Friends of the Ruidosa Church et al v. Mullin etal

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
FRIENDS OF THE RUIDOSA
CHURCH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. EP-26-CV-1099-KC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On August 17, 2026, Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Ruidosa
Church, and Danny William Miller Junior filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction
(“Motion”), ECF No. 34. On October 2, 2026, the Court GRANTED the Motion with a
memorandum opinion to follow. Oct. 2, 2026, Order, ECF No. 66. The Court now issues its
opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves Plaintiffs’ claims that the Government lacks the authority to build
border enforcement infrastructure in a remote swath of West Texas. See 1st Am. 2d Supp.
Compl. ¶¶ 1–4, ECF No. 26. That construction proceeded pursuant to a series of waivers issued
between February and July 2026 by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (the
“Secretary”). See id. ¶ 3. The Secretary invoked the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) to waive the application of dozens of laws, mainly
environmental laws, along a 517-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border. See 91 Fed. Reg. 7297
(Feb. 17, 2026), as amended by 91 Fed. Reg. 40550 (July 2, 2026) (the “West Waiver”); 91 Fed.
Reg. 27969 (May 15, 2026), as amended by 91 Fed. Reg. 34831 (June 9, 2026) (the “National
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Park Waiver”); 91 Fed. Reg. 46939 (July 27, 2026) (the “Lower Canyons Waiver”) (collectively,
the “Big Bend Waivers”).
The area of the border at issue includes Big Bend National Park, Big Bend Ranch State
Park, and other public and private land in Hudspeth, Jeff Davis, Presidio, Brewster, Terrell, and
Val Verde Counties, Texas. Pls.’ Ex. 1 (“Map of Big Bend Area”).1 The area is co-extensive
with the section of the border encompassed by the United States Border Patrol’s “Big Bend
Sector.” Id.; Hr’g Tr. 28:10–23, 35:25–36:5, ECF No. 72. The Big Bend Waivers invoked “an
acute and immediate need to construct additional physical barriers and roads” to prevent “illegal
entry” and the “smuggl[ing of] illicit drugs.” National Park Waiver; Lower Canyons Waiver;
West Waiver.
On April 16, 2026, Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming on various grounds that the
Secretary’s waivers are unconstitutional. Compl. ¶¶ 63–94, ECF No. 1. They contend that they
would be personally and irreparably harmed by the construction of border wall and related
infrastructure in the Big Bend Sector. Id. ¶¶ 14, 22, 24. After fully briefing cross-motions for
summary judgment, see Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 24,
Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion, citing ongoing construction as the basis for immediate,
preliminary relief. Mot. 4–6. Defendants filed a Response, ECF No. 38, in opposition, to which
Plaintiffs filed a Reply, ECF No. 39. Amicus Briefs, ECF Nos. 33, 42, were also filed by the
Coalition to Protect America’s National Parks, Keep Big Bend Wild, National Parks
Conservation Association, the Sierra Club, and its Lone Star Chapter.
1 The exhibits presented by the parties at the October 2, 2026, Preliminary Injunction Hearing were
submitted via a secure cloud-based file-sharing system and remain on file with the Court as part of the
record of the case.
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On October 2, 2026, the Court convened an evidentiary hearing. Minute Entry, ECF No.
64. After hearing the parties’ evidence and argument, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion and
entered a preliminary injunction as follows:
Effective immediately and until the Court orders otherwise, Defendants shall not
build border barrier or related infrastructure, or engage in any construction or
ground disturbing activities, in the Big Bend Sector until and unless Defendants
comply with all applicable laws. Defendants must comply with all applicable
laws notwithstanding the “Big Bend Waivers,” including the “West Waiver,” 91
Fed. Reg. 7297 (Feb. 17, 2026), as amended by 91 Fed. Reg. 40550 (July 2,
2026), the “National Park Waiver,” 91 Fed. Reg. 27969 (May 15, 2026), as
amended by 91 Fed. Reg. 34831 (June 9, 2026), and the “Lower Canyons
Waiver,” 91 Fed. Reg. 46939 (July 27, 2026). The effect of all “Big Bend
Waivers” is stayed for the duration of this Injunction.
Oct. 2, 2026, Order 1–2 (emphasis omitted).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard
Whether to grant a preliminary injunction is within the district court’s discretion. Allied
Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989). “The purpose of a
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable injury until the court
renders a decision on the merits.” Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL
486610, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022) (citing Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576
(5th Cir. 1974)).
To prevail on a request for a preliminary injunction, a movant must show: “(1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that [the movant] will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs
any damage that the injunction might cause the [non-movant], and (4) that the injunction will not
disserve the public interest.” Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Hous. & S.E. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2005)).
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A plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is determined by reference to the
applicable substantive law. William E. McBryde, Inc. v. Rodriguez, No. 5:07-cv-143-XR, 2007
WL 628793, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2007) (quoting Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d
1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1997)). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary, equitable remedy that
“should only be granted when the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion.”
Svoboda v. Bank of Am., N.A., 964 F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Anderson v.
Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
right.” (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008))).
B. Analysis
1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs argue that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their major
questions doctrine claim. Mot. 7–10. Defendants disagree. Resp. 5–8. They argue that the
Court does not have jurisdiction, and even if it had jurisdiction, the major questions doctrine
claim fails on the merits because the Congressional delegation of authority is clear. Id.
a. Jurisdiction
Defendants’ jurisdictional argument is predicated on a jurisdiction-stripping provision
that follows IIRIRA’s delegation of authority to the Secretary “to waive all legal requirements”
as “necessary to ensure expeditious construction” of certain border enforcement infrastructure.
8 U.S.C. § 1103 note, § 102(c)(1) (2009) (Improvement of Barriers at Border). For challenges to
such waivers, “[a] cause of action or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear [any other
claim].” Id. § 102(c)(2)(A); accord Zapata County v. Biden, No. 20-cv-106, 2023 WL
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11915719, at *2 & n.3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023). Defendants argue that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ major questions doctrine claim, because the major questions
doctrine is a “‘tool’ or ‘rule’ of statutory interpretation.” Resp. 5–6. While they concede that it
is “animated by constitutional principles,” they contend that a violation of the major questions
doctrine is not a violation of the Constitution. Id. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that
Defendants’ actions amount to “a violation of separation of powers and Article I’s Vesting
Clause,” which present a “justiciable constitutional question squarely within this Court’s
Jurisdiction.” Reply 1.
Whether the major questions doctrine is merely a textual tool of statutory interpretation
or a substantive rule of constitutional magnitude is a “heady question” and “the subject of
ongoing debate.” Mayfield v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 117 F.4th 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2024). Some
justices on the Supreme Court view the doctrine as a canon of interpretation, while others view it
as “a clear-statement rule” with a constitutional dimension. Id. n.2 (citations omitted). Major
questions doctrine jurisprudence is thus pervaded by “both separation of powers principles and a
practical understanding of legislative intent.” Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 243
(2026) (quoting West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 723–24 (2022)).
By Plaintiffs’ count, “a majority of the Supreme Court agrees that the major questions
doctrine is . . . rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles.” Mot. 7 & n.7 (citations
omitted). But such tallying is unhelpfully reductive—it cobbles together the justices’ scattered
statements on the doctrine and obscures the nuances of the debate. See id. Indeed, Defendants
concede that the major questions doctrine “is animated by background constitutional principles,”
but still insist that it does not provide a vehicle for Plaintiffs to claim that the Big Bend Waivers
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amount to a “violation of the Constitution,” as required to confer jurisdiction in this case.
Resp. 6.
The constitutional view of the major questions doctrine is that “to sustain a claim that
Congress has granted them an extraordinary power, executive officials must identify clear
authority for that power.” Learning Res., Inc., 607 U.S. at 262 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). This
so-called “clear statement rule” derives from the core of the Constitution’s structure: “Article I
of the Constitution vests all federal legislative power in Congress, and Article II charges the
executive branch with seeing that Congress’s laws are faithfully executed.” Id. at 268. To be
sure, “federal legislation cannot anticipate every eventuality,” so members of Congress
“sometimes draft broad delegation language to account for this.” Id. at 270. “And when a
particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts
must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.” Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024). But when the executive arrogates to itself a major
legislative power without a clear statement from Congress, such an action is not within
constitutional limits. Learning Res., Inc., 607 U.S. at 278 (“Article I—a substantive value
external to statute—imposes a clear-statement rule when executive officials claim Congress has
afforded them an extraordinary authority.”) (cleaned up) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). In other
words, an assertion of extraordinary authority not clearly delegated violates a “constitutional
rule[]” implicit in Article I. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 740 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Proponents of the view that the major questions doctrine is instead a linguistic tool of
statutory construction contend that it is common sense to doubt that Congress would cede
extraordinary powers vaguely or lightly. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 514–16 (2023)
(Barrett, J., concurring). After all, sweeping authority is not usually communicated in general
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instructions. See id. The doctrine is akin to other commonsense canons of textual interpretation,
as embodied in the maxim that “Congress does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’” Id. at 518
(quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). Even under this view,
however, the Constitution is still relevant—demanding more clarity and specificity from a
delegation of major legislative authority than from run-of-the-mill delegations makes sense “in a
system of separated powers.” Id. at 515.
The Fifth Circuit has largely declined to weigh in on either side of the debate. See, e.g.,
Rest. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 120 F.4th 163, 174 n.9 (5th Cir. 2024) (taking “no position”
on whether the doctrine is “a substantive clear-statement rule” or “a purely linguistic canon of
construction”). But the constitutional view has obtained at least some limited recognition. See
VDX Distro, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 179 F.4th 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2026) (describing
the major questions doctrine as “closely related” to the nondelegation doctrine, which itself is
grounded in separation of powers) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 595 U.S.
109, 142 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).
While acknowledging that the law is unsettled, the Court rules that the major questions
doctrine is a constitutional clear statement rule grounded in separation of powers. The doctrine’s
fundamental notion, that courts should expect Congress to speak clearly when it delegates major
lawmaking authority to the executive, finds its genesis nowhere but the Constitution. Advocates
of the textual canon theory claim that it is common sense to demand greater clarity from
Congress when they delegate extraordinary powers. Biden, 600 U.S. at 513–16 (Barrett, J.,
concurring). But as Justice Gorsuch persuasively explains, common sense only counsels such a
demand in the context of this country’s constitutional structure. See Learning Res., Inc., 607
U.S. at 277 (“[T]his version of common sense does require us to account for ‘values’ entirely
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‘external to a statute,’ including specifically the ‘substan[ce]’ of Article I.”) (citation omitted).
In other words, the doctrine cannot be a canon of textual interpretation because there is nothing
intrinsic to the English language that warrants looking askance at a delegation of authority
simply because that authority is expansive. The source of the skepticism is not linguistic—it is
constitutional.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ major questions
doctrine claim because it alleges a Constitutional violation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note,
§ 102(c)(2)(A).
b. Clear Congressional Authorization
Turning to the merits, Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary exceeded her authority when
issuing the Big Bend Waivers. The “major-questions doctrine bars agencies from exploiting
ambiguous statutes to grant themselves broad new powers.” Tex. Tobacco Barn, L.L.C. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 180 F.4th 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted). It asks
(1) whether the power claimed by an executive agency is “of major economic and political
significance” and (2) whether the agency identified “‘clear’ congressional authorization to
sustain those actions.” Learning Res., 607 U.S. at 231, 280 (citing W. Virginia, 597 U.S. at 721).
Both parties appear to agree that the waiver of all legal requirements to construct a border wall in
the Big Bend Sector is of “major economic and political significance.” Mot. 9; see also Resp. 5–
8 (making no arguments on this issue). Thus, the Court must only decide whether the Secretary
had “clear congressional authorization” to issue the Big Bend Waivers.
For clear congressional authorization, it is not enough that “the statutory text might ‘[a]s
a matter of definitional possibilities’ have been read to delegate the asserted power.” Learning
Res., Inc., 607 U.S. at 243 (citation omitted). The court should be “skeptical” of “broad” or
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“uncertain” delegations of authority on major questions. Id. at 232, 242–43. And should
consider “other language within the statute,” read in the context of common sense and our
constitutional structure, to find limiting principles that cabin any potentially extraordinary
delegation of authority. See id. at 243.
Defendants’ main argument is that Congress “unequivocally authorized DHS to construct
barriers along the southern border and waive laws in furtherance thereof.” Resp. 6. And
certainly, the narrow provision of IIRIRA authorizing waivers speaks in broad language:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the
authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion,
determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under this
section . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note, § 102(c)(1). But at the outset, that same section of
IIRIRA—i.e., “this section”—states: “The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such
actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads . . . in the vicinity of
the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United
States.” Id. § 102(a). Reading these provisions together, the construction under “this section”
for which the Secretary is authorized to waive legal requirements includes only construction “to
deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry.” See id.
To this point, Defendants argue that “the Big Bend Sector is an area of high illegal entry
given the rates of illegal crossings and drug smuggling.” Resp. 8. In support, they contend that
over 89,000 individuals were apprehended attempting to enter the United States illegally in the
Big Bend Sector between 2021 and 2025. Id. at 11. Evidence submitted by Plaintiffs at the
Hearing showed this gross total to be undisputed. Pls.’ Ex. 2 (“Illegal Migrant Activity in Big
Bend Nat’l Park”).
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However, Plaintiffs presented additional evidence putting this number in context. The
evidence shows that the Big Bend Sector of the border was in “extraordinarily distant last place”
for apprehensions compared to the other six Southern border sectors. Hr’g Tr. 54:22–25. The
Big Bend Sector experienced both the lowest aggregate number of apprehensions and the lowest
number of apprehensions per mile of border. See Pls.’ Ex. 5 (“Suppl. Expert Report of Adam B.
Isacson”); see also Mot. Suppl. Ex. 1, at 12–42, ECF No. 55-3. While the Big Bend Sector
comprises over 25% of the U.S.-Mexico border, for the last thirty years, annual apprehensions in
the Big Bend Sector fluctuated between 0.3% and 2.2% of total border-wide apprehensions. See
Pls.’ Ex. 5. Even assuming that apprehensions reflect only a small portion of total illegal
entries,2 there was no evidence adduced at the hearing to suggest that there is a lower rate of
apprehensions in the Big Bend Sector compared to any other sector. Therefore, even if total
apprehensions are a poor proxy for total entries border-wide, the comparative data on
apprehensions is still probative of the relative number of entries, sector to sector.
As for narcotics, the evidence showed that “the Big Bend Sector accounts for one percent
of non-marijuana drug seizures and fifteen percent of all drug seizures in the . . . period for
which we have data, 2020 to 2026.” Hr’g Tr. 45:19–22. These totals include not only drugs
seized at or near the border or otherwise determined to have recently entered the country, but
also drugs seized while moving through the interior of the country. Id. at 46:8–23. The Big
Bend Sector includes several highway checkpoints, at which twenty-five to fifty percent of
border patrol drug seizures occur, nationally. Id. at 40:9–22, 46:2–4.
In sum, the key evidence—data regarding apprehensions and narcotics seizures—is
essentially undisputed. The parties’ disagreement boils down to how the “areas of high illegal
2 But see Hr’g Tr. 60:7–16 (Plaintiffs’ expert testifying that there was an 80% apprehension rate in the
Big Bend Sector); see also Pls.’ Ex. 3 (“Krumenaker FOIA Request”) (reporting the number of “Got
Away[s]” compared to the number of Apprehensions).
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entry” limitation on the Secretary’s waiver authority should be understood. Defendants point to
over 89,000 apprehensions in five years, and similarly large quantities of drugs seized in the Big
Bend Sector and the neighboring Del Rio Sector to argue that because these are “high” numbers,
Big Bend is an area of high illegal entry. Resp. 11–12. But this argument elides the comparative
dimension. The unrebutted evidence shows that the Big Bend Sector is, by far, the sector with
the lowest rate of migrant apprehensions along the entire U.S.-Mexico border, both in terms of
gross totals and apprehensions per mile of border.3 Therefore, if the Big Bend Sector is an area
of high illegal entry, so is every other sector, and the waiver authority would apply to the entire
U.S.-Mexico border. If that were the case, Congress could have simply authorized construction
“to deter illegal crossings.” Instead, it authorized construction “to deter illegal crossings in areas
of high illegal entry.”
Under the major questions doctrine, courts eschew interpretations that would render
limiting language meaningless. See, e.g., Learning Res., Inc., 607 U.S. at 231 (rejecting an
interpretation that would delegate “power to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs” considered
“[a]gainst [a] backdrop of clear and limited delegations” of tariff authority); Biden, 600 U.S. at
497 (rejecting an interpretation “that avoids any need to show compliance with the statutory
limitation on [the relevant secretary’s] authority”). For “high illegal entry” to impose any limit,
it must at least mean, “not the lowest rate of illegal entry.” And the evidence shows that the Big
Bend Sector has the lowest rate of illegal entry along the entire U.S.-Mexico border. Therefore,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their major questions doctrine
claim that the Big Bend Waivers were issued in excess of the Secretary’s authority.
3 The evidence also shows that the Big Bend Sector has comparatively low drug seizure rates, especially
for non-marijuana drug seizures. From the evidence presented during the Hearing, the Court finds it
likely that at least a significant portion of drug seizures in the Big Bend Sector represent drugs moving
through the interior of the country, not drugs entering the country from Mexico. See Hr’g Tr. 45:10–
48:10.
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2. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Harm
Having established a likelihood of success on the merits,4 Plaintiffs must also show a
substantial threat of irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. Nichols, 532 F.3d at 372. To
obtain preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show that they are “‘likely to suffer
irreparable harm,’ that is, harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.” Daniels Health
Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs argue that, absent a preliminary injunction, they will be irreparably harmed
because the Big Bend Sector is “one of the last great wilderness landscapes in the United States,”
Mot. 16, and “[a] later order cannot undo the harms resulting from Plaintiffs’ injuries,” Hr’g Tr.
170:8–9. At the October 2 Hearing, Plaintiffs’ witnesses described how construction has and
will restrict their livelihood, affect their spiritual, recreational and aesthetic interests, and impact
the natural ecosystem.
First, the evidence shows that border wall construction will restrict Plaintiffs’ livelihood.
Plaintiff Miller, a riverboat guide, described how barriers would prevent him from launching
boat tours on the Rio Grande. See Hr’g Tr. 96:7–21. Bill Guerra-Addington, a member of
Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity and a rancher whose family has lived on their land for at
least three generations, testified that construction would cut him off from the river and, with no
alternative water sources, prevent him from growing crops. See id. at 119:23–25, 132:19–
133:16. And Bernadette Devine, a member of Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity and an
educator and river guide, testified that the placement of waterborne barriers in the Rio Grande
would disrupt any river activity she planned to lead. Mot. Ex. 4 (“Devine Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF
No. 34-4; Hr’g Tr. 146:4–15.
4 The Court need not consider likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, because
the claim discussed suffices to demonstrate their entitlement to the injunctive relief sought. See, e.g.,
Arnold v. Barbers Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 479 F. Supp. 3d 511, 519 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (collecting cases).
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In addition, they highlight the harm to the natural ecosystem, including local wildlife.
Guerra-Addington testified that the influx of construction contractors’ vehicles in his area has
already caused a dramatic uptick in roadkill. Hr’g Tr. 125:4–16. And that if construction of
border barriers proceeded, both wildlife and livestock would be prevented from accessing the
river, both as a source of water and a migration route. See id. at 136:22–137:14. The Court also
heard extensive testimony regarding the effect of construction on the overall ecosystem. See
Hr’g Tr. 155:4–167:12. An ecologist and soil scientist testified that construction activities would
destroy the hydrologic function of the riparian habitat, impacting soil, vegetation, and wildlife in
and beyond the Big Bend Sector. Id. at 161:13–163:11. The associated vegetation loss, invasion
by non-native vegetation, and soil disruption would take decades to recover, if ever. Id. at
163:3–164:21.
Lastly, the witnesses also testified at length about their enjoyment of the wild spaces in
the Big Bend Sector, which they appreciate from spiritual, recreational, and aesthetic
perspectives. Miller testified that the appeal of his riverboat trips are so individuals can “escape
from modern life,” and that the wilderness “saved [his] life.” Id. at 81:20; 83:17–18. Devine
stated that she enjoyed viewing the dark skies in Big Bend, where she “can see by starlight,” as
well as go birding, which is “phenomenal along the river.” See id. at 142:9–143:2. Both
testified at length regarding how ground disturbing and construction activities have and will
continue to deteriorate the spiritual, recreational, and aesthetic value of the area. See, e.g., id. at
86:13–87:4, 145:17–147:19.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have established a substantial threat of irreparable harm. As
one witness neatly summarized it, the impact of construction on the land amounts to a “visible
scar that’ll never go away.” Hr’g Tr. 85:11.
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3. Balance of Harms and Public Interest
The third and fourth factors—the balance of the harms and the public interest,
respectively—“merge when the Government is the opposing party.” United States v. Texas, 97
F.4th 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009)).
As Plaintiffs have demonstrated, without an injunction, they and the public at large stand
to permanently lose protected wilderness that benefits tourism, recreation, farming, ranching,
spirituality, aesthetic sensibilities and education. On the other hand, if enjoined, Defendants only
suffer a temporary delay while this Court assesses the merits of the pending summary judgment
motions. Oct. 2, 2026, Order. Thus, the final factors, balance of harms and the public interest,
also weigh in favor of Plaintiffs. In sum, all four factors weigh in favor of issuing a preliminary
injunction.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 34, is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 14th day of October, 2026.
KATHLEEN CARDONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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