State v. De Jesus

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
05-MAY-2026
07:50 AM
Dkt. 81 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARCOS A. DE JESUS, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
KĀNE‘OHE DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DTA-23-01261)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Marcos A. De Jesus (De Jesus)

appeals from the District Court of the First Circuit's (district

court) 1 October 1, 2024 "Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order

and Plea/Judgment" (Judgment).

On August 10, 2023, the State of Hawaiʻi (State)

charged De Jesus by Complaint with Reckless Driving of Vehicle

1 The Honorable Alvin K. Nishimura presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-2 (2020)

(Count 1), and Racing on Highways in violation of HRS § 291C-103

(2020). Following a jury-waived trial, the district court found

De Jesus guilty as to Count 1, but granted De Jesus' motion for

judgment of acquittal as to Count 2. The district court imposed

a $1,000 fine, $29,631 in restitution, fees, and ordered De

Jesus to take a driver's improvement course.

On appeal, De Jesus raises two points of error,

contending that the district court erred: (1) "in convicting De

Jesus of Reckless Driving . . . because the State failed to

provide sufficient evidence to prove that De Jesus operated his

vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of persons or

property"; and (2) "in convicting De Jesus of Reckless Driving

. . . because the [d]istrict [c]ourt did not find that De Jesus

acted with the requisite state of mind—recklessly."

Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and

relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration

to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,

we address De Jesus' points of error on appeal as follows:

(1) De Jesus contends that there is insufficient

evidence to support "that De Jesus operated his vehicle in

reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property." We

apply the following standard in our review of De Jesus'

contention:
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[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the
case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010)

(citations omitted). "Substantial evidence . . . is credible

evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to

enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion."

Id. (cleaned up).

De Jesus specifically argues that the district court's

finding of guilt was premised on its erroneous factual finding

that De Jesus was "sewing" (i.e., "darting in and out of the

lanes back and forth"). De Jesus contends that there is no

substantial evidence to support that De Jesus was "sewing," and

therefore not sufficient evidence to support that De Jesus'

driving was "reckless and contributed to this collision [of the

complaining witnesses' (CW) vehicle with another vehicle]."

At trial, the CW testified as follows:

Well, I was driving with my wife. Was about 4 p.m., I
think. I don't remember. We're coming from church, going
to the base. And [De Jesus, driving a blue car] passed
between me and another car right -- right beside me very
fast, very (indiscernible), sewing, (gestures)[.]

. . . .

I'm driving with my wife. And then [De Jesus] pass between
me and this car on the -- that was little space, to be
honest. (Gestures.) That was completely ridiculous. [De
Jesus] pass, flying between us. Where I'm from, as we call
that sewing, when you go -- (gestures).

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. . . .

Then [De Jesus] pass, flying between us. That's when I saw
[De Jesus]. [De Jesus] keep going fast.

. . . .

[De Jesus' car] was speeding and switching lanes
irresponsibly way above the speed limit.

. . . .

Then the Honda Civic slam behind my car. (Gestures.) And
we went out of control, spinning.

(Emphasis added.) 2

CW testified that De Jesus was speeding, passing and

"flying" between cars with "little space," "switching lanes

irresponsibly," and "sewing." We conclude that the State

introduced sufficient evidence, through CW's testimony, to

support De Jesus' conviction for Count 1.

(2) De Jesus contends that the district court erred

because it "did not find that De Jesus acted with the requisite

state of mind—recklessly." HRS § 291-2 provides, in relevant

part, that "[w]hoever operates any vehicle . . . in disregard of

the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving

of vehicle." Although HRS § 291-2 does not itself define

"recklessly," HRS § 702-206(3) (2014) instructs that,

(a) A person acts recklessly with respect to his conduct
when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is of the
specified nature.

. . . .

2 At trial, the CW at times referred to De Jesus' car as the "blue
car," and the car that collided with CW's car as "the Honda Civic, white."

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(c) A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of
his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such
a result.

(d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the
meaning of this section if, considering the nature and
purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, the disregard of the risk involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the same situation.

See also State v. Agard, 113 Hawaiʻi 321, 324, 151 P.3d 802, 805

(2007) (recognizing that "the state of mind definition in HRS

§ 702-206(3) applies to HRS § 291-2").

Here, the district court found that,

[T]he evidence that came out during the trial was that as
that person and other people were driving down the highway,
you in your vehicle and another person in their vehicle
were darting in and out of traffic at a high rate of speed,
catching up to people and darting in and out of the lanes
back and forth. In fact, I think one witness described it
as kind of like a sewing maneuver, in and out and in and
out and in and out, between all the vehicles down the
highway.

And that dangerous, reckless type of driving at the
high rate of speed is what caused all of this to occur. It
caused other vehicles to be in danger and caused other
vehicles to collide because of [De Jesus'] driving in and
out of traffic at that high rate of speed.

And although [De Jesus'] vehicle may not have made
actual contact [with CW's vehicle], it was the actions of
[De Jesus] in [De Jesus'] vehicle going in and out and --
and essentially causing people to be in fear on the road
and -- and being contacted by other vehicles because [De
Jesus'] vehicle was reckless. I mean, I don't know how to
describe it other than the conduct was reckless.

And this sewing maneuver in and out of traffic, I
mean, it's almost like -- I mean -- well, I'm not going to
get into comparisons, because there's many times where
people can cause things to happen even without making
contact because their actions are so reckless.

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We conclude that the district court found, based on

the evidence presented at trial, that De Jesus acted recklessly.

We therefore affirm the Judgment.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, May 5, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Presiding Judge
Henry P. Ting,
Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge

Brian R. Vincent, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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