State of Iowa v. Angel Guerrero Garcia

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1670
Filed December 4, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ANGEL GUERRERO GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John C. Nelson,

Judge.

The defendant appeals his convictions following a jury trial. AFFIRMED.

Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma Law Firm, P.C., Orange City, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

After investigating two complaints made on the same day involving

inappropriate conduct with a child and an assault on a man mowing a yard, Angel

Guerrero Garcia was charged and later found guilty by a jury of indecent contact

with a child, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.12 (2023); possession of a

controlled substance, in violation of section 124.401(5); and assault causing bodily

injury or mental illness, in violation of section 708.2. Garcia appeals two counts of

his three-count conviction, claiming there is insufficient evidence (1) to satisfy the

elements of indecent contact with a child and (2) to support an assault causing

bodily injury or mental illness. We affirm the convictions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On July 5, a group of children traveled to a nearby park to set off fireworks.

While at the park, an individual, later identified as Garcia, approached the children

and struck up a conversation. Garcia, a twenty-six-year-old man, decided to sit

down next to thirteen-year-old K.G. on a park bench. The interaction quickly turned

sour. Garcia asked the child to be his “girlfriend.” K.G. declined, saying “no,

because I’m only thirteen.” Garcia countered “the age of consent in Mexico is

thirteen.” The child, growing increasingly uncomfortable, responded “We’re not in

Mexico.”

At that point, Garcia wrapped his hands around the child’s lower waist, such

that his hands were near her buttocks, and kissed K.G. on the cheek. The child

reported being “terrified” and made a speedy exit. As the children were leaving,

Garcia “came behind [the child] and touched [the child’s] butt.” She and her friends
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started running to her friend’s nearby home to get away. K.G. later described

Garcia as acting “a little weird.”

Later that day, Michael Bakkers was mowing his grandmother’s lawn and

saw Garcia emerge from a vacant lot. A shoeless, rambling Garcia started to walk

towards Bakkers, prompting Bakkers to call the police because Garcia appeared

“quite erratic and violent for no reason.” Bakkers had never seen Garcia before

this day. Yet, Garcia approached Bakkers, saying, “Hey, Adam. We good, dog?

We good, dog? Whatcha doing?” before starting to “swing” at him. Bakkers

attempted to lure Garcia away from his wife and child as Garcia swung at him and

threw rocks, twigs, and an empty soda bottle at him. All the while, Garcia continued

to accuse Bakkers of killing his parents, who, according to Garcia, were Presidents

of the United States. At some point during the interaction, as he tried to run from

Garcia, Bakkers tripped and fell to the ground. According to Bakkers’s wife, Garcia

continued to punch Bakkers in the head and stomp on him as he was on the

ground.

As the police arrived, the assault was no longer in progress, but Garcia was

still outside Bakkers’s home. Officers questioned Garcia. Garcia first gave an

incorrect name and birth date. Around this same time, K.G.’s mother called the

police, reporting the earlier incident in the park. The police investigated both

complaints, culminating in the arrest of Garcia. In the squad car, en route to jail,

Garcia dumped contents from his pocket into the backseat. At booking, Garcia

dropped a baggie at the foot of the officer. The baggie’s contents were field tested

at the jail, testing positive for methamphetamine, and sent to the Iowa Division of
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Criminal Investigation (DCI) Criminalistics Laboratory for further testing. DCI

confirmed the contents of the baggie were, in fact, methamphetamine.

The matter proceeded to trial, where Garcia was found guilty of indecent

contact with a child, possession of a controlled substance, and assault causing

bodily injury or mental illness. Garcia appeals two of his three convictions on

claims of insufficient evidence: indecent contact with a child and assault causing

bodily injury or mental illness.

II. Standard of Review.

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law.

State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 116 (Iowa 2004).

III. Discussion.

When assessing sufficiency of the evidence challenges, evidence must be

assessed “in the light most favorable to the State.” See State v. Tipton, 897

N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017). The non-moving party is entitled to “legitimate

inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the

record evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). As a result, “[e]vidence is sufficient to

support a conviction if, viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, ‘any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 2003) (citation

omitted). If sufficient evidence from the record exists to support a conviction, we

are bound by the jury’s verdict. State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2023).

A. Indecent Contact with a Child.

Garcia argues there is insufficient record evidence to convict him of

indecent contact with a child. For the jury to properly find indecent contact with a
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child, the State must prove that an individual of eighteen years of age or older

committed any of the enumerated acts in the statute against a child, who is not

their spouse, “with or without the child’s consent, for the purpose of arousing or

satisfying the sexual desires of either of them.” Iowa Code § 709.12(1). Of the

enumerated acts in section 709.12, the State focuses on section 709.12(1)(b):

“Touch the clothing covering the immediate area of the inner thigh, groin, buttock,

anus, or breast of the child.” Garcia first denies touching K.G.’s buttocks, but

argues, even if the jury accepted the child’s testimony that he did, there was no

proof that the touching was for “the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual

desire” of Garcia or of the child.

Our role is to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence. Here, the jury accepted K.G.’s version of what happened. While Garcia

argues that the details of K.G.’s testimony are sparce, we do not weigh witness

credibility when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Slaughter,

3 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Iowa 2024) (noting that when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, “it is not within the province of our court ‘to resolve conflicts in the

evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of

explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury’” (citation

omitted). Instead, the ultimate question is whether the evidence supports the

finding actually made. Id. Here, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the State, K.G.’s testimony about how Garcia approached her, what he said, the

unwanted kiss to her cheek and his move to touch her buttocks, is substantial

evidence to support the conviction. Testimony at trial, by itself, may be sufficient

evidence to ground a conviction. See State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11
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(Iowa 2021) (“A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be sufficient evidence

for conviction.”); State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993) (“The jury is

free to believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and to give weight to the

evidence as in its judgment such evidence should receive.”).

Next, as to Garcia’s challenge that the State failed to produce sufficient

evidence to show the touching was for the purpose of sexual arousal, we look to

the totality of Garcia’s behavior. Intent is seldom shown by direct evidence;

instead, “[t]he requisite intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person

can be inferred from an accused’s conduct, remarks, and all surrounding

circumstances.” State v. Jorgensen, 758 N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 2008). Much of

Garcia’s behavior towards K.G. was sexually charged. Sitting close to the child,

wrapping his arms around the child’s lower waist near her buttocks, asking the

child to be his girlfriend, suggesting the child was “of age” in another country,

kissing the child on the cheek, and, finally, touching the child’s buttocks as she

tried to flee, constitute substantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find Garcia

touched K.G.’s buttock to arouse or satisfy his or the child’s sexual desires.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find

substantial evidence to support the conviction for indecent contact with a child.

Because we find substantial evidence, we are bound by the jury verdict and affirm

the conviction.

B. Assault Causing Bodily Injury or Mental Illness.

Garcia argues the cuts and scrapes sustained by Bakkers were a result of

Bakkers tripping and falling and there is no evidence that Garcia made physical

contact with Bakkers. Thus, he contends the “only substantial evidence that exists
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is of simple assault.” Iowa Code section 708.1(2)(a) defines assault to include

“Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result

in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the

apparent ability to execute the act.” Under section 708.2(2), a person who commits

an assault “who causes bodily injury or mental illness” is guilty of a serious

misdemeanor, while any other assault, except as otherwise provided under other

paragraphs in section 708.2, is a simple misdemeanor. See Iowa Code

§ 708.2(7). Garcia was charged with a serious misdemeanor. So, we then look

to whether the evidence supports a showing of bodily injury or mental illness that

was caused by Garcia’s act that was intended to cause Bakkers pain or injury.

At trial, Bakkers testified Garcia threw rocks, sticks, and an empty two-liter

soda bottle at him as Bakkers was leading Garcia away from his pregnant wife and

small child. During this time, Garcia repeatedly accused Bakkers of killing Garcia’s

parents, who, according to him, were Presidents of the United States. In addition,

Bakkers’s wife testified that Garcia repeatedly punched Bakkers in the head and

stomped on him, including when Bakkers was on the ground. The photographs

admitted as exhibits at trial showed cuts and scrapes to Bakkers’s leg and foot

sustained in the attack. Finally, Bakkers also described an increase in anxiety or

nervousness since the assault, especially when he visits his grandmother’s home.

He reported an uneasiness and feeling the need to scope out the street because

he “[doesn’t] know what I’m going to run into now.” As Bakkers testified the

increase in anxiety is the “real lasting thing.”

Contrary to Garcia’s claim that he made no physical contact with Bakkers,

his exchange with his counsel at trial suggests otherwise:
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Q. Okay. Well, you heard testimony that you—you assaulted
Mr. Bakkers . . . ? A. Mm-hmm.
Q. Do you recall that? A. Yeah I pushed him—pushed him to
the ground.
Q. I’m sorry? A. Yeah. I pushed him to the ground. I threw
the Sprite bottle at him that I had on me, and I threw it at him.

Evaluating the record before us, we find substantial evidence existed for a

fact finder to determine Garcia committed an assault causing bodily injury or

mental illness as defined by Iowa Code sections 708.1(2) and 708.2(2).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons detailed above, we affirm the convictions.

AFFIRMED.