1:24-cv-00027•Allstate Insurance Company et al v. Toshner et al
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN DIVISION ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs v. DANIEL TOSHNER, LACEY DAVIES, et al., Defendants § § § § § § § § § No. 1:24-CV-00027-RP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO: THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Before the Court is Plaintiffs Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company’s (together, “Allstate”) motion for default judgment, Dkt. 70, Defendants Daniel Toshner, Lacey Davies, Michael Trinh (the “Individual Defendants”) motion to set aside default judgment, Dkt. 71, and all related briefing. Having reviewed the motions, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the District Judge grant Allstate’s motion for default judgment and deny the Individual Defendants’ motion to set aside default judgment. I. BACKGROUND Allstate initiated this insurance-fraud lawsuit based on the Individual Defendants, Roadside Response, LLC, Responsible Billing, LLC’s (the “Corporate Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 1 of 22
2 Defendants,” and with the Individual Defendants, “Defendants”) alleged submission of false reimbursement claims for hazardous material cleanups that were never performed, were unnecessary, or did not involve an Allstate insured. Dkt. 1, at 18-75. Allstate brought claims against the Defendants for: (1) violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.; (2) common-law fraud (under Texas, Florida, Ohio, and North Carolina law); (3) civil conspiracy (under Texas and Florida law); (4) violations of state RICO statutes (under Florida, Ohio, and North Carolina law); and (5) unjust enrichment (under Texas, Florida, and Ohio law). Id. at 75-114. Although Defendants initially appeared in this lawsuit, Dkt. 17, they failed to retain new counsel after their attorney withdrew and also failed to timely respond to discovery ordered by the Court. Dkts. 46; 57. After failing to show cause for their lack of compliance with Court orders requiring the Corporate Defendants to retain counsel and Defendants to comply with discovery orders, the Court entered default against Defendants. Dkts. 57; 59; 63. Toshner moved to set aside the default entered against him, which the Court denied. Dkts. 60; 69. Allstate then moved for default judgment against Defendants. Dkt. 70. The Individual Defendants again moved to set aside the default entered against them, arguing that their “extraordinary financial constraints and competing litigation demands” merit setting aside the entry of default and continuing this matter until the conclusion of other litigation in which they are Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 2 of 22
3 involved. Dkt. 71, at 4. II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts have the authority to enter a default judgment against a defendant that has failed to plead or otherwise defend itself. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(b). That said, “[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). A party is not entitled to a default judgment simply because the defendant is in default. Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). Rather, a default judgment is generally committed to the discretion of the district court. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). In considering Allstate’s motion, the Court must determine: (1) whether default judgment is procedurally warranted; (2) whether Allstate’s complaint sets forth facts sufficient to establish that it is entitled to relief; and (3) what form of relief, if any, Allstate should receive. United States v. 1998 Freightliner Vin #: 1FUYCZYB3WP886986, 548 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008); see also J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 809, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (using the same framework). III. DISCUSSION A. Default judgment is procedurally warranted. To determine whether entry of a default judgment is procedurally warranted, district courts in the Fifth Circuit consider six factors: “[1] whether material issues of fact are at issue, [2] whether there has been substantial prejudice, [3] whether the grounds for default are clearly established, [4] whether the default was caused by a Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 3 of 22
4 good faith mistake or excusable neglect, [5] the harshness of a default judgment, and [6] whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). On balance, the Lindsey factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against Defendants. Because Defendants have defaulted, there are no material facts in dispute. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact.”). Defendants’ failure to comply with court orders has ground the adversary process to a halt, prejudicing Allstate’s interest in pursuing its claims for relief. See J & J Sports, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 814 (“Defendants’ failure to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt, effectively prejudicing Plaintiff’s interests.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The grounds for default are established: Defendants were properly served and defaulted by failing to comply with multiple court orders. See Dkts. 63; 65; 69; Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The Court has previously found that Defendants’ default was not caused by a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect, and as such, the Court is not obliged to set aside the default on Defendants’ motion. Dkts. 65; 69. 1 The undersigned therefore finds that default 1 The Individual Defendants filed a motion to set aside the entry of default in response to Allstate’s motion for default judgment, raising the same arguments already considered by the undersigned in evaluating their prior motion to set aside. Dkts. 65; 71. Based on the same reasons explained in the undersigned’s recommendation on the prior motion to set aside the entry of default, Dkt. 65, at 4-7, the undersigned recommends that the District Judge deny the Individual Defendants’ pending motion to set aside the entry of default against them. Dkt. 71. Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 4 of 22
5 judgment is procedurally warranted.2 B. Allstate’s complaint is sufficient to establish its right to relief. Default judgment is proper only if the well-pleaded factual allegations in Allstate’s complaint establish a valid cause of action. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. By defaulting, a defendant “admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact.” Id. In determining whether factual allegations are sufficient to support a default judgment, the Fifth Circuit employs the same analysis used to determine sufficiency under Rule 8. Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The factual allegations in the complaint need only “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Here, Allstate moved for default judgment on its claims against the Defendants for violations of federal and state RICO statutes, fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. Dkt. 70-1, at 10-16. The undersigned will assess each of 2 Moreover, there is no evidence that any of the Individual Defendants is a minor or incompetent person, or currently a member of the United States military. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); 50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(1). Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 5 of 22
6 Allstate’s causes of action in turn. 1. Allstate has sufficiently pleaded violations of RICO under state and federal law. Allstate brought RICO claims against Defendants under federal and state law. Dkt. 1, at 75-83; 88-92, 102-05, 112-13. The elements of claims brought under the Ohio, Florida, and North Carolina RICO statutes are the same as for those brought under their federal counterpart. Collier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 5:12CV2937, 2013 WL 3715699, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2013) (“The [Ohio Pattern of Corrupt Activities Act] is modeled after the federal RICO statute, and courts have found that the elements for an OPCA violation are the same as those for a federal RICO claim.” (citations omitted)); Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG, No. 13-23998-CIV, 2017 WL 11103938, at *9 n.7 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2017) (“The elements of a RICO action based on Florida state law are the same as those of a RICO action arising under federal law.”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. S K Everhart Inc., No. 1:00CV00260, 2003 WL 21788858, at *3 n.1 (M.D.N.C. July 31, 2003) (“Because the North Carolina RICO statute mirrors the federal RICO statute, they will be considered simultaneously.”). Thus, the undersigned will evaluate Allstate’s state and federal RICO claims together. To state a federal civil RICO claim under any of the relevant subsections, a plaintiff must adequately allege “(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.” Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 122 Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 6 of 22
7 (5th Cir. 1996)). Allstate has sufficiently stated its RICO claims against Defendants brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which prohibits “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” First, Allstate sufficiently alleges that Defendants constitute persons under the statute. Dkt. 1, at 6-11, 67-75; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (defining “person” as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property”). Second, Allstate sufficiently alleges that Defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by sending “hundreds, if not thousands” of fraudulent invoices to Allstate through the U.S. mail system based on unnecessary or nonexistent accident scene cleanup work for the purpose of inducing Allstate to make insurance payments to Defendants. Dkts. 1, at 4-5, 18-21, 67-75; 70-2, at 17; 70-4; Word of Faith, 90 F.3d at 122 (“‘Racketeering activity’ consists of two or more predicate offenses, defined by the statute to include acts violating federal wire or mail fraud statutes.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961)); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 648 (2008) (“Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO[.]”); Sharp v. Bandera Cnty., No. SA-09-CA-0676-H, 2010 WL 11602720, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (“To prove mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) the plaintiff must show (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) which involves the use of the mails, (3) for the purpose of Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 7 of 22
8 executing the scheme.” (citing United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). Allstate also complied with Rule 9(b) in alleging the mail fraud on which it bases its RICO claims by delineating “each defendant’s contribution to the fraud” as members of the scheme and “the specific circumstances constituting the overall fraudulent scheme.” Dkt. 1, at 6-11; Garcia v. Lion Mexico Consol., LP, No. 5:15-CV- 1116-DAE, 2017 WL 9479195, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2017) (finding Rule 9(b) met because in the context of RICO claims “the rule ‘only requires the plaintiff to delineate, with adequate particularity, the specific circumstances constituting the overall fraudulent scheme.’” (citing Cypress/Spanish Ft. I, LP v. Prof. Serv. Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 698, 711-12 (N.D. Tex. 2011))). Allstate also included factual allegations and presented evidence giving rise to a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent by Defendants. Dkt. 1, at 21-75; 70-2, at 12-16; 70-3; 70-4; Ranieri v. AdvoCare Int’l, LP, 336 F. Supp. 3d 701, 716 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (“[W]hile intent can be averred generally ... a RICO mail fraud averment must nonetheless provide some ‘factual basis for conclusory allegations of intent, which must, in turn, give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.’” (citation omitted)). Finally, Allstate has sufficiently alleged that the Defendants engaged in the racketeering activities “connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of” either Roadside Response or Responsible Billing, each of which constitute an enterprise as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (defining “enterprise” to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”); Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 8 of 22
9 Word of Faith, 90 F.3d at 122. “[A] RICO person must be distinct from the RICO enterprise.” Bridgewater v. Double Diamond-Delaware, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:09-CV- 1758-B, 2010 WL 1875617, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2010) (citing Abraham, 480 F.3d at 357). In Count I of the complaint, Allstate brought a RICO claim against the Individual Defendants and Responsible Billing LLC, with Roadside Response LLC as the qualifying enterprise. Dkt. 1, at 75. In Count II, Allstate brought the same claim against the Individual Defendants and Roadside Response LLC, with Responsible Billing LLC as the qualifying enterprise. Id. at 79. The “persons” and “enterprises” relevant to each of Allstate’s RICO claims are thus sufficiently distinct to maintain these claims. Allstate has also adequately stated its conspiracy claims brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which makes it unlawful for any person to violate any other provision of that subsection, including 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To state a claim for a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), a plaintiff must plead that (1) two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense, and (2) the defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense. Chaney v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 2010). Here, Allstate’s allegations that Defendants “purposely designed and executed this scheme with the express aim of eliciting payments of automobile insurance proceeds from Allstate” are sufficient to plead its RICO conspiracy claims. St. Gregory Cathedral Sch. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 6:12-CV-739, 2015 WL 11121531, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2015) (finding “[p]laintiffs ha[d] also sufficiently pleaded a RICO conspiracy claim” by alleging that defendants “agreed to carry out a pattern Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 9 of 22
10 of racketeering activities”); see also Abraham, 480 F.3d at 357 (“Plaintiffs specifically alleged that the Defendants entered into an agreement and that each agreed to commit at least two predicate acts of racketeering. These allegations are specific enough to state a claim that the Defendants conspired to violate § 1962(c).”). The undersigned recommends that the District Judge grant Allstate’s motion for default judgment as to its RICO claims. 2. Allstate has sufficiently stated its fraud claims against Defendants. Next, Allstate brought claims for fraud against Defendants under Texas, Florida, Ohio and North Carolina law based on their submission of fraudulent insurance claims to Allstate. Dkt. 1, at 83-84, 92-93, 100-101, 105-107. Under Texas law, the elements of common-law fraud are: (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) which was false, and (3) which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of the truth, (4) which was intended to be acted on, (5) which was relied upon, and (6) which caused injury. Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990)). The elements of fraud claims under Ohio, North Carolina, and Florida law are the same as those required under Texas law. Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgmt., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ohio 2010); Williamson v. Prime Sports Mktg., LLC, 101 F.4th 302, 314 (4th Cir. 2024) (applying North Carolina law); Myers v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1181 (M.D. Fla. 2021). Common-law fraud claims brought in federal court must comply with the heightened pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Dorsey v. Portfolio Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 10 of 22
11 Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[S]tate-law fraud claims are subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”). Rule 9(b) requires the complaint to set forth “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the events at issue. ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Grp. v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Allstate has sufficiently pleaded its fraud claims against Defendants by alleging that Defendants knowingly submitted invoices with material misrepresentations regarding vehicle fluid spills at accident scenes, which Allstate relied on in paying out insurance claims to its detriment. Dkt. 1, at 23-24, 28-36, 37- 43, 44-45, 46-47, 49-50, 53-63, 72-75; Ibe, 836 F.3d at 525; Volbers-Klarich, 929 N.E.2d at 440; Williamson, LLC, 101 F.4th at 314; Myers, 564 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. Moreover, Allstate’s allegations of fraud comply with Rule 9(b) by identifying “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the submission of fraudulent invoices, and by outlining the role of each Defendant in the fraudulent scheme. Dkts. 1, at 6-11; 23- 24, 28-36, 37-43, 44-45, 46-47, 49-50, 53-63, 72-75; 70-2, at 14-16; ABC Arbitrage, 291 F.3d at 350; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Benhamou, 190 F. Supp. 3d 631, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that plaintiff had stated claims for common-law fraud against Defendants in addition to RICO claims based on mail fraud where plaintiff “identified the speaker, time, place, and content of fraudulent misrepresentations”). The undersigned recommends that the District Judge grant Allstate’s motion for default judgment as Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 11 of 22
12 to its fraud claims against Defendants. 3. Allstate has sufficiently stated its claims for civil conspiracy against Defendants. Allstate brought civil conspiracy claims against Defendants under Texas and Florida law. Dkt. 1, at 85-86, 94-95. Under Texas law, civil conspiracy is a “derivative tort,” meaning that it “survives or fails alongside” “some underlying tort or other illegal act.” Agar Corp. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 140-41 (Tex. 2019). The elements of civil conspiracy are “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result.” Id. The damages alleged must be caused by the underlying wrongful act, not the conspiracy to commit it. Id. at 142. Under Florida law, a cause of action for civil conspiracy requires; (1) an agreement between two or more parties; (2) to perform an unlawful act; (3) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of acts done under the conspiracy. See United Tech Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). Allstate has sufficiently stated its claims for civil conspiracy against Defendants under Texas and Florida law. First, Allstate alleges that Defendants entered in an agreement to perpetrate an insurance fraud scheme. Dkt. 1, at 85-86, 92-93. Allstate also alleges that Defendants took overt actions in furtherance of the conspiracy by sending false invoices through the U.S. mail, which as explained above, constitutes the independently unlawful acts of mail fraud and RICO violations. Id. at 23-24, 28-34, 41-43, 46-47, 49-50, 53-55, 57-59; Humana Pharmacy Sols., Inc. v. Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 12 of 22
13 Michelin, No. 2081361CIVCANNONREIN, 2021 WL 3403950, at *8 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2021) (finding plaintiffs had stated claim for civil conspiracy under Florida law where plaintiffs had stated claims for conspiracy under federal RICO statute); Benhamou, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 664-65 (concluding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for common-law conspiracy under Texas law where the court already determined that the plaintiffs stated a claim for a RICO conspiracy). Finally, Allstate alleged that it was injured by the conspiracy because it paid insurance claims to Defendants based on the fraudulent invoices. Dkts. 1, at 85-86, 92-93; 70-2, at 19. The undersigned recommends that the District Judge grant Allstate’s motion for default judgment as to its civil conspiracy claims against Defendants. 4. Allstate has sufficiently stated its claims for unjust enrichment against Defendants. Finally, Allstate brought claims of unjust enrichment against Defendants under Texas, Florida, and Ohio law. Dkt, 1, at 84-85, 95, 101-102. For each of these claims, Allstate alleges that Defendants wrongfully obtained and sought insurance benefits from Allstate, and that allowing Defendants to retain the payments “would violate fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience[.]” Id. at 85, 95, 102. Under Texas law, “unjust enrichment allows recovery ‘when one person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage.’” Berrocal v. Nissan Motors, No. 5:25-CV-00453-JKP, 2025 WL 2988465, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2025) (quoting Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)). An unjust-enrichment claim brought under Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 13 of 22
14 Florida law requires the following four elements: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the benefit; (3) the defendant accepted or retained the benefit conferred; and (4) it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying fair value for it. Merle Wood & Assocs., Inc. v. Trinity Yachts, LLC, 714 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Finally, an unjust-enrichment claim brought under Ohio law requires a plaintiff to prove that “(1) she conferred a benefit upon the defendants; (2) they had knowledge of that benefit; and (3) it would be unjust for the defendants to retain the benefit without compensation.” Lemmon v. Ayres, 517 F. App’x 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2013). Here, Allstate has sufficiently pleaded its claims for unjust enrichment by alleging that Defendants obtained the benefit of insurance payments from Allstate through an insurance-fraud scheme and that it would be unfair for Defendants to retain the payments obtained through fraud. Dkts. 1, at 68-70, 72-1, at 16-20; Berrocal, 2025 WL 2988465, at *9; Merle Wood, 714 F.3d at 1237; Lemmon, 517 F. App’x at 427. The undersigned recommends that the District Judge grant Allstate’s motion for default judgment on its claims for unjust enrichment. * * * Allstate’s factual allegations and the record before the undersigned are enough to raise its right to relief above a speculative level as to its claims against Defendants. Wooten, 788 F.3d at 498. The undersigned finds that default judgment is substantively warranted as to an entry of judgment on Allstate’s causes of action for Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 14 of 22
15 RICO violations, fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. C. Allstate is entitled to the relief it seeks in the form of a declaration and money damages. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) states that “[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). In other words, the relief prayed for in a complaint defines the scope of relief available on default judgment. Id. A defendant’s default concedes the truth of the allegations of the complaint concerning the defendant’s liability but not damages. United States v. Shipco Gen. Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). In its motion, Allstate seeks a declaration confirming that Allstate has no legal obligation to pay for claims submitted by Defendants and also asks for monetary damages. Dkt. 70-1, at 16-19. 1. Allstate is entitled to its requested declaration that it has no legal obligation to pay for claims submitted by Defendants. Allstate seeks a declaration from this Court, under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), stating that Allstate “shall have no legal obligation to make any further payment(s) on any claim(s) submitted to Allstate by Roadside Response and/or Responsible Billing on behalf of Roadside Response.” Dkt. 1, at 4, 107. The DJA provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The DJA “does not create a substantive cause of action” and “is merely a vehicle that allows a party Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 15 of 22
16 to obtain an early adjudication of an actual controversy arising under other substantive law.” Metropcs Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile USA, LP, No. 3:08-CV-165- D, 2009 WL 3075205, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 25, 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The DJA is an authorization and not a command, and allows federal courts broad, but not unfettered, discretion to grant or refuse declaratory judgment. Id. “When considering a declaratory judgment action, a district court must engage in a three-step inquiry.” Orix Credit All., Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000). The three steps involve determining: (1) “whether an ‘actual controversy’ exists between the parties to the action”; (2) “whether [the Court] has the ‘authority’ to grant declaratory relief in the case presented”; and (3) “how to exercise its broad discretion to decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment action.” Id. (citations omitted). First, the undersigned finds that an “actual controversy” exists between Allstate and Defendants. “As a general rule, an actual controversy exists where ‘a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality’ [exists] between parties having adverse legal interests.” Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. v. Unknown Tr. of Revocable Trust-8407, No. 13-CV-412, 2014 WL 2091257, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2014) (quoting Orix Credit All., 212 F.3d at 896). Here, Allstate alleges that Defendants have and continue to submit fraudulent insurance claims for services that were unnecessary, not performed, or unrelated to the underlying vehicle accident; thus, there is an “actual controversy” between the parties. Dkt. 1, at 2-5, 21- Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 16 of 22
17 75, 107. “Under the second element of the Orix Credit Alliance test, a district court does not have authority to consider the merits of a declaratory-judgment action when: (1) the declaratory defendant previously filed a cause of action in state court; (2) the state case involved the same issues as those in federal court; and (3) the district court is prohibited from enjoining the state proceedings under [28 U.S.C. §] 2283.” Fid. & Guar. Life Ins., No. 13-CV-412-PRM, 2014 WL 2091257, at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2014) (quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. Holmes Cnty., 343 F.3d 383, 388 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted)). Here, nothing in the record suggests the existence of a similar, parallel state-court action3 relating to Allstate’s causes of action in this case, and as such, the Court has the authority to grant declaratory relief here. Finally, when determining whether to exercise or decline jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, a district court should consider several important factors, particularly: (1) “whether a state action is pending in which all of the matters in controversy may be fully litigated”; (2) “whether the plaintiff filed the declaratory- action suit in anticipation of a suit by the defendant”; (3) “whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit”; (4) “whether possible inequities exist in allowing the declaratory judgment plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums”; (5) “whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses”; (6) “whether retaining the case in federal court will serve judicial economy”; and (7) “whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state 3 While Defendants are involved in litigation in California, that case involves claims brought by a different insurance carrier on behalf of the State of California. See Dkt. 72-1. Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 17 of 22
18 judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is pending.” Id. (citing Sherwin– Williams, 343 F.3d at 388). After reviewing the record, the undersigned finds these factors to weigh in favor of granting Allstate’s requested declaratory judgment. As noted above, there is no evidence of a parallel state-court action that is related to this case. Nor is there any evidence that Allstate filed this lawsuit in anticipation of a future suit or that Allstate engaged in forum-shopping in filing its lawsuit before this Court. Further, fairness and judicial efficiency counsel in favor of granting a declaratory judgment confirming that Allstate has no legal obligation to make payments on Defendants’ fraudulent claims. The undersigned recommends that the District Judge exercise his discretion to enter a declaratory judgment against Defendants. 2. Allstate is entitled to its requested damages in the amount of $1,891,947.30. Allstate requests damages the amount of $1,891,947.30 4 representing “threefold” the payments it made to Defendants based on their submission of fraudulent claims to Allstate. Dkt. 1, at 4, 75; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (stating that “any person injured in his business” under section 1962 “shall recover threefold the damages he sustains”). The movant bears the burden to bring forth competent evidence in support of the damages it seeks under a default judgment. United States 4 Allstate notes “[f]or purposes of clarity” that it “is not seeking duplicative monetary damages pursuant to its state law claims, as all damages associated therewith are otherwise encompassed by its federal causes of action; making any such calculation relative to these underlying causes of action moot.” Dkt. 70-1, at 19. Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 18 of 22
19 IRS v. Precision Craft Cabinets, Inc., No. SA-19-CA-1110-DAE, 2020 WL 13421127, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020), R. & R. adopted, 2020 WL 13421126 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020). When a party seeks a default judgment, damages ordinarily may not be awarded “without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.” United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979). But if the amount of damages can be “determined with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents” and a hearing would reveal no pertinent information, “the court need not jump through the hoop of an evidentiary hearing.” James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that Rule 55(b) “gives the [district] judge wide latitude in determining whether such a hearing will be beneficial”). The undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary in this case because Allstate presented sufficient evidence in support of its request for treble damages under section 1964(c). In support of its request for damages, Allstate presented evidence demonstrating the amount and date of each of the payments it made to Defendants based on the fraudulent claims, which total $630,649.10. Dkt. 1- 3; 70-2, at 19-20; 70-3. Because “treble damages are mandatorily assessed upon a finding of liability under RICO,” Allstate is thus entitled to its requested damages of $1,891,947.30. D’Arcy Petroleum, LLC v. Mink, No. 3:19-CV-02770-M-BT, 2021 WL 5218223, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2021), R. & R. adopted, 2021 WL 5213035 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). The undersigned recommends that the Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 19 of 22
20 District Judge grant Allstate its requested damages of $1,891,947.30. 3. Allstate should receive post-judgment interest, but not prejudgment interest. Allstate also requests prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Dkt. 1, at 108- 113. “Federal law governs the allowance of prejudgment interest when a cause of action arises from a federal statute.” In re Texas Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288 (5th Cir. 1994)). But even where prejudgment interest is available, “the decision to award such interest rests within the sound discretion of the district court[.]” Sellers v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 839 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit applies a two-step analysis to determine whether an award of prejudgment interest is within a court’s discretion: (1) whether the federal act that creates the cause of action precludes such an award; and (2) whether such an award furthers the congressional policies of the federal act. Id. Here, “[t]he RICO statute does not provide for the recovery of prejudgment interest, and federal courts have generally refused to award prejudgment interest on claims which provide for multiple damages.” La. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 811 (E.D. La. 1986). Because “Allstate’s recovery of treble damages sufficiently offset the loss it suffered from being deprived of the use of its money caused by the fraud,” the undersigned recommends that the District Judge deny Allstate’s request for prejudgment interest. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 802 F.3d 665, 679 (5th Cir. 2015) (concluding that district judge did not abuse its discretion “in relying on the extracompensatory nature Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 20 of 22
21 of RICO treble damages in denying prejudgment interest.”). Federal law applies to the award of post-judgment interest. See Travelers Ins. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int’l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 689 (5th Cir. 1989)). In particular, “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any monetary judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Therefore, Allstate should receive post-judgment interest on the entire amount of the final judgment as calculated under § 1961. IV. RECOMMENDATION In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Judge GRANT Allstate’s motion for default judgment, Dkt. 70. Specifically, the District Judge should enter default judgment against Defendants. The District Judge should further issue a declaration stating that Allstate “shall have no legal obligation to make any further payment(s) on any claim(s) submitted to Allstate by Roadside Response and/or Responsible Billing on behalf of Roadside Response.” The District Judge should finally award Allstate damages in the amount of $1,891,947.30, as well as post-judgment interest. The undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY the Individual Defendants’ motion to set aside the entry of default, Dkt. 71. The referral of this case to the Magistrate Judge should now be canceled. V. WARNINGS The parties may file objections to this report and recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 21 of 22
22 which objections are being made. The District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen days after the party is served with a copy of the report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations in the report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). SIGNED December 15, 2025. DUSTIN M. HOWELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Case 1:24-cv-00027-RP Document 73 Filed 12/15/25 Page 22 of 22
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