Scott, Erin v. Diehn, Daniel et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ERIN LYNN SCOTT,
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
25-cv-990-wmc
HON. DANIEL S. DIEHN, PENNY J. PRECOUR,
DR. NINA BARTELL, JACKSON COUNTY
FAMILY COURT, and ANTHONY EVERS,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Erin Scott, representing herself, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking
monetary and injunctive relief against a variety of Jackson County officials. (Dkt. #1.)
She alleges that defendants deprived her of her constitutional rights to associate with her
children, to refrain from self-incrimination, and to due process of law throughout her
ongoing family court proceedings. Plaintiff additionally moves for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against all defendants, seeking to prevent
them from entering a default judgment and other penalties against her at a family court
hearing on January 9, 2026. (Dkt. #11.) For the reasons described below, plaintiff may
not proceed against any named defendant, and the court will dismiss this case with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
OPINION
A case may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), regardless of
whether the plaintiff has paid the full filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis. See
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (the federal in forma pauperis
statute “authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little
Case: 3:25-cv-00990-wmc Document #: 12 Filed: 01/09/26 Page 1 of 5

2
doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”);
Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (“district courts have the power to screen
complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non‑prisoners alike, regardless of fee status”);
Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample
authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save
everyone time and legal expense. This is so even when the plaintiff has paid all fees for
filing and service”). Likewise, under its inherent authority, the court may review any
lawsuit filed by a pro se litigant for subject-matter jurisdiction before the named defendants
are served in the case. Administrative Order 421 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 2024); Rowe, 196
F.3d at 783. Here, this case must be dismissed for several reasons.
As a threshold matter, the court cannot provide injunctive relief in an ongoing state
court proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Federal courts must abstain
where its jurisdiction would intrude into ongoing civil proceedings “that implicate a State’s
interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts,” including ongoing family court
proceedings. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013); see also Doe v. Lindell,
No. 22-1666, 2023 WL 196467, at *3 (7th Cir. Jan. 17, 2023) (Younger abstention
appropriate where family court litigant had adequate opportunity to raise her claims in the
state court, including on appeal, and failed to allege “extraordinary circumstances” that
would warrant an exception to Younger abstention.) Plaintiff should raise her objections to
the ongoing family court proceedings in family court or the state appellate courts, as
appropriate.
Case: 3:25-cv-00990-wmc Document #: 12 Filed: 01/09/26 Page 2 of 5

3
Moreover, even if the court could address plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff has not named
any defendant that can be sued in this court. Plaintiff may not proceed against Judge
Diehn, as he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his actions during family court
proceedings. Myrick v. Greenwood, 856 F.3d 487, 488–89 (7th Cir. 2017). Judges have
absolute immunity from liability for damages for acts taken in a judicial capacity, and
plaintiff only alleges in her complaint that Judge Diehn’s official acts violated her
constitutional rights. Id. Judicial immunity applies “whether or not the judge erred in
conducting the litigation,” and “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.” Id.
at 488.
Nor can plaintiff proceed with a claim against Guardian ad litem Penny Precour, nor
court-appointed expert Dr. Nina Bartell, as they are also absolutely immune from liability
for damages for their actions taken at the court’s direction throughout a family court
proceeding. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Guardians ad litem and
court-appointed experts, including psychiatrists, are absolutely immune from liability for
damages when they act at the court’s direction”); see also Paige K.B. v. Molepske, 580 N.W.2d
289 (Wis. 1998) (affirming immunity to a guardian ad litem and noting that “quasi-judicial
immunity extends to non-judicial officers when they are performing acts intimately related
to the judicial process”). Again, plaintiff only alleges that her rights were violated
throughout her pending family court proceedings, entitling Precour and Bartell to absolute
immunity.
Plaintiff also may not proceed with a claim against the Jackson County Family
Court, as the court is part of a building, not a person, so it does not have the legal capacity
Case: 3:25-cv-00990-wmc Document #: 12 Filed: 01/09/26 Page 3 of 5

4
to be sued for violating plaintiff’s rights under § 1983. See Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666
F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012); Whiting v. Marathon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 382 F.3d 700,
704 (7th Cir. 2004). Even construing plaintiff’s complaint to allege a claim against Jackson
County itself, as a municipality the County would only be liable if the harm resulted from
a policy or custom, and she does not allege that she was harmed as the result of a policy or
custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Thomas
v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010).
Finally, Plaintiff may not proceed with a claim against Governor Evers because
plaintiff does not allege facts showing that Evers had any involvement with an alleged
constitutional violation. Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2018); see also
Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Individual liability under
[42 U.S.C.] § 1983 . . . requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.”). Likewise, individuals are not liable for their general supervisory role over
others. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Public officials do not
have a free-floating obligation to put things to rights.”). Thus, to the extent that plaintiff
sues Governor Evers as a general supervisor over state agencies such as DHHS who work
with the family court system, her claim fails.
The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against dismissing a pro se plaintiff's case without
giving the plaintiff a chance to amend the complaint. Felton v. City of Chicago, 827 F.3d
632, 636 (7th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the court is dismissing this action with prejudice
and without leave to amend, since any amended pleading would be futile under the
circumstances alleged. See Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009)
Case: 3:25-cv-00990-wmc Document #: 12 Filed: 01/09/26 Page 4 of 5

5
(“courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be
futile”).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
is DENIED. (Dkt. # 11.)
2) This case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk of court is directed to close
this case.
Entered this 9th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
Case: 3:25-cv-00990-wmc Document #: 12 Filed: 01/09/26 Page 5 of 5