Carrasquillo v. Spherion Staffing LLC et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
RONALD CARRASQUILLO, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPHERION STAFFING, LLC;
INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. OF
NORTH AMERICA; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Case No. 1:24-cv-00010-HCN-JCB
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
I NTRODUCTION1
Defendant Spherion Staffing, LLC (“Spherion”) moved for summary judgment on all six
causes of action in Plaintiff Ronald Carrasquillo’s (“Mr. Carrasquillo”) amended complaint.2
Spherion is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Carrasquillo’s only federal claim (i.e., Count I
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)). Spherion is also entitled to summary
judgment on the state-law claims that Mr. Carrasquillo has expressly abandoned in his summary
judgment briefing (i.e., Counts IV for defamation and Count VI for civil conspiracy).3 Given that
1 District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr. referred this case to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF No. 55.
2 ECF No. 57.
3 ECF No. 61 at 52 of 56 (“Plaintiff acknowledges that the defamation claim is time-barred under
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302’s one-year statute of limitations.”); 54 of 56 (“Plaintiff withdraws
civil conspiracy as a separate cause of action.”). Therefore, this Report and Recommendation
will not discuss those claims further.
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the remaining unwaived claims (i.e., Counts II, III, V) are brought under state law, this court
should dismiss them without prejudice to allow for refiling in state court.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Spherion is a staffing company that places temporary employees into the workforce of
Spherion’s client companies.4 Mr. Carrasquillo began working as a temporary employee for
Spherion in December 2021.5 Spherion placed Mr. Carrasquillo in a temporary job with Wheel
Pros on December 13, 2021.6 Shortly into his shift, Mr. Carrasquillo injured his right bicep,
which required medical attention.7
While in a physician’s waiting room, Mr. Carrasquillo received a telephone call from
Andrew Judd (“Mr. Judd”) who served as Spherion’s safety manager.8 Mr. Judd instructed Mr.
Carrasquillo to go to the Intermountain WorkMed Clinic (“WorkMed”) for an evaluation.9
A nurse at WorkMed informed Mr. Carrasquillo that he needed to take a drug test
according to Spherion’s company policy.10 Mr. Carrasquillo then asked the nurse whether
marijuana was “‘a disqualifying factor on [the drug] test.’”11 When the nurse answered in the
affirmative, Mr. Carrasquillo told the nurse, “‘I’m not taking it.’”12 Mr. Carrasquillo later
4 ECF No. 57-4 at 4-5 of 49.
5 ECF No. 57-2 at 10 of 27.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 11 of 27.
8 Id. at 11-12 of 27.
9 Id. at 12 of 27.
10 ECF No. 57-6 at 104-105 of 226.
11 Id. at 106-107 of 226.
12 Id. at 107 of 226.
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explained that he declined to test because he had failed Spherion’s initial drug test for marijuana
the week before, and, because marijuana stays in the body for around 30 days, he figured that he
would test positive again.13
As to drug testing, Spherion’s employment policy provided that “Flexible Employees
have the right to refuse to undergo drug and alcohol testing, but those Flexible Employees who
refuse to undergo testing or otherwise refuse to cooperate in a drug and/or alcohol test will be
terminated.”14 Conversely, Flexible Employees who test positive for alcohol or drugs “will be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.”15 Mr.
Carrasquillo was well aware of Spherion’s drug and alcohol policies given that, on December 8,
2021, he both acknowledged receipt and review of those policies and signed a consent form prior
to his pre-employment drug test that referred him to Spherion’s drug and alcohol policies.16
Following his injury, Mr. Carrasquillo’s medical providers placed him on restrictions that
precluded him from continuing to work at Wheel Pros.17 Consequently, Spherion offered him “a
light-duty job” at Spherion’s office.18 Spherion represented that Mr. Carrasquillo’s work hours
13 Id. at 108 of 226.
14 Id. at 213 of 226 (emphasis added).
15 Id. (emphasis added).
16 Id. at 203 of 226 (acknowledging that “I will be subject to disciplinary action consistent with
the policy and any applicable policy addendum if I test positive for alcohol, have a verified
positive drug test result, or otherwise violate the policy”); 205 of 226 (“This form is to verify that
I have received a copy of Spherion Staffing’s employee handbook. I have read and understand
the content in this handbook and will act in accord with these policies as a condition of my
employment with the company.”).
17 Id. at 217, 221 of 226.
18 Id. at 221 of 226.
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would be 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday and that he “would be assisting with
various tasks as needed.”19 Mr. Carrasquillo’s pay for light work (i.e., $18.00 per hour)20 was the
same as he was making at Wheel Pros.21 Spherion gave Mr. Carrasquillo until December 17,
2021, at 8:00 a.m. to accept or decline the offer and allowed him to start light duty the next day.22
Spherion did not provide specific details as to what the light-duty job would entail.
Mr. Carrasquillo responded to Spherion’s light-duty messages by asking for a ride to
work because his injury prevented him from using two hands to drive and because he was taking
opioid medication.23 In response, Spherion confirmed that the light-duty assignment would
conform to his medical conditions, but Mr. Carrasquillo would have to find his own
transportation to and from work.24 Mr. Carrasquillo replied that he “refuse[d] to [accept or
decline the employment offer] at this moment because [he] cannot drive,” and that he would
consult with his medical provider to get his conditions adjusted to preclude driving.25
Later, Spherion responded to Mr. Carrasquillo by reiterating that no one was asking him
to “operate a motor vehicle.”26 Instead, Spherion stated that it was clarifying that Mr.
Carrasquillo “would need to make arrangements to get to work.”27 Consistent with his response
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 56 of 226.
22 Id. at 222 of 226.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 223 of 226.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 224 of 226.
27 Id.
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to Spherion, Mr. Carrasquillo visited his medical provider and obtained a letter stating that Mr.
Carrasquillo was not allowed to operate a motor vehicle.28 Mr. Carrasquillo again requested that
Spherion “accommodate [him] with transportation.”29 The transportation request was the only
requested accommodation provided to the court in the record.
Spherion did not provide transportation for Mr. Carrasquillo or for any other employee,30
and Mr. Carrasquillo did not appear for light-duty work in December 2021 as Spherion had
offered.31 Instead, on January 3, 2022, Mr. Judd called to ask why Mr. Carrasquillo had failed to
take his post-injury drug test on December 15, 2021, because “corporate” wanted to know.32 Two
days later, Mr. Judd called again and informed Mr. Carrasquillo that “corporate” had decided to
terminate Mr. Carrasquillo’s employment.33
After pursuing an administrative claim before the Utah Labor Commission,34 Mr.
Carrasquillo filed this action.35 He amended his complaint approximately five months later.36
Like the original, Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains six “counts.” Count I comprises two
28 ECF No. 57-4 at 10 of 49.
29 ECF No. 57-6 at 226 of 226.
30 ECF No. 57-4 at 11 of 49.
31 ECF No. 61 at 16 of 56 (Mr. Carrasquillo’s response to Spherion’s Fact No. 34) (stating that
Mr. Carrasquillo “never attended the light[-]duty assignment but was never considered to have
resigned and instead a was terminated weeks later.”)
32 ECF No. 57-6 at 114 of 226.
33 Id.
34 ECF No. 57-2 at 8 of 27.
35 ECF No. 1.
36 ECF No. 37.
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claims under the ADA: (1) failure to “initiate and complete the interactive process”;37 and
(2) retaliation for requesting an accommodation (i.e., seeking employer-provided transportation
to and from work).38 None of the allegations in the amended complaint alleges termination based
on disability or disparate treatment with similarly situated employees. The remaining five counts
plead state-law claims. Spherion moved for summary judgment on all six counts.
L EGAL S TANDARDS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” “A genuine issue of fact exists only where ‘the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’”39 “Thus, the relevant
inquiry is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”40
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court “view[s] the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s
favor.”41 “‘The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie demonstration of the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.’”42 If
37 Id. at ¶ 86.
38 Id. at ¶ 87.
39 Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
40 Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
41 Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 2015).
42 Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Libertarian Party
of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2007)).
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the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial as to the claims for which it seeks summary
judgment, then the movant “may make its prima facie demonstration by pointing out to the court
a lack of evidence on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.”43
“If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to set
forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.”44 To satisfy
its burden, “the nonmovant must identify facts ‘by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts,
or specific exhibits incorporated therein.’”45 “These facts must establish, at a minimum, an
inference of the presence of each element essential to the case.”46 Entry of summary judgment is
required,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof.47
Under the foregoing standards, the court addresses Mr. Carrasquillo’s federal
cause of action and recommends summary judgment in favor of Spherion. Thereafter—
except for the two causes of action that Mr. Carrasquillo abandoned at summary
43 Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986)); see also Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137.
44 Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309 (citation modified).
45 Savant Homes, Inc., 809 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Libertarian Party of N.M., 506 F.3d at 1309).
46 Id. at 1137-38 (citation modified).
47 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23 (citation modified).
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judgment—the court recommends dismissal of the state-law causes of action without
prejudice so that they can be pursued, if at all, in state court.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Spherion Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Mr. Carrasquillo’s Two ADA
Claims.
The court recommends granting summary judgment to Spherion on Mr. Carrasquillo’s
two ADA claims in Count I of the amended complaint because: (A) the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that an accommodation related to employer-provided
transportation is not reasonable; and (B) Mr. Carrasquillo cannot show that terminating his
employment for refusing to take a drug test is pretext for retaliation under the familiar
McDonnell Douglas framework.48 The court addresses each ADA cause of action below.
A. Mr. Carrasquillo’s Reasonable Accommodation Claim Fails Because His Request for
an Accommodation Related to Transportation to and From Work Was neither a
Request for a Reasonable Accommodation nor Sufficient to Trigger the Interactive
Process.
As a matter of law, Mr. Carrasquillo’s request for employer-provided transportation to
and from work neither requested a reasonable accommodation nor required Spherion to engage
in the interactive process. The court uses a two-part analysis when analyzing failure-to-
accommodate claims.49 First, “the employee must make an initial showing that (1) [he] is
disabled; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified; and (3) [he] requested a plausibly reasonable
accommodation.”50 Second, if the employee makes the requisite showing, then the employer
48 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
49 Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017).
50 Id. at 1050 (citation modified).
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must “present evidence either (1) conclusively rebutting one or more elements of plaintiff’s
prima facie case or (2) establishing an affirmative defense, such a undue hardship,” among
others.51 As shown below, Mr. Carrasquillo’s failure-to-accommodate claim fails at step one
because he cannot show that he requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.
Requesting an employer-provided ride to and from work is not a reasonable
accommodation as a matter of law. In Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan, Inc.,52 the plaintiff became
legally blind and, therefore, could no longer drive to and from work.53 The plaintiff also lacked
any public transportation options, and obtaining rides from others was too unreliable.54
Consequently, the plaintiff requested “a flexible schedule to accommodate her transportation.”55
In response, the employer provided the plaintiff with some limited accommodations related to
her schedule.56 When that arrangement ended, the plaintiff requested to be able to telecommute
full time.57 The employer denied that request.58 Eventually, the employer terminated the
plaintiff’s employment, and the plaintiff filed an action under the ADA for, among other things,
51 Id. (citation modified).
52 993 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 2021).
53 Id. at 874.
54 Id. at 874-75.
55 Id. at 875 (citation modified).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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failure to reasonably accommodate and for failing to engage in the interactive process.59 After a
three-day bench trial, the court ruled for the employer.60
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted the district court’s unchallenged finding that the
plaintiff’s attendance at work was an essential function of her job.61 Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that an accommodation related to transportation to and from work was not a
reasonable accommodation—and, by implication, sufficient to trigger the duty to engage in the
interactive process—because the employer was not depriving the plaintiff of any benefit or
privilege of employment due to her disability.62 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the reasonable
accommodation requirements exist under the ADA so that employees with disabilities can “enjoy
equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by other similarly situated
employees without disabilities.”63 But the court also made clear that a reasonable
accommodation is not intended to address a barrier that the employee faces outside of the
workplace.64 The court observed that transportation to and from work was neither an essential
function of the plaintiff’s job nor a privilege of employment, and, therefore, the employer was
under no legal obligation to accommodate the plaintiff’s transportation barrier.65 The Unrein
court then added: “Whether a transportation barrier is caused by a broken car or legal blindness
59 Id. at 876.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 877.
62 Id. at 878-79.
63 Id. at 878 (citation modified).
64 Id. at 878-79.
65 Id. at 879.
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and unreliable rides, the analysis of an employer’s obligations should not change if transportation
is unrelated to an essential job function and not a privilege of employment.”66 Therefore, the
court held, the district court correctly found in favor of the employer on the plaintiff’s reasonable
accommodation and interactive process claims.67
Mr. Carrasquillo raises the same flawed arguments as the plaintiff in Unrein. Even if
physical presence is an essential job function for his light-duty job,68 as in Unrein, Spherion did
not deny Mr. Carrasquillo any benefit or privilege of employment by refusing to provide him
with a ride to and from work. Indeed, Spherion did not provide transportation to and from work
for any employee. Moreover, Mr. Carrasquillo’s barriers getting to and from work were both
outside of the workplace and unrelated to an essential job function or the privileges of
employment. In fact, Mr. Carrasquillo’s problem with getting to and from work is about as
removed from the essential functions of his job as getting a good night’s sleep or a healthy
breakfast so that he would have energy to work. And even though energy to work is essential to
any job, no reasonable accommodation requires an employer to supply a disabled employee with
a comfortable bed or a nutritious breakfast. Because transportation was a barrier that Mr.
Carrasquillo had outside of work that was neither a benefit nor a privilege of employment at
Spherion, as in Unrein, an employer-provided ride is not a plausible reasonable accommodation
to either initiate the interactive process or require fulfillment. Therefore, Mr. Carrasquillo has
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 The court in Punt points out, “Particularly for temporary employees, the ability to report to
work consistently is a necessary part of the job . . . .” 862 F.3d at 1051 (citation modified).
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failed to establish a plausible reasonable accommodation, and Spherion is entitled to summary
judgment on Mr. Carrasquillo’s claim of failure to engage in the inactive process.
B. Mr. Carrasquillo’s Retaliation Claim Fails Because He Cannot Show That Spherion’s
Reason for Terminating His Employment Was Pretext for Retaliation.
Spherion is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Carrasquillo’s retaliation claim because
even if he can establish a prima facie case of retaliation for requesting that Spherion provide a
ride to and from work, he cannot establish pretext. Where, as here, Mr. Carrasquillo attempts to
prove his retaliation claim through circumstantial evidence, the court relies on the familiar
three-part framework under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.69 The McDonnell Douglas
framework first requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, then “the employer has the burden of showing it had
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer can do so, the
burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to prove pretext, which requires a showing that
the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is unworthy of belief.”70 As shown below, assuming
arguendo that Mr. Carrasquillo can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, he cannot establish
that Spherion’s reason for terminating his employment was pretext for retaliation.
Mr. Carrasquillo’s pretext argument fails because he cannot show that the reason
Spherion gave for terminating his employment is unworthy of belief. Spherion terminated Mr.
Carrasquillo’s employment for refusing to take a drug test after his December 15, 2021 injury.
69 411 U.S. at 802-04; see also Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir.
2016) (“Because [the plaintiff] attempts to prove his retaliation claim using circumstantial
evidence, the analytical framework pronounced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green guides
our review.” (citation modified)).
70 Foster, 830 F.3d at 1186 (citation modified).
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That decision was consistent with Spherion’s policy. Spherion’s policy provides that “Flexible
Employees who refuse to undergo testing or otherwise refuse to cooperate in a drug and/or
alcohol test will be terminated.”71 Conversely, when an employee fails a drug test, Spherion’s
policy provides that the employee “will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, up to and
including termination of employment.”72 The plain language of these two policies clearly imbues
Spherion with greater discretion to terminate employment when an employee fails a drug test
compared to when an employee refuses to take one. The policy for refusing to take a drug test is
unequivocal, and termination is the prescribed outcome.
And that was exactly what happened after Mr. Carrasquillo refused to take a required
drug test. Mr. Carrasquillo admits he refused a drug test after his workplace accident in
December 2021. Mr. Judd told Mr. Carrasquillo that “corporate” had terminated Mr.
Carrasquillo’s employment for failing to take the drug test.73 There is no legitimate factual
dispute challenging the credibility of why Spherion terminated Mr. Carrasquillo’s employment.
Nevertheless, Mr. Carrasquillo claims that pretext exists for two reasons. First, other
Spherion employees failed company drug tests but were not fired from their jobs and, therefore,
Spherion selectively applied its drug policies. Second, because Spherion did not fire Mr.
Carrasquillo immediately after he refused to take the drug test, his termination must be based on
his request for accommodation. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
71 ECF No. 57-6 at 213 of 226.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 114 of 226.
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Mr. Carrasquillo’s first argument is not persuasive because Spherion’s policy treats
refused drug tests differently from failed drug tests. Spherion’s policies provide discretion to
continue to work with employees who fail a drug test but offers no such grace to those who
refuse to test. Mr. Carrasquillo provides no evidence at all showing that Spherion declined to
terminate any employee for refusing to take a drug test. Instead, the unrefuted evidence shows
the contrary because the only other employee who refused a drug test was also terminated from
Spherion’s employ.74 Spherion following its own policies cannot be pretext for retaliation.
Mr. Carrasquillo’s second argument fares no better. Mr. Carrasquillo believes that Mr.
Judd was aware of the refused drug test on the day Mr. Carrasquillo refused it (i.e., December 15,
2021), and, therefore, Mr. Judd should have immediately fired him under the policy instead of
waiting to terminate his employment until January 2022. Mr. Carrasquillo then argues that
because Mr. Judd waited to terminate Mr. Carrasquillo’s employment until after receiving his
request for accommodation, his termination was based on retaliation for requesting a ride to and
from work instead of refusing to take a drug test. The chief problem with this argument is that
Mr. Judd did not make the decision to terminate Mr. Carrasquillo’s employment. The record
shows that “corporate” had to investigate the allegation (hence the January 3, 2022 phone call
from Mr. Judd that Mr. Carrasquillo received) and that the decision to terminate employment
came from “corporate,” not Mr. Judd.75 Between the December 15, 2021 refusal to take a drug
test and the January 5, 2022 termination of employment, “corporate” had to be informed that Mr.
74 ECF No. 57-3 at 5-6 of 9. Mr. Carrasquillo’s response to this fact does not dispute that a
person was terminated for failing to take a drug test.
75 ECF No. 57-6 at 114 of 226.
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Carrasquillo refused a drug test, discuss the issue, deal with the holidays, and then issue a final
decision. This three-week delay between Mr. Carrasquillo’s refusal to test and his termination of
employment does not create a jury question of pretext; it merely engenders speculation.76
Therefore, Mr. Carrasquillo is unable to carry his burden of showing pretext, which means
Spherion is entitled to summary judgment on his retaliation claim.
II. 	With the Dismissal of the Only Federal Claims, This Court Should Dismiss All
Non-Waived State-Law Claims So That They May Be Pursued, if at All, in State
Court.
Mr. Carrasquillo’s viable state-law claims should be dismissed without prejudice after
dismissing his federal claims and his two abandoned state-law claims. “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a), federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims outside their
original jurisdiction if those claims are part of the same Article III case or controversy as claims
over which the court has original jurisdiction.”77 But under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “a district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When all federal claims have been dismissed, the
court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state
claims.”78
As demonstrated above, both of Mr. Carrasquillo’s ADA claims fail and should be
dismissed with prejudice. Because the remaining, unabandoned claims are all based upon state
76 Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that mere
conjecture is insufficient to support an allegation of pretext).
77 Brock v. Herbert, No. 2:09-CV-1118, 2012 WL 1029355, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2012).
78 Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation
modified).
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law, the court should decline to reach the merits of those claims here because, without any viable
federal claims, the Tenth Circuit strongly suggests that this court dismiss without prejudice.79
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS:
1. 	Spherion’s motion for summary judgment80 be GRANTED.
2. 	Mr. Carrasquillo’s federal claims under the ADA (i.e., Count I) be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
3. 	Mr. Carrasquillo’s abandoned state law claims (i.e., Counts IV and VI) be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
4. 	Mr. Carrasquillo’s remaining state law claims (i.e., Counts II, III, V) be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Copies of this Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties, who are hereby
notified of their right to object.81 The parties must file any objections to this Report and
Recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of it.82 Failure to object may
constitute waiver of objections upon subsequent review.
79 Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1997) (“If federal
claims are dismissed before trial, leaving only issues of state law, ‘the federal court should
decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.’” (quoting
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988))).
80 ECF No. 57.
81 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
82 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
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DATED this 28th day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
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