FirstBank Puerto Rico v. Christopher

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
FIRSTBANK PUERTO RICO, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	)
) 	Civil Action No. 2013-0093
CARL F. CHRISTOPHER a/k/a 	)
Asarkasaamsu Raasar Ra II Karapernuntu 	)
Herishetapaheru a/k/a Nsw Setep N Ra Neb Ka 	)
Ra Herishetapaheru Neb Aha Asarkasaamsu 	)
Raasar Ra II KaraPernuntu Herishetapaheru 	)
a/k/a Nesut Ra Setep N Ra Neb Ka Ra 	)
Herishetapaheru Neb Aha a/k/a 	)
Nesut Sa Ra Setep N Ra Neb Ka Ra 	)
Herishetapaheru Neb Aha a/k/a 	)
Asarkasaamsu ‘Raasar ‘Ra II KaraPernuntu 	)
Herishetapaheru a/k/a 	)
Asarkasaamsu Raasar II KaraPernuntu 	)
Herishetapaheru and 	)
CHENZIRA D. KAHINA, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
__________________________________________)
Attorneys:
Warren B. Cole, Esq.,
Elisa Catera, Esq.,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For the Plaintiff
Carl F. Christopher, Pro Se,
Chenzira D. Kahina, Pro Se,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lewis, Chief Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on three Motions for Reconsideration filed by
Defendants Carl F. Christopher and Chenzira D. Kahina (“Defendants”) in this matter on March
13 and March 17, 2015. (Dkt. Nos. 89, 90, 91). In their Motions, Defendants, appearing pro se,
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ask the Court to reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, issued February 27, 2015,
which granted Summary Judgment to Plaintiff FirstBank Puerto Rico (“FirstBank”) on its debt
and foreclosure causes of action against Defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 83, 84). For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ Motions will be denied.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 17, 2013, Firstbank filed a Complaint against Defendants, alleging causes
of action for debt and foreclosure of real property mortgage. (Dkt. No. 1). Attorney Martial
Webster entered an appearance on behalf of Defendants on October 22, 2013 and filed an
Answer to the Complaint the same day. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12). In January 2014, Attorney Webster
moved to withdraw as Defendants’ attorney and the Court granted his motion. (Dkt. Nos. 26, 27).
On March 6, 2014, FirstBank filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 32).
After moving for an extension of time, until April 24, 2014, to respond to FirstBank’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 48), which was granted by the Court (Dkt. No. 50), Defendants
then began filing a series of motions, none of which appeared to respond to FirstBank’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 47, 53, 57, 63, 66). Because Defendants were proceeding pro
se, by Order entered on May 22, 2014, the Court “afford[ed] them one more opportunity to file a
legally cognizable response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” by June 10, 2014.
(Dkt. No. 68).
On June 2, 2014, Defendants filed a “Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice in Maat
(Truth) on Behalf of Defendants as Defense Response to Court’s Order to Proceed Pro Se to
Motion of Summary Judgment of the Plaintiff and Decree for Damages for the Defendants,”
(Dkt. No. 70), which the Court construed as Defendants’ Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. In their thirty-two page filing, Defendants made largely incomprehensible arguments
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that generally challenged service of process and raised questions of subject matter jurisdiction
based on Christopher allegedly having been transformed into a “New Liberated Sovereign
Being.” Id. at 3. FirstBank filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, also construing
Defendants’ filing as an opposition to its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 71).
FirstBank observed that Defendants appeared to raise issues of insufficiency of process and/or
insufficiency of service of process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) and (5). Id.
From June 13 through August 1, 2014, Defendants filed seven additional motions, none
of which appeared to challenge the legal or factual basis of FirstBank’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. See Dkt. Nos. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80. The filings, inter alia, reiterated
Christopher’s alleged “Sovereign Being” status and sought damages against FirstBank.
On February 27, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment to FirstBank, issuing a
Memorandum Opinion and a Judgment and Order. (Dkt. Nos. 84, 85). The Court ruled that
FirstBank provided evidence to support all of the elements of its debt and foreclosure causes of
action, and that it demonstrated that it was damaged in the amount of $160,947.52 as of February
3, 2014. The Court rejected Defendants’ jurisdictional and service arguments. Id.
Defendants responded with three Motions for Reconsideration filed on March 13 and 17,
2015. (Dkt. Nos. 89, 90, and 91). They have invoked, inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60, and
have requested “the right and privilege to answer, respond to the plaintiff allegations and litigate
the Defendants defense with clarity dignity, and respect.” (Dkt. No. 89 at 3). Defendants agree
that their arguments, as described by the Court, were “largely incomprehensible,” and contend
that they are entitled to relief from judgment because they did not have a “justified and equitable
opportunity to respond” to FirstBank’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 4. They assert that
they have prepared “the necessary defense to dispute all aspects of the plaintiff motion.” Id. at 5.
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FirstBank filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions on March 23, 2015, asserting that
Defendants have set forth no legal basis for relief under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60, and
therefore the Court should deny the Motions. (Dkt. No. 92). Subsequently, Defendants filed
another “motion for reconsideration,” which the Court construes as a reply brief. (Dkt. No. 98).
In it, Defendants took issue with certain statements FirstBank made in its Opposition, and
reiterated their request to allow them to further litigate against FirstBank’s claims. Id.
DISCUSSION
A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) “must rely on one of three grounds:
(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need
to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666,
669 (3d Cir. 2010). Such motions “are not to be used as ‘a vehicle for registering disagreement
with the court’s initial decision, for rearguing matters already addressed by the court, or for
raising arguments that could have been raised before but were not.’” Greene v. V.I. Water &
Power Auth., 2012 WL 4755061, at *2 (D.V.I. Oct. 5, 2012) (quoting Bostic v. AT & T of the
V.I., 312 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (D.V.I. 2004)); see also LRCi 7.3. Reconsideration “is an
extraordinary remedy and should be granted sparingly.” Boldrini v. Wilson, 2013 WL 619774, at
*1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2013) (citing D’Angio v. Borough of Nescopeck, 56 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504
(M.D. Pa. 1999)).
Defendants have not relied on an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of
new evidence, or the need to correct clear error of law as the basis for their Motion for
Reconsideration. Rather, they argue that they should be accorded another opportunity to contest
FirstBank’s Motion for Summary Judgment as a general matter of justice. However, in order to
support their position that it would be manifestly unjust for the Court not to grant them the relief
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they seek, Defendants would have to show that “the Court overlooked some dispositive factual
or legal matter that was presented to it.’” Greene, 2012 WL 4755061, at *2 (quoting In re Rose,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64622, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007)). Courts will entertain a motion
relying on the manifest unjust factor where the overlooked matter “might reasonably have
resulted in a different conclusion.” Assisted Living Assocs. of Moorestown, L.L.C. v. Moorestown
Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J. 1998).
Defendants’ filings do not contain any argument that the Court’s February 27, 2015
Memorandum Opinion overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter when adjudicating
the Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, “manifest injustice” cannot provide a basis for the
Court to grant Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
In addition to their motion to dismiss, which the Court construed as an opposition to
FirstBank’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants filed seven more motions. The Court
reviewed these motions prior to adjudicating the Motion for Summary Judgment in order to
determine whether they contained any grounds for relief. They did not, and the Court denied
these motions with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 86). Thus, Defendants had ample opportunity to oppose
FirstBank’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Their arguments, however, were inapposite and
meritless.
In a similar vein, Defendants have requested relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). This rule
provides:
Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and
just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
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(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier 	judgment 	that 	has 	been 	reversed 	or 	vacated; 	or 	applying 	it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A ‘“movant under Rule 60(b) bears a heavy burden’ and ‘[w]e view Rule
60(b) motions as extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary
justifying circumstances are present.”’ Oat v. Sewer Enters., Ltd., 584 F. App’x 36, 41 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991)). “Relief under Rule 60(b) . . .
should ‘be reserved for those cases of injustices which . . . are deemed sufficiently gross to
demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.”’ Id. (quoting United
States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998)).
Here, too, Defendants have offered no substantive argument why they should be relieved
from the Court’s Order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff. While mindful that, because
they are pro se litigants, the Court must construe Defendants’ pleadings liberally, see, e.g., Higgs
v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), Defendants have not provided any
grounds for Rule 60(b) relief, and this case does not present the kind of extraordinary
circumstances that would justify such relief.
In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that reconsideration of this Court’s
February 27, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, and accompanying Judgment and Order, is warranted.
The Court will therefore deny Defendants’ Motions for Reconsideration (Dkt. Nos. 89, 90, 91).
To 	the 	extent 	that 	Defendants’ 	Reply 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Opposition 	to 	their 	Motions 	for
Reconsideration has been filed as a Motion, the Court will deny that Motion as well. (Dkt. No.
98).
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An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: June 8, 2015 	_______/s/________
WILMA A. LEWIS
Chief Judge
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