State of Iowa v. Samuel Gurisho Kabo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1780
Filed October 30, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

SAMUEL GURISHO KABO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, William A. Price,

Judge.

Samuel Gurisho Kabo appeals from his conviction for eluding. AFFIRMED.

John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Samuel Gurisho Kabo appeals his conviction after a jury found him guilty of

eluding. Because the court did not err in its jury instructions ruling and substantial

evidence supports Kabo’s conviction, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On August 28, 2022, Sergeant Tracy Cox of the Jasper County Sheriff’s

Office observed a vehicle driving eighty-six miles per hour in a

sixty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Cox followed the speeding driver in a marked law

enforcement vehicle and initiated his emergency lights. When the vehicle did not

stop, Cox also initiated his sirens and asked dispatch for assistance. Deputies

from Marshall County Sheriff's Office joined the chase, also in marked law

enforcement vehicles and with their emergency lights on. The vehicle eventually

did stop twice. Both times, several officers from both Jasper and Marshall

Counties exited their vehicles, drew their firearms, and commanded the driver to

exit the vehicle in accordance with their training. Both times, the driver took off.

After several miles, Cox performed a successful PIT maneuver.1 Again,

several officers exited their vehicles, drew their firearms, and made verbal

commands to the driver to exit the vehicle and get on the ground. Notwithstanding

being held at gunpoint, the driver did not respond to the officers’ instructions.

Instead, he walked around to the rear of his vehicle to check for damage. A

1 We have previously described a PIT maneuver or “Precision Intervention
Technique” as “a driving technique used by police officers that is designed to halt
a fleeing motorist by hitting his or her car at a specific point to throw the car into a
spin and brings it to a stop.” State v. Shears, No. 16-1665, 2017 WL 6034626,
at *3 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017) (Tabor, J., dissenting).
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Marshall County deputy deployed a taser on the driver, and the officers arrested

him.

The State charged the driver, who was later identified as Kabo, with

eluding–willful failure to stop for law enforcement. At trial, the State presented

video evidence of the chase and corroborating testimony from Cox. Kabo testified

in his own defense through an interpreter.2 He stated that while the video “depicted

what occurred that evening,” he did not understand what was happening. He

maintained he was not speeding and did not know police were following him

despite the close proximity. He further claimed that when he pulled over both

times, the officers commanded him to go.

Before the case was submitted to the jury, Kabo proposed a substitute

willfulness instruction, which the district court denied. The jury found Kabo guilty

of eluding. He appeals.

II. Jury Instructions.

Kabo challenges the jury instructions, arguing his preferred “willfulness”

instruction should have been given to prevent prejudice. “We generally review a

district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for errors at law.” State

v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). To support his position,

Kabo generally argues the disputed instruction was prejudicial because it is not a

uniform instruction approved by the Iowa State Bar Association Uniform Jury

Instruction committee and was “too far removed” from the accompanying

2 Kabo is a refugee from Ethiopia and speaks no English.
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general-intent instruction.3 He also claims the court erred by relying on

unpublished authorities in its ruling.

First, Kabo concedes that the trial court is not required to use uniform jury

instructions. See id. at 9–10 (not requiring courts to abide by a particular “model

or form in formulating instructions” (citation omitted)). Therefore, his claim that the

instructions were required to expressly include specific uniform language is

incorrect. And his claim that we must then presume prejudice lacks supporting

authority.4 But even if we did find a presumption of prejudice, this can be overcome

by the overwhelming evidence against Kabo, which we address as part of the

sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Iowa 2022)

(overcoming a presumption of prejudice “when the jury received ‘strong evidence’

of a defendant’s guilt” (citation omitted)).

Second, Kabo argues that the jury instructions were somehow improper

because they were “too far removed.” Specifically, he questions the jury’s ability

to read Instruction No. 13 regarding general intent, move onto the marshalling

instruction at No. 14, and then apply the general intent instruction to the definition

of “willfulness” in No. 15. But “we presume juries follow instructions.” State v.

3 He also contends that because the court did not include specific language, the

court effectively “direct[ed] a verdict for the State on the question of willfulness.”
But he does not expand on this argument. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3)
(waiving issues inadequately argued on appeal). Further, the case he cites in
support of this proposition, State v. Gordon, is inapposite. See 560 N.W.2d 4, 6
(Iowa 1997) (analyzing definitions of “bodily injury” in the Model Penal Code).
4 Kabo actually does cite an authority for this assertion, but it does not exist. The

case name does not match its given citation, and in any case, he provides limited
analysis. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(2)(a) (requiring parties to cite cases using “a
Bluebook-type citation”), 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3) (waiving issues that fail to cite
supporting authority).
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Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 552 (Iowa 2010). Further, “[w]e consider the jury

instructions as a whole rather than in isolation to determine whether they correctly

state the law.” Davis, 975 N.W.2d at 8 (citation omitted). “Read together, the jurors

were informed that to convict [Kabo], they were required to find he was consciously

aware of the officer’s signals to stop and that his failure to stop was voluntary, and

not by mistake or accident.”5 State v. Tubbs, No. 10-0758, 2011 WL 768756, at *3

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2011). These instructions were neither conflicting nor

confusing to the jury. Compare id. (finding the above instructions “sufficient”

because they adequately instruct on general intent), with State v. Benson,

919 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Iowa 2018) (including conflicting intent instructions

“render[s] the instructions confusing and misleading”).

Finally, Kabo relies on our appellate rules to argue that the court erred

because it relied on an unpublished decision. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(2)(a)(2)

(noting that unpublished decisions are not binding but provide “persuasive

reasoning”). But unpublished decisions are still persuasive authority, and Kabo

fails to explain how this is error. In this particular case, Tubbs is highly persuasive

given the disputed jury instructions are nearly identical. See Tubbs,

2011 WL 768756, at *3; see also Evans v. State, No. 24-0292, 2024 WL 4370633,

at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2024) (finding unpublished authority highly persuasive

when it “presents a nearly identical fact pattern”). We therefore find Kabo’s

5 Instruction No. 13 says in part, “While it is not necessary that a person knows the

act is against the law, it is necessary that the person was aware he was doing the
act and he did it voluntarily, not by mistake or accident.” Instruction No. 15 says
in part, “‘Willfully,’ in this case means a conscious awareness by Mr. Kabo of the
peace officer’s visual or audible signal to stop and Mr. Kabo’s response thereto.”
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arguments regarding the jury instructions without merit and affirm the court’s

exclusion of his proposed instruction.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Kabo then claims we must reverse his conviction because there was

insufficient evidence. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction

of errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In

conducting that review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,” viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State and upholding the verdict if

supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient

to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. For the jury to find Kabo guilty of eluding, the State had to prove:

1. On or about August 28, 2022 Mr. Kabo was the driver of a
motor vehicle
2. A peace officer driving a marked or unmarked law
enforcement vehicle gave Mr. Kabo a visual (flashing red and blue
lights) and audible (siren) signal to stop.
3. Mr. Kabo willfully failed to bring the motor vehicle he was
driving to a stop or otherwise willfully eluded or attempted to elude
the pursuing law enforcement vehicle, after being given a visual and
audible signal to stop.

Kabo concedes that the evidence “overwhelmingly establish[es] the first two

elements.” Instead, he only challenges the third element of willfulness.

Kabo maintains that he did not know police were behind him, he was not

speeding, and on both occasions that he pulled over, an officer told him to go;

therefore he did not possess the requisite intent of “willfulness” for eluding. But all

of these claims, in essence, are challenges to the jury’s credibility determination.

It is not our role on appeal “to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine

the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the
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jury.” State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). Instead,

“we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all

‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be

deduced from the record evidence.’” Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202 (quoting

Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 27). The State here offered overwhelming evidence that

conflicted with Kabo’s claims, including two separate videos and officer testimony.

The jury was tasked with reconciling such inconsistencies and making its

determination, which we ordinarily will not disturb. See Williams, 695 N.W.2d

at 28. The record evidence showed Kabo’s ability to stop for law enforcement and

his failure to do so; accordingly, we find there is substantial evidence to support

Kabo’s conviction for eluding.

IV. Disposition.

Because the court did not err in its jury-instructions ruling and substantial

evidence supports Kabo’s conviction, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.