State v. Naki

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
17-OCT-2025
08:06 AM
Dkt. 53 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN NAKI, Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 3FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawaiʻi
(State) challenges the family court's conclusion that the
defendant's two prior abuse of family or household member
(Abuse) offenses, charged in a single complaint resulting in a
single judgment of conviction, constituted one prior conviction
rather than the two prior convictions required for felony Abuse
sentencing under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(8)
(felony aggravator provision). 1 We affirm.

1 HRS § 709-906 (2014 & 2023 Supp.) provides graduated penalties
for repeat Abuse offenders by classifying Abuse as a misdemeanor with a
thirty-day minimum jail sentence "[f]or a second offense that occurs within
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

The State appeals from the November 26, 2024 "Order
Remanding Case to Family Court" (Dismissal Order), filed by the
Family Court of the Third Circuit (Family Court). 2 On appeal,
the State contends the Family Court erred by dismissing Count 1,
felony Abuse, when it concluded that Defendant-Appellee John
Naki's (Naki) two prior Abuse convictions had to "be recorded in
separate judgments and arise out of separate incidents" to
qualify for the felony aggravator provision in HRS § 709-906(8).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the
State's point of error as follows.
The June 4, 2024 Information charged Naki with felony
Abuse in violation of HRS § 709-906(8) (Count 1); and petty
misdemeanor Abuse in violation of HRS § 709-906(6) (Count 2).
The felony Abuse in Count 1 relied on two prior Abuse offenses
that occurred on the same date, which were prosecuted in a
single case, resulting in two convictions set forth in a single
Judgment of Conviction entered on December 19, 2022, as follows:

1. In Case No. 3FFC-22-384, C22-08165/PN, which occurred on
or about July 16, 2022, and for which Judgment of
Conviction was entered on December 19, 2022;

2. In Case No. 3FFC-22-384, C22-08172/PN, which occurred on
or about July 16, 2022, and for which Judgment of
Conviction was entered on December 19, 2022;

. . . .

one year of the first conviction"; and classifying Abuse as a class C felony
under the felony aggravator provision "[f]or a third or any subsequent
offense that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent conviction[.]"
See HRS § 709-906(5)(b) and (8).

2 The Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto presided.

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On October 10, 2024, Naki filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Felony Information Complaint Count 1" (Motion to Dismiss),
arguing that because Count 1 was based on a "conviction for two
counts of abuse under one complaint," this did "not constitute a
'second or subsequent conviction' for repeat offender
sentencing" under HRS § 709-906(8).
Following a November 26, 2024 hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss, the Circuit Court filed the Dismissal Order, dismissing
Count 1 and remanding the remaining petty misdemeanor Abuse
offense in Count 2 back to the Family Court. 3 The State timely
appealed the Dismissal Order.
On December 30, 2024, the Family Court filed its
"Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and
Order Granting [Naki]'s Motion to Dismiss Felony Information
Complaint Count 1," 4 which contained the following COLs germane
to this appeal:

1. [Naki]'s convictions arising out of two counts of
misdemeanor Abuse of Family or Household Member in Case No.
3FFC-22-384 against separate individuals during the same
incident is one prior conviction under Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes Section 709-906(8), as the convictions were
charged in one case, are recorded in one judgment, and
involve one incident;

2. To satisfy the requirement of having two prior
convictions under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes Section 709-
906(8), [Naki] must be charged with having two or more
prior convictions which are recorded in two or more
judgments, and which arise out of separate incidents.

(Emphases added.)

3 On March 19, 2025, Naki pled no contest to Count 2, and was
placed on probation for a one-year period.

4 See Hawaiʻi Family Court Rule 52(a) (requiring the family court to
enter FOFs and COLs where none have been entered, upon the filing of a notice
of appeal).

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On appeal, the State argues that the "plain language"
of HRS § 709-906(8) "does not require that prior convictions
occur at separate times, in separate incidents, or in separate
judgments"; the statute "contains no requirement other than that
the new offense occurs [sic] within two years of a second or
subsequent [Abuse] conviction"; and the statute had "no
limitations, descriptors, or qualifiers regarding what
constitutes a 'second or subsequent conviction.'" The State's
reliance upon State v. Murray, 116 Hawaiʻi 3, 169 P.3d 955 (2007)
and State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawaiʻi 262, 978 P.2d 700 (1999), is
unpersuasive, as Murray and Dudoit are distinguishable. 5
"[T]he fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself[,]" and
"where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole
duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning."
Barker v. Young, 153 Hawaiʻi 144, 148, 528 P.3d 217, 221 (2023)
(citation omitted). The felony penalty in HRS § 709-906(8) is
triggered by a third offense "that occurs within two years of a

5 In Murray, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that the "at least two
prior convictions" language in HRS § 709-906(8) constituted an element that
the State had to prove. 116 Hawaiʻi at 9, 169 P.3d at 961. Murray did not
deal with the question in this case, of whether two Abuse offenses charged in
a single complaint resulting in a single judgment of conviction constitute
two qualifying prior convictions for the felony aggravator provision.

In Dudoit, the supreme court construed a prior version of the
Abuse statute that imposed a repeat offender penalty if the subsequent
offense occurred within a year of "the previous offense," rather than a
previous "conviction" under the version applicable here. 90 Hawaiʻi at 263-
64, 978 P.2d at 701-02 (emphasis added) (quoting HRS § 709-906(5)(b) (Supp.
1997)). The version of the statute at issue here imposes repeat offender
penalties based on a prior conviction and not based on a prior offense as in
Dudoit. The Dudoit court distinguished "offense" as a "'breach of the
criminal laws,' i.e., a 'violation of law for which a penalty is
prescribed[,]'" versus "conviction," which meant "the final judgment on a
verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo
contendere." Id. at 269, 978 P.2d at 707 (brackets omitted) (citing Black's
Law Dictionary 333, 1081 (6th ed.1990)).

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

second or subsequent conviction[.]" (Emphasis added.) HRS
Chapter 709, however, does not define "conviction."
"When a term is not defined by statute, we determine
its meaning by looking to its ordinary and familiar
signification and general and popular use, and we may also
consider legal or other well accepted dictionaries." State v.
Nagamine, 155 Hawaiʻi 442, 448, 565 P.3d 787, 793 (App. 2025)
(citation modified). "Conviction" is defined as "[t]he act or
process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the
state of having been proved guilty." Black's Law Dictionary 423
(12th ed.); see State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 129, 706 P.2d
1293, 1297 (1985) ("In its common and popular sense, a
conviction refers to the finding of the jury or the court that
the defendant is guilty." (citation modified)). "Conviction" is
also defined as "[t]he judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a
person is guilty of a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 423 (12th
ed.); see Rodrigues, 68 Haw. at 129, 706 P.2d at 1297 ("In a
more technical sense, however, it means a final judgment entered
on such a determination." (citation modified)). Under these
definitions above, "conviction" has two meanings: the common
definition of the state of having been proved guilty, or a
technical definition meaning the entry of a final judgment based
on a determination of guilt. In this case, the State relies on
the common definition, and the Family Court utilized the
technical definition. Because there is "doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty" as to the term
"conviction," and whether two Abuse convictions within a single
judgment constitute one "conviction" or two under HRS § 709-
906(8), an ambiguity exists. See Barker, 153 Hawaiʻi at 148,
528 P.3d at 221 (citation omitted).

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"[W]hen there is ambiguity in a statute, . . . the
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by applying other
methods of statutory interpretation, such as the in pari materia
canon[.]" 6 Id. at 149, 528 P.3d at 222 (citation modified); see
Slaton v. State, 155 Hawaiʻi 312, 325, 564 P.3d 330, 343 (App.
2025) ("Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,
shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear
in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful
in another." (quoting HRS § 1-16 (2009)). We thus look to other
sections of the penal code in ascertaining the meaning of
"conviction."
HRS § 706-606.5 (2014 & 2022 Supp.), the repeat
offender statute governing "sentencing of repeat offenders" for
felonies, includes the Abuse felony aggravator provision in
subsection (1)(z), as follows: "Section 709-906(8) . . .
relating to abuse of family or household members[.]" HRS § 706-
606.5(8) pertinently explains how to treat multiple convictions
in a single judgment for felony repeat offender sentencing, as
follows:
(8) For purposes of this section:

(a) Convictions under two or more counts of an indictment
or complaint shall be considered a single conviction
without regard to when the convictions occur;

. . . .

(c) A conviction occurs on the date judgment is entered.

HRS § 846E-1 (2014 & 2022 Supp.), governing the registration of
sex offenders, similarly defines "conviction" as a "judgment on

6 We note that our review of the legislative history of HRS § 709-
906(8) did not shed light on the meaning of "conviction." See State v.
Kotis, 91 Hawaiʻi 319, 329, 984 P.2d 78, 88 (1999) (holding that the plain
language and legislative history of the statute at issue in that case was
"silent" as to intent, and resorting to pari materia).

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the verdict, or a finding of guilt," and provides that a
"conviction" "occurs on the date judgment is entered." Thus,
under these other criminal statutes that specifically address
how to define or apply the term "conviction," the technical
definition of "conviction" to mean the entry of judgment should
apply in this case.
Here, consistent with the felony repeat offender
sentencing statute applicable to felony Abuse convictions, HRS §
707-606.5(1)(z), we conclude that because Naki's two prior Abuse
convictions are from two counts in the same complaint, they
should be considered a single "conviction." Cf. HRS § 706-
606.5(8)(a). Because a "conviction" occurs on the date the
judgment is filed, and there was only a single December 19, 2022
Judgment of Conviction, HRS § 709-906(8)'s requirement of a
"second or subsequent conviction" was not met in this case. Cf.
HRS §§ 706-606.5(8)(c) and 846E-1.
We thus affirm the Family Court's conclusion that
Naki's prior Abuse offenses that arose from "one case" and
"recorded in one judgment" were "one prior conviction," and did
not establish the "second or subsequent conviction" requirement
for the felony aggravator provision. Under these circumstances,
the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Count 1 of the Information. See State v. Correa, 124 Hawaiʻi
179, 184, 238 P.3d 706, 711 (App. 2010) (reviewing a trial
court's decision to dismiss a criminal charge for abuse of
discretion). In light of our disposition affirming the
dismissal of Count 1, we need not address Naki's argument
regarding a double jeopardy clause violation for the State's
continued prosecution of Count 1.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 26,
2024 Dismissal Order, filed by the Family Court of the Third
Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, October 17, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Kirsten J. Selvig,
Chief Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
County of Hawai‘i, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Plaintiff-Appellant. Associate Judge
William B. Heflin, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Defendant-Appellee. Associate Judge

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
17-OCT-2025
08:06 AM
Dkt. 53 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN NAKI, Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 3FFC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawaiʻi
(State) challenges the family court's conclusion that the
defendant's two prior abuse of family or household member
(Abuse) offenses, charged in a single complaint resulting in a
single judgment of conviction, constituted one prior conviction
rather than the two prior convictions required for felony Abuse
sentencing under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-906(8)
(felony aggravator provision). 1 We affirm.

1 HRS § 709-906 (2014 & 2023 Supp.) provides graduated penalties
for repeat Abuse offenders by classifying Abuse as a misdemeanor with a
thirty-day minimum jail sentence "[f]or a second offense that occurs within
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

The State appeals from the November 26, 2024 "Order
Remanding Case to Family Court" (Dismissal Order), filed by the
Family Court of the Third Circuit (Family Court). 2 On appeal,
the State contends the Family Court erred by dismissing Count 1,
felony Abuse, when it concluded that Defendant-Appellee John
Naki's (Naki) two prior Abuse convictions had to "be recorded in
separate judgments and arise out of separate incidents" to
qualify for the felony aggravator provision in HRS § 709-906(8).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve the
State's point of error as follows.
The June 4, 2024 Information charged Naki with felony
Abuse in violation of HRS § 709-906(8) (Count 1); and petty
misdemeanor Abuse in violation of HRS § 709-906(6) (Count 2).
The felony Abuse in Count 1 relied on two prior Abuse offenses
that occurred on the same date, which were prosecuted in a
single case, resulting in two convictions set forth in a single
Judgment of Conviction entered on December 19, 2022, as follows:

1. In Case No. 3FFC-22-384, C22-08165/PN, which occurred on
or about July 16, 2022, and for which Judgment of
Conviction was entered on December 19, 2022;

2. In Case No. 3FFC-22-384, C22-08172/PN, which occurred on
or about July 16, 2022, and for which Judgment of
Conviction was entered on December 19, 2022;

. . . .

one year of the first conviction"; and classifying Abuse as a class C felony
under the felony aggravator provision "[f]or a third or any subsequent
offense that occurs within two years of a second or subsequent conviction[.]"
See HRS § 709-906(5)(b) and (8).

2 The Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto presided.

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On October 10, 2024, Naki filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Felony Information Complaint Count 1" (Motion to Dismiss),
arguing that because Count 1 was based on a "conviction for two
counts of abuse under one complaint," this did "not constitute a
'second or subsequent conviction' for repeat offender
sentencing" under HRS § 709-906(8).
Following a November 26, 2024 hearing on the Motion to
Dismiss, the Circuit Court filed the Dismissal Order, dismissing
Count 1 and remanding the remaining petty misdemeanor Abuse
offense in Count 2 back to the Family Court. 3 The State timely
appealed the Dismissal Order.
On December 30, 2024, the Family Court filed its
"Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and
Order Granting [Naki]'s Motion to Dismiss Felony Information
Complaint Count 1," 4 which contained the following COLs germane
to this appeal:

1. [Naki]'s convictions arising out of two counts of
misdemeanor Abuse of Family or Household Member in Case No.
3FFC-22-384 against separate individuals during the same
incident is one prior conviction under Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes Section 709-906(8), as the convictions were
charged in one case, are recorded in one judgment, and
involve one incident;

2. To satisfy the requirement of having two prior
convictions under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes Section 709-
906(8), [Naki] must be charged with having two or more
prior convictions which are recorded in two or more
judgments, and which arise out of separate incidents.

(Emphases added.)

3 On March 19, 2025, Naki pled no contest to Count 2, and was
placed on probation for a one-year period.

4 See Hawaiʻi Family Court Rule 52(a) (requiring the family court to
enter FOFs and COLs where none have been entered, upon the filing of a notice
of appeal).

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On appeal, the State argues that the "plain language"
of HRS § 709-906(8) "does not require that prior convictions
occur at separate times, in separate incidents, or in separate
judgments"; the statute "contains no requirement other than that
the new offense occurs [sic] within two years of a second or
subsequent [Abuse] conviction"; and the statute had "no
limitations, descriptors, or qualifiers regarding what
constitutes a 'second or subsequent conviction.'" The State's
reliance upon State v. Murray, 116 Hawaiʻi 3, 169 P.3d 955 (2007)
and State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawaiʻi 262, 978 P.2d 700 (1999), is
unpersuasive, as Murray and Dudoit are distinguishable. 5
"[T]he fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself[,]" and
"where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole
duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning."
Barker v. Young, 153 Hawaiʻi 144, 148, 528 P.3d 217, 221 (2023)
(citation omitted). The felony penalty in HRS § 709-906(8) is
triggered by a third offense "that occurs within two years of a

5 In Murray, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that the "at least two
prior convictions" language in HRS § 709-906(8) constituted an element that
the State had to prove. 116 Hawaiʻi at 9, 169 P.3d at 961. Murray did not
deal with the question in this case, of whether two Abuse offenses charged in
a single complaint resulting in a single judgment of conviction constitute
two qualifying prior convictions for the felony aggravator provision.

In Dudoit, the supreme court construed a prior version of the
Abuse statute that imposed a repeat offender penalty if the subsequent
offense occurred within a year of "the previous offense," rather than a
previous "conviction" under the version applicable here. 90 Hawaiʻi at 263-
64, 978 P.2d at 701-02 (emphasis added) (quoting HRS § 709-906(5)(b) (Supp.
1997)). The version of the statute at issue here imposes repeat offender
penalties based on a prior conviction and not based on a prior offense as in
Dudoit. The Dudoit court distinguished "offense" as a "'breach of the
criminal laws,' i.e., a 'violation of law for which a penalty is
prescribed[,]'" versus "conviction," which meant "the final judgment on a
verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo
contendere." Id. at 269, 978 P.2d at 707 (brackets omitted) (citing Black's
Law Dictionary 333, 1081 (6th ed.1990)).

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second or subsequent conviction[.]" (Emphasis added.) HRS
Chapter 709, however, does not define "conviction."
"When a term is not defined by statute, we determine
its meaning by looking to its ordinary and familiar
signification and general and popular use, and we may also
consider legal or other well accepted dictionaries." State v.
Nagamine, 155 Hawaiʻi 442, 448, 565 P.3d 787, 793 (App. 2025)
(citation modified). "Conviction" is defined as "[t]he act or
process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the
state of having been proved guilty." Black's Law Dictionary 423
(12th ed.); see State v. Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 129, 706 P.2d
1293, 1297 (1985) ("In its common and popular sense, a
conviction refers to the finding of the jury or the court that
the defendant is guilty." (citation modified)). "Conviction" is
also defined as "[t]he judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a
person is guilty of a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 423 (12th
ed.); see Rodrigues, 68 Haw. at 129, 706 P.2d at 1297 ("In a
more technical sense, however, it means a final judgment entered
on such a determination." (citation modified)). Under these
definitions above, "conviction" has two meanings: the common
definition of the state of having been proved guilty, or a
technical definition meaning the entry of a final judgment based
on a determination of guilt. In this case, the State relies on
the common definition, and the Family Court utilized the
technical definition. Because there is "doubt, doubleness of
meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty" as to the term
"conviction," and whether two Abuse convictions within a single
judgment constitute one "conviction" or two under HRS § 709-
906(8), an ambiguity exists. See Barker, 153 Hawaiʻi at 148,
528 P.3d at 221 (citation omitted).

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"[W]hen there is ambiguity in a statute, . . . the
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by applying other
methods of statutory interpretation, such as the in pari materia
canon[.]" 6 Id. at 149, 528 P.3d at 222 (citation modified); see
Slaton v. State, 155 Hawaiʻi 312, 325, 564 P.3d 330, 343 (App.
2025) ("Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,
shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear
in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful
in another." (quoting HRS § 1-16 (2009)). We thus look to other
sections of the penal code in ascertaining the meaning of
"conviction."
HRS § 706-606.5 (2014 & 2022 Supp.), the repeat
offender statute governing "sentencing of repeat offenders" for
felonies, includes the Abuse felony aggravator provision in
subsection (1)(z), as follows: "Section 709-906(8) . . .
relating to abuse of family or household members[.]" HRS § 706-
606.5(8) pertinently explains how to treat multiple convictions
in a single judgment for felony repeat offender sentencing, as
follows:
(8) For purposes of this section:

(a) Convictions under two or more counts of an indictment
or complaint shall be considered a single conviction
without regard to when the convictions occur;

. . . .

(c) A conviction occurs on the date judgment is entered.

HRS § 846E-1 (2014 & 2022 Supp.), governing the registration of
sex offenders, similarly defines "conviction" as a "judgment on

6 We note that our review of the legislative history of HRS § 709-
906(8) did not shed light on the meaning of "conviction." See State v.
Kotis, 91 Hawaiʻi 319, 329, 984 P.2d 78, 88 (1999) (holding that the plain
language and legislative history of the statute at issue in that case was
"silent" as to intent, and resorting to pari materia).

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the verdict, or a finding of guilt," and provides that a
"conviction" "occurs on the date judgment is entered." Thus,
under these other criminal statutes that specifically address
how to define or apply the term "conviction," the technical
definition of "conviction" to mean the entry of judgment should
apply in this case.
Here, consistent with the felony repeat offender
sentencing statute applicable to felony Abuse convictions, HRS §
707-606.5(1)(z), we conclude that because Naki's two prior Abuse
convictions are from two counts in the same complaint, they
should be considered a single "conviction." Cf. HRS § 706-
606.5(8)(a). Because a "conviction" occurs on the date the
judgment is filed, and there was only a single December 19, 2022
Judgment of Conviction, HRS § 709-906(8)'s requirement of a
"second or subsequent conviction" was not met in this case. Cf.
HRS §§ 706-606.5(8)(c) and 846E-1.
We thus affirm the Family Court's conclusion that
Naki's prior Abuse offenses that arose from "one case" and
"recorded in one judgment" were "one prior conviction," and did
not establish the "second or subsequent conviction" requirement
for the felony aggravator provision. Under these circumstances,
the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Count 1 of the Information. See State v. Correa, 124 Hawaiʻi
179, 184, 238 P.3d 706, 711 (App. 2010) (reviewing a trial
court's decision to dismiss a criminal charge for abuse of
discretion). In light of our disposition affirming the
dismissal of Count 1, we need not address Naki's argument
regarding a double jeopardy clause violation for the State's
continued prosecution of Count 1.

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 26,
2024 Dismissal Order, filed by the Family Court of the Third
Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, October 17, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Kirsten J. Selvig,
Chief Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
County of Hawai‘i, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
for Plaintiff-Appellant. Associate Judge
William B. Heflin, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Defendant-Appellee. Associate Judge

8