Hardy v. City of Naples et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
MICHAEL HARDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF NAPLES; UINTAH COUNTY; and
CHAMPION X CORPORATION,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER PERMITTING AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND TEMPORARILY
GRANTING MOTION TO WAIVE
FILING FEE (DOC. NO. 2)
Case No. 2:25-cv-00586
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Michael Hardy filed this action without an attorney and without paying the filing
fee.1 The court temporarily granted Mr. Hardy’s motion to waive the filing fee and
stayed the case for screening.2 Because Mr. Hardy’s complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for relief under federal law, he is permitted to file an amended complaint by
December 29, 2025. The court again temporarily grants the motion to waive the filing
fee3 pending screening of the amended complaint, if any is filed.
1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1; Mot. to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 2.)
2 (See Order Temp. Granting Mot. to Waive Filing Fee and Notice of Screening Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915, Doc. No. 8.)
3 (Doc. No. 2.)
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LEGAL STANDARDS
When a court authorizes a party to proceed without paying a filing fee, the court
must dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.”4 In making this determination, the court uses the standard for
analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 To avoid dismissal under this rule, a complaint must
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”6 The court
accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views the allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.7
But a court need not accept a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.8 “[A] plaintiff
must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim,”9 and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”10
4 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
6 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
7 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
8 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
9 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
10 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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This court also has an “independent obligation to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”11
As relevant here, subject-matter jurisdiction may be based on federal-question
jurisdiction12 or diversity jurisdiction.13 Federal-question jurisdiction applies to claims
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”14 When
determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the court examines only “well
pleaded allegations of the complaint.”15 Alternatively, if only state-law claims are
alleged, diversity jurisdiction applies if “complete diversity of citizenship exists between
the adverse parties and [] the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”16
Because Mr. Hardy proceeds without an attorney (pro se), his filings are liberally
construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”17 Still, pro se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern
11 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
14 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
15 Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16 Id. at 987 (citation omitted).
17 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
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other litigants.”18 For instance, pro se plaintiffs still have “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”19 While courts must
make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”20 courts “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s
behalf.”21
ANALYSIS
Mr. Hardy brought this case against the City of Naples and Uintah County (both
in Utah), and Champion X Corporation, a private company in Vernal, Utah.22 He alleges
he has been harassed daily for three years by loud noises coming from Champion X’s
facility near his home, which the company denied responsibility for.23 He believes this
harassment “may involve individuals” coordinating with local government, law
enforcement, or public entities as retaliation against him because he filed a civil rights
18 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
19 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
20 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
21 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
22 (Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, Doc. No. 1.)
23 (Id. ¶¶ 7–10.)
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action against a Naples City police officer.24 Mr. Hardy claims this retaliation by the City
of Naples and Uintah County violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.25
He also contends Defendants unlawfully conspired under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to “harass,
intimidate, or punish” him.26 Finally, he asserts two state-law claims: a claim for private
nuisance based on Champion X’s noise and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on Defendants’ actions generally.27 The complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for relief under federal law.28
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
First, Mr. Hardy fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 only
provides a recovery mechanism for violations of federal rights in specific
circumstances.29 “To establish a cause of action under [§] 1983, a plaintiff must allege
24 (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.) Although Mr. Hardy does not identify the case number, he appears to
be referring to the suit he filed in this district in March against Officer Robert Magaha
and the City of Naples, claiming they violated his constitutional rights by seizing his car
without a warrant or providing notice and a hearing. See Hardy v. McGaha, et al., No.
2:25-cv-00203, (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2025).
25 (Compl. ¶¶ 15–17, Doc. No. 1.)
26 (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.)
27 (Id. ¶¶ 20–24.)
28 Mr. Hardy contends this court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343 for his civil rights and conspiracy
claims, and supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
(Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. No. 1.)
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir.
2017) (describing § 1983 generally).
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(1) deprivation of a federal right by (2) a person acting under color of state law.”30 A
local government “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.”31 “Instead, ‘the government as an entity’ may only be held liable
‘when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury.’”32
Here, Mr. Hardy generally alleges the City of Naples and Uintah County, “through
their agents,” acted under color of law to harass him in retaliation for suing a Naples
City police officer.33 Elsewhere in the complaint, he alleges “the source of the
harassment may involve individuals” coordinating with local government, and that
“members of a multi-agency task force may be involved in coordinating this conduct.”34
But Mr. Hardy does not allege facts showing any official policy or custom gave rise to
his injury. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim against the City of Naples
and Uintah County under § 1983.35
30 Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988).
31 See Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2019).
32 Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
33 (Compl. ¶ 16, Doc. No. 1.)
34 (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14 (emphasis added).)
35 Mr. Hardy appears to assert a § 1983 claim against City of Naples and Uintah
County, not Champion X. (Compl. ¶ 16, Doc. No. 1.) Champion X, as a private
company, is not subject to suit under § 1983, where there are no allegations it acted
under color of state law. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)
(“Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Second, Mr. Hardy fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Section 1985 prohibits certain conspiracies to interfere with a person’s civil
rights.36 Although Mr. Hardy does not identify any of § 1985’s subsections, he claims
Defendants “entered into a tacit or explicit agreement to harass, intimidate, or punish
[him] for his civil rights lawsuit.”37 This suggests his claim is likely based on § 1985(2)
or § 1985(3).38 The complaint fails to state a claim under either provision.
To start, Mr. Hardy does not allege facts demonstrating a conspiracy claim under
§ 1985(2). A conspiracy claim under § 1985(2) requires three elements: “(1) a
conspiracy, (2) to deter attendance in court or testimony by force or intimidation or to
injure a witness for having appeared in court or testified, and (3) injury to the plaintiff.”39
The conspiracy element requires “a meeting of the minds” between “two or more
state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36 Archuleta v. City of Roswell, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1247 (D.N.M. 2012); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(1)–(3).
37 (Compl. ¶ 18, Doc. No. 1.)
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (addressing conspiracies interfering with judicial
proceedings); id. § 1985(3) (addressing private conspiracies depriving rights or
privileges); cf. § 1985(1) (addressing conspiracies interfering with federal officials
performing their duties).
39 Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1113; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); Wright v. No Skiter Inc., 774
F.2d 422, 425 (10th Cir. 1985) (“For the purposes of § 1985(2), an individual is deemed
to have ‘attended’ a court of the United States from the moment that the person files a
complaint.” (citation modified)).
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persons acting in concert.”40 A § 1985(2) claim “fails when the complaint does not
allege either that the defendant’s actions in some way were designed to intimidate or
deter the plaintiff from appearing in a judicial proceeding or to injure a person for
appearing in court.”41
Mr. Hardy has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for civil conspiracy
under § 1985(2). He generally alleges Defendants entered an agreement, claiming the
“coordinated use of after-hours noise, ongoing denials, and local government ties to the
involved actors suggest a conspiracy.”42 Mr. Hardy suggests the noise “may involve
individuals” coordinating with local government and a “multi-agency task force.”43 But it
is unclear who is alleged to have agreed to what with whom. Although conspiracies are
often established through circumstantial evidence (since direct evidence of an
agreement is rare),44 Mr. Hardy has not alleged direct or indirect circumstances showing
an agreement. For instance, although Mr. Hardy filed his civil rights suit in March 2025,
he claims the noise from Champion X’s facility has harassed him daily for three years.45
This does not suggest Champion X acted in concert with the City of Naples and Uintah
40 Id. at 1114 (quoting Brever v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1129 (10th Cir.
1994)); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okla., 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990).
41 Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1114 (internal citations omitted).
42 (Compl. ¶¶ 18–19, Doc. No. 1.)
43 (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.)
44 Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 702 (10th Cir. 1990).
45 (Compl. ¶¶ 7–10, Doc. No. 1.)
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County to harass Mr. Hardy by emitting loud noises in retaliation for his lawsuit. Where
the complaint does not give rise to an inference that Defendants conspired to deter Mr.
Hardy’s attendance in court or to injure him for having attended, Mr. Hardy fails to state
a claim under § 1985(2). This claim is subject to dismissal.
To the extent Mr. Hardy intends to state a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), he
similarly fails to do so. To assert a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a
conspiracy; (2) to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities;
(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury or deprivation resulting
therefrom.”46 This statute applies “only to conspiracies motivated by ‘some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’”47 In other words,
the plaintiff “must be a member of a statutorily protected class, and the actions taken by
defendant must stem from plaintiff’s membership in the class.”48 Mr. Hardy’s allegations
are insufficient to state a claim under § 1985(3) because Mr. Hardy does not allege
facts revealing a discriminatory animus, nor does he claim to be a member of a
protected class.
Further, as explained above, the facts Mr. Hardy alleges do not show a
conspiracy. Mr. Hardy’s complaint can be fairly read as alleging a private conspiracy
and a conspiracy under the color of state law, but he fails to state a claim under either
46 Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
47 Id. (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101–02).
48 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1980).
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theory. Section 1985(3) only applies to private conspiracies if they are “aimed at
interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as official,
encroachment.”49 The Supreme Court has recognized “few such rights”—the right to be
free from involuntary servitude and the right of interstate travel.50 Because Mr. Hardy
does not allege a conspiracy aimed at either of these rights, he fails to state a claim for
private conspiracy.51
Mr. Hardy likewise fails to state a claim for conspiracy under the color of state
law.52 Mr. Hardy alleges interference with “his constitutional right to seek redress in
49 United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983);
see also Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 (“1985(3) applies to private conspiracies only in the event
that the right aimed at by the conspiracy is one protected against both public and private
interference.”).
50 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993) (explaining
§ 1985(3) “does not apply . . . to private conspiracies that are aimed at a right that is by
definition a right only against state interference”); see also Duran v. Cmty. First
Bankshares, Inc., 92 F. App’x 756, 762 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“The Supreme
Court has recognized only two rights as protected against private conspiracies under
§ 1985(3): the right to be free from involuntary servitude and the right to interstate
travel, both under the Thirteenth Amendment.”).
51 Champion X is a private entity. Yet Mr. Hardy has not alleged interference with his
right to be free from involuntary servitude or right of interstate travel—the two rights the
Supreme Court recognized as protected against private conspiracies under § 1985(3).
See Duran, 92 F. App’x at 762.
52 See Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 830 (“[A]n alleged conspiracy to infringe First
Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the state is
involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of
the state.”); Jackson v. Coons, 719 F. App’x 732, 733 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(“[S]tate action or involvement in the alleged conspiracy [is] a required element of a
§ 1985(3) claim alleging deprivation of First Amendment rights.” (citing Carpenters, 463
U.S. at 830)); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1272–73 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause was enforceable
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court” under the “First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”53 But he has not named
any individual state actors as defendants. He has named government entities: the City
of Naples and Uintah County. But municipal liability under § 1985(3) has the same
limits as municipal liability under § 1983.54 To state a claim for municipal liability, a
plaintiff must allege a “direct causal link” between a municipal policy or custom and his
injury.55 Mr. Hardy has not alleged a policy or custom of the City of Naples or Uintah
County is linked to his injury. He has not alleged the existence of any policy or custom
at all.56 Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Hardy intended to raise a claim under § 1985(3),
it is subject to dismissal.
C. State-Law Claims
Mr. Hardy’s remaining claims arise under state law.57 Because Mr. Hardy’s
claims under § 1983 and § 1985 should be dismissed, the court should decline to
against state actors through § 1985(3)); Lesley v. Bennett, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1217–
18 (D. Wy. 2025) (concluding that, like First Amendment rights, § 1985(3) claims
alleging deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights similarly require state action or
involvement in the alleged conspiracy, as this amendment “also protects only against
state encroachment”).
53 (Compl. ¶¶ 15–19, Doc. No. 1.)
54 Galindo v. Taylor, 723 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1022 (D. Kan. 2024).
55 Id.
56 Cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (explaining that “the
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to
the State” to constitute state action).
57 (Id. ¶¶ 20–24.)
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.58 And where all parties to
this case are apparently Utah citizens,59 Mr. Hardy does not establish complete diversity
of citizenship.60
* * *
For these reasons, the complaint is subject to dismissal.61 Nevertheless,
“[d]ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is
obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile
to give him an opportunity to amend.”62 Accordingly, Mr. Hardy will be given an
opportunity to amend his complaint.
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (providing for supplemental jurisdiction over related state law
claims “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction”); Estate of
Harshman v. Jackson Hole Mt. Resort Corp., 379 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“District courts do not otherwise have jurisdiction to hear pendent state law claims but
for their intertwinement with claims over which they have original jurisdiction.”); Smith v.
City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all
federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”)
59 (Compl. ¶¶ 3–6, Doc. No. 1.)
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Dutcher, 733 F.3d at 985; see also Grynberg v. Kinder
Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 805 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Diversity jurisdiction
requires complete diversity—no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.”). Claims arising from state law must be brought in state court—unless a
federal court has a basis for jurisdiction over the claims (for example, diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction). Cf. Fletcher v. Summit Food, No. 18-cv-1220, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75194, at *8 (D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2020) (unpublished) (“To the extent the
Complaint raises any state law claims for . . . torts, those claims will be dismissed
without prejudice. Plaintiff must re-file those claims in [state court] to obtain relief.”).
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
62 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
1. 	Mr. Hardy may file an amended complaint by December 29, 2025. The
words “Amended Complaint” should appear in the caption of the document.
2. 	Mr. Hardy is advised that an amended complaint will completely replace
all prior versions of the complaint. Claims which are not realleged in the amended
complaint will be deemed abandoned.63
3. 	Once filed, the court will screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) and Rule 3-2(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Practice.64
4. 	Failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this action.
DATED this 8th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
63 See Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 107 F.4th 1121, 1137
(10th Cir. 2024) (“An amended complaint supersedes a prior complaint and renders it of
no legal effect. Failing to replead a claim, when given leave to do so, ordinarily
constitutes abandonment when an amended complaint is filed.” (citation modified)).
64 See DUCivR 3-2(b), available at
https://www.utd.uscourts.gov/sites/utd/files/Civil%20Rules%20Final%202025.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5J9-A9YV].
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