State v. Roman-Peter

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
29-SEP-2025
08:36 AM
Dkt. 102 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RYAN ROMAN-PETER, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, and McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Ryan Roman-Peter (Roman-Peter)
appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment)
entered on December 15, 2023, in the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit.1/ Roman-Peter also challenges the Circuit Court's
December 27, 2023 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Denying [Roman-Peter's] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,
or in the Alternative, New Trial" (FOFs/COLs).
On August 20, 2020, Roman-Peter allegedly brandished a
gun and fired a shot at complainants Maung Zaw (Zaw) and Brianna
Joyner (Joyner), while Roman-Peter was driving a black Dodge Ram
pickup truck at high speed on the H-2 freeway, chasing a gray
Ford Mustang driven by Zaw and occupied by Joyner. On
September 29, 2020, Roman-Peter was charged by Complaint with the
following:
• Attempted Murder in the First Degree, in violation
of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 705-500, 707-

1/
The Honorable Rowena A. Somerville presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

701(1)(a), and 706-656 (Count 1, where the
complainants were Zaw and Joyner);
• two counts of Attempted Murder in the Second
Degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500, 707-701.5,
and 706-656 (Counts 2 and 3, where the
complainants were Zaw and Joyner, respectively);
• three counts of Carrying or Use of Firearm in the
Commission of a Separate Felony, in violation of
HRS § 134-21 (Counts 4, 5, and 6 relating to
Counts 1, 2, and 3, respectively);
• Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree, in
violation of HRS § 707-716(1)(e) (Count 7, where
the complainant was Joyner); and
• Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver, in violation of
HRS § 134-25 (Count 8).
On May 6, 2022, a jury acquitted Roman-Peter of Count 1
and the related Count 4. As to Counts 2 and 3, the jury found
Roman-Peter guilty of the included offenses of Attempted Assault
in the First Degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-710.2/

2/
HRS § 707-710(1) (2014) states: "A person commits the offense of
assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes
serious bodily injury to another person."

HRS § 705-500 (2014) states, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if the person:
. . . .
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under
the circumstances as the person believes them to
be, constitutes a substantial step in a course
of conduct intended to culminate in the person's
commission of the crime.

(2) When causing a particular result is an element of
the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the
crime if, acting with the state of mind required to
establish liability with respect to the attendant
circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the
person intentionally engages in conduct which is a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to
cause such a result.

(3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step
under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of
the defendant's criminal intent.

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The jury found Roman-Peter guilty as charged of Counts 5, 6, 7,
and 8.
On appeal, Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court
erred in denying his May 17, 2022 motion for judgment of
acquittal or, in the alternative, for new trial (Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal).3/ In support of this contention, Roman-
Peter argues that: (1) the jury's verdicts on Counts 2 and 3 are
inconsistent with its verdict on Count 1;4/ (2) the Circuit Court
erred in allowing Officer Franchot Termeteet (Officer Termeteet)
to testify "as to post-incident observations of the truck"
allegedly driven by Roman-Peter; (3) the Circuit Court erred in
instructing the jury on the included offenses of Attempted
Assault in the First Degree for Counts 2 and 3; (4) the Circuit
Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on merger as to the
firearms offenses in Counts 5, 6, and 8; and (5) the Circuit
Court erred in denying Roman-Peter's motion to strike allegedly
improper and misleading comments in the deputy prosecuting
attorney's (DPA) closing argument.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Roman-Peter's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, because the
jury's acquitting him of attempted murder in the first degree in
Count 1 was inconsistent with the jury's finding him guilty of
the included offenses of attempted assault in the first degree in
Counts 2 and 3.
We review a ruling on a motion for judgment of
acquittal by applying the same standard as the trial court,
namely, "whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most

3/
In addition, Roman-Peter summarily challenges COLs 5-6, 12-16, and
18-19, but presents no specific argument as to why any of them is clearly
erroneous. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(7).
4/
Relatedly, Roman-Peter argues that the Circuit Court erred in
denying his May 2, 2022 motion for judgment of acquittal brought after the
State rested, based on an alleged lack of substantial evidence to support
Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6.

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favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the
province of the trier of fact, the evidence is sufficient to
support a prima facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly
conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Angei, 152
Hawai#i 484, 492, 526 P.3d 461, 469 (2023) (quoting State v.
Jhun, 83 Hawai#i 472, 481, 927 P.2d 1355, 1364 (1996)). "The
granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a
clear abuse of discretion." State v. Williams, 149 Hawai#i 381,
391, 491 P.3d 592, 602 (2021).
Roman-Peter argues that because there was only one shot
fired at the complainants' vehicle, his conviction on two counts
(as to Zaw and Joyner separately) of attempted assault in the
first degree was inconsistent with his acquittal on one count (as
to Zaw and Joyner together) of attempted murder in the first
degree, and therefore violated HRS § 701-109(1)(c). Relatedly,
he argues that the convictions on Counts 2 and 3 were not
supported by substantial evidence, requiring acquittal on Counts
2, 3, 5, and 6.
HRS § 701-109(1)(c) prohibits convicting a defendant
"of more than one offense if . . . [i]nconsistent findings of
fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses[.]"
In order to convict Roman-Peter of attempted assault in the first
degree, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intentionally engaged in conduct that was a substantial
step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause serious
bodily injury to another person. See HRS §§ 705-500, 707-710.
To convict Roman-Peter of attempted murder in the first degree,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
intentionally engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a
course of conduct intended or known to cause the death of "[m]ore
than one person in the same or separate incident[.]" HRS
§§ 705-500, 707-701.
"The key factor supporting a charge of first degree
murder is the actor's state of mind." Briones v. State, 74 Haw.
442, 455, 848 P.2d 966, 973 (1993). Murder in the first degree
requires a single state of mind to cause the death of more than

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one person as part of the same plan. On the other hand, murder
in the second degree requires "separate, unrelated states of mind
to cause the death of each victim . . . ." Id. at 457, 848 P.2d
at 974. Similar to murder in the second degree, assault in the
first degree in this context requires "separate, unrelated states
of mind" to cause serious bodily injury.
Here, there is no dispute that both Zaw and Joyner were
riding in the same vehicle when Roman-Peter allegedly chased them
at high speeds with his headlights off and fired a single bullet,
which hit the trunk of their vehicle. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Roman-Peter did not attempt, with a single state of mind, to
cause the death of Zaw and Joyner together and, thus, was not
guilty of attempted murder in the first degree.
Once the jury determined that Roman-Peter was not
guilty of attempted murder in the first degree, the jury was
required to consider Counts 2 and 3, attempted murder in the
second degree (as to Zaw and Joyner separately). Based on the
same evidence, the jury could have reasonably determined that
Roman-Peter did not attempt to cause any death, but instead
attempted to cause serious bodily injury to Zaw and Joyner.
Acquitting Roman-Peter of attempted murder in the first degree
and convicting him of attempted assault in the first degree did
not require the application of inconsistent findings of fact.
Thus, the jury's verdicts did not violate HRS § 701-
109(1)(c), and substantial evidence supported the verdicts on
Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6. As to these counts, COLs 5 and 6 were not
wrong, and the Circuit Court did not err in denying the Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal.
(2) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in allowing Officer Termeteet to testify as to his observations
of the truck allegedly driven by Roman-Peter after the shooting.
He argues that the testimony was not relevant and, in any event,
was "more prejudicial than probative."
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less

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probable than it would be without the evidence." Hawai#i Rules
of Evidence (HRE) Rule 401. HRE Rule 404 prohibits evidence of a
person's character or a trait of a person's character "for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion," but permits the use of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts "where such evidence is probative of another fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or
accident." The list of permissible purposes in Rule 404(b) is
not intended to be exhaustive. See State v. Clark, 83 Hawai#i
289, 300, 926 P.2d 194, 205 (1996). In this regard, we note that
"[a] defendant's activity after committing a crime in an attempt
to evade detection is 'relevant circumstantial evidence of
guilt.'" State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai#i 390, 412, 56 P.3d 692,
714 (2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723 (Wyo.
1999)). HRE Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence where "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Here, Officer Termeteet allegedly spotted a black Dodge
Ram pickup truck, within an hour of the shooting incident and
related all-points bulletin, fitting the description (including
license plate number) of the truck involved in the incident,
driving erratically and at high speed on the H-1 freeway
eastbound. The Circuit Court allowed Officer Termeteet to
testify, stating:

I do think it's relevant with respect to it being
probative versus prejudicial. I do think it is probative to
the fact that [Roman-Peter] continued on the freeway, never
stopping. The whole defense here is identification, if I'm
not mistaken, so I think the continuation of the reckless
driving is relevant, so I -- and it's more probative than
prejudicial, so I will allow it.

Additionally, the Circuit Court concluded in COLs 13
and 14:

13. [Roman-Peter's] flight from police was closely linked

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with and stemmed from the incident itself. [Roman-
Peter's] flight from police occurred immediately after
the incident. The circumstances surrounding [Roman-
Peter's] flight from police support an inference of
[Roman-Peter's] consciousness of guilt.
14. Despite the fact that neither Officer Termeteet nor
Officer Saul could identify the driver of the vehicle
which fled, both were able to identify the vehicle by
description and license plate. The lack of
identification of the driver goes to weight not
admissibility.

On this record, we conclude that the Circuit Court did
not err in concluding that Officer Termeteet's testimony was
relevant, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed
by any danger of unfair prejudice. COLS 12, 13 and 14 were not
wrong, and the Circuit Court did not err in allowing the
challenged testimony by Officer Termeteet.
(3) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in instructing the jury on the included offenses of attempted
assault in the first degree for Counts 2 and 3. He argues that
"[t]here was no rational basis for Roman-Peter to be acquitted of
attempting to kill [Zaw] and [Joyner] with a single bullet, yet
to convict him of attempting to separately cause serious or
substantial bodily injury to [Zaw] and [Joyner] with one bullet."
"[J]ury instructions on lesser-included offenses must
be given when there is a rational basis in the evidence for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting the defendant of the included offense." State v.
Martin, 146 Hawai#i 365, 387, 463 P.3d 1022, 1044 (2020) (quoting
State v. Flores, 131 Hawai#i 43, 51, 314 P.3d 120, 128 (2013));
see HRS § 701-109(5) (2014).
Roman-Peter's argument is a repackaged variation of his
first contention, discussed above. We reject Roman-Peter's
argument regarding the challenged jury instructions for a similar
reason. Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was a
rational basis for a jury to find that Roman-Peter did not intend
to cause the deaths of Zaw and Joyner, but did engage in "a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to
cause serious bodily injury to" Zaw and Joyner. The Circuit

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Court did not err in instructing the jury on the included
offenses of attempted assault in the first degree for Counts 2
and 3. To the extent that Roman-Peter challenges COL 15 on this
basis, it is not wrong.
(4) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on merger as to: (a) Counts 5
and 6, by which he was charged with Carrying or Use of Firearm in
the Commission of a Separate Felony (use of a firearm), in
violation of HRS § 134-215/; and (b) these same counts and Count
8, by which he was charged with Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver
(place to keep), in violation of HRS § 134-25.6/ He argues that
these offenses "could have been charged as continuous offenses,
and the jury was required to determine whether there was 'one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan[,]'" under State v.

5/
HRS § 134-21 (2011) states, in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly
carry on the person or have within the person's immediate
control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm
while engaged in the commission of a separate felony,
whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable
or not . . . .
(b) A conviction and sentence under this section shall
be in addition to and not in lieu of any conviction and
sentence for the separate felony; provided that the sentence
imposed under this section may run concurrently or
consecutively with the sentence for the separate felony.
6/
HRS § 134-25 (2011) states, in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in sections 134-5 and 134-9,
all firearms shall be confined to the possessor's place of
business, residence, or sojourn; provided that it shall be
lawful to carry unloaded firearms in an enclosed container
from the place of purchase to the purchaser's place of
business, residence, or sojourn, or between these places
upon change of place of business, residence, or sojourn, or
between these places and the following:
(1) A place of repair;
(2) A target range;

(3) A licensed dealer's place of business;
(4) An organized, scheduled firearms show or
exhibit;
(5) A place of formal hunter or firearm use training
or instruction; or
(6) A police station.

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Lavoie, 145 Hawai#i 409, 432, 453 P.3d 229, 252 (2019).
HRS § 701–109(1)(e) (2014) provides:

(1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be
prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an
element. The defendant may not, however, be convicted of
more than one offense if:
. . . .

(e) The offense is defined as a continuing course of
conduct and the defendant's course of conduct
was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that
specific periods of conduct constitute separate
offenses.

In Lavoie, the supreme court explained that "only one
crime is committed when '(1) there is but one intention, one
general impulse, and one plan, (2) the two offenses are part and
parcel of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, and
(3) the law does not provide that specific periods of conduct
constitute separate offenses.'" 145 Hawai#i at 431, 453 P.3d at
251 (quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai#i 17, 38, 881 P.2d 504, 525
(1994)). Relatedly,

[t]he test for whether a crime can be charged as a
continuous offense is whether the statute precludes charging
an offense as a continuous offense, and whether the
element(s) of the offense may constitute a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts, however long a time the act
or acts may occur. . . .

If the statute provides that distinct acts constitute
separate offenses, then conduct may not be charged as a
continuous offense.

Id. (citations omitted).
As to Counts 5 and 6 for use of a firearm, HRS § 134-
21(b) expressly provides that "[a] conviction and sentence under
this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any
conviction and sentence for the separate felony[.]" Thus, Counts
5 and 6 cannot merge with Counts 2 and 3, the underlying counts
for attempted assault in the first degree as to Zaw and Joyner,
respectively. Roman-Peter makes no argument as to why Counts 5
and 6 can merge in these circumstances.
He does argue, however, that the offenses of use of a
firearm, on the one hand, and place to keep (Count 8), on the
other hand, could have been charged as continuous offenses and

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thus required a merger instruction. The supreme court has
recognized that the offenses of possession of a prohibited
firearm (felon in possession) and place to keep loaded firearms
required a merger instruction where "both offenses arose out of
the same elemental conduct, 'i.e., what the defendant did with
the object, namely, possessed it.'" Lavoie, 145 Hawai#i at 432,
453 P.3d at 252 (brackets and some internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawai#i 76, 83, 156 P.3d
1182, 1189 (2007)).
Here, the offenses at issue – use of a firearm and
place to keep – did not arise out of the same elemental conduct.
While the place to keep offense arose out of Roman-Peter's
possession of a firearm, the use of a firearm offenses arose out
of different, more serious conduct, namely his carrying or using
the firearm in committing the attempted assaults. Cf. Martin,
146 Hawai#i at 370, 388-91, 463 P.3d at 1027, 1045-48
(recognizing that the defendant was convicted of use of a firearm
in the commission of a separate felony, but noticing plain error
only as to the lack of a merger instruction on the defendant's
firearms convictions involving possession). Accordingly, the
Circuit Court did not err in not instructing the jury on merger
as to the use of a firearm and place to keep offenses. COL 16
was not wrong.
(5) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in denying his motion to strike part of the DPA's closing
argument regarding the attempt offenses. During closing
argument, the DPA stated:

[W]henever anything's charged as an attempt, there's
specific language in the jury instruction, where the Court
tells you that the State has to prove that the defendant
took a -- engaged in a -- let me get the wording
right. . . .

. . . So that the conduct that he engaged in was a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended to cause
death, either the death of [Zaw] and [Joyner] in Count 1, or
just [Zaw] and [Joyner] separately in Count[s] 2 and 3.
Substantial step in a course of conduct. So that's what's
kind of important.

It doesn't mean that he actually killed them, or this
would not be an attempt; right? He didn't succeed. It's a
substantial step in a course of conduct. So this is the

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pattern of conduct. And the substantial step is when he
fired the gun at them. It doesn't require that we make him
fire multiple shots or that we wait until he's fired ten
shots at them. Just this first shot alone is the
substantial step.
And [Zaw] told you how, after he heard that gunshot
and [Joyner's] like, he has a gun, he took off. He didn't
give the defendant a chance to shoot at them again, because
the defendant couldn't catch them again. He took off, and
he was going 120 miles per hour, at least. That is what
Officer Saul told you. He wasn't going to give him another
chance. The substantial step, though, in this course of
conduct, that was that gunshot.

Roman-Peter appears to contend that the final paragraph
quoted above "was improper as it asked the jury to base its
verdict on suspicion or mere speculation" as to what Roman-Peter
would have done if Zaw had not accelerated away from Roman-
Peter's vehicle.
We disagree. "[D]uring closing argument, a prosecutor
is 'permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and
wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence.'" State v.
McGhee, 140 Hawai#i 113, 119, 398 P.3d 702, 708 (2017) (quoting
State v. Nofoa, 135 Hawai#i 220, 228, 349 P.3d 327, 335 (2015));
see State v. Willis, 156 Hawai#i 195, 204, 572 P.3d 668, 677
(2025) ("[I]t is well-established that prosecutors are afforded
wide latitude in closing to discuss the evidence, and may 'state,
discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as to draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence.'" (quoting State v. Udo,
145 Hawai#i 519, 536, 454 P.3d 460, 477 (2019))). "An inference
is reasonable when 'the evidence bears a logical and proximate
connection to the point the prosecutor wishes to prove.'"
Willis, 156 Hawai#i at 204, 572 P.3d at 677 (quoting State v.
Basham, 132 Hawai#i 97, 112, 319 P.3d 1105, 1120 (2014)).
Here, the challenged statements by the DPA were based
on reasonable inferences from, and were consistent with, the
evidence presented at trial. Indeed, the DPA referenced the
supporting testimony of Zaw, Joyner, and Officer Saul. The DPA
reasonably connected this testimony to the "substantial step"
element of the attempt offenses. The challenged statements did
not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and the Circuit Court did
not err in denying the motion to strike.

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For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence entered on December 15, 2023, in the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, September 29, 2025.

On the briefs:

Randall K. Hironaka /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
(Miyoshi & Hironaka, LLLC) Presiding Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian R. Vincent, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
29-SEP-2025
08:36 AM
Dkt. 102 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RYAN ROMAN-PETER, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, and McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Ryan Roman-Peter (Roman-Peter)
appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment)
entered on December 15, 2023, in the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit.1/ Roman-Peter also challenges the Circuit Court's
December 27, 2023 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Denying [Roman-Peter's] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,
or in the Alternative, New Trial" (FOFs/COLs).
On August 20, 2020, Roman-Peter allegedly brandished a
gun and fired a shot at complainants Maung Zaw (Zaw) and Brianna
Joyner (Joyner), while Roman-Peter was driving a black Dodge Ram
pickup truck at high speed on the H-2 freeway, chasing a gray
Ford Mustang driven by Zaw and occupied by Joyner. On
September 29, 2020, Roman-Peter was charged by Complaint with the
following:
• Attempted Murder in the First Degree, in violation
of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 705-500, 707-

1/
The Honorable Rowena A. Somerville presided.
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701(1)(a), and 706-656 (Count 1, where the
complainants were Zaw and Joyner);
• two counts of Attempted Murder in the Second
Degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500, 707-701.5,
and 706-656 (Counts 2 and 3, where the
complainants were Zaw and Joyner, respectively);
• three counts of Carrying or Use of Firearm in the
Commission of a Separate Felony, in violation of
HRS § 134-21 (Counts 4, 5, and 6 relating to
Counts 1, 2, and 3, respectively);
• Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree, in
violation of HRS § 707-716(1)(e) (Count 7, where
the complainant was Joyner); and
• Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver, in violation of
HRS § 134-25 (Count 8).
On May 6, 2022, a jury acquitted Roman-Peter of Count 1
and the related Count 4. As to Counts 2 and 3, the jury found
Roman-Peter guilty of the included offenses of Attempted Assault
in the First Degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-710.2/

2/
HRS § 707-710(1) (2014) states: "A person commits the offense of
assault in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes
serious bodily injury to another person."

HRS § 705-500 (2014) states, in relevant part:

(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if the person:
. . . .
(b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under
the circumstances as the person believes them to
be, constitutes a substantial step in a course
of conduct intended to culminate in the person's
commission of the crime.
(2) When causing a particular result is an element of
the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the
crime if, acting with the state of mind required to
establish liability with respect to the attendant
circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the
person intentionally engages in conduct which is a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to
cause such a result.

(3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step
under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of
the defendant's criminal intent.

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The jury found Roman-Peter guilty as charged of Counts 5, 6, 7,
and 8.
On appeal, Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court
erred in denying his May 17, 2022 motion for judgment of
acquittal or, in the alternative, for new trial (Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal).3/ In support of this contention, Roman-
Peter argues that: (1) the jury's verdicts on Counts 2 and 3 are
inconsistent with its verdict on Count 1;4/ (2) the Circuit Court
erred in allowing Officer Franchot Termeteet (Officer Termeteet)
to testify "as to post-incident observations of the truck"
allegedly driven by Roman-Peter; (3) the Circuit Court erred in
instructing the jury on the included offenses of Attempted
Assault in the First Degree for Counts 2 and 3; (4) the Circuit
Court erred in failing to instruct the jury on merger as to the
firearms offenses in Counts 5, 6, and 8; and (5) the Circuit
Court erred in denying Roman-Peter's motion to strike allegedly
improper and misleading comments in the deputy prosecuting
attorney's (DPA) closing argument.
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Roman-Peter's contentions as follows, and affirm.
(1) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in denying his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, because the
jury's acquitting him of attempted murder in the first degree in
Count 1 was inconsistent with the jury's finding him guilty of
the included offenses of attempted assault in the first degree in
Counts 2 and 3.
We review a ruling on a motion for judgment of
acquittal by applying the same standard as the trial court,
namely, "whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most

3/
In addition, Roman-Peter summarily challenges COLs 5-6, 12-16, and
18-19, but presents no specific argument as to why any of them is clearly
erroneous. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(7).
4/
Relatedly, Roman-Peter argues that the Circuit Court erred in
denying his May 2, 2022 motion for judgment of acquittal brought after the
State rested, based on an alleged lack of substantial evidence to support
Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6.

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favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the
province of the trier of fact, the evidence is sufficient to
support a prima facie case so that a reasonable mind might fairly
conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Angei, 152
Hawai#i 484, 492, 526 P.3d 461, 469 (2023) (quoting State v.
Jhun, 83 Hawai#i 472, 481, 927 P.2d 1355, 1364 (1996)). "The
granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a
clear abuse of discretion." State v. Williams, 149 Hawai#i 381,
391, 491 P.3d 592, 602 (2021).
Roman-Peter argues that because there was only one shot
fired at the complainants' vehicle, his conviction on two counts
(as to Zaw and Joyner separately) of attempted assault in the
first degree was inconsistent with his acquittal on one count (as
to Zaw and Joyner together) of attempted murder in the first
degree, and therefore violated HRS § 701-109(1)(c). Relatedly,
he argues that the convictions on Counts 2 and 3 were not
supported by substantial evidence, requiring acquittal on Counts
2, 3, 5, and 6.
HRS § 701-109(1)(c) prohibits convicting a defendant
"of more than one offense if . . . [i]nconsistent findings of
fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses[.]"
In order to convict Roman-Peter of attempted assault in the first
degree, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intentionally engaged in conduct that was a substantial
step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause serious
bodily injury to another person. See HRS §§ 705-500, 707-710.
To convict Roman-Peter of attempted murder in the first degree,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
intentionally engaged in conduct that was a substantial step in a
course of conduct intended or known to cause the death of "[m]ore
than one person in the same or separate incident[.]" HRS
§§ 705-500, 707-701.
"The key factor supporting a charge of first degree
murder is the actor's state of mind." Briones v. State, 74 Haw.
442, 455, 848 P.2d 966, 973 (1993). Murder in the first degree
requires a single state of mind to cause the death of more than

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one person as part of the same plan. On the other hand, murder
in the second degree requires "separate, unrelated states of mind
to cause the death of each victim . . . ." Id. at 457, 848 P.2d
at 974. Similar to murder in the second degree, assault in the
first degree in this context requires "separate, unrelated states
of mind" to cause serious bodily injury.
Here, there is no dispute that both Zaw and Joyner were
riding in the same vehicle when Roman-Peter allegedly chased them
at high speeds with his headlights off and fired a single bullet,
which hit the trunk of their vehicle. Based on the evidence
presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Roman-Peter did not attempt, with a single state of mind, to
cause the death of Zaw and Joyner together and, thus, was not
guilty of attempted murder in the first degree.
Once the jury determined that Roman-Peter was not
guilty of attempted murder in the first degree, the jury was
required to consider Counts 2 and 3, attempted murder in the
second degree (as to Zaw and Joyner separately). Based on the
same evidence, the jury could have reasonably determined that
Roman-Peter did not attempt to cause any death, but instead
attempted to cause serious bodily injury to Zaw and Joyner.
Acquitting Roman-Peter of attempted murder in the first degree
and convicting him of attempted assault in the first degree did
not require the application of inconsistent findings of fact.
Thus, the jury's verdicts did not violate HRS § 701-
109(1)(c), and substantial evidence supported the verdicts on
Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6. As to these counts, COLs 5 and 6 were not
wrong, and the Circuit Court did not err in denying the Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal.
(2) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in allowing Officer Termeteet to testify as to his observations
of the truck allegedly driven by Roman-Peter after the shooting.
He argues that the testimony was not relevant and, in any event,
was "more prejudicial than probative."
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less

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probable than it would be without the evidence." Hawai#i Rules
of Evidence (HRE) Rule 401. HRE Rule 404 prohibits evidence of a
person's character or a trait of a person's character "for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion," but permits the use of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts "where such evidence is probative of another fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or
accident." The list of permissible purposes in Rule 404(b) is
not intended to be exhaustive. See State v. Clark, 83 Hawai#i
289, 300, 926 P.2d 194, 205 (1996). In this regard, we note that
"[a] defendant's activity after committing a crime in an attempt
to evade detection is 'relevant circumstantial evidence of
guilt.'" State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai#i 390, 412, 56 P.3d 692,
714 (2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723 (Wyo.
1999)). HRE Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant
evidence where "its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Here, Officer Termeteet allegedly spotted a black Dodge
Ram pickup truck, within an hour of the shooting incident and
related all-points bulletin, fitting the description (including
license plate number) of the truck involved in the incident,
driving erratically and at high speed on the H-1 freeway
eastbound. The Circuit Court allowed Officer Termeteet to
testify, stating:

I do think it's relevant with respect to it being
probative versus prejudicial. I do think it is probative to
the fact that [Roman-Peter] continued on the freeway, never
stopping. The whole defense here is identification, if I'm
not mistaken, so I think the continuation of the reckless
driving is relevant, so I -- and it's more probative than
prejudicial, so I will allow it.

Additionally, the Circuit Court concluded in COLs 13
and 14:

13. [Roman-Peter's] flight from police was closely linked

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with and stemmed from the incident itself. [Roman-
Peter's] flight from police occurred immediately after
the incident. The circumstances surrounding [Roman-
Peter's] flight from police support an inference of
[Roman-Peter's] consciousness of guilt.

14. Despite the fact that neither Officer Termeteet nor
Officer Saul could identify the driver of the vehicle
which fled, both were able to identify the vehicle by
description and license plate. The lack of
identification of the driver goes to weight not
admissibility.

On this record, we conclude that the Circuit Court did
not err in concluding that Officer Termeteet's testimony was
relevant, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
probative value of the testimony was not substantially outweighed
by any danger of unfair prejudice. COLS 12, 13 and 14 were not
wrong, and the Circuit Court did not err in allowing the
challenged testimony by Officer Termeteet.
(3) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in instructing the jury on the included offenses of attempted
assault in the first degree for Counts 2 and 3. He argues that
"[t]here was no rational basis for Roman-Peter to be acquitted of
attempting to kill [Zaw] and [Joyner] with a single bullet, yet
to convict him of attempting to separately cause serious or
substantial bodily injury to [Zaw] and [Joyner] with one bullet."
"[J]ury instructions on lesser-included offenses must
be given when there is a rational basis in the evidence for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting the defendant of the included offense." State v.
Martin, 146 Hawai#i 365, 387, 463 P.3d 1022, 1044 (2020) (quoting
State v. Flores, 131 Hawai#i 43, 51, 314 P.3d 120, 128 (2013));
see HRS § 701-109(5) (2014).
Roman-Peter's argument is a repackaged variation of his
first contention, discussed above. We reject Roman-Peter's
argument regarding the challenged jury instructions for a similar
reason. Based on the evidence presented at trial, there was a
rational basis for a jury to find that Roman-Peter did not intend
to cause the deaths of Zaw and Joyner, but did engage in "a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to
cause serious bodily injury to" Zaw and Joyner. The Circuit

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Court did not err in instructing the jury on the included
offenses of attempted assault in the first degree for Counts 2
and 3. To the extent that Roman-Peter challenges COL 15 on this
basis, it is not wrong.
(4) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in failing to instruct the jury on merger as to: (a) Counts 5
and 6, by which he was charged with Carrying or Use of Firearm in
the Commission of a Separate Felony (use of a firearm), in
violation of HRS § 134-215/; and (b) these same counts and Count
8, by which he was charged with Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver
(place to keep), in violation of HRS § 134-25.6/ He argues that
these offenses "could have been charged as continuous offenses,
and the jury was required to determine whether there was 'one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan[,]'" under State v.

5/
HRS § 134-21 (2011) states, in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly
carry on the person or have within the person's immediate
control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm
while engaged in the commission of a separate felony,
whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable
or not . . . .

(b) A conviction and sentence under this section shall
be in addition to and not in lieu of any conviction and
sentence for the separate felony; provided that the sentence
imposed under this section may run concurrently or
consecutively with the sentence for the separate felony.
6/
HRS § 134-25 (2011) states, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in sections 134-5 and 134-9,
all firearms shall be confined to the possessor's place of
business, residence, or sojourn; provided that it shall be
lawful to carry unloaded firearms in an enclosed container
from the place of purchase to the purchaser's place of
business, residence, or sojourn, or between these places
upon change of place of business, residence, or sojourn, or
between these places and the following:
(1) A place of repair;
(2) A target range;

(3) A licensed dealer's place of business;
(4) An organized, scheduled firearms show or
exhibit;
(5) A place of formal hunter or firearm use training
or instruction; or
(6) A police station.

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Lavoie, 145 Hawai#i 409, 432, 453 P.3d 229, 252 (2019).
HRS § 701–109(1)(e) (2014) provides:

(1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be
prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an
element. The defendant may not, however, be convicted of
more than one offense if:

. . . .
(e) The offense is defined as a continuing course of
conduct and the defendant's course of conduct
was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that
specific periods of conduct constitute separate
offenses.

In Lavoie, the supreme court explained that "only one
crime is committed when '(1) there is but one intention, one
general impulse, and one plan, (2) the two offenses are part and
parcel of a continuing and uninterrupted course of conduct, and
(3) the law does not provide that specific periods of conduct
constitute separate offenses.'" 145 Hawai#i at 431, 453 P.3d at
251 (quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai#i 17, 38, 881 P.2d 504, 525
(1994)). Relatedly,

[t]he test for whether a crime can be charged as a
continuous offense is whether the statute precludes charging
an offense as a continuous offense, and whether the
element(s) of the offense may constitute a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts, however long a time the act
or acts may occur. . . .

If the statute provides that distinct acts constitute
separate offenses, then conduct may not be charged as a
continuous offense.

Id. (citations omitted).
As to Counts 5 and 6 for use of a firearm, HRS § 134-
21(b) expressly provides that "[a] conviction and sentence under
this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any
conviction and sentence for the separate felony[.]" Thus, Counts
5 and 6 cannot merge with Counts 2 and 3, the underlying counts
for attempted assault in the first degree as to Zaw and Joyner,
respectively. Roman-Peter makes no argument as to why Counts 5
and 6 can merge in these circumstances.
He does argue, however, that the offenses of use of a
firearm, on the one hand, and place to keep (Count 8), on the
other hand, could have been charged as continuous offenses and

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thus required a merger instruction. The supreme court has
recognized that the offenses of possession of a prohibited
firearm (felon in possession) and place to keep loaded firearms
required a merger instruction where "both offenses arose out of
the same elemental conduct, 'i.e., what the defendant did with
the object, namely, possessed it.'" Lavoie, 145 Hawai#i at 432,
453 P.3d at 252 (brackets and some internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting State v. Frisbee, 114 Hawai#i 76, 83, 156 P.3d
1182, 1189 (2007)).
Here, the offenses at issue – use of a firearm and
place to keep – did not arise out of the same elemental conduct.
While the place to keep offense arose out of Roman-Peter's
possession of a firearm, the use of a firearm offenses arose out
of different, more serious conduct, namely his carrying or using
the firearm in committing the attempted assaults. Cf. Martin,
146 Hawai#i at 370, 388-91, 463 P.3d at 1027, 1045-48
(recognizing that the defendant was convicted of use of a firearm
in the commission of a separate felony, but noticing plain error
only as to the lack of a merger instruction on the defendant's
firearms convictions involving possession). Accordingly, the
Circuit Court did not err in not instructing the jury on merger
as to the use of a firearm and place to keep offenses. COL 16
was not wrong.
(5) Roman-Peter contends that the Circuit Court erred
in denying his motion to strike part of the DPA's closing
argument regarding the attempt offenses. During closing
argument, the DPA stated:

[W]henever anything's charged as an attempt, there's
specific language in the jury instruction, where the Court
tells you that the State has to prove that the defendant
took a -- engaged in a -- let me get the wording
right. . . .

. . . So that the conduct that he engaged in was a
substantial step in a course of conduct intended to cause
death, either the death of [Zaw] and [Joyner] in Count 1, or
just [Zaw] and [Joyner] separately in Count[s] 2 and 3.
Substantial step in a course of conduct. So that's what's
kind of important.
It doesn't mean that he actually killed them, or this
would not be an attempt; right? He didn't succeed. It's a
substantial step in a course of conduct. So this is the

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pattern of conduct. And the substantial step is when he
fired the gun at them. It doesn't require that we make him
fire multiple shots or that we wait until he's fired ten
shots at them. Just this first shot alone is the
substantial step.

And [Zaw] told you how, after he heard that gunshot
and [Joyner's] like, he has a gun, he took off. He didn't
give the defendant a chance to shoot at them again, because
the defendant couldn't catch them again. He took off, and
he was going 120 miles per hour, at least. That is what
Officer Saul told you. He wasn't going to give him another
chance. The substantial step, though, in this course of
conduct, that was that gunshot.

Roman-Peter appears to contend that the final paragraph
quoted above "was improper as it asked the jury to base its
verdict on suspicion or mere speculation" as to what Roman-Peter
would have done if Zaw had not accelerated away from Roman-
Peter's vehicle.
We disagree. "[D]uring closing argument, a prosecutor
is 'permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and
wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence.'" State v.
McGhee, 140 Hawai#i 113, 119, 398 P.3d 702, 708 (2017) (quoting
State v. Nofoa, 135 Hawai#i 220, 228, 349 P.3d 327, 335 (2015));
see State v. Willis, 156 Hawai#i 195, 204, 572 P.3d 668, 677
(2025) ("[I]t is well-established that prosecutors are afforded
wide latitude in closing to discuss the evidence, and may 'state,
discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as to draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence.'" (quoting State v. Udo,
145 Hawai#i 519, 536, 454 P.3d 460, 477 (2019))). "An inference
is reasonable when 'the evidence bears a logical and proximate
connection to the point the prosecutor wishes to prove.'"
Willis, 156 Hawai#i at 204, 572 P.3d at 677 (quoting State v.
Basham, 132 Hawai#i 97, 112, 319 P.3d 1105, 1120 (2014)).
Here, the challenged statements by the DPA were based
on reasonable inferences from, and were consistent with, the
evidence presented at trial. Indeed, the DPA referenced the
supporting testimony of Zaw, Joyner, and Officer Saul. The DPA
reasonably connected this testimony to the "substantial step"
element of the attempt offenses. The challenged statements did
not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and the Circuit Court did
not err in denying the motion to strike.

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For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence entered on December 15, 2023, in the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit, is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, September 29, 2025.

On the briefs:

Randall K. Hironaka /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
(Miyoshi & Hironaka, LLLC) Presiding Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.

Brian R. Vincent, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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