State v. Woods

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
27-AUG-2025
07:50 AM
Dkt. 93 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM DEL MICHAEL WOODS, also known as Smokey,
Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Leonard and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant William Del Michael Woods (Woods)
challenges his attempted murder conviction, on grounds of trial
evidentiary errors and insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. We affirm.
Woods appeals from the January 12, 2024 "Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence" (Judgment), entered by the Circuit
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Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court). 1 Woods was charged
via Indictment with second degree attempted murder against
Complainant Jimmy Vaiagae (Complainant), for a May 12, 2021,
5:46 a.m. incident, in which Complainant was doused with an
accelerant and set on fire while he was sleeping (charged
incident), allegedly by Woods, near the Longs Drugs store off of
the Pali Highway in Honolulu. Following a 2023 jury trial,
Woods was convicted as charged, and sentenced to a life term of
imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Woods raises four points of error,
contending that the Circuit Court erred by: (1) ruling that a
similar incident that occurred 2.5 hours before the 5:46 a.m.
charged incident (3:13 a.m. incident), 2 was "probative of any
other fact that was of consequence" and that "its probative
value outweighed its prejudicial effect"; (2) denying Woods's
"motion for mistrial" for the admission of Honolulu Police
Department (HPD) Officer Brandon Goda's (Officer Goda) lay
opinion testimony identifying Woods in the surveillance video of
the 3:13 a.m. incident; (3) "allowing the purported expert
opinion testimony" of a fingerprint examiner; and (4) convicting
Woods despite the "lack of substantial evidence to support [the]
conviction." 3

1 The Honorable Kevin A. Souza presided.

2 The 3:13 a.m. incident involved a male, identified as Woods by a
civilian eyewitness, wearing a black tank top and black shorts, allegedly
throwing a Molotov cocktail and a burning rag toward Complainant while
Complainant was sleeping; the surrounding area around Complainant igniting,
but not Complainant; Woods leaving the scene; and Complainant going back to
sleep.

3 We have numbered Woods's points of error "A" through "D." See
Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4) (requiring
"numbered" points of error).
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Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve Woods's
contentions as follows.
(1) The evidence of the 3:13 a.m. incident
Woods argues that the evidence of the 3:13 a.m.
incident was inadmissible "bad character" evidence and not
relevant under Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (HRE) 404(b) 4 because it
"was not probative of any other fact that was of consequence."
Even if relevant, Woods argues that the evidence should have
been excluded as prejudicial, "unnecessary and cumulative" under
HRE Rule 403. The State points to State's Exhibits 23 and 24, 5
the surveillance videos of the 3:13 a.m. incident and the
charged incident, and responds that the 3:13 a.m. incident aided
in identifying Woods as the perpetrator of the charged incident
and in proving Woods's intent to kill Complainant.
"'Prior bad act' evidence under HRE Rule 404(b) is
admissible when it is 1) relevant and 2) more probative than
prejudicial." State v. Behrendt, 124 Hawai‘i 90, 102, 237 P.3d
1156, 1168 (2010) (cleaned up). We review the trial court's
determination of relevance under HRE Rule 401 "under the
right/wrong standard of review." Id. (citation omitted).
"However, a trial court's balancing of the probative value of

4 HRE Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of "[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts" (prior bad acts) to prove character, but such
evidence may be admissible if other probative value is shown, "such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus
operandi, or absence of mistake or accident."

5 Exhibit 23 was a surveillance video of the 3:13 a.m. incident.
Exhibit 24, the surveillance video of the charged incident at 5:46 a.m.,
showed an individual wearing a hoodie and a mask, carrying a torch and a cup.
The individual poured the liquid from the cup onto Complainant, who was
sleeping, and then used the torch to light Complainant on fire.
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prior bad act evidence against the prejudicial effect of such
evidence under HRE Rule 403 is reviewed for abuse of
discretion." Id. (ellipses and citation omitted).
Under HRE Rule 403, relevant evidence "may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice[.]" The Behrendt court explained that when
weighing the probative value versus the prejudicial effect of
prior bad act evidence under HRE Rule 404(b), the court must
consider various factors, 6 which include the ones the Circuit
Court referenced here: "the similarities between the crimes"
and "the interval of time that ha[d] elapsed between the
crimes[.]" Id. at 106, 237 P.3d at 1172 (citation omitted).
The record reflects that in conducting its balancing
under HRE Rule 403, the Circuit Court considered the
similarities between the prior bad act and the current offense,
and the time interval between the two; and it concluded that the
3:13 a.m. evidence was "highly relevant" for permissible
purposes under HRE Rule 404(b), as follows:
THE COURT: . . . As such, I think, under 404(b), the
video evidence of the 3:13 a.m. incident does become --
because of the similarities of the acts . . . both the
vehicle, the height, the size, the stature of the -- of the
individual depicted in both videos, the similar shorts and
shoes, the tattoos . . . and other body markings that were
recovered, as well as the other items that were recovered
from [Woods]'s vehicle, the 3:13 a.m. [incident] video does

6 The Behrendt court indicated that a trial court "must consider a
variety of factors" when weighing probative value versus prejudicial effect
in the context of prior bad act evidence; and these factors include:

the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse
the jury to overmastering hostility.

Id. at 106, 237 P.3d at 1172 (quoting State v. Renon, 73 Haw. 23, 38, 828
P.2d 1266, 1273 (1992)).
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become highly relevant, in this Court's opinion, as to
perhaps motive, intent, preparation, plan, certainly
identity, modus operandi, and absence of mistake or fact.

. . . .

Essentially it's -- the State's videos that they have
presented show [sic] an individual twice attempting to
douse the [C]omplainant with accelerant and -- and light
the [C]omplainant on fire. So [sic] the similarities
between the incidents are -- they're almost exactly the
same.

And finally, the interval of time that elapsed
between the incidents is very short. We're talking about a
little over two hour -- two and a half -- about two and a
half hours apart on the same exact day by an individual
that appears to be the same person.

And so [sic] when I do consider the 403 balancing
factors that the Hawaii Supreme Court has indicated that I
must consider, the Court does find that the State has
demonstrated strong and cogent reasons why the 3:13 a.m.
[incident] video should be presented to the -- to the jury.

(Emphases added.)
Here, the Circuit Court did not err in its
determination that the 3:13 a.m. incident was "highly relevant"
for other permissible purposes under HRE Rule 404(b) such as
motive, intent, preparation, plan, identity, modus operandi, and
absence of mistake. See id. at 102, 237 P.3d at 1168. Nor did
the Circuit Court abuse its discretion in concluding that the
probative value of the 3:13 a.m. incident outweighed its
prejudicial effect, based on the similarities between the two
incidents and the short interval of time between them. See id.
at 107, 237 P.3d at 1173 (upholding admission of prior bad act
evidence that is of the "same general type" as the charged
conduct and "involv[ing] the same complaining witness").

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(2) Motion for mistrial
At trial, Officer Goda identified the male in the 3:13
a.m. incident video as the same person he had an interaction
with approximately 3.5 hours earlier, at 11:30 p.m.
On appeal, Woods contends that he moved for a mistrial
because "the State violated the principles underlying the trial
court's ruling on Woods'[s] motion in limine that lay witness
testimony be based on their own perception of the incident."
Because Officer Goda lacked personal knowledge of the 3:13 a.m.
incident, Woods argues that "HRE Rule 602 was ignored, and
Officer Goda presented an improper lay witness opinion under HRE
Rule 701[,]" because "[l]ay witness testimony must be based on
personal knowledge." Woods argues that "Officer Goda testified
that [(the prior 11:30 p.m.)] interaction was in response to a
call, where the caller identified himself as Woods[,]" the "same
individual that was sitting in the courtroom as the defendant";
and the State's attempt "to get Officer Goda to render an
opinion that the person depicted in the [3:13 a.m.] surveillance
video . . . was Woods," "grazed the surface of prosecutorial
misconduct."
The Circuit Court denied the motion for mistrial
because Officer Goda did not identify the individual in the 3:13
a.m. surveillance video as Woods, and thus, his answer did not
violate the motion in limine, explaining as follows:
THE COURT: . . . Here it appears as though what
Officer Goda testified to was his belief that the person
depicted in the 3 -- is it 13 a.m. [sic] video was the same
person he interacted with the night before. He did not
identify that person as William Woods. The body camera
video was in play in which Mr. Woods identified himself as
well as the 911 call.

And so [sic] I don't believe at this point based on
the questioning that transpired that [Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney (DPA)]'s question or Officer Goda's answer is
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violative of the motion in limine. And so [sic] I'm going
to respectfully deny your motion for mistrial . . . .

(Emphases added.)
"The denial of a motion for mistrial is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be upset absent
a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Mark, 120 Hawai‘i 499,
515, 210 P.3d 22, 38 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).
The sole legal authority upon which Woods relies is
HRE Rules 602 and 701. Woods's argument does not explain how
Officer Goda's testimony violated a motion in limine ruling, but
asserts only that the testimony violated "underlying"
"principles" of such ruling. It is not clear what "principles"
to which Woods refers. Woods's claim that Officer Goda's
testimony "grazed the surface of prosecutorial misconduct[,]"
without further explanation, is also vague. We do not address
these arguments. See In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 113
Hawai‘i 236, 246, 151 P.3d 717, 727 (2007) ("An appellate court
may disregard a particular contention if the appellant makes no
discernable argument in support of that position." (cleaned
up)); HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) ("Points not argued may be deemed
waived.").
We address Woods's discernable challenge based on HRE
Rules 602 and 701, that Officer Goda lacked personal knowledge
of the 3:13 a.m. incident and his lay identification was
improper. HRE Rule 602 prohibits a witness's testimony
regarding "a matter" unless there is evidence "sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter." Here, Officer Goda testified to the "matter" of his
11:30 p.m. encounter, for which he had personal knowledge under
HRE Rule 602. Officer Goda did not testify to any "matter" as

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to the events depicted in the 3:13 a.m. incident video, and
there was no HRE 602 violation. Officer Goda gave a lay opinion
identifying the person depicted in the 3:13 a.m. incident video,
as the same male he encountered a few hours prior, at 11:30 p.m.
Under HRE Rule 701, lay opinion testimony, including
identification, is admissible if it is "(1) rationally based on
the perception of the witness, and (2) helpful to . . . the
determination of a fact in issue." Identification was a "fact
in issue" in this case, and this court has previously allowed a
lay witness's opinion identifying a defendant through a
surveillance video as "helpful" to a jury where "there is some
basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to
correctly identify the defendant . . . than is the jury." State
v. Gabriel, NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2022 WL 1284613, at *5 (Haw.
App. Apr. 29, 2022) (mem. op.) (quoting People v. Thompson,
49 N.E.3d 393, 405 (Ill. 2016)). 7 We conclude that the Circuit
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Woods's motion for
a mistrial based on the claimed violation of HRE Rules 602 and
701. See Mark, 120 Hawai‘i at 515, 210 P.3d at 38.
(3) Fingerprint expert testimony
Woods argues the Circuit Court abused its discretion
in "qualifying [Lori Kaneshiro (Kaneshiro)] as an expert in
fingerprint comparison and identification" in violation of HRE
Rules 702 and 703 because Kaneshiro "did not have sufficient
knowledge, skill, experience, training[,] or education." Woods

7 In Gabriel, this court relied on a federal case interpreting the
identical federal rule counterpart to HRE Rule 701, to uphold the trial
court's admission of two police officers' lay opinions identifying the
defendant through a surveillance video and photograph "as helpful to the jury
under HRE Rule 701" in light of the police officers' sufficient prior contact
with Gabriel. 2022 WL 1284613, at *7.

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also contends that because Kaneshiro based her opinion on a
latent fingerprint that was covered "more than 50 percent" by a
smudge, "the underlying facts or data from which Kaneshiro
rendered her opinion that there was a match" was "unreliable."
" Whether expert testimony should be admitted at trial
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai‘i 172, 180, 907 P.2d 758, 766 (1995)
(citation omitted).
The Circuit Court held that Kaneshiro was a qualified
expert in latent fingerprint identification, as follows:
THE COURT: . . . While [Kaneshiro] does not have a
bachelor's degree and is not certified by the
[International Association of Identification], she is
properly certified and qualified to do her job at the
Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center. And her background and
qualifications lend this Court to making a finding that
this . . . proffered expert is qualified to testify as an
expert in this particular field and perform fingerprint
identification and analysis as necessary in this particular
case.

(Emphasis added.) The Circuit Court addressed the "smudge"
argument and concluded Kaneshiro's testimony met "the threshold
level of reliability," as follows:
As to the proffered evidence in this particular case,
[Defense Counsel] is correct that we do have a latent
fingerprint that does have a large area of it that does
contain a smudge or, as the witness put it, a distortion.
However, there are ten points of commonality or
identification that this particular expert found as between
the latent print and the exemplar print.

. . . .

. . . the Court does find the proposed latent
fingerprint analysis and expert testimony is not only
relevant but does past [sic] muster with respect to the
threshold level of reliability . . . .

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Here, at the pretrial hearing on Woods's motion in
limine to determine the admissibility of the video pursuant to
HRE Rule 104, Kaneshiro testified that: she was a criminal
identification supervisor for the Hawai‘i Criminal Justice Data
Center; she had 29 years of experience in fingerprint, tenprint,
and latent comparisons; she previously worked for HPD as a
latent fingerprint examiner; she was trained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in latent fingerprint examinations; she
took courses in complex fingerprint examination; she testified
four times in court as a qualified expert in latent fingerprint
comparison and identification; and she handled over 10,000 cases
involving latent fingerprint comparisons with ink fingerprints.
Despite Kaneshiro's lack of a bachelor's degree and other
certifications, the record reflects Kaneshiro's skill,
knowledge, experience, and training in the field of latent
fingerprint examination to qualify as an expert in this case.
See State v. Cababag, 9 Haw. App. 496, 504, 850 P.2d 716, 720
(App. 1993) ("It is not necessary that an expert witness have
the highest possible qualifications to testify about a
particular matter . . . but the expert witness must have such
skill, knowledge, or experience in the field in question" to aid
in arriving at the truth. (citation omitted)).
Woods's argument that Kaneshiro's opinion of the
latent fingerprint was "unreliable" because of the smudge, goes
to the weight, rather than the admissibility of this evidence.
Woods cites no authority for his "reliability" challenge, and we
note such evidence has been recognized as reliable. See State
v. Escobido-Ortiz, 109 Hawai‘i 359, 370, 126 P.3d 402, 413 (App.
2005) (noting that the validity of the theory underlying latent
fingerprint identification, where proper procedures were

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followed for such identification, has been "widely accepted as
reliable" (citation omitted)). The Circuit Court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing Kaneshiro's expert opinion testimony
regarding the latent fingerprint. See Maelega, 80 Hawai‘i at
180, 907 P.2d at 766.
(4) Sufficiency of evidence
Woods argues that his conviction should be
reversed because "there was a lack of credible evidence of
sufficient quality" to support Woods's conviction.
"Evidence adduced in the trial court must be
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the
appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence
to support a conviction[.]" State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai‘i 43,
49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010) (brackets and citation omitted).
"The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the trier of fact." Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the record reflects, among other things, that
"18 percent" of Complainant's body was burned, resulting in
"life-threatening injuries"; the surveillance videos from the
3:13 a.m. incident and the charged incident each depicted a
person of similar height and stature, attempt to light
Complainant on fire twice, succeeding on the second attempt; an
eyewitness saw the male in the charged incident, who was wearing
a maroon hoodie, enter a vehicle belonging to Woods; Officer
Goda identified the male in the 3:13 a.m. incident video as the
same male from the 11:30 p.m. encounter who had called 911, and
the caller had identified himself as Woods; the male whom
Officer Goda encountered at 11:30 p.m. and the male whom Officer

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Goda later identified in the 3:13 a.m. incident video were both
wearing a black tank top per Officer Goda's testimony and as
shown in the footage from Officer Goda's body-worn camera
(Exhibit 84); and articles of clothing similar to what the
suspect wore in both incidents –- the black tank top in the
3:13 a.m. incident and the maroon hoodie in the charged incident
-– were both recovered from Woods's vehicle. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, there was substantial
evidence to convict Woods of attempted murder in the second
degree. See id.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the January 12,
2024 Judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, August 27, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Harrison L. Kiehm,
Chief Judge
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Stephen K. Tsushima,
Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City and County of Honolulu,
/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Associate Judge

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