Hall et al v. Hall et al

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
ELSA HALL as PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE of the ESTATE OF
ETHLYN LOUIS HALL, and ELSA Hall
as TRUSTEE of the ETHLYN LOUISE
HALL FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAMUEL H. HALL, Jr. and HALL &
GRIFFITH, P.C.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
) Civil No. 2011-54
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
SAMUEL H. HALL, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELSA HALL,
Defendant.
)
)
)
) Civil No. 2013-95
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ATTORNEYS:
Andrew C. Simpson, Esq.
Emily A. Shoup, Esq.
Law Offices of Andrew Simpson
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For Elsa Emily Hall in her representative capacity and as
trustee.
Carl A. Beckstedt, III, Esq.
Beckstedt and Associate
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Elsa Emily Hall in her personal capacity.
Robert L. King, Esq.
Law Offices of Robert L. King
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 1 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 2
For Samuel Hall and Hall and Griffith, PC.
Marie E. Thomas-Griffith, Esq.
Hall & Griffith, P.C., PC.
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
For Samuel Hall and Hall and Griffith, PC.
ORDER
GÓMEZ, J.
Before the Court is Samuel H. Hall, Jr., and Hall &
Griffith P.C.’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s March
30, 2016, order granting Elsa Hall’s motion for a new trial in
Civil No. 2013-95.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At all material times, until approximately April 19, 2002,
Ethlyn Louise Hall (“Ethlyn Hall”)1 was the owner of the plot of
land known as Parcel 17, Estate Peter Bay, St. John, U.S. Virgin
Islands (“the Property”). On or about April 19, 2002, Ethlyn
Hall subdivided the Property into separate sub-plots. Ethlyn
Hall transferred ownership of certain of the plots to her
children and grandchildren as gifts. Specifically, she executed
1 Ethlyn Hall was born on June 6, 1916. She was 94 years old as of the date
that the Complaint was filed.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 2 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 3
a Deed of Gift, granting to her son, Attorney Samuel H. Hall,
Jr. (“Samuel Hall”)2, the real property described as:
Parcel No. 17-5, Estate Peter Bay, No. 2aa Maho Bay
Quarter, St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands consisting of
1.161 acre, more or less.
(“Parcel 17-5”). She also made the following gifts:
Parcel 17-2 to her daughter, Elsa Hall;
Parcel 17-4 to her daughter, Phyllis Hall Brin; and
Parcel 17-6 to her granddaughter, Yassin Hall Young.
(“the Gifts”). Samuel Hall represented his mother in the
aforementioned transactions, drawing up the legal documents to
accomplish the gifts and recording the same.
From April 19, 2002, until approximately December 15, 2010,
Ethlyn Hall was the owner of the plot of land known as Parcel
17-7, Estate Peter Bay on St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands (“Parcel
17-7”).
On January 24, 2003, Ethlyn Hall, as landlord, entered into
a Ground Lease (the “2003 Ground Lease”) with Andrews St. John
Trust (“Andrews”), as tenant. The lease was drafted by Samuel
Hall. Pursuant to the 2003 Ground Lease, Ethlyn Hall leased
Parcel 17-7 to Andrews for a period of fifty years. The lease
provided that Andrews was to design and build two cottages at
2 At all relevant times, until sometime in 2010, Samuel Hall served as Ethlyn
Hall’s attorney.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 3 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 4
Andrews’s expense. One cottage was to be built on Parcel 17-6
(the “17-6 Cottage”). It would be owned by Yassin Hall Young.
The other cottage was to be built on Parcel 17-4 (the “17-4
Cottage”). It would be owned by Phyllis Hall Brin.
The 2003 Ground Lease provided that, if the 17-6 Cottage
was not completed within two years from the date of the lease,
Andrews was to pay rent of $5,000 per month ($2,500 to Yassin
Hall Young and $2,500 to Phyllis Hall Brin), until the date of
completion. If the 17-4 Cottage was not completed within four
years of the date of the lease, Andrews was to pay $2,500 per
month to Phyllis Hall Brin until the date of completion.
Additionally, if the two cottages were not completed in the
requisite time, Ethlyn Hall, Phyllis Hall Brin, and Yassin Hall
Young retained the right to seek injunctive relief and to sue
for specific performance. The lease also provided that the three
of them would be granted a first priority lien on any
improvements constructed on Parcel 17-7 by Andrews, and on any
income derived by Andrews from the use and enjoyment of Parcel
17-7.
Also under the 2003 Ground Lease, Andrews was obligated to
reimburse Ethlyn Hall for all property taxes on Parcel 17-7,
including all property taxes on any improvements thereon.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 4 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 5
Construction of the cottages on Parcels 17-4 and 17-6 was
not completed by the time allotted in the 2003 Ground Lease. As
such, Andrews became obligated to pay rent. Samuel Hall
collected the rent for his mother under the 2003 Ground Lease.
He also managed Andrews’s reimbursement of property taxes to
Ethlyn Hall and Andrews’s construction of the cottages.
At some point in time during the term of the 2003 Ground
Lease, changes were made to the design of the 17-6 Cottage,
substantially increasing its size. Ethlyn Hall was aware of the
changes.
On August 3, 2007, Samuel Hall drafted, and Ethlyn Hall
allegedly signed, a document which allowed Samuel Hall to halt
or postpone construction on the 17-4 Cottage. The document
allowed Samuel Hall to redirect the 2003 Ground Lease rental
income from being used for the construction of the cottage on
Parcel 17-4 to being used for the construction of a house on
Parcel 17-5, owned by Samuel Hall.
On the following day, August 4, 2007, Ethlyn Hall allegedly
signed a Power of Attorney in favor of Samuel Hall. The Power of
Attorney was not notarized. That same day, Samuel Hall drafted,
and Ethlyn Hall allegedly signed, a document purporting to be an
Assignment of Interest. Pursuant to the document, Ethlyn Hall
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 5 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 6
assigned all of her interest in the 2003 Ground Lease to Samuel
Hall in consideration for his assistance with her future care
and upkeep.
On August 13, 2008, Ethlyn Hall signed another Power of
Attorney in favor of Samuel Hall. The document was notarized by
Samuel Hall’s law partner, Marie Thomas-Griffith.
In August of 2010, Ethlyn Hall sent letters to Samuel Hall
requesting that he provide her with a complete accounting of her
financial obligations with regard to Parcel 17-7. She also
requested that Samuel Hall provide her with information
regarding the reimbursement of property taxes paid on Parcel
17-7. Samuel Hall did not respond to Ethlyn Hall’s requests for
information.
Thereafter, Ethlyn Hall allegedly became aware that, on or
about October 28, 2009, Samuel Hall, purporting to act
“individually and as attorney-in-fact for” Ethlyn Hall, entered
into an “Early Termination of Lease, Mutual Release and Estoppel
Certificate” (the “Release”), with Andrews. The Release
discharged Andrews of any further obligation under the terms of
the 2003 Ground Lease. Ethlyn Hall alleged that she was neither
aware of, nor did she otherwise consent to or approve of the
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 6 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 7
transaction at the time that Samuel Hall purportedly undertook
it on her behalf.
Ethlyn Hall also allegedly became aware that Samuel Hall,
purporting to act as her attorney-in-fact, entered into a lease
agreement dated December 2, 2008 (the “2008 Lease”), with the
Talton Family Trust (“Talton”). Under the 2008 Lease, Parcel
17-7 was leased to Talton for a period of 75 years, with the
rent payment to be made in an $800,000 lump sum. The lump sum
was payable to Samuel Hall, as “agent and attorney in fact” for
Ethlyn Hall. The lease agreement obligated Talton to reimburse
Ethlyn Hall for all property taxes on Parcel 17-7.
On or before December 15, 2010, Ethlyn Hall discharged
Samuel Hall and his firm as counsel. Thereafter, she retained
new counsel and created the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust
(“the Trust”). On December 15, 2010, Ethlyn Hall transferred all
of her property to the Trust. Ethlyn Hall named herself the sole
trustee of the Trust.
Subsequently, Ethlyn Hall received a letter from Samuel
Hall, dated February 1, 2011. The letter informed Ethlyn Hall
that the 2008 Lease generated a capital gain in 2010 totaling
$1,070,000. The letter explained that the capital gain was
subject to a capital gains tax of 15%. In the letter, Samuel
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 7 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 8
Hall stated that Ethlyn Hall must pay the capital gains tax in
the full amount. He further explained that he, along with
Phyllis Hall Brin and Yassin Hall Young, would reimburse Ethlyn
Hall for her capital gains tax payment.
Thereafter, on May 9, 2011, Ethlyn Hall, individually and
as Trustee of the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust (the “Trust”),
filed a six-count complaint against Samuel Hall and his law
firm, Hall and Griffith, P.C., in Civil No. 2011-54 (the “Trust
Action”). Count One alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against Samuel Hall. Count Two alleged a claim for legal
malpractice against Samuel Hall and Hall & Griffith, P.C. Count
Three alleged an action for fraud against Samuel Hall. Count
Four asked the Court to order an accounting. Count Five asked
the Court to establish a constructive trust for allegedly
diverted proceeds and other monies. Count Six requested that the
Court impose an equitable lien on Parcel 17-5.
While the Trust Action was pending, Ethlyn Hall passed
away. Elsa Hall, as successor trustee to the Trust and as
personal representative of Ethlyn Hall’s estate (the “Trustee”),
amended the complaint. The amended complaint contains ten
counts. Count One alleges a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against Samuel Hall and Hall & Griffith, P.C., arising out of
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 8 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 9
the attorney-client relationship. Count Two alleges a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against Samuel Hall arising out of a power
of attorney. Count Three alleges a legal malpractice claim
against Samuel Hall and Hall & Griffith, P.C. Counts Four and
Five allege conversion claims against Samuel Hall and Hall &
Griffith, P.C. Count Six alleges fraud against Samuel Hall.
Count Seven alleges an unjust enrichment claim against Samuel
Hall. Count Eight seeks an accounting. Count Nine seeks a
constructive trust. Count Ten seeks an equitable lien.
Samuel Hall then filed a nine-count counterclaim against
the Trustee in the Trust Action. He also filed a nine-count
complaint against Elsa Hall in her personal capacity (“Elsa
Hall”) in Civil No. 2013-95 (the “Samuel Hall Action”). Count
One alleges a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Elsa Hall.
Count Two alleges an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim against Elsa Hall. Count Three alleges a fraud
claim against Elsa Hall. Count Four alleges civil conspiracy and
tortious interference claims against Elsa Hall, and others.
Count Five alleges a conversion claim against Elsa Hall. Count
Six seeks a mandatory injunction against Elsa Hall. Count Seven
requests an accounting from Elsa Hall and the Trust. Count Eight
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 9 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 10
asserts a constructive trust. Count Nine asserts a claim for
tortious interference against Elsa Hall.
The Trust Action and the Samuel Hall Action were
consolidated. Prior to trial, the Court dismissed the
counterclaims in the Trust Action. The Court also dismissed all
counts other than Counts Two, Four, and Nine in the Samuel Hall
Action.
The Samuel Hall Action and the Trust Action proceeded to
trial on January 12, 2015. At trial, the Court dismissed Counts
Four and Nine of the Samuel Hall Action. As such, the only claim
asserted by Samuel Hall that reached the jury was Count Two of
the complaint in the Samuel Hall Action.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Samuel Hall and
Hall & Griffith, P.C., in the Trust Action. The jury also found
in Samuel Hall’s favor on Count Two in the Samuel Hall Action--
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress--and
awarded him $500,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in
punitive damages.
Thereafter, Elsa Hall filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law directed at the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim and a motion for new trial directed at
the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In her
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 10 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 11
motion for judgment as a matter of law, Elsa Hall argued that
she was entitled to judgment because tortious interference with
the parent-child relationship is not actionable under Virgin
Islands law. In her motion for a new trial, Elsa Hall argued
that she was entitled to a new trial because the Court erred in
making several evidentiary rulings.
On March 30, 2016, the Court (1) denied Elsa Hall’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) granted her motion for
a new trial.
In its March 30, 2016, order, the Court first observed
that,
when protection of an identified emotional interest
is removed from tort liability, claims for
infliction of emotional harm under this Chapter are
unavailable for conduct that would have infringed
that interest. For example, the torts of criminal
conversation and alienation of affection protected
a spouse's specific interest in his or her partner's
remaining monogamous and a more general interest in
family harmony. In jurisdictions that have abolished
those torts, an actor is not subject to liability
under this Chapter for conduct that would have
subjected the actor to liability under those torts.
However, if the actor's conduct goes beyond that
comprising the abolished tort, the actor may be
subject to liability.
Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No. 315 at 12 (quoting Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 47 cmt. o (2012)).
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 11 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 12
The Court held that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court would
not recognize a tort for alienation of a parent’s affection
where one “entice[s]” a parent to leave their child. Id. at 16.,
20. Accordingly, conduct that would constitute that tort was not
actionable as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
harm. Id. The Court also held that the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court would recognize a tort where one “abducts” or “by similar
intentional action compels a [parent] to be asunder from [their
child].” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 684(1)
(1977)). Accordingly, such conduct was actionable as a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional harm. Id. at 20. Thus, the
Court held that “the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim is partially barred.” Id. at 22.
After reviewing the evidence presented during trial, the
Court found it “clear that the jury could have reached its
verdict relying on the barred conduct, the unbarred conduct, or
both.” Id. at 22 n.5. Moreover, “neither the Court’s
instructions nor the verdict allow[ed] the Court to determine
whether the jury’s verdict was reached on unbarred conduct.” Id.
at 22. Accordingly, in a March 30, 2016, order, the Court
granted Elsa Hall’s motion for a new trial. Id.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 12 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 13
Samuel Hall now asks the Court to reconsider its March 30,
2016, order.
II. DISCUSSION
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.3 permits motions for
reconsideration only when there is (1) an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to
correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. LRCi 7.3; see
also Max's Seafood Café by Lou–Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir.1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.1995)). A motion
for reconsideration “shall be filed within fourteen (14) days
after entry of the order or decision unless the time is extended
by the Court.” LRCi 7.3.
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d
Cir.1985). “Such motions are not substitutes for appeals, and
are not to be used ‘as a vehicle for registering disagreement
with the court's initial decision, for rearguing matters already
addressed by the court, or for raising arguments that could have
been raised before but were not.’” Cabrita Point Dev., Inc. v.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 13 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 14
Evans, 52 V.I. 968, 975 (D.V.I. 2009) (quoting Bostic v. AT & T
of the V.I., 312 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (D.V.I. 2004)).
In the context of a motion to reconsider, “manifest
injustice ‘generally means that the Court overlooked some
dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it.’”
Id. (quoting In re Rose, No. 06–1818(JLP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64622, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007)). Manifest injustice has
also been defined as “‘an error in the trial court that is
direct, obvious, and observable.’” Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc.
v. Wells, 371 F.2d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 974 (7th ed. 1999)). “[M]ost cases . . . use the term
‘manifest injustice’ to describe the result of plain error.”
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1425 (5th
Cir. 1996).
III. ANALYSIS
In his motion for reconsideration, Samuel Hall argues that
the Court committed clear error in ordering a new trial in this
matter. His arguments can be grouped into three categories.
First, Samuel Hall argues that the Court erred in ordering a new
trial based on an argument that Elsa Hall did not raise in her
motion for a new trial. Second, Samuel Hall argues that the
Court erred in its interpretation of the intentional infliction
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 14 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 15
of emotional distress tort. Third, Samuel Hall argues that the
Court erred when it found that there was sufficient evidence for
the jury have to reached its verdict relying on the barred
conduct. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
A. The Grant of a New Trial Based on Arguments not Made in
Elsa Hall’s Motion for a New Trial
Samuel Hall first argues that “[t]he issue of a partial bar
was never pled, briefed or argued by [Elsa Hall] prior to trial,
and was never raised by [Elsa Hall] in her post-trial motions
for relief.” Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No. 317 at 7. Instead,
Samuel Hall asserts, “[t]he partial tort bar was raised sua
sponte by the Court.” Id. at 8. As such, Samuel Hall claims he
was entitled to notice that the Court was considering a partial
bar and an opportunity to be heard on that issue.
Judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 should be
granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and giving [the nonmovant] the
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is
insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find
liability.” Lightening Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153,
1166 (3d Cir. 1993). “‘The question is not whether there is
literally no evidence supporting the unsuccessful party, but
whether there is evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 15 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 16
properly have found its verdict.’” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d
199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Gomez v. Allegheny Health
Servs. Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995)).
When a party files a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the party “may include an alternative or joint
request for a new trial under Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
When ruling on the motion, “the court may: (1) allow judgment on
the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new
trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Amer. Bearing Co. v. Litton
Indust., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 948 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining
that, where a party “made an alternative motion for a new trial
. . . , the motion is tested by the same by the same standards
that would apply if the motion were independently made under
rule 59” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the absence of
an alternative or joint motion for a new trial, however, a
district court may only order a new trial if the moving party is
otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Goldsmith
v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 767 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that Rule 50 “gives a court discretion to order a
new trial absent a motion therefor only where the moving party
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 16 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 17
otherwise would have been entitled to judgment notwithstanding
the verdict”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (“Rule 59”) provides
that, on motion, a new trial may be granted on some or all of
the issues that were tried to the jury. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(a)(1). A court must grant a motion for a new trial when there
are nonconstitutional errors in a civil suit unless “it is
highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of
the case.” See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916,
917 (3d Cir. 1985).
Rule 59(d) provides that,
[n]o later than 28 days after the entry of judgment,
the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any
reason that would justify granting one on a party's
motion. After giving the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the court may grant a timely
motion for a new trial for a reason not stated in
the motion. In either event, the court must specify
the reasons in its order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(d). The 28-day limit applies only where a
district court sua sponte orders a new trial in the absence of a
motion. See Lesende v. Borrero, 752 F.3d 324, 334 (3d Cir. 2014)
(discussing distinction between “first and second sentence of
Rule 59(d)” and explaining that 28-day limitation applies only
where the court sua sponte orders a new trial, not where the
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 17 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 18
court grants a motion for a new trial for reasons not stated in
a timely motion).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 (“Rule 7”) provides the
standard for determining whether a party stated a particular
reason in their motion for a new trial. See Harkins v. Ford
Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 1970) (explaining that
Rule 7(b) is “the relevant rule” for determining “[t]he degree
of specificity with which reasons for a new trial must be
stated”). Rule 7 provides that motions must “state with
particularity the grounds for seeking [an] order” and “state the
relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B)-(C). “Rule 7(b)(1)
does not require ritualistic detail.” Kelly v. Moore, 376 F.3d
481, 484 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rather, as the Third Circuit has explained, the grounds for a
new trial need only “be stated with sufficient specificity to
put the opposing party on notice as to the reasons put forward
for granting a new trial.” Harkins, 437 F.2d at 277. If the
moving party does not state a reason with sufficient specificity
to put the opposing party on notice, a district court may
nevertheless grant the motions on that ground. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(d). In that case, however, the district court itself must
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 18 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 19
put the opposing party on notice and afford an opportunity to be
heard. Id.
The purpose of Rule 7(b) “is to afford notice of the
grounds and prayer of the motion to both the court and to the
opposing party, providing that party with a meaningful
opportunity to respond and the court with enough information to
process the motion correctly.” Strain v. Payette Sch. Dist. No.
371J, 134 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The particularity requirement should not be applied
in an overly technical fashion when the purpose behind the rule
is not jeopardized.” Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336
F.3d 789, 793 (8th Cir. 2003). For this reason, “[c]ourts
routinely take into consideration other closely filed pleadings
to determine whether sufficient notice of the grounds for the
motion are given and the opposing party has a fair opportunity
to respond.” Id. at 793-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The circumstances presented in this case are somewhat
unique. Elsa Hall filed separate motions for judgment as a
matter of law and for a new trial, each raising distinct
arguments. The Court denied Elsa Hall’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law and granted her motion for a new trial.
Significantly, the Court granted the motion for a new trial on
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 19 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 20
grounds that were explicitly stated in Elsa Hall’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law but not in her motion for a new
trial.
The Court is satisfied that Elsa Hall’s joint motions
satisfied the purposes of Rule 7(b) and afforded Samuel Hall an
opportunity to respond to that argument. Indeed, the arguments
Samuel Hall raises in his motion for reconsideration largely
mirror those he made in opposition to Elsa Hall’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law. Compare Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No.
296 at 6 (“[F]ederal courts have long recognized that the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from
the tort of alienation of affection, and is within their
diversity jurisdiction to decide.”), and id. at 4 (“Plaintiff’s
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was
caused, not by alienation of affection, but by the Defendant’s
intentional and malicious desire to cause Plaintiff severe
emotional distress and reputational harm in order to defeat any
attempt by him to prevent her exploitation of her mother’s
income and assets.”), with Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No. 317 at 12
(“Federal courts have long recognized that tort suits for
interference with custody are distinct from the tort of
alienation of affection and is within their diversity
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 20 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 21
jurisdiction to decide.”), and id. at 12 (“Plaintiff’s IIED was
caused, not by alienation of affection, but by the Defendant’s
intentional and malicious desire to cause Plaintiff severe
emotional distress and reputational harm in order to defeat any
attempt by him to prevent her exploitation of their mother and
her income and assets.”). Even if the Court’s grant of a new
trial is characterized as the “grant [of] a timely motion for a
new trial for a reason not stated in the motion,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(d), Samuel Hall had sufficient notice and opportunity to
be heard on that reason through Elsa Hall’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court finds no clear error or manifest
injustice.
B. The Court’s Holding that Claims for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress are Partially Barred
The Court next addresses Samuel Hall’s argument that the
Court erred in holding that intentional infliction of emotional
distress was partially barred in the Virgin Islands. Primarily,
Samuel Hall argues that “the Court inadvertently grafted onto
the prima facie elements of the tort an additional element of a
partial bar.” See Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No. 317 at 11.
This argument misstates the Court’s holding. As discussed
above, when a jurisdiction abolishes the torts of criminal
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 21 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 22
conversation and alienation of affection, “an actor is not
subject to liability [under torts imposing liability for
emotional harm] for conduct that would have subjected the actor
to liability under [criminal conversation or alienation of
affection].” Restatement (Third) Torts § 47 cmt. o (2012); see
also Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 1998) (“An
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot
be maintained where the underlying claim for alienation of
affection is not actionable and the emotional distress is the
alleged consequence of the same acts which caused the child to
separate from the parent.” (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). In its March 30, 2016, order, the Court held
that the Virgin Islands Supreme Court would not recognize a tort
for alienation of a parent’s affection. Thus, conduct
constituting that tort could not form the basis for a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court did not
“graft . . . an additional element,” Civil No. 2013-95, ECF No.
317 at 11, on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
harm. Rather, the Court found that a category of conduct was
removed from liability under that tort. The Court finds no error
in this holding.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 22 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 23
C. Evidence of Abduction and Enticement
Finally, Samuel Hall argues that the Court erred in finding
that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to
have reached its verdict based on the barred conduct. In
essence, Samuel Hall argues that the weight of the evidence
presented to the jury was in his favor.
This does not address the standard required by Rule 59.
Under Rule 59, when the Court finds nonconstitutional errors in
a civil suit, the Court must grant a motion for a new trial
unless “it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the
outcome of the case.” See McQueeney, 779 F.2d at 917. Having
reviewed the record, the Court remains convinced that the jury
could have found in Samuel Hall’s favor because Elsa Hall
enticed Ethlyn Hall to leave, abducted her, or both. Because
neither the verdict, nor the jury instructions allow the Court
to resolve this question, a new trial was appropriate. See
Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79,
106-07 (3d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court finds no clear
error or manifest injustice.
Having found no grounds under which to reconsider the March
30, 2016, order granting Elsa Hall a new trial, the Court will
deny Samuel Hall’s motion to reconsider.
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 23 of 24

Elsa Hall v. Samuel Hall
Civil No. 2011-54
Samuel Hall v. Elsa Hall
Civil No. 2013-95
Order
Page 24
The premises considered, it is hereby
ORDERED that Samuel Hall’s motion to reconsider docketed in
Civil No. 2013-95 at ECF Number 316 is DENIED.
S\
Curtis V. Gómez
District Judge
Case: 3:11-cv-00054-RAM-GAT Document #: 463 Filed: 03/30/17 Page 24 of 24