Halvorsen et al v. Cox et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
TRACIE HALVORSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SPENCER COX as an individual and
official capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:25-cv-00909-HCN-JCB
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
I NTRODUCTION1
Plaintiffs Tracie Halvorsen, Nancy Inman, Steven Huber, Wayne Wickizer, and Daniel
Newby (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)2 move to strike the notices of appearance of counsel for:
(1) Defendants Utah Governor Spencer Cox, Utah Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson, and
the State of Utah (collectively, “State Defendants”); (2) Defendants Utah State Senator Curtis
Bramble, Utah State Senator Daniel McCay, Utah State House Representative Mike Schultz, and
Utah State Senator J. Stuart Adams (collectively, “Legislative Defendants”); and (3) Defendant
Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Matthew Durrant (“Chief Justice Durrant”) (collectively,
“Counsel”).3 Plaintiffs contend that the court should strike Counsel’s notices of appearance
1 This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF
No. 21.
2 Sophie Anderson was named as a plaintiff in the complaint, ECF No. 1, but was later
voluntarily dismissed. ECF No. 80.
3 ECF No. 62.
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because the actions of the State Defendants, the Legislative Defendants, and Chief Justice
Durrant alleged in Plaintiffs complaint fall outside the protections of the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah, and, therefore, they are not entitled to state-funded representation by the
Utah Attorney General in this case. For the reasons explained below, the court denies the motion.
ANALYSIS
The court denies Plaintiffs’ motion because the authority they cite does not support the
proposition that the State Defendants, the Legislative Defendants, and Chief Justice Durrant are
not entitled to representation by the Utah Attorney General. Plaintiffs rely upon a provision of
the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah—Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3)(a)—which governs
when a Utah governmental entity must defend an action against one of its employees. In relevant
part, that statutory provision provides:
The governmental entity may decline to defend, or, subject to any
court rule or order, decline to continue to defend, an action against
an employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee’s duties;
(ii) within the scope of the employee’s employment; or
(iii) under color of authority . . . .4
Plaintiffs also rely upon Utah Admin. Code R477-2-9, which provides that “[i]n most cases,
under [the] Governmental Immunity Act, an employee shall receive defense and indemnification
unless the case involves fraud, malice, or the use of alcohol or drugs by the employee.”5
4 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3)(a)(i)-(iii).
5 Utah Admin. Code R477-2-9(1).
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Plaintiffs’ reliance on those provisions does not support their argument. The language of
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3)(a) is purely permissive because it states that “[t]he
governmental entity may decline to defend” the employee “if it determines that act or omission in
question did not occur” within the three specified categories.6 Thus, that provision does not
mandate that a governmental entity cannot defend its employee. Further, that provision leaves to
the governmental entity the determination of whether the employee’s act or omission occurred
within the three specified categories, none of which applies here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ reliance
upon Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3)(a) is misplaced.7
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Utah Admin. Code R477-2-9 is likewise misplaced. Utah Admin.
Code R477-2-1 provides, “Title R477 applies to the executive branch of Utah State
Government,” but certain other entities “are not bound by mandatory compliance with Title
R477.” Those entities include: (1) “members of the Legislature and legislative employees”;
(2) “members of the judiciary and judicial employees”; and (3) “elected members of the
executive branch and their Schedule A employees.”8 Because the State Defendants, the
Legislative Defendants, and Chief Justice Durrant all fall into one of those categories, Utah
Admin. Code R477-2-9 does not apply to them. Accordingly, none of the authorities cited by
6 Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3) (emphasis added).
7 Plaintiffs also fail to acknowledge Counsel’s constitutional and statutory duties. The Utah
Constitution provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the State officers,
except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties as
provided by law.” Utah Const. art. VII, § 16. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1(b) provides
that “the attorney general shall . . . defend all causes to which the state or any officer, board, or
commission of the state in an official capacity is a party.” Accordingly, Counsel is required to
represent the State Defendants, the Legislative Defendants, and Chief Justice Durrant in their
official capacities in this case.
8 Utah Admin. Code R477-2-1(1), (2), (6).
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Plaintiffs support their motion to strike Counsel’s notices of appearance, and, therefore, the court
denies the motion.
O RDER
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the notices of appearance of
Counsel9 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 12th day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
9 ECF No. 62.
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