State v. Wilson

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
29-APR-2025
07:50 AM
Dkt. 66 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. DALE K. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
WAILUKU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 2DTA-21-01063)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.)

This appeal challenges the imposition of a mandatory
sentence of a substance abuse assessment with recommended
treatment, and a 14-hour substance abuse rehabilitation program
(collectively, substance abuse treatment penalties), for a
conviction for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
Intoxicant (OVUII), without the imposition of probation. The
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challenge relies on State v. Agdinaoay, 150 Hawaiʻi 223, 500 P.3d
408 (2021) (overturned due to legislative action). 1 We affirm.
Defendant-Appellant Dale K. Wilson (Wilson) appeals
from the February 2, 2022 Judgment and Notice of Entry of
Judgment (Judgment), entered by the District Court of the Second
Circuit (District Court). 2 Wilson pled guilty to OVUII pursuant
to a plea agreement with Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi
(State). Over his objection based on Agdinaoay, Wilson was
sentenced, inter alia, to the substance abuse treatment
penalties under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61. 3

1 In Agdinaoay, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that the defendant
could not be sentenced to a domestic violence intervention program (DVI) with
imprisonment because, inter alia, DVI was available only as part of a
probation sentence. 150 Hawaiʻi at 225, 500 P.3d at 410.

2 The Honorable Blaine J. Kobayashi presided.

3 The OVUII statute, HRS § 291E-61 (2020 & 2021 Supp.), mandates
the imposition of the following substance abuse treatment penalties in
subsections (b) and (h), without probation:

(b) A person committing the offense of [OVUII] shall
be sentenced without possibility of probation or suspension
of sentence as follows:

. . . .

(A) A fourteen-hour minimum substance abuse
rehabilitation program, including education and counseling,
or other comparable programs deemed appropriate by the
court;

. . . .

(h) Whenever a court sentences a person pursuant to
subsection (b), it also shall require that the offender be
referred to the driver's education program for an
assessment, by a certified substance abuse counselor deemed
appropriate by the court, of the offender's substance abuse
or dependence and the need for appropriate treatment. The
counselor shall submit a report with recommendations to the
court. The court shall require the offender to obtain
appropriate treatment if the counselor's assessment
establishes the offender's substance abuse or dependence.
All costs for assessment and treatment shall be borne by
the offender.

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On appeal, Wilson's sole challenge is to the District
Court's imposition of the mandatory substance abuse treatment
penalties under HRS § 291E-61(b) and (h), because "these
requirements cannot be imposed except as conditions of
probation" under HRS Chapter 706.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve
Wilson's point of error as follows.
We preliminarily address the State's arguments that
Wilson is "judicially estopped" from challenging the sentence on
appeal because Wilson "waived" this argument by pleading guilty
and due to Wilson's "on-record agreement" that the substance
abuse treatment penalties at issue were "possible penalties."
These arguments are unpersuasive.
Here, the record does not reflect that Wilson "waived"
the ability to challenge his sentence by pleading guilty. It
reflects the opposite, that Wilson was "accepting a plea deal,
but then doing [sic] an appeal" of the sentencing issue. 4 Nor
did Wilson "waive" this challenge on appeal by agreeing that the
penalties at issue were "possible penalties." Agreeing that
penalties are "possible" does not mean that Wilson agreed to the
penalties and gave up his right to challenge them. In fact, the

(Emphases added.)

4 The record reflects that at the outset of the February 2, 2022
sentencing hearing, Wilson told his attorney he would plead, then appeal, as
follows:

[Defense Counsel]: Ah, hey, [Wilson], we had talked
on the phone, ah, about, ah, accepting a plea deal, but
then doing an appeal of the issue that I raised. Do you
want to go ahead and do that today?

[Wilson]: Yeah. I'd still be willing to do so.

(Emphasis added.)

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record reflects the plea agreement did not require Wilson to
agree to the substance abuse treatment penalties. The State
phrased the plea agreement as including recommended penalties,
i.e. that the State would "recommend[] a $500.00 fine and the
remaining statutory requirements" in exchange for Wilson's
guilty plea. (Emphasis added.) Thus, Wilson is not judicially
estopped from, and did not waive his challenge to, the penalties
at issue.
We turn to Wilson's point of error. Relying on
Agdinaoay, Wilson argues that because "[s]ubstance abuse
treatment is not one of the authorized [sentencing] dispositions
of HRS § 706-605[,]" 5 and can only be ordered as a "condition of
probation" under "HRS § 706-624(2)(j)," 6 "it is not possible . .
. to sentence Wilson to complete substance abuse treatment"
under HRS § 291E-61(b), which "expressly prohibits a sentence of
probation."
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo." State v. Castillon, 144 Hawaiʻi 406, 411,
443 P.3d 98, 103 (2019) (citation omitted). "[T]he fundamental
starting point for statutory[]interpretation is the language of
the statute itself." Id. (citation omitted).
In Agdinaoay, the defendant was sentenced to 181 days
of imprisonment and to complete DVI, without being sentenced to

5 HRS § 706-605 (2014 & 2016 Supp.), entitled "Authorized
disposition of convicted defendants," provides that a convicted defendant may
be sentenced to one or more of the following: probation, to pay a fine,
imprisonment, and/or community service. In 2022, HRS § 706-605 was amended
to add DVI, because of the 2021 Agdinaoay decision.

6 HRS § 706-624(2)(j) (2014 & 2016 Supp.), entitled "Conditions of
probation," provides that a court may order "assessment and treatment for
substance abuse dependency" as a probation condition.

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probation, following a conviction for violation of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). 7 The supreme court stated:
We hold that courts cannot impose imprisonment
exceeding the statutory threshold for a probationary
sentence and also conditions of probation. Because a
misdemeanor defendant sentenced to imprisonment exceeding
180 days cannot also receive a probationary sentence - and
DVI cannot be imposed except as a condition of probation -
Agdinaoay's sentence was unlawful.

150 Hawaiʻi at 225, 500 P.3d at 410. The supreme court noted the
plain language of HRS § 706-600 (2014), that "[n]o sentence
shall be imposed otherwise than in accordance with this
chapter[,]" and ruled that "Chapter 706 controls all sentencing
dispositions[.]" 8 Id. (emphasis omitted). The supreme court
explained that Agdinaoay's sentence was illegal because "DVI is
not available to sentencing courts as a 'standalone' sentencing
option" under the plain language of HRS § 706-605, and "must be
imposed with probation." Id. at 225-26, 500 P.3d at 410-11.
HRS § 291E-61(b) provides that an OVUII offender
"shall be sentenced without possibility of probation[.]" Unlike
in Agdinaoay, where a probation sentence could be imposed for
the TRO violation offense at issue, here, a probation sentence
cannot be imposed for an OVUII offense under HRS § 291E-61. HRS
§ 291E-61 expressly prohibits the imposition of probation, but
also requires the substance abuse treatment penalties be
imposed. HRS § 291E-61 thus conflicts with HRS § 706-605,
because substance abuse treatment is not listed as a
"standalone" sentencing option. See id. at 226, 500 P.3d at
411.

7 The TRO statute in effect at that time, HRS § 586-4 (2018 & 2021
Supp.), mandated that a person convicted of a TRO violation "shall undergo"
DVI.

8 We note that HRS § 706-600 was amended in 2022, and now provides:
"A sentence shall be imposed in accordance with this chapter, unless
otherwise provided by applicable law." (Emphasis added.) The previous
version of the statute was in effect at the time of this case.

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"[W]here there is a plainly irreconcilable conflict
between . . . two statutes" that "cover the same subject matter,
the one general and the other special, the specific statute will
be favored." State v. Kuuku, 61 Haw. 79, 82, 595 P.2d 291, 294
(1979) (citations omitted). In rejecting the application of
this general principle of statutory interpretation, the
Agdinaoay court explained: "this principle is a mere tool of
statutory interpretation designed for use where legislative
intent is unclear. It does not override or undermine otherwise
clear legislative intent." 150 Hawaiʻi at 230, 500 P.3d at 415
(citations omitted). The Agdinaoay court concluded that HRS §§
706-600 and 701-102(3) 9 are statutes that "direct that all
sentencing in our state happen in accordance with Chapter 706."
Id. The court noted: "HRS § 584-6's DVI directive may be
'specific,' but that specificity does not supersede Chapter
706's comprehensive sentencing framework." Id.
Here, the specific statute, HRS § 291E-61, does not
merely contain a mandatory sentencing term like the DVI, but
goes even further in its specificity, by expressly precluding
the imposition of probation. This express preclusion of a
probation sentence is a material and dispositive distinction
between the HRS § 291E-61 OVUII statute here, and the HRS § 586-
4 TRO violation statute in Agdinaoay. HRS § 291E-61's express
preclusion of probation, which would otherwise be required under
"Chapter 706's comprehensive sentencing framework[,]" is "clear
legislative intent" to require the imposition of the substance
abuse treatment penalties outside of the ordinary sentencing
framework's requirement of probation to accompany such penalties

9 HRS § 701-102 was also amended in 2022, which now states in
pertinent part: "(3) The provisions of chapters 701 through 706 of the Code
are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes, unless otherwise
provided by applicable law." (Emphasis added.)

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under Chapter 706. See id. A contrary interpretation would
result in an unreasonable, illogical situation –– where a court
is never able to sentence a defendant convicted of OVUII to a
robust minimum-14-hour substance abuse rehabilitation program,
or to complete a substance abuse assessment and recommended
treatment –– a result we must avoid. See Matter of Lindner,
152 Hawaiʻi 130, 142, 522 P.3d 1117, 1129 (App. 2022) ("A
statutory interpretation that is rational, sensible, and
practicable is preferred to one which is unreasonable,
impracticable, inconsistent, contradictory, and illogical."
(cleaned up)).
We conclude the District Court acted within its
discretion in imposing the mandatory substance abuse treatment
penalties under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1)(A), for Wilson's OVUII
conviction. See State v. Kong, 131 Hawaiʻi 94, 101, 315 P.3d
720, 727 (2013) (reviewing sentencing for abuse of discretion).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the February 2,
2022 Judgment, entered by the District Court of the Second
Circuit.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, April 29, 2025.
On the briefs:
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Henry P. Ting,
Presiding Judge
Deputy Public Defender,
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Associate Judge
Gerald K. Enriques,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
County of Maui,
Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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