In re: J.B.

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
06-JUN-2025
08:05 AM
Dkt. 56 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

–––O0O–––

IN THE INTEREST OF J.B.

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(FC-J NO. 0115174)

JUNE 6, 2025

LEONARD, ACTING CHIEF JUDGE, AND WADSWORTH AND NAKASONE, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WADSWORTH, J.

This appeal stems from the Family Court of the First
Circuit's adjudication of Minor-Appellant J.B. (Minor) as a law
violator for assaulting another minor, the complaining witness
(CW).1/ Minor appeals from the following decree and orders
entered by the family court: (1) the September 26, 2022 "Decree
Re: Law Violation Petition(s)" (Decree); (2) the November 22,
2022 "Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration Filed October 4,
2022"; and (3) the November 22, 2022 "Order Re Disposition
Hearing." Following a bench trial, the family court adjudicated
Minor a law violator as to one count of Assault in the Third

1/
The Honorable Jessi L.K. Hall presided.
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Degree under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-712(1)(a).2/
On appeal, Minor contends that: (1) the family court
erred in denying his June 13, 2022 Motion to Dismiss Petition
Based Upon Defective Charge (Motion to Dismiss), where
Petitioner-Appellee State of Hawaii's (State) petition against
Minor (Petition) failed to define or specify the alleged "bodily
injury" caused by Minor; and (2) "there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the adjudication of the petition of assault in the
third degree." (Formatting altered.) Minor also summarily
challenges multiple findings of fact (FOFs) and conclusions of
law in the family court's January 17, 2023 Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
We hold that the term "bodily injury" in HRS
§ 707-712(1)(a) is a generic term, as defined by the Hawai#i
Supreme Court in State v. Jardine, 151 Hawai#i 96, 99, 508 P.3d
1182, 1185 (2022). A charging document must therefore identify
the "species" of the alleged "bodily injury" and, as appropriate,
provide a defendant "with particulars." Id. at 98, 508 P.3d at
1184. Here, the Petition failed to meet the Jardine standard.
In addition, the record does not establish that discovery
materials given to Minor before he filed the Motion to Dismiss
provided him with sufficient notice of the CW's bodily injury.
The family court therefore erred in denying the Motion to
Dismiss.
Before remanding the case for dismissal based on the
defective Petition, we must also address, for double jeopardy
purposes, Minor's express claim of insufficiency of the evidence.
See State v. Davis, 133 Hawai#i 102, 120, 324 P.3d 912, 930
(2014). As to that claim, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the State, we hold there was sufficient evidence to

2/
HRS § 707-712 (2014) states, in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of assault in the third
degree if the person:
(a) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another person[.]

HRS § 707-700 (2014) states, in relevant part: "'Bodily injury'
means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."

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support the family court's adjudication of Minor as a law
violator on the count of Assault in the Third Degree.
Accordingly, we vacate the challenged Decree and orders
with instructions to dismiss the Petition without prejudice.

I. Background

On April 29, 2020, the State filed the Petition
pursuant to HRS § 571-11(1),3/ alleging the following:

On or about November 8, 2019, in the City and County
of Honolulu, State of Hawai#i, [Minor] did intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to [CW],
thereby committing the offense of Assault in the Third
Degree, in violation of [HRS §] 707-712(1)(a) . . . .

On June 13, 2022, Minor filed the Motion to Dismiss.
Relying on Jardine, he argued that the term "bodily injury" is a
generic term, such that the State was required to include the
term's statutory definition in "the charging document," and "[to]
state the species . . . and descen[d] to particulars." (Quoting
Jardine, 151 Hawai#i at 100, 508 P.3d at 1186 (original brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).)
On July 11, 2022, the State filed a memorandum in
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The State did not address
Minor's argument based on Jardine, contending instead that "all
of the information supplied to the accused prior to the filing of
their motion must be considered when determining whether they
have been given fair notice of the charge against them[.]" The
State further argued: "[Minor] was provided with discovery in
this case on March 2, 2022. That discovery contained the
specific injury that formed the basis of the bodily injury
supporting the charge. Therefore, Minor has been given fair
notice of the charge against him . . . ."

3/
Minor comes within the purview of HRS § 571-11 (2018), which
states, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1) Concerning any person who is alleged to have
committed an act prior to achieving eighteen
years of age that would constitute a violation
or attempted violation of any federal, state, or
local law or county ordinance.

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On August 15, 2022, the family court heard and orally
denied the Motion to Dismiss. The court reasoned:

[I]n Jardine, there was a list of classes or levels of harm
that needed to be identified. We do not have that situation
in this case. Assault Third is any bodily injury, which
. . . is not a generic term. Court finds the petition does
state the charge with reasonable clarity.

Trial began the same day and continued on September 26,
2022. The testifying witnesses included CW and RB, a passerby
who witnessed the alleged assault. CW identified Minor as one of
the boys who hit and physically hurt him.
Following the trial testimony, the family court ruled
as follows:

After full consideration of the evidence and/or
representations presented, the Court finds that the State's
witnesses to be [sic] credible. The State has met their
burden of proving the material allegations of the case
beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically with regards to
referral of Assault in the Third Degree.

The Court finds that the minor is adjudged a law
violator pursuant to [HRS] Chapter 571.

The Decree similarly stated: "[T]he Court finds that the
material allegations of the [P]etition[] have been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt and that the [M]inor is a law violator within
the purview of HRS Section 571-11(1)."
On November 22, 2022, the family court denied Minor's
Motion for Reconsideration, filed on October 4, 2022, and placed
Minor on probation with rules and conditions.

II. Standards of Review

A. Sufficiency of the Charge

"The question of whether a charge sets forth all the
essential elements of a charged offense is a question of
law that this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong
standard." Jardine, 151 Hawai#i at 99, 508 P.3d at 1185 (citing
State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170, 1177
(2009)).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal as

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follows:

Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered
in the strongest light for the prosecution when the
appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such
evidence to support a conviction. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact. Indeed, even if it could
be said in a bench trial that the conviction is against the
weight of the evidence, as long as there is substantial
evidence to support the requisite findings for conviction,
the trial court will be affirmed. Substantial evidence is
credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and
probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to
support a conclusion.

In re GH, 152 Hawai#i 8, 14, 518 P.3d 1158, 1164 (2022) (quoting
State v. Xiao, 123 Hawai#i 251, 257, 231 P.3d 968, 974 (2010)).

III. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Charge

Minor contends that the family court erred in denying
the Motion to Dismiss, where the Petition was deficient under the
standard applied in Jardine, 151 Hawai#i at 100-01, 508 P.3d at
1186-87. In Jardine, the supreme court held that the term
"substantial bodily injury" in HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (d) is
"generic," such that "[a] charging document must . . . identify
the species of 'substantial bodily injury' alleged, and provide a
defendant with particulars." Id. at 98, 508 P.3d at 1184. Minor
argues that the term "bodily injury" in HRS § 707-712(1)(a) is
similarly generic, such that the State was required to include
the statutory definition of the term and other relevant specifics
in the Petition.
The State does not address Minor's contention regarding
the deficiency of the Petition under Jardine. Instead, as it did
below, the State argues that other information provided to Minor
before he filed the Motion to Dismiss gave Minor "actual
knowledge that physical pain was the nature of the bodily
injury[,]" such that Minor was not deprived of the right "to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" against him.
In Jardine, the supreme court reiterated: "[W]here the
definition of an offense includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the [charging document] shall charge the offense

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in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state
the species and descend to particulars." Id. at 100, 508 P.3d at
1186 (ellipses and original brackets omitted) (quoting State v.
Israel, 78 Hawai#i 66, 73, 890 P.2d 303, 310 (1995)). The court
defined "generic" as follows: "A term is 'generic' if it
'relates to or is characteristic of a whole group or class.'"
Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary 348 (1965)). Applying this definition, the court
determined that "[a]s statutorily defined, 'substantial bodily
injury' is a generic term that covers five 'classes' of
injuries[.]"4/ Id.
The term "bodily injury" in HRS § 707-712(1)(a) is
similarly generic. As statutorily defined, it covers three
classes of injuries: "physical pain, illness, or any impairment
of physical condition." HRS § 707-700. "Thus, it is incumbent
upon the State to "state the species" and, as appropriate, to
"descend to particulars." Id. at 101, 508 P.3d at 1187 (quoting
Israel, 78 Hawai#i at 73, 890 P.2d at 310).
Here, this standard required the State at least to
identify the species of alleged bodily injury caused by Minor,
i.e., to allege in the Petition that the bodily injury consisted
of "physical pain," in order to provide sufficient notice. Id.
(citing State v. Wells, 78 Hawai#i 373, 379-80, 894 P.2d 70, 76-
77 (1995)). This level of specificity was all the more important
in this case, where Minor was allegedly one of three boys who
attacked CW. "The inclusion of such information would apprise
[Minor] of what [he] must be prepared to meet." Id. (citing
Wells, 78 Hawai#i at 379-80, 894 P.2d at 76-77). The family

4/
HRS § 707-700 defines "substantial bodily injury" as "bodily
injury which causes":
(1) A major avulsion, laceration, or penetration of
the skin;
(2) A burn of at least second degree severity;

(3) A bone fracture;
(4) A serious concussion; or

(5) A tearing, rupture, or corrosive damage to the
esophagus, viscera, or other internal organs.

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court therefore erred in ruling that "bodily injury" is not a
generic term and the State was not required to identify the
species of bodily injury alleged.
Nonetheless, the State contends that "[t]he record
unique to this case supports the conclusion that Minor had actual
knowledge of the nature of the bodily injury, and as such, Minor
was not deprived of his right 'to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation . . . .'" (Quoting Haw. Const. Art. 1,
§ 14.)
The supreme court has recognized "that in determining
whether a defendant has been adequately informed of the charges
against them, the appellate court can consider other information
in addition to the charge that may have been provided to the
defendant until the time defendant objected to the sufficiency of
the charges." State v. Van Blyenburg, 152 Hawai#i 66, 70 n.3,
520 P.3d 264, 268 n.3 (2022) (brackets and ellipsis omitted)
(quoting Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 396, 219 P.3d at 1183).
However, "[o]nly when a defendant alleges that a charging
document which states an offense is nonetheless deficient because
it inadequately informs the defendant of the nature and cause of
the charge against them" may courts consider such information.
Id. (quoting Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 396, 219 P.3d at 1183).
Here, the Petition sufficiently alleged the essential
elements of Assault in the Third Degree, i.e., that (1) Minor
caused bodily injury to CW, and (2) he did so intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. See HRS § 707-712(1)(a). In these
circumstances, where Minor contends that the Petition was
nonetheless deficient because it inadequately informed him of the
nature and cause of the allegations against him, we may "consider
other information in addition to the [allegations] that may have
been provided to [Minor] . . . until the time [Minor] objected to
the sufficiency of the [allegations]." Van Blyenburg, 152
Hawai#i at 70 n.3, 520 P.3d at 268 n.3 (quoting Wheeler, 121
Hawai#i at 396, 219 P.3d at 1183).
In opposing the June 13, 2022 Motion to Dismiss, the
State argued generally that "Minor was provided the discovery in
the case on March 2, 2022[,]" and "[t]hat discovery contained the

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specific injury that formed the basis of the bodily injury
supporting the charge." However, the referenced discovery, or
any included information describing or portraying CW's injury, is
not part of the record. In its answering brief, the State
further argues that Minor's May 9, 2022 list of witnesses and
exhibits included an entry for "written statements, photographs,
[and] any documents and/or material identified in [the relevant]
police report . . . ." (Original brackets omitted.) The State
asserts that these materials included photographs of CW that
revealed his injury. But none of these materials, or any
description of them, appear to be part of the pre-Motion to
Dismiss record. In short, the record does not establish that
Minor was "fully informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him" before he filed the Motion to Dismiss.
Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 396, 219 P.3d at 1183 (quoting State v.
Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 120, 680 P.2d 250, 251 (1984)).
The family court therefore erred in denying the Motion
to Dismiss. In these circumstances, the Decree must be vacated
and on remand, the family court must dismiss the Petition without
prejudice. See State v. Pacquing, 139 Hawai#i 302, 308-09, 389
P.3d 897, 903-04 (2016) ("Because the complaint against [the
defendant] is legally insufficient, it is dismissed without
prejudice."); Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 386, 219 P.3d at 1173
(affirming this court's judgment, which vacated and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, because the
charge was deficient).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial because Minor also expressly contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the family court's adjudication
of Minor as a law violator as to the count of Assault in the
Third Degree. See Davis, 133 Hawai#i at 120, 324 P.3d at 930
(holding that the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10
of the Hawai#i Constitution requires an appellate court to
address a defendant's express claim of insufficiency of the
evidence before remanding for dismissal based on a defective

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charge"); Schwartz v. State, 136 Hawai#i 258, 265, 361 P.3d 1161,
1168 (2015) (same).
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Minor "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
cause[d] bodily injury to [CW.]" See HRS § 707-712(1)(a). At
trial, CW testified that on September 13, 2021, he "was walking
to Wendy's" in "Ka Makana," a shopping mall in Kapolei. "There
were three boys . . . walking up to me. And I recognized one of
'em, and then I shaked [sic] his hand. One of the boys I didn't
recognize sideblind me . . . [h]it me . . . while I wasn't paying
attention . . . [i]n my face." This "hurt" physically. CW
testified that after being "sideblinded," "[t]hey all started
hitting me . . . I know they were hitting me in my face." Asked
how he knew all three boys were hitting him, CW responded,
"'Cause I felt . . . different body parts getting hit, like . . .
my side of my body and my face and, like, somebody was kicking
me." Getting hit "hurt" physically. CW suffered a "lump on
[his] head and a black eye." A photo of CW showing his injuries
was admitted into evidence. CW identified Minor as one of the
boys who hit him.
RB, who witnessed the incident, also testified. He
identified Minor as one of the boys who struck CW.
The family court found "the State's witnesses
credible." The family court further found in FOFs 27 and 28:
(1) "there was conflicting testimony as to who 'side blinded'
[CW]," but "Minor did assault [CW] while he was on the ground";
and (2) "[CW] physically felt hurt, or physical pain due to the
hits and kicks he received from all three minors while on the
ground."
Minor's arguments on appeal go to CW's credibility and
the weight of the evidence. He asserts that CW improperly
"assumed that [Minor] inflicted bodily injury upon him" based on
what he felt, and the State failed to prove Minor "caused a
specific bodily injury to . . . CW." We "will not pass upon the
trial judge's decisions with respect to the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence, because this is the
province of the trial judge." State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai#i 131,

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139, 913 P.2d 57, 65 (1996). Minor summarily lists FOFs 8, 10,
12, 14, 22, 27, 28, and 32 as "points on appeal," but presents no
discernible argument as to why each FOF is clearly erroneous.
"This court is not obliged to address matters for which the
appellants have failed to present discernible arguments." Hussey
v. Say, 139 Hawai#i 181, 191, 384 P.3d 1282, 1292 (2016) (quoting
Exotics Hawai#i-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116
Hawai#i #277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032 (2007)); see HRAP Rule
28(b)(7).
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, we conclude there was substantial evidence that
Minor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily
injury to CW. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to
support the family court's adjudication of Minor as a law
violator as to the Petition.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the
following, entered in the Family Court of the First Circuit: (1)
the September 26, 2022 "Decree Re: Law Violation Petition(s)";
(2) the November 22, 2022 "Order Denying Motion for
Reconsideration Filed October 4, 2022"; and (3) the November 22,
2022 "Order Re Disposition Hearing." This case is remanded to
the family court with instructions to dismiss the Petition
without prejudice.

On the briefs:

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Randal I. Shintani Acting Chief Judge
for Minor-Appellant

/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Donn Fudo, Associate Judge
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City & County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Associate Judge

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