Gonzales v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation

5:25-cv-01177Txwd5 de dez. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
ANGEL C GONZALES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FREEDOM MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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SA-25-CV-01177-OLG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Orlando L. Garcia:
This Report and Recommendation concerns Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint [#6]. All pretrial matters in this case have been referred to the undersigned for
disposition pursuant to Western District of Texas Local Rule CV-72 and Appendix C. The
undersigned therefore has authority to enter this recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion be
granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff Angel C. Gonzales filed this case, proceeding pro se, in state court against
Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation as an “Action in Equity for Writ of Quo Warranto.”
(State Court Petition [#1-1], at 4–8.) Plaintiff alleges that he is the mortgagor in a real estate
transaction involving real property located at 7516 Linkmeadow, San Antonio, Texas, 78240,
and that Defendant lacks standing or authority to foreclose on the property due to broken chain
of title from the original lender, an invalid assignment, and lack of possession of the promissory
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note. By this action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent foreclosure and
to declare him owner of the property.
Defendant removed the petition to this Court on September 19, 2025, on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction,1 and thereafter filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s state-court petition
lacks any factual or legal basis and cannot support a plausible claim of relief. Plaintiff’s
response in opposition to the motion was due on or before October 24, 2025. See W.D. Tex.
Loc. R. CV-7(d). Although Plaintiff filed several notices and “memoranda of law” after removal
and before the response deadline, none of these filings responded to Defendant’s motion to
dismiss or could be construed as attempting to respond to the motion. The Court therefore issued
a Show Cause Order, which ordered Plaintiff to show cause by November 10, 2025, as to why
Defendant’s motion should not be granted as unopposed and/or on its merits. (Show Cause
Order [#12], at 1.) In the Order, the Court directed Plaintiff to explain his reasons for not timely
filing a response.
Plaintiff filed an untimely response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss on November 17,
2025, without explanation. (Resp. [#13].) Under this Court’s Local Rules, the Court may grant
a motion as unopposed if there is no response filed within the time period prescribed by the rule.
See W.D. Tex. Loc. R. CV-7(d). Accordingly, the Court could treat the motion to dismiss as
unopposed. However, the Court observes the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to dispose of a cause of
action simply for failure to comply with a response deadline imposed by the local rules, Johnson
v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006), and will therefore evaluate the sufficiency of the
1 This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the parties are diverse
and the market value of the property exceeds $75,000. See Farkas v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 737
F.3d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (when party seeks injunctive relief to prevent foreclosure, value of
property is included in amount in controversy).
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pleadings under governing standards. In doing so, the Court has considered Plaintiff’s untimely
response, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the “allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Martin K. Eby Const. Co.
v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, as here, the Court liberally construes the pleadings and
applies “less stringent standards” than it does “to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Perez v.
United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002). That said, a court need not credit
conclusory allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In
short, a claim should not be dismissed unless the Court determines that it is beyond doubt that
the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that support the claim and would justify relief.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
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III. Analysis
Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s “Action in Equity for Writ of
Quo Warranto” for failure to state a claim. In support of its motion, Defendant provides the
Court with two exhibits: a copy of the deed of trust and a copy of the corporate assignment of the
deed of trust. (Exs. [#6-1, #6-2].) In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may consider
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference or attached to a motion to dismiss that
are central to the Plaintiff’s claim and referenced by the complaint. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.),
L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Because Plaintiff references both
the deed of trust and the lack of an assignment to demonstrate proper chain of title in his
pleading, both exhibits may be considered by the Court in evaluating the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s pleadings. Additionally, the Court may take judicial notice of the deed of trust and
assignment because they were recorded in the Official Public Records of Bexar County, Texas,
as Doc. Nos. 20230091406 and 20240148296. See Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 783
(5th Cir. 2011).
Defendant’s motion should be granted for several reasons. First, Plaintiff has styled his
case a “quo warranto action.” Under Texas law, a quo warranto action is the mechanism for
challenging someone who unlawfully holds or executes a franchise or office and must be brought
in the name of the state of the attorney general or appropriate district or county attorney. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 66.001, 66.002; Robinson v. Neeley, 192 S.W.3d 904, 909 (2006).
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a quo warranto action because he is not the attorney general or
the county or district attorney, and his case is therefore procedurally improper.
Additionally, the documents attached to Defendant’s motion, which are matters of public
record, establish that Defendant is the current beneficiary and mortgagee under the deed of trust
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with authority to foreclose. A “mortgagee” is defined as “(A) the grantee, beneficiary, owner, or
holder of a security instrument; (B) a book entry system; or (C) if the security instrument has
been assigned of record, the last person to whom the security interest has been assigned of
record.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.0001(4). The deed of trust reflects that Plaintiff and
his wife, Christina Margia, executed a deed of trust on May 19, 2023, secured by the real
property located at 7516 Linkmeadow, San Antonio, Texas, 78240, in favor of MERS as
mortgagee as nominee for AmCap Mortgage, Ltd. d/b/a Gold Financial Services and its
successors and assigns. (Deed of Trust [#6-1], at 2–3.) On August 15, 2024, MERS assigned its
rights in the deed of trust to Defendant. (Assignment [#6-2], at 2.) The Fifth Circuit has clearly
held that a mortgagee does not have to produce the original note to be entitled to foreclose under
Texas law. See Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013).
The assignment explicitly included the power to foreclose by the deed of trust. (Assignment [#6-
2], at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant may only foreclose if it can show
the original note or lacks authority to foreclose due to a broken chain of title fail as a matter of
law and cannot be the basis of any cause of action to prevent foreclosure.
Plaintiff argues in his response that Rule 12(b)(6) and other precedents regarding
foreclosure law do not govern his case because he is invoking equity and this Court is sitting as a
court of chancery. This argument is without merit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
equally when a district court sits in equity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (“These rules govern the
procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated
in Rule 81.”) This case does not fall into any of the exceptions in Rule 81. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
81. Plaintiff has not identified any basis for exempting this case from the requirements of the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Plaintiff has failed to
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state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the District Court should grant Defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having considered Defendant’s motion, the lack of response by Plaintiff, the governing
law, and Plaintiff’s pleading, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint [#6] be GRANTED.
V. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on
all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as
a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified
mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be
filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is
modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections are
limited to no more than 20 pages unless leave of court is granted. The party shall file the
objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which
objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party’s failure to file written objections to the
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party
from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985);
Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file
timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained
in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain
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error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
SIGNED this 5th day of December, 2025.
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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