Marion County Coal Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, International Union et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARION COUNTY COAL
RESOURCES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-56
(KLEEH)
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF
AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL UNION, and
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,
DISTRICT 31,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12], GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 14], AND CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	cross 	motions 	for 	summary
judgment 	filed 	by 	the 	Plaintiff 	and 	Counter-Defendant, 	Marion
County Coal Resources, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Marion County Coal”),
along 	with 	the 	Defendants 	and 	Counter-Claimants, 	the 	United 	Mine
Workers 	of 	America, 	International 	Union, 	and 	the 	United 	Mine
Workers 	of 	America, 	District 	31 	(together, 	the 	“Union” 	or
“Defendants”). 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	below, 	the 	Court 	DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 12] and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion [ECF
No. 14].
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 	June 	11, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	filed 	suit
against 	Defendants 	United 	Mine 	Workers 	of 	America, 	International
Union, 	and 	United 	Mine 	Workers 	of 	America, 	District 	31, 	pursuant
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to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185. ECF No. 1. Defendants filed their Answer and Counterclaim on
August 	1, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	6. 	Plaintiff 	answered 	Defendants’
Counterclaim on August 21, 2025. ECF No. 8.
On 	October 	31, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	its 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, asking the Court to vacate Arbitrator Philip A. Smalley’s
Decision 	and 	Award 	(“Award”) 	in 	American 	Consolidated 	Natural
Resources, Inc./Marion County Coal Resources, Inc. and United Mine
Workers 	of 	America, 	District 	31, 	Local 	9099, 	Case 	No. 	20-31-25-
035. ECF No. 12. Defendants responded in opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion 	on 	November 	21, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	15. 	Defendants 	additionally
moved 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	October 	31, 	2025, 	asking 	the 	Court
to 	affirm 	the 	Award 	as 	final, 	binding, 	and 	enforceable. 	ECF 	Nos.
14, 14-1. Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendants’ Motion
on November 21, 2025. ECF No. 16. The Court heard oral argument on
the 	motions 	on 	June 	25, 	2026. 	Both 	motions 	are 	fully 	briefed 	and
ripe for review.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. Longwall Assembly and Recovery
Since 	September 	2020, 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	has 	operated 	the
Marion 	County 	Mine 	(the 	“Mine”), 	a 	large 	underground 	coal 	mine
located 	in 	Marion 	County, 	West 	Virginia. 	Compl., 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶
6. 	The 	Mine 	produces 	coal 	through 	the 	longwall 	method, 	which
entails shearing coal from a single wall, or panel, of coal. Pl.’s
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Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 13, at 3. The mining of a longwall
panel 	takes 	about 	nine 	(9) 	months 	to 	complete. 	Id. 	at 	4. 	Once 	a
panel 	is 	complete, 	all 	equipment 	is 	disassembled, 	moved, 	and
reassembled at the next panel. Id. at 3-4. This process is referred
to 	as 	“assembly 	and 	recovery,” 	and 	generally 	takes 	between 	ten
(10) and fifteen (15) days. Id. at 4.
Prior 	to 	Marion 	County 	Coal’s 	acquisition 	of 	the 	Mine,
Consolidation 	Coal 	Company 	(“Consolidation”) 	operated 	the 	Mine
from 1956 to 2013, at which time its assets were sold to The Marion
County 	Coal 	Company 	(“TMCCC”). 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	at 	¶¶ 	6, 	9-10.
Consolidation 	began 	using 	the 	longwall 	mining 	system 	in 	1976,
assigning 	related 	assembly 	and 	recovery 	work 	consistently 	to
general 	inside 	laborers. 	Id. 	at 	¶ 	9-10. 	When 	TMCCC 	took 	over
operations 	of 	the 	Mine 	in 	2013, 	it 	continued 	the 	same 	practice.
Id. 	at 	¶ 	11. 	Now, 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	similarly 	assigns 	longwall
mining system assembly and recovery work to general inside laborers
and has done so since acquiring the Mine in 2020. Id. at ¶ 12.
B. The NCWA
The subject action stems from a grievance filed by an employee
at 	the 	Marion 	County 	Mine. 	The 	Union 	represents 	Marion 	County
Coal’s 	classified 	employees 	pursuant 	to 	the 	2020 	National 	Coal
Wage 	Agreement 	(“NCWA” 	or 	“the 	agreement”), 	which 	sets 	forth 	the
terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment 	for 	Union-represented 	Mine
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employees. 	Id. 	at 	¶¶ 	2, 	7; 	Defs.’ 	Countercl., 	ECF 	No. 	6, 	at 	6, 	¶
5. The NCWA provides the following regarding “Work Jurisdiction”:
The 	production 	of 	coal, 	including 	removal 	of
overburden 	and 	coal 	waste, 	preparation,
processing 	and 	cleaning 	of 	coal 	and
transportation of coal (except by waterway or
rail 	not 	owned 	by 	Employer), 	repair 	and
maintenance 	work 	normally 	performed 	at 	the
mine site or at a central shop of the Employer
and 	maintenance 	of 	gob 	piles 	and 	mine 	roads,
and 	work 	of 	the 	type 	customarily 	related 	to
all 	of 	the 	above 	shall 	be 	performed 	by
classified 	Employees 	of 	the 	Employer 	covered
by 	and 	in 	accordance 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	this
Agreement. 	Contracting, 	subcontracting,
leasing and subleasing, and construction work,
as 	defined 	herein, 	will 	be 	conducted 	in
accordance 	with 	the 	provisions 	of 	this
Article.
Nothing 	in 	this 	section 	will 	be 	construed 	to
diminish the jurisdiction, express or implied,
of the United Mine Workers.
ECF No. 11-1, at 1-2.
The agreement also discusses the precedential effect of prior
arbitration decisions:
All decisions of the Arbitration Review Board
rendered 	prior 	to 	the 	expiration 	of 	the
National 	Bituminous 	Coal 	Wage 	Agreement 	of
1978 	shall 	continue 	to 	have 	precedential
effect under this Agreement to the extent that
the 	basis 	for 	such 	decisions 	have 	not 	been
modified 	by 	subsequent 	changes 	in 	this
Agreement.
Id. 	at 	86-87. 	Finally, 	the 	NCWA’s 	grievance 	and 	arbitration
provisions govern the settlement of disputes:
Settlements 	reached 	at 	any 	step 	of 	the
grievance procedure shall be final and binding
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on 	both 	parties 	and 	shall 	not 	be 	subject 	to
further proceedings under this Article except
by 	mutual 	agreement. 	Settlements 	reached 	at
steps 	2 	and 	3 	shall 	be 	in 	writing 	and 	signed
by 	appropriate 	representatives 	of 	the 	Union
and the Employer.
Id. at 86.
C. The Dispute
On January 23, 2025, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of
a 	Mine 	employee, 	alleging 	that 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	neglected 	to
post job bids for employees assigned to perform longwall recovery
and 	assembly 	work 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	NCWA. 	ECF 	No. 	13, 	at 	5;
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 14-1, at 8. The grievance
further indicated that Marion County Coal had assigned one foreman
and 	two 	or 	more 	general 	inside 	laborers 	to 	perform 	the 	job. 	See
ECF 	No. 	11-1, 	at 	133. 	As 	relief, 	the 	grievance 	requested 	that
Marion 	County 	Coal 	post 	three 	(3) 	job 	bids 	for 	such 	recovery 	and
assembly work. Id.
D. The Arbitration Award
After 	several 	failed 	attempts 	to 	settle 	the 	dispute, 	an
arbitration 	hearing 	was 	held 	before 	Arbitrator 	Philip 	A. 	Smalley
(“Arbitrator 	Smalley” 	or 	“the 	Arbitrator”) 	on 	March 	27, 	2025, 	in
Fairmont, West Virginia. ECF No. 13, at 5; ECF No. 14-1, at 8; see
ECF 	No. 	11-1, 	at 	134. 	The 	issue 	presented 	to 	the 	Arbitrator 	was
whether 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	had 	violated 	the 	NCWA 	and, 	if 	so, 	to
identify the appropriate remedy for such violation. ECF No. 11-1,
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at 	153. 	After 	considering 	each 	party’s 	arguments, 	evidence, 	and
witness testimonies, Arbitrator Smalley issued his Award on April
25, 	2025, 	finding 	that 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	violated 	the 	NCWA 	by
failing 	to 	post 	job 	bids 	for 	the 	assigned 	longwall 	recovery 	and
assembly 	work, 	as 	required 	for 	new 	jobs 	under 	the 	agreement. 	See
id. 	at 	157-60; 	ECF 	No. 	13, 	at 	6. 	Accordingly, 	Arbitrator 	Smalley
sustained the Union’s grievance and required Marion County Coal to
post job vacancies for three (3) permanent job openings in longwall
recovery and assembly. ECF No. 11-1, at 160.
E. Parties’ Contentions
Plaintiff argues that Arbitrator Smalley issued an award that
contradicts 	express 	contract 	language 	and 	instead 	comports 	with
his 	own 	sense 	of 	fairness 	and 	equity. 	Most 	notably, 	Plaintiff
contends 	that 	the 	Arbitrator 	ignored 	binding 	arbitral 	precedent
requiring him to deny the Union’s grievance. Defendants argue that
the Award is entitled to deference and should be upheld because it
draws 	its 	essence 	from 	the 	agreement. 	Defendants 	believe
Arbitrator Smalley applied the contract language, considered past
arbitral 	precedent, 	and 	best 	drew 	the 	Award’s 	essence 	from 	the
NCWA.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary 	judgment 	is 	appropriate 	if 	“there 	is 	no 	genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	The movant
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“bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on 	file, 	together 	with 	the 	affidavits, 	if 	any, 	which 	it 	believes
demonstrate 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact.”
Celotex 	Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477 	U.S. 	317, 	323 	(1986) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted). 	The burden then shifts to the nonmoving
party 	to 	present 	“specific 	facts 	showing 	that 	there 	is 	a 	genuine
issue 	for 	trial.” 	Blair 	v. 	Defender 	Servs., 	Inc., 	386 	F.3d 	623,
625 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
“When 	the 	moving 	party 	has 	carried 	its 	burden . . . , its
opponent 	must 	do 	more 	than 	simply 	show 	that 	there 	is 	some
metaphysical 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	material 	facts.” 	Matsushita 	Elec.
Indus. 	Co., 	Ltd. 	V. 	Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	586 	(1986)
(citations 	omitted). 	Rather, 	the 	Court 	must 	ask 	“whether 	the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.” 	Anderson 	v. 	Liberty 	Lobby, 	Inc., 	477 	U.S.
242, 	251–52 	(1986). 	At 	its 	core, 	the 	summary-judgment 	process
examines 	whether 	a 	trial 	is 	needed. 	See 	id. 	at 	250. 	“Where 	the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find 	for 	the 	non-moving 	party, 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	issue 	for
trial.” 	Matsushita, 	475 	U.S. 	at 	587 	(citation 	and 	internal
quotation marks omitted).
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“When 	faced 	with 	cross-motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	the
court 	must 	review 	each 	motion 	on 	its 	own 	merits 	to 	determine
whether 	either 	of 	the 	parties 	deserves 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law.” 	Rossignol 	v. 	Voorhaar, 	316 	F.3d 	516, 	523 	(4th 	Cir. 	2003)
(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	The 	same
standards 	of 	review 	apply 	when 	both 	parties 	file 	motions 	for
summary judgment. 	See ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d
42, 45 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The court is not permitted to resolve
genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	facts 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment — even where . . . both parties have filed cross motions
for summary judgment.”).
IV. 	GOVERNING LAW
This 	Court 	may 	review 	labor 	arbitrators’ 	decisions 	under
Section 301 	of 	the 	Labor 	Management 	Relations 	Act 	of 	1947, 	29
U.S.C. 	§ 	185, 	but 	this 	power 	of 	review 	is 	“extremely 	limited.”
Cannelton 	Indus., 	Inc. 	v. 	Dist. 	17, 	UMWA, 	951 	F.2d 	591, 	593 	(4th
Cir. 	1991) 	(citing 	United 	Steelworkers 	of 	America 	v. 	Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)). “An arbitrator’s award is
entitled to special judicial deference on judicial review.” Island
Creek Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, UMWA, 29 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, courts generally afford a presumption of validity to
arbitration 	awards. 	Mountaineer 	Gas 	Co. 	v. 	Oil, 	Chem. 	& 	Atomic
Workers 	Int’l 	Union, 	76 	F.3d 	606, 	608 	(4th 	Cir. 	1996) 	(citing
Richmond, 	Fredericksburg 	& 	Potomac 	R.R. 	Co. 	v. 	Transp. 	Commc’ns
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Int’l 	Union, 	973 	F.2d 	276, 	278 	(4th 	Cir. 	1992)). 	This 	is 	because
the 	parties 	“bargained 	for 	the 	arbitrator’s 	interpretation 	and
resolution 	of 	their 	dispute.” 	Id. 	(citing 	Enterprise 	Wheel, 	363
U.S. at 599).
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the “Steelworkers
Trilogy,”1 “emphasized that federal courts should refuse to review
the 	merits 	of 	an 	arbitration 	award 	under 	a 	collective 	bargaining
agreement.” 	Mutual 	Mining, 	Inc. 	v. 	Dist. 	17, 	UMWA, 	47 	F.3d 	1165,
at 	*2 	(4th 	Cir. 	1995) 	(unpublished). 	In 	reviewing 	arbitration
awards, the Court “must determine only whether the arbitrator did
his job—not whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but
simply whether he did it.” Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 608 (citing
Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)). In
this determination, the Court considers:
(1) 	the 	arbitrator’s 	role 	as 	defined 	by 	the
[collective 	bargaining 	agreement]; 	(2)
whether 	the 	award 	ignored 	the 	plain 	language
of the [collective bargaining agreement]; and
(3) 	whether 	the 	arbitrator’s 	discretion 	in
formulating 	the 	award 	comported 	with 	the
essence 	of 	the 	[collective 	bargaining
agreement’s] proscribed limits.
Id.
1 	The 	Steelworkers 	Trilogy 	includes 	the 	following 	cases: 	United
Steelworkers 	of 	America 	v. 	Enterprise 	Wheel 	& 	Car 	Corp., 	363 	U.S. 	593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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Still, there are some limitations on arbitration awards. The
award 	must 	“draw 	its 	essence 	from 	the 	collective 	bargaining
agreement.” Id. at 608 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v.
Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)). In other words, it cannot “simply
reflect 	the 	arbitrator’s 	own 	notions 	of 	industrial 	justice.”
Misco, 	484 	U.S. 	at 	38. 	“When 	the 	arbitrator’s 	words 	manifest 	an
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse
enforcement of the award.” Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. But
“[a]s 	long 	as 	the 	arbitrator 	is 	even 	arguably 	construing 	or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,
the court cannot overturn his decision simply because it disagrees
with his factual findings, contract interpretations, or choice of
remedies.” 	Misco, 	484 	U.S. 	at 	Syl. 	Pt. 	1(a). 	In 	deciding 	whether
an 	award 	draws 	its 	essence 	from 	the 	agreement, 	courts 	should 	be
mindful 	that 	arbitrators 	“need 	not 	give 	their 	reasons 	for 	an
award,” but courts may rely on arbitrators’ reasoning to determine
whether 	the 	arbitrator 	applied 	“his 	own 	brand 	of 	industrial
justice.” Cannelton, 951 F.2d at 594.
In 	reviewing 	arbitration 	awards, 	a 	Court 	must 	also 	evaluate
whether the arbitrator considered “any existing common law of the
particular 	plant 	or 	industry, 	for 	it 	is 	an 	integral 	part 	of 	the
contract.” 	Norfolk 	Shipbuilding 	& 	Drydock 	Corp. 	v. 	Int’l 	Bhd. 	of
Boilermakers, 	671 	F.2d 	797, 	799-800 	(4th 	Cir. 	1982). 	It 	is 	well-
established 	that 	a 	“labor 	arbitrator’s 	source 	of 	law 	is 	not
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confined 	to 	the 	express 	provisions 	of 	the 	contract, 	as 	the
industrial common law — the practices of the industry and the shop
— is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although
not expressed in it.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf 	Navigation 	Co., 	363 	U.S. 	574, 	581–82 	(1960). 	This 	includes
past 	arbitral 	decisions. 	Clinchfield 	Coal 	Co. 	v. 	Dist. 	28, 	UMWA,
738 F.2d 998, 999 (4th Cir. 1984).
V. 	DISCUSSION
Recognizing 	the 	extremely 	limited 	role 	of 	the 	Court 	in
deciding arbitration decisions and the great deference afforded to
arbitrator 	decisions, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	Award 	draws 	its
essence 	from 	the 	agreement. 	Arbitrator 	Smalley 	sufficiently
considered 	the 	issue 	of 	whether 	Marion 	County 	Coal 	violated 	the
agreement and issued an award he deemed an appropriate remedy. At
a minimum, the Arbitrator “arguably” applied the contract and acted
within the scope of his authority.
The 	Court 	rejects 	Plaintiff’s 	primary 	argument 	that
Arbitrator 	Smalley 	ignored 	the 	precedential 	effect 	of 	past
Arbitration 	Review 	Board 	(“ARB”) 	decisions 	under 	the 	agreement.2
ECF No. 13, at 13-14. Plaintiff maintains that ARB Decision No. 19
required 	Arbitrator 	Smalley 	to 	find 	that 	removing 	general 	inside
2 	Article 	XXIII, 	Section 	(k) 	of 	the 	NCWA 	renders 	precedential 	any 	ARB
decisions issued prior to the expiration of the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1978.
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laborers from performing longwall assembly and recovery work would
“negatively affect their seniority rights,” as that classification
has 	performed 	such 	work 	consistently 	since 	1976. 	Id. 	at 	10.
Plaintiff’s reliance on this Decision alone is misplaced.
The Arbitrator considered copious ARB decisions submitted by
the parties, including those issued before and after the expiration
of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1978 (“NBCWA”).
See 	ECF 	No. 	11-1, 	at 	152-53. 	In 	doing 	so, 	he 	seemingly 	found
appropriate the application of more recent arbitral decisions. See
id. at 153, 155-56. The Arbitrator reviewed the various arbitration
decisions submitted by the parties and applied the principles from
the 	decisions 	he 	found 	most 	relevant 	to 	his 	analysis. 	See 	id. 	at
157-160. 	As 	Defendants 	point 	out, 	there 	is 	no 	indication 	that
arbitration decisions issued prior to the expiration of the NBCWA,
namely 	ARB 	Decision 	No. 	19, 	are 	any 	more 	precedential 	or
controlling 	than 	those 	issued 	after. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	15, 	at 	12.
Accordingly, 	Arbitrator 	Smalley 	was 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	his
authority to afford greater weight to past arbitral decisions other
than 	ARB 	Decision 	No. 	19, 	despite 	Plaintiff’s 	assertions
otherwise.
Additionally, 	the 	Court 	is 	not 	persuaded 	by 	Plaintiff’s
argument 	that 	Arbitrator 	Smalley 	relied 	on 	personal 	notions 	of
fairness and equity to make his determination. See ECF No. 13, at
13-15. 	The 	Court 	recognizes 	that 	the 	Award 	makes 	numerous
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references 	to 	factors 	not 	expressly 	addressed 	by 	the 	agreement,
such 	as 	artificial 	intelligence, 	renewable 	energy 	sources, 	and
government 	regulations. 	See 	ECF 	No. 	11-1, 	at 	153-54. 	Still, 	the
Arbitrator’s 	discussion 	of 	such 	factors 	is 	not 	alone 	grounds 	to
invalidate 	his 	Award. 	In 	substance, 	Arbitrator 	Smalley 	reviewed
the 	parties’ 	arguments, 	analyzed 	contract 	language, 	and 	applied
and distinguished past arbitral precedent. See id. at 151-57. Thus,
the 	Arbitrator 	did 	not 	merely 	apply 	his 	own 	brand 	of 	industrial
justice to the Award.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	Award 	draws 	its
essence 	from 	the 	agreement. 	The 	Arbitrator 	did 	not 	ignore 	past
arbitration decisions or fail to apply express contract language.
To the contrary, he analyzed the agreement and construed its terms
in 	accordance 	with 	established 	arbitral 	precedent. 	Arbitrator
Smalley 	did 	his 	job, 	and 	the 	Court 	will 	refrain 	from 	discerning
whether 	he 	did 	it 	correctly 	or 	whether 	the 	Court 	would 	have 	done
it differently. The record before the Court does not support this
Court taking the drastic step to overturn this arbitration award.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	above, 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for
Summary 	Judgment 	is 	DENIED 	[ECF 	No. 	12], 	and 	Defendants’ 	Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED [ECF No. 14]. The arbitration award
is CONFIRMED. It is further ORDERED that this action be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.
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It is so ORDERED.
The 	Clerk 	is 	directed 	to 	transmit 	copies 	of 	this 	Memorandum
Opinion and Order to counsel of record by the CM/ECF system.
DATED: August 19, 2026
____________________________
THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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