Stowers v. Henderson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
19-DEC-2024
08:34 AM
Dkt. 66 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

TOMMY M. STOWERS, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee, v.
CHARLES W. HENDERSON, Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee, and
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants.

CHARLES W. HENDERSON, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ANGELA BROOKS, JASON MOONEYHAN, DEVRON LEE BROOKS,
Third-Party Defendants-Appellees,
WILLIAM "GREG" PRESSLEY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant,
and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CC191000330(1))

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)

Third-Party Defendant-Appellant William Pressley

appeals from the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's

February 17, 2021 order denying Pressley's "Motion for Judgment

on the Pleading Pursuant to [Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS)]

§ 634F [(2016) (repealed 2022)] (Citizen Participation in
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Government)." 1 (Formatting altered.) We have jurisdiction under

HRS § 634F-2(2)(A).

Pressley sought dismissal of a First Amended Third-

Party Complaint filed by Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party

Plaintiff-Appellee Charles W. Henderson against Pressley, Angela

Brooks, Devron Lee Brooks, and Jason Mooneyhan. Pressley

asserted that Henderson only named him as a third-party

defendant to prevent him from testifying in support of his

brother, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee Tommy M.

Stowers, and that the third-party claims were an impermissible

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) as

defined by HRS § 634F-1.

The circuit court denied Pressley's motion for

judgment on the pleadings, and Pressley timely appealed.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve

Pressley's appeal as discussed below and affirm.

On appeal, Pressley contends the circuit court erred

in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings because it

shifted the burden of proof, applied the wrong legal standard,

1 The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.

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and found the First Amended Third-Party Complaint was

substantially justified. 2 To support these contentions, Pressley

argues that "HRS § 634F does not utilize a 'conceivable basis'

test."

HRS § 634F-2 provided in relevant part as follows:

Required procedures; motion. Notwithstanding any law to
the contrary, including rules of court, upon the filing of
any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding
on the grounds that the claim is based on, relates to, or
involves public participation and is a SLAPP lawsuit:

(1) The motion shall be treated as a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings shall be
excluded by the court, and the court shall expedite the
hearing of the motion;

. . . .

(4) The responding party shall:

(A) Without leave of court, have seven days to amend
its pleadings to be pled with specificity, and shall
include such supporting particulars as are
peculiarly within the supporting pleader's
knowledge; and

(B) Have the burden of proof and persuasion on the
motion;

(5) The court shall make its determination based upon
the allegations contained in the pleadings;

2 Pressley raises the following two points of error:

1. "The circuit court erred when it shifted the burden
of proof and applied the wrong legal standards in
denying [his] SLAPP motion"; and

2. "The circuit court erred in finding that the First
Amended Third Party Complaint was substantially
justified."

(Formatting altered and emphasis omitted.) Because these points of error
involve HRS § 634F-2 and require a similar analysis, we address these points
together.

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(6) The court shall grant the motion and dismiss the
judicial claim, unless the responding party has
demonstrated that more likely than not, the respondent's
allegations do not constitute a SLAPP lawsuit as defined
in section 634F-1[.]

(Formatting altered and emphasis added.)

"A ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings

pursuant to HRS § 634F, regarding SLAPP cases, is reviewed de

novo." Domingo v. James B. Nutter & Co., 153 Hawai‘i 584, 599,

543 P.3d 1, 16 (App. 2023). Pursuant to HRS § 634F-2(4)(B),

"when a motion to dispose of a purported SLAPP claim is filed,

the burden of proof and persuasion rests with the non-moving

party." Id.

In the hearing on Pressley's motion for judgment on

the pleadings, the circuit court explained the purpose of HRS

§ 634F and reiterated Pressley's arguments. The circuit court

then explained Henderson's argument and referenced the

allegations in Henderson's First Amended Third-Party Complaint:

Mr. Henderson opposes the motion, arguing that there
are facts pled sufficient to implicate Pressley in
[Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)]
offenses and contract breaches. As support, Henderson
cites to paragraph 16 of the first amended [third-party]
complaint that alleges in early 2019, Pressley sent at
least three e-mails to Henderson pressuring Henderson to
make payments directly to Pressley.

Relying on the email allegations as pleaded by Henderson, the

circuit court explained it could not find that Henderson

intended to intimidate or silence Pressley:

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The Court cannot find that it's more likely than not
that Henderson used SLAPP as a basis for his claims against
Pressley. Provided with these allegations about the e-
mails from Pressley to Henderson, the Court cannot say that
it is more likely than not that Henderson only identified
Pressley as a Doe defendant in the [first amended] third-
party complaint in order to intimidate and harass Pressley.

The proximity in time between Pressley's affidavit
and Henderson's identification of Pressley as a Doe
defendant is not more likely than not proof of Henderson's
intent to silence Pressley against testifying in the main
case.

Because there are factual allegations against
Pressley contained in the first amended [third-party]
complaint that are unrelated to Pressley's affidavit, there
is a conceivable basis other than SLAPP for Henderson's
identification of Pressley as a Doe defendant in the first
amended third-party complaint.

(Emphases added.)

As described above, the circuit court relied on the

email allegations in Henderson's First Amended Third-Party

Complaint. By relying on the allegations in Henderson's First

Amended Third-Party Complaint, the circuit court did not shift

the burden of production and persuasion to Pressley. And the

circuit court did not apply the wrong legal standard because it

looked at whether Henderson demonstrated that his allegations,

more likely than not, did not constitute a SLAPP lawsuit as HRS

§ 634F-2(6) required.

Because the circuit court properly applied HRS § 634F-

2(6), the circuit court's additional statement that the emails

provided a "conceivable basis" for Henderson's First Amended

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Third-Party Complaint against Pressley does not require us to

vacate the circuit court's order denying Pressley's motion.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

February 17, 2021 order denying Pressley's motion for judgment

on the pleadings.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, December 19, 2024.

On the briefs: /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Presiding Judge
Daniel Hempey,
for Third-Party Defendant- /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Appellant. Associate Judge

Birney B. Bervar, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Ward D. Jones, Associate Judge
(Bervar & Jones),
for Defendant/
Counterclaimant/Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellee.

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