).

Section 232.8(1)(a) sets forth the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court as

follows:

The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning a child who is alleged to have committed a
delinquent act unless otherwise provided by law, and has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning an adult who is
alleged to have committed a delinquent act prior to having become
an adult, and who has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court pursuant to an order under section 803.5.

Section 803.5(1) provides a procedure for the transfer of the jurisdiction of an adult

who is alleged to have committed a criminal offense before reaching the age of

eighteen, if the juvenile court has not already waived its jurisdiction. See Duncan,

841 N.W.2d at 608. “The defendant or the county attorney may file a motion for

transfer any time within ten days of the initial appearance,” and “[t]he court shall

hold a transfer hearing on all such motions.” Iowa Code § 803.5(2), (3). Noehl

also points to section 232.45(6), which provides a procedure for waiver of the

juvenile court’s jurisdiction “for the purpose of prosecution of the child as an adult”

upon motion by “the county attorney or the child.”2 As with the procedure provided

by section 803.5, the court “shall hold a waiver hearing on all such motions.” Id.

2 There is no question that “[b]ecause [Noehl] is no longer a child, he is not subject

to a waiver proceeding under section 232.45(6).” Duncan, 841 N.W.2d at 613.
9

§ 232.45(2). “At the conclusion of the waiver hearing the court may waive its

jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public offense for the

purpose of prosecution of the child as an adult if . . . [t]he child is fourteen years of

age or older” and satisfies other discretionary findings by the court. Id.

§ 232.45(6)(a).

Noehl argues section 232.45(6)(a) is instructive because it “deprives the

criminal court of jurisdiction to hear cases concerning crimes committed by an

accused who was under the age of fourteen.” We agree the court is without

discretion to try an adult in criminal court “for offenses committed when the adult

was younger than fourteen.” Duncan, 841 N.W.2d at 614. But in that scenario,

the charges would not be dismissed, as Noehl suggests. Instead, they would be

transferred “to the juvenile court for adjudication.” Id.; State v. Erdman, 996

N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 2023) (“[T]he juvenile court and the district court are

separate dockets within the same court of original jurisdiction in our unified court

system.”). In any event, here, the charges were not exclusive to a period when

Noehl was younger than fourteen.3

As for offenses committed when Noehl was older than fourteen, “the district

court may transfer an adult back to juvenile court if the criteria set forth in section

232.45 signals the inappropriateness of trying the offenses in criminal court.”

Duncan, 841 N.W.2d at 614; Iowa Code § 803.5(1). But such a transfer

presupposes a waiver was requested. Neither the prosecutor nor Noehl’s attorney

filed an application for waiver to juvenile court, known as a “reverse waiver” motion.

3 It is undisputed that Noehl was fourteen years old for a two-week span of the

offenses alleged in the State’s initial trial information, prior to amendments.
10

See Iowa Code § 803.5(1). Accordingly, the district court had no request for

transfer to consider. See, e.g., State v. Hess, 983 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa 2022)

(observing the court denied the defendant’s motion to transfer his case to juvenile

court); see Duncan, 841 N.W.2d at 609 (reversing the district court’s automatic

denial of Duncan’s application to transfer his case to juvenile court, noting

“Duncan’s case begins in criminal court by virtue of the fact he was an adult when

the allegations arose. He may be transferred to juvenile court for adjudication and

disposition as a juvenile if—after a transfer hearing—the district court determines

probable cause exists to believe Duncan committed an offense while still a juvenile

and trying his case in criminal court would be inappropriate under the criteria set

forth in sections 232.45(6)(c) and (8), ‘if the adult were still a child.’” (citations

omitted)).

Moreover, “any failure to comply with the transfer procedure merely affects

the authority of the district court to hear the case,” not the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 123 (“Even if an appropriate transfer of

‘jurisdiction’ . . . was not accomplished, the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction.”); Erdman, 996 N.W.2d at 549 (“‘Jurisdiction,’ as it is referenced in

Iowa Code sections 232.8 and 232.45, refers to the court’s authority to adjudicate

the charges, not its subject matter jurisdiction over such cases.”). “Whether

noncompliance takes the form of faulty proceedings . . . or the form of a total

absence of such proceedings, as occurred here, makes no difference.” Emery,

636 N.W.2d at 123. Any “lack of a proper transfer” of jurisdiction “is simply a defect

in the district court’s authority that can be waived.” Id. For these reasons, Noehl’s
11

challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is unpersuasive, and we

affirm on this issue.

IV. Amendments to the Trial Information

Noehl next claims the State’s amendments to the trial information “were not

authorized by Iowa law.” Iowa courts have “a ‘relatively narrow view’ of the

circumstances under which the state may amend a trial information.” Vandermark,

965 N.W.2d at 889. “Amendment is not allowed if substantial rights of the

defendant are prejudiced by the amendment, or if a wholly new and different

offense is charged.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(6)(c).4

In Vandermark, the supreme court determined the district court erred by

allowing the State to amend a charge of assault causing bodily injury to a charge

of willful injury causing bodily injury, finding the amendment “charged a wholly new

and different offense.” 965 N.W.2d at 892. The court noted the amendment

“increased the level of punishment” and “altered the elements of the offense.” Id.

at 893 (“Other than predicates for enhanced sentencing under drug trafficking and

recidivist statutes, we have focused on whether the new charge increases the

potential punishment and requires proof of different or additional elements.”).

Noehl relies on Vandermark, claiming the “screening” policy of the court is

defeated “if the prosecution can substitute a different crime—one that occurred at

a different time and place—for the crime originally charged, simply because the

two crimes share the same elements.” See id. at 894 (“In exercising the screening

function, the judge or magistrate must find ‘that the evidence contained in the

4 This rule was renumbered from Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8)(a),
effective July 1, 2023.
12

information and the minutes of evidence, if unexplained, would warrant a

conviction by the trial jury.’” (citation omitted)). According to Noehl, where the third

version of the trial information changed the location and date of the offense, “it

cannot be true that [the] amended information charges the same offense.” He

claims, “The amendment may recite the same statute, but it plainly charges a

different offense—one that took place years later and in a different place than the

violation that was originally charged.”5

This case is distinguishable from Vandermark. The original minutes of

testimony stated R.S. would testify Noehl sexually assaulted her over many years,

starting when she was approximately four years old and he was approximately ten

years old, and the abuse stopped “for a few years until she was 16 years old”

because she had threatened to tell their grandmother. R.S. would testify about

assaults that took place at a park during a birthday party, at a family reunion, at a

library near the grandmother’s house, at a family Thanksgiving, and at the homes

of family members. R.S.’s mother would testify that after R.S.’s grandmother

passed away, R.S. disclosed Noehl’s sexual abuse that took place when Noehl

was between fourteen and sixteen years old. Investigators would testify Noehl

5 The State counters that Noehl “did not preserve error on a claim that this
amendment charges a wholly new or different offense.” We observe, however, in
his resistance to the State’s second amended trial information, Noehl challenged
the charging of different offenses. And the State responded, countering that “the
new amended trial information does not charge a new or different offense as the
original trial information.” Moreover, in the court’s ruling denying Noehl’s motions
to dismiss, the court found, “These amended filings do not prejudice the substantial
rights of Defendant, and do not charge wholly new and different offenses.”
Because the issue was raised before and ruled upon by the court, error was
preserved. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (noting error is
preserved when an issue is “both raised and decided by the district court”).
13

“admitted 23 sexual actions” during interviews but blamed the sexual encounters

on R.S.

The minutes of testimony were later amended to state R.S. would testify

Noehl “was continuing to sexually abuse her” when he was fourteen and fifteen

years old, including that he “forced her to touch his penis” when he was fourteen

years old. R.S.’s mother would testify about how she figured out exact dates for

the offenses, “based upon events that occurred around the same time, such as

[R.S.] refusing to go certain places, changes in her behavior and other family

events such as when they stopped going to certain places and deaths in the

family.” An investigator would testify that interview recordings would show Noehl

“admitted to sexually molesting [R.S.] multiple times including when she was 11

years old and including during times when the defendant was 14 and older.”

“The dates fixed in the indictment for the commission of a crime are not

material, and an indictment may be amended to conform to the proof.” State v.

Woodyard, 414 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); State v. Brown, 400

N.W.2d 74, 77 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“The date fixed in the indictment or

information for the commission of a crime is not material, and a conviction can be

returned upon any date within the statute of limitations, absent a fatal variance

between the allegations and proof.”). The amended trial information conformed

with the proof, as set forth in the minutes of testimony, which were amended before

trial. See Woodyard, 414 N.W.2d at 658 (finding amendments to dates and where

the defendant was living did “not change the offense charged”). Under these

circumstances, we are not persuaded by Noehl’s contention that the amended trial

information charged him with new crimes. See id.; Brown, 400 N.W.2d at 76
14

(rejecting the defendant’s claim that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

to establish the “time and place where the alleged sexual abuse occurred,”

because “the time and place of the offense [we]re not material to the charge” of

sexual abuse). Moreover, even the initial trial information alleged conduct that took

place when Noehl was fourteen, so “the amendment did not change [his] defense

strategy.” Maghee, 573 N.W.2d at 6 (“An amendment prejudices the substantial

rights of the defendant if it creates such surprise that the defendant would have to

change trial strategy to meet the charge in the amended information.”).

Neither did the amended trial information increase Noehl’s potential

punishment. Noehl points to the court’s ruling in State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d

187 (Iowa 2013). There, the court stated a defendant’s substantial rights could be

prejudiced by allowing an amendment “during trial to add an enhancement,” “if the

defendant had no prior notice of the State’s plan to amend and would have pled

guilty had he or she known of that plan before trial.” Brothern, 832 N.W.2d at 196.

Brothern does not apply to this case. To the extent Noehl argues the amendment

was prejudicial because it availed him to criminal court, we disagree. The

allegations raised in the initial trial information included dates when Noehl was

fourteen. In any event, Noehl did not file a reverse waiver motion to prompt the

court’s consideration of transferring the case to the juvenile court. We affirm on

this issue.6

6 Noehl raises two additional contentions to support his claim. First, he argues the
State “acted in bad faith” by continuing “to change the dates of the offense conduct
in order to keep [him] in adult criminal court.” Bad faith is not a cognizable legal
challenge to preclude amendments to a trial information. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4.
In any event, these facts would not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the
15

V. Evidentiary Hearing

Noehl also claims the court erred in “declining to hold an evidentiary hearing

to determine jurisdiction.” If we do not dismiss the trial information, Noehl requests

that we “remand the case to the district court with directions for an evidentiary

hearing on the jurisdictional issue.” Noehl relies on Tigges v. City of Ames, 356

N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 1984) to support his claim. In Tigges, the court addressed “the

proper procedure to be used in determining subject matter jurisdiction of the district

court.” 356 N.W.2d at 510. The court advised “when a court is confronted with the

question of its own authority to proceed it should take charge of the proceedings

affirmatively, regardless of the vehicle used to raise the issue; utilize the most

efficient methods at its disposal to determine the true fact; and decide the issue

promptly.” Id. The court further explained,

Where there is a conflict between the parties as to the
existence of a jurisdictional fact, the court should not decide the
question on affidavits, even with the consent of the parties; in such
case the dispute should be determined by the taking of evidence,
either at a hearing on that issue or at the trial of the case.

Id. at 511 (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 112 (1940)).

The supreme court’s guidance in Tigges is not applicable to this case. Here,

although framed that way, Noehl’s challenge was unrelated to the court’s subject

State in amending the trial information to clarify the conduct alleged based on the
evidence.
Second, Noehl claims the court’s ruling “discourages attorneys from raising
jurisdiction sooner” when he could have just “wait[ed] until immediately after
jeopardy has attached to make an objection to the district court’s jurisdiction.” This
claim fails on its premise, because as noted above, Noehl’s challenge was not to
the court’s jurisdiction but the court’s authority. And “an objection to a court’s
authority to hear a particular case must be raised in that court in order to preserve
error on this issue.” Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 120. Had Noehl not raised the issue
when he did, his challenge would have been waived. Id. at 123.
16

matter jurisdiction. There is no question the court had jurisdiction; any error in

determining whether the offenses should be tried in juvenile court or district court

would be “judicial, not jurisdictional.” State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 386

(Iowa 1997). And Noehl challenged the court’s authority to hear his case via a

motion to dismiss. So we must accept as true the facts alleged in the trial

information, and, “if the facts the State has alleged charge a crime as a matter of

law,” the motion to dismiss would be properly denied. See State v. Gonzalez, 718

N.W.2d 304, 307 (Iowa 2006) (“We accept the facts alleged by the State in the trial

information and attached minutes as true. ‘We will reverse the trial court’s

dismissal of the charge at issue if the facts the State has alleged charge a crime

as a matter of law.’” (internal citations omitted)).

Noehl’s challenge to the court’s authority at the motion-to-dismiss stage

centered on “whether the facts the State has alleged in the trial information and

attached minutes charge[d] a crime as a matter of law.” State v. Bailey, 2 N.W.3d

429, 434 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted). As we concluded above, they did. And

even if Noehl had raised a claim relating to a transfer to juvenile court—which he

did not—the absence of a proper transfer would “not deprive the district court of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 125. We find no error in the

court’s denial of Noehl’s motions to dismiss, and we conclude Noehl was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim.

We affirm the district court’s order granting the State’s motion to amend the

trial information and denying Noehl’s motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED.