State v. Eugenio

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
19-JUN-2026
07:57 AM
Dkt. 79 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

STATE OF HAWAI I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
JUSTIN JOSHUA SERRANO EUGENIO, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Justin Joshua Serrano Eugenio

(Eugenio) appeals from the May 21, 2024 Judgment of Conviction

and Probation Sentence (Judgment) entered against him by the

Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).1

On January 24, 2023, Plaintiff-Appellee State of

Hawai i (the State) filed a Felony Information charging Eugenio

with Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a Minor in violation of

Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1209.1(1)(a) (Supp. 2021).

The charge arose from an undercover police operation in which

Maui Police Department (MPD) Detective John Surina (Detective

Surina) posed as an underage female prostitute online (the

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The Honorable Catherine H. Remigio presided.
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persona).2 At the conclusion of a January 2024 trial, a jury

found Eugenio guilty of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of a

Minor.

Eugenio raises three points of error on appeal,

contending there is a reasonable possibility that: (1) the

Circuit Court's failure to provide a mistake of fact jury

instruction contributed to the conviction; (2) that Hawai i Jury

Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 7.08 contributed to the

conviction; and (3) the Circuit Court's omission of HAWJIC 7.09

contributed to the conviction.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve

Eugenio's points of error as follows:

(1) Eugenio argues the evidence elicited at trial made

a mistake of fact instruction necessary. Specifically, Eugenio

argues that the record demonstrates that the police created the

impression that the persona was an adult by initially listing her

age at 19 and using photos of an adult woman. Eugenio contends

that this evidence is credible evidence constituting the mistake

of fact defense as to the persona's age.

To convict a defendant of Commercial Sexual

Exploitation of a Minor in violation of HRS § 712-1209.1(1)(a) 3,

2
The operation was a joint effort between MPD, Honolulu Police
Department (HPD), and state and federal agencies.
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HRS § 712-1209.1 states, in relevant part:

§ 712-1209.1 Commercial sexual exploitation of a
minor. (1) A person eighteen years of age or older commits
the offense of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor if
the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
(continued...)

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the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

(1) was 18 years or older and (2) intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly, (3) offered or agreed to provide anything of value to

a law enforcement officer who represents themselves to be a

minor.

The trial court has the primary responsibility to

ensure that the jury is properly instructed. State v. Henley,

136 Hawai i 471, 479, 363 P.3d 319, 327 (2015). Hawai i appellate

courts employ a two-step framework to determine whether a circuit

court should have sua sponte instructed the jury on mistake of

fact. State v. Taylor, 130 Hawai i 196, 206, 307 P.3d 1142, 1152

(2013). First, the court looks to whether the trial court

plainly erred in failing to give a mistake of fact instruction.

Id. at 207-08, 307 P.3d at 1153-54. "[P]lain error affecting

substantial rights exists if the defendant had met his or her

initial burden at trial of adducing credible evidence of facts

constituting the defense (or those facts are supplied by the

prosecution's witnesses)." Id. at 205, 307 P.3d at 1151

(footnote omitted). Credible evidence is evidence from which the

Circuit Court could conclude "that the evidence offered

reasonable grounds for being believed, i.e., that a reasonable

juror could harbor a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's

guilt" Id. at 207, 307 P.3d at 1153 (quotation marks omitted).

Where there is plain error, we reverse "only if an examination of

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(...continued)
(a) Offers or agrees to provide anything of value to
a member of a police department, a sheriff, or a
law enforcement officer who represents that
person's self as a minor to engage in sexual
conduct[.]

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the record as a whole reveals that the error was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 208, 307 P.3d at 1154.

We conclude that there is no credible evidence in the

record supporting a mistake of fact defense. First, HRS § 712-

1209.1(1)(a) prohibits, inter alia, the act of recklessly

offering or agreeing to provide anything of value to a law

enforcement officer who represents themselves to be a minor, and

a violation of this statute does not rest on the "fact" of the

persona's age. Here, there was testimony at trial that Detective

Surina represented, multiple times, that the officer's persona

was a minor. More specifically, while the persona's age was

initially listed on a website as 19, Detective Surina proceeded

to represent the persona's age as 16 on three separate occasions.

Eugenio's responses indicate his knowledge of the representation

as to age. In response to the first message that the persona was

16, Eugenio responded "now knowing that fact I would want price

drop." (Emphasis added). When Detective Surina asked if Eugenio

was okay with the persona's age, Eugenio responded, "[p]romise

your not telling anybody cuz I can get into serious trouble

including getting arrested?" Based on the evidence elicited at

trial, we cannot conclude that a reasonable juror could harbor a

reasonable doubt that Eugenio was mistaken as to the officer's

representation of the persona's age. Indeed, these

representations are not negated by the fact that the pictures

provided by Detective Surina depicted a woman who was not a minor

and/or did not appear to Eugenio to be a minor. Therefore, we

conclude that the Circuit Court did not commit plain error in

failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact.

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(2) Eugenio argues that HAWJIC 7.08 "does not provide

an adequate instruction on the objective standard applicable to

an entrapment defense." Eugenio argues this prejudiced his

defense because the jury asked if there was a legal definition of

the term "inducement," indicating their confusion. Eugenio

maintains that the term inducement frames "the first element in

terms of what Mr. Eugenio did or why," and therefore "blurred the

line between a subjective and objective standard."

To determine whether a jury instruction is adequate,

the key inquiry is whether the instruction was insufficient,

inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Lagat, 97 Hawai i 492,

500, 40 P.3d 894, 902 (2002). Where the plain language of a

statute is clear and unambiguous, a jury instruction that tracks

the language of the statute is generally adequate. Id.

(instruction that tracked statutory language was not erroneous

where statute was clear and instruction adequately explained the

applicable law); Armstrong v. Cione, 6 Haw. App. 652, 661, 736

P.2d 440, 447 (1987) (holding that reading the statute verbatim

to the jury is a sufficient instruction where statutory language

was "very simple and easy to understand"); Fredricksen v. Dyas,

No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2021 WL 305750, *6 (Jan. 29, 2021) (mem.

op.) (jury instruction was not misleading where it tracked

statutory language verbatim); State v. Scott, No. 30499, 2011 WL

1878851, *2 (May 12, 2011) (SDO).

In State v. Anderson, the Supreme Court of Hawai i held

that "the language of HRS [§] 702-237 fully comports with the

objective view of entrapment." 58 Haw. 479, 484, 572 P.2d 159,

162 (1977). The court reasoned that the statute's language

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focuses "on the police conduct and its probable effect on a

'reasonable person.' No attention is directed toward the state

of mind of the particular defendant in determining the entrapment

issue." Id.

Here, HAWJIC 7.08 tracks HRS § 702-237 nearly

verbatim.4 Like the statutory language, HAWJIC 7.08 "fully

comports with the objective view of entrapment." Because HAWJIC

4
HAWJIC 7.08 states, in relevant part:

Entrapment is an affirmative defense to the charge(s)
of (specify charge(s) and any instructed included
offense(s)). A person is entrapped if he/she engaged in the
prohibited conduct or caused the prohibited result because
he/she was induced or encouraged to do so by a law
enforcement officer [or by a person acting in cooperation
with a law enforcement officer] who, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, employed
methods of persuasion or inducement which created a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it.

Entrapment has two elements.

These two elements are:

1. That the defendant engaged in the prohibited
conduct or caused the prohibited result because he/she was
induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer
[or by a person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement
officer]; and

2. That the law enforcement officer [or a person
acting in cooperation with a law enforcement officer] did,
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of
an offense, employ methods of persuasion or inducement which
created a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by persons other than those who are ready to
commit it.

HRS § 702-237 states, in relevant part:

§ 702-237 Entrapment. (1) In any prosecution, it is
an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the
prohibited conduct or caused the prohibited result because
the defendant was induced or encouraged to do so by a law
enforcement officer, or by a person acting in cooperation
with a law enforcement officer, who, for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, either:
(a) Knowingly made false representations designed to
induce the belief that such conduct or result
was not prohibited; or
(b) Employed methods of persuasion or inducement
which created a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it.

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7.08 "adequately and understandably apprised the jury of the law

to be applied in its deliberation," we conclude that the Circuit

Court did not err in using HAWJIC 7.08. See Lagat, 97 Hawai i at

500, 40 P.3d at 902.

(3) Eugenio argues that the Circuit Court erred in

failing to instruct the jury with HAWJIC 7.09 because Detective

Surina initially listed the persona's age as 19 and gave Eugenio

pictures of an adult. Eugenio contends that this could lead a

rational jury to find that "law enforcement 'knowingly made false

representations designed to induce'" Eugenio to believe that his

conduct was not "prohibited."

HAWJIC 7.09 states in relevant part:
Entrapment has two elements.

These two elements are:

1. That the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct or
caused the prohibited result because he/she was induced or
encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer [or by a
person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement
officer]; and

2. That the law enforcement officer [or a person acting in
cooperation with a law enforcement officer] did, for the purpose
of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, knowingly
make false representations designed to induce the belief that such
conduct or result was not prohibited.

Here, there is no evidence in the record that a law

enforcement officer made a false representation that would induce

a belief that the conduct prohibited by HRS § 712-1209.1(1)(a) is

legal. As discussed above, although Detective Surina initially

posted the persona's age was 19, he informed Eugenio multiple

times that the persona's age was 16. At no point did any law

enforcement officer represent that trading something of value to

engage in sexual conduct with a minor is not prohibited by law.

Because there was no evidence in the record of law enforcement

making a false statement to induce Eugenio's violative conduct,

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we conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in declining to

submit HAWJIC 7.09 to the jury.

For these reasons, the Circuit Court's May 21, 2024

Judgment is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, June 19, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
Matthew Mannisto
(Law Office of Matthew /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Mannisto), Associate Judge
for Defendant-Appellant
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
David M. Van Acker, Associate Judge
Leigh M. Okimoto,
Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff-Appellee

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