Luecke, James et al v. Casey, David et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JAMES ARTHUR LUECKE and
TALIA DELCARMEN LUECKE,
Plaintiffs, 	OPINION AND ORDER
v.
26-cv-14-wmc
DAVID CASEY, Secretary of the Wisconsin
Department of Revenue, in his official capacity;
HEATHER M. MORISSEY, in her official and
personal capacities; SAUNDRA (last name unknown),
in her official and personal capacities; and KRISTINE
(last name unknown), in her official and personal
capacities,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs James Arther Luecke and Talia DelCarmen Luecke, who are representing
themselves, have filed a civil rights complaint against David Casey, in his official capacity
as Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Heather M. Morrissey, in her
personal and official capacity, and two other defendants identified by their first names only
as Saundra and Kristine, in their personal and official capacities. 	(Dkt. #1.) 	Plaintiffs
have also filed an emergency motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order. (Dkt. #2.)
Pursuant to W.D. Wis. Administrative Order 421, the court is required to confirm subject
matter jurisdiction before issuing summons. (Dkt. #3.) For reasons explained below, the
court confirms that plaintiffs satisfy the federal-question statute and that jurisdiction is
proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Accordingly, the clerk’s office shall issue and plaintiffs
may serve a subpoena on defendants along with their complaint, motion for TRO, and this
opinion and order. However, plaintiffs are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.
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ALLEGATIONS OF FACT1
Plaintiffs James Arthur Luecke and Talia DelCarmen Luecke (the “Luecke’s”) are a
married couple who reside in Land O’Lakes, Wisconsin. 	Defendant David Casey is the
Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue (“DOR”). 	Defendant Heather M.
Morrisey is an attorney who works in the DOR Office of General Counsel. 	Defendants
Saundra and Kristine, whose last names are unknown to plaintiffs at this time, work for
DOR in an unspecified capacity.
Shortly after noon on October 3, 2025, Saundra and Kristine seized funds belonging
to the Luecke’s from Headwaters State Bank, which is a federally insured financial
institution located in Land O’Lakes. 	According to the Luecke’s, Saundra and Kristine
refused repeated requests for their “lawful and legal identity, employee numbers, and the
identity of the lawful and legal state authorizing official[.]” The Luecke’s contend that the
seizure was executed “without a warrant, court order, or pre-deprivation hearing,” and in
reliance 	upon 	a 	“facially 	defective, 	unsigned, 	unauthenticated 	and 	unverified 	levy
enforcement instrument that did not satisfy constitutional requirements.”
On October 4, 2025, the Luecke’s reported the unlawful seizure to the Vilas County
Sheriff’s Office. 	The Luecke’s then sent a copy of the Sheriff’s report to the DOR,
Morrissey, and the Wisconsin Attorney General.
1 In addressing any pro se litigant’s complaint, the court must read the allegations generously,
drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor. 	Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). Unless otherwise indicated, the facts in this section, which are taken
from the complaint (dkt. #1), the supplemental declaration from Mr. Luecke (dkt. #4), and
supporting exhibits (dkt. #4-1), are assumed to be true for purposes of this order.
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On October 25, 2025, the Luecke’s sent notice of the “wrongful bank levy
enforcement instrument” to DOR, and gave the agency until November 2, 2025, to correct
the error. 	“Defendants” reportedly acknowledged receipt of the notice, but did not
respond, and have retained the Luecke’s funds.
The seizure apparently stems from an adverse decision against the Luecke’s by the
Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission. 	According to a corrected ruling and order dated
October 22, 2025, the Luecke’s filed a petition for review from two Notices of Office Audit
Amount Due by the DOR, one for tax year 2019 for the amount of $4,883.11, and one
for tax years 2021 and 2022 for the amount of $530.74.2 The Luecke’s filed petitions for
redetermination, which the DOR denied in a Notice of Action dated June 20, 2024,
advising the Luecke’s that they had 60 days to file a petition for review with the Tax
Appeals Commission. 	After the Luecke’s filed a petition for review on October 1, 2024,
Morrissey, who represented DOR during these proceedings, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for review as untimely filed. 	The Tax Appeals Commission granted that motion
after finding the Luecke’s did not file their petition for review within 60 days after the
DOR’s Notice of Action as required by law. In their order, the Tax Appeals Commission
advised the Luecke’s of their right to appeal by: (1) filing a petition for rehearing before
the Tax Appeals Commission within 20 days; or (2) filing a petition for judicial review in
2 A court may take judicial notice of matters in the public record, including pleadings and orders in
previous court cases. 	Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th
Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). The court takes judicial notice of the October 22, 2025 order, which
is a corrected version of a previous order that issued on March 26, 2025, and was re-issued to
provide the appeal options available to the parties. The order in Docket No.24-I-211 is available
on the State of Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission website at https://taxappeals.wi.gov (last
accessed Jan. 12, 2026).
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the appropriate circuit court within 30 days.
The Luecke’s did not file an appeal using either procedure outlined by the Tax
Appeals Commission in its October 22, 2025 order. 	Instead, seeking to obtain an
emergency administrative hearing to recover their seized funds, the Luecke’s contacted the
Tax Appeals Commission and were told by unidentified staff to file their emergency request
with the DOR directly. And so, on November 12, 2025, the Luecke’s submitted a formal
request for an expedited administrative hearing with the DOR. 	After no hearing was
scheduled, the Luecke’s submitted a direct request to the Wisconsin Division of Hearings
and Appeals (“DHA”) on December 2, 2025.3 The following day, DHA reportedly advised
the Luecke’s that neither DHA nor the Tax Appeals Commission had jurisdiction, and that
DOR was responsible for scheduling any hearing.
On December 20, 2025, the Luecke’s served a “Notice of Continuing Constitutional
Violations and Failure to Provide Emergency Post-Deprivation Hearing” on both DOR and
the Wisconsin Attorney General. On December 22, 2025, Morrissey responded in writing
to the Leuke’s November 12 request for an expedited administrative hearing, stating that
DOR would not be scheduling such a hearing because the Luecke’s had failed to follow the
Tax Appeals Commission’s instructions for filing an appeal, which were provided to them
in the order dated October 22, 2025. (Dkt. #4-1, at 1-3.)
Subsequently, on January 7, 2026, the Luecke’s filed their civil rights complaint in
3 The DHA is a quasi-judicial, independent entity created to hold administrative hearings for
selected state agencies. 	See State of Wisconsin, Department of Administration website, at
https://doa.wi/gov/Pages/About DOAHearings And Appeals.aspx (last accessed Jan. 12, 2026).
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this case against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their bank funds
were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and that they
were also denied both substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 	Citing Mr. Luecke’s health issues and the need for financial resources to
ensure reliable transportation to and from medical appointments, the Luecke’s request a
temporary restraining order to enjoin defendants from retaining their seized bank funds
and seek immediate release of those funds. (Dkt. #2, at 3.)
OPINION
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the court must satisfy itself that jurisdiction exists. 	Here,
plaintiffs allege that the defendants wrongfully seized their funds in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. This allegation, which is presumed true for
purposes of jurisdictional review, is arguably actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
imposes liability on any “person” who, acting under color of state law, violates the
Constitution or federal law. Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th 507, 519 (7th Cir.
2024). Thus, plaintiffs meet the criteria for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-85 (1946) (A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331
jurisdiction when he pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of
the United States.). 	Having confirmed subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the court
will direct the clerk of court to issue summons, which plaintiffs will be responsible for
serving in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
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II. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a TRO
Plaintiffs seek an ex parte temporary restraining order in the form of an injunction
requiring the immediate return of their seized funds and prohibiting defendants from
“further enforcement actions absent a constitutionally valid levy enforcement instrument
and due process.” 	(Dkt. #2, at 3.) 	Injunctive relief is “an exercise of very far-reaching
power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” 	Cassell v. Snyders,
990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021). To obtain such extraordinary relief, the party seeking
the preliminary injunction carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. 	See id.;
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). 	Specifically, a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must demonstrate “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
It is evident from the pleadings, the exhibits, and available public records that
plaintiffs were involved in administrative proceedings with the DOR before their funds
were seized. 	As a result, it appears that plaintiffs had at least some notice of a problem
and an opportunity to be heard, even if they failed to avail themselves of that opportunity
properly or were otherwise unable to raise additional objections, which they do not
describe. Likewise, to the extent that plaintiffs claim their funds were seized pursuant to
a facially invalid levy enforcement instrument, they do not provide a copy of that
instrument or establish its invalidity. 	Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order must be denied because they do not provide enough detail or evidentiary
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support establishing that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. 	Should
plaintiffs believe that they can establish these things, they may still bring a motion for
preliminary injunction consistent with the requirements of this court, which are attached.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Having confirmed that subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
the clerk of court is directed to issue summons and extend plaintiffs’ deadline
for service accordingly.
2) Plaintiffs will be responsible for serving the complaint and summons pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
3) Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order (dkt. #2) is DENIED.
Entered this 13th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
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